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'Identity, Nationalism and the State System: the Case of Iraqi Kurdistan'
Sophia I. Wanche, PhD Thesis, Durham University, 2002
Abstract
This thesis looks at the internal and external dynamics of the politics of the self-
ruling area of Iraqi Kurdistan, arguing that internal forces often carry equal, and
sometimes greater weight than do external influences when it concerns Northern
Iraq. Following a modern political history of Iraqi Kurdistan, which sets the
context for the forthcoming analyses, the origins and development of the state
system and its underlying key concepts are examined. The complex political
phenomena of nation and nationalism are analysed and the latter classified as
evaluations and classifications of Kurdish nationalism later follow. Whether or
not the state system is a form of political organisation that is transitional in
nature is highly relevant when anticipating the future of the Kurds. The view that
globalisation could render the nation-state redundant is not endorsed, but the
'crisis of the state' clearly affects Kurdish aspirations towards statehood - issues
that are accounted for when discussing the prospects for the establishment of a
Kurdish state in the twenty-first century.
The impact of Iraqi Kurdish socio-political identity on the political development
is furthermore subject to analysis. The 'class-divided' society of Kurdistan is
considered, as is the major issue of tribalism, together with religion and
language as political factors. These components provide the machinery of
identity-building, and significantly account for the multiplicity of Kurdish
identity, which impacts heavily on the political development. An understanding
of these processes is essential when placing Iraqi Kurdistan in regional and
international contexts. On the regional level, policies by the major regional
powers in order to prevent the Kurds from asserting themselves are set in the
context of the previous analyses, as are the policies of powerful international
actors such as the European Union, the USA and the United Nations. Finally, the
main themes are revisited and future prospects of the Kurds of Northern Iraq
discussed, concluding that only a solution to the wider question of Iraq can end
the uncertainty currently surrounding the future of Iraqi Kurdistan.
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PART A
The Historical-Political Context
1
Introduction
In the turbulent aftermath of the Kuwait War in the early 1990s, an autonomous
Kurdish entity was set up in Northern Iraq through the efforts of the international
community. The internal and external dynamics of this self-ruling area and its
political development is the heart of this study — a central issue on the political
scene of the Middle East on which little has been written. The interaction of
internal and external dynamics shaping developments in Iraqi Kurdistan is
instrumental in understanding the complexities of Kurdish politics. This thesis
will show that internal forces often carry equal, and sometimes greater, weight
than do external influences when it concerns the political development of
Northern Iraq.
The mode of thought driving this study suggests that the political development
of Northern Iraq is propelled by an array of issues, such as class, tribalism,
religion and language that all are or have become politicised. A broad aim with
the study is to examine why Kurdish statehood (with the focus squarely on Iraqi
Kurdistan) is likely to remain elusive, which is the underlying assumption. In
order to satisfy that objective one needs to look at the numerous aspects of
nationalism, the international state system and the nature of Kurdish nationalism:
analyses, which in turn highlight the necessity of addressing and evaluating the
impact of the socio-political identity on the political process. The main factors
determining the multifaceted Kurdish identity are in turn influenced by forces
external to Iraqi Kurdistan, whose behaviour are largely determined by
geopolitical interests.
Such an approach poses research questions such as: What is the capacity, if any,
of the long-standing international state system to accommodate into its structure
a possible Kurdish state? What is the relation between class conflict and national
interest in Iraqi Kurdistan and how does it relate to the tribal structure of
Kurdish society? Have local and tribal loyalties been replaced by integrative
nationalist feelings? Is religion a mobilising force in Iraqi Kurdish politics?
2
What is the effect on the political discourse in the area of self-rule of the absence
of a universal Kurdish language? What impact does the multiplicity of Kurdish
identity have on Iraqi Kurdish politics? Which role do internal forces play in
determining external behaviour?
The mainstream of political thought does not offer any theories providing the
scope for a fuller understanding of Kurdish society and politics, which prompts
this thesis to argue for the need of a 'hybrid' and multilevel approach. This will
be illustrated through an in-depth survey of the case of Iraqi Kurdistan,
incorporating aspects of political anthropology and sociology into its
politics/international relations framework. Such an approach will also involve
building upon the works of many distinguished scholars; developing ideas into
more concrete thoughts, and linking notions and concepts that may not
previously have been brought together. The analytical framework encompasses
diverse and ambiguous concepts such as nation, nation-state, socio-political
identity, among others, with a view to offer an understanding of Kurdish internal
dynamics before adding to the equation the influence of external factors.
Conclusions will be drawn from past and current trends as well as from the
author's own understanding of the intertwining of the concepts of identity,
nationalism and the state system, for likely future scenarios.
Throughout the thesis new interpretations of existing data complement new
sources of information, and relevant aspects of many different theoretical
viewpoints will have been taken into account. As constituting the thesis' main
theoretical framework, the discussion on nationalism incorporates work of many
prominent scholars, but few theories have been wholly appropriate here, as the
current topic in several respects challenges existing theories. Only a range of
diverse and contrasting theories are deemed to constitute a good basis from
which to examine and describe the specific circumstances characterising
Northern Iraq. Such theory-building provides for a 'hybrid theory' to be
generated through the process of research.
As already suggested, this subject matter necessitates research into several
different disciplines of social science. In addition to the obvious political
3
scientists, views and theories of sociologists, historians and anthropologists are
well represented. However important some of them may be, this study is
anchored in the discipline of political science on which basis the research
questions will be answered, but it contrasts with conventional approaches that
are fixed firmly within a narrow disciplinary focus.
The sources utilised have been various and wide-ranging: the large literature that
already exists in the many fields has been heavily consulted. Apart from library
services in the UK, extensive specialist library searches have been carried out
mainly at the Kurdish library in Stockholm, Sweden,' and at the Institute for
Political and International Studies in Tehran, Iran.
A second source is interviews, the most appropriate method for this type of
research. It has taken the shape of structured, formal interviews as regards
individuals in power-positions, whereas the approach to interviewees in lower
hierarchy has been that of semi-structured dialogues — often these have been
cases where listening has proved to be of greater importance than questioning.
Interviews have taken place in many different places and countries, in formal as
well as informal settings.
The fieldwork has been carried out in phases and the nature of the topic
researched necessitated a considerable degree of flexibility. Due to political
restrictions, certain types of fieldwork were made difficult, and research has had
to be done in a diplomatic way so as not to create tension. Moreover, literal field
familiarisation, i.e. seeing the landscape, the setting of Kurdish politics, provided
a better understanding of the region and its people in view of the fact that
learning how to interpret certain data proved to be as important as data collection
itself. Indeed, personal observations revealed facts that could often be useful for
interpreting information gained. A great deal of political observations were also
I . The significance of Stockholm's Kurdish library should not be underestimated. In the 1980s
Sweden emerged as one of the leading countries hosting Kurdish literature. The existence of
some hundred active Kurdish writers, numerous publishers coupled with a number of Kurdish
magazines and journals make Stockholm an important city of Kurdish literature. This national
Kurdish library was established in the Swedish capital in the autumn of 1997. Material is found
in the major regional languages Arabic, Persian Turkish, as well as English, French, German,
Swedish, Russian, but perhaps most importantly, Sorani and Kermanji.
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made during a six-month period in Tehran in the spring of 2001 in the capacity
of working at the Embassy of Sweden in a multi-national diplomatic
environment.
The author has been able to access information and compile data in several
languages. Of particular importance has been the use of regional languages for
unstructured interviews and consulting conversations. Due attention has been
paid to bias inevitably present in opinions of certain interviewees. A cautious
position has been adopted towards the political orientation of some sources, so
as to minimise any impact on the thesis' impartiality. With such a value-laden
topic as the Kurdish question, particular efforts have gone into trying to establish
a balanced account that would address information from many different quarters.
At the outset one issue of terminology will be remarked upon. In many accounts
of the region, autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan is frequently referred to as an enclave.
Such terminology is not employed in this thesis, since an enclave is in reality a
piece of territory, which belongs to a state or a people, and, crucially, is
surrounded by that of another. Iraqi Kurdistan's area of self-rule is admittedly a
relatively small territory belonging to the Kurds and Iraq, but another people or
state does not fully surround it. In comparison, the area of Nagorno-Karabakh —
the hotly disputed territory constituting Armenian people fully inside and
surrounded by Azerbaijan — is a 'genuine' enclave. In the context of autonomous
Northern Iraq, it is noteworthy that the UN has never employed the word
enclave to denote the Kurdish areas under its control. The word enclave has
connotations that affect the sovereignty of Iraq, and in the wake of the Kuwait
War there were indeed suggestions about the possibility of establishing enclaves
on Iraqi territory, discussions that, however, had no lasting influence.
Moreover, it has to be pointed out that throughout the thesis an important
distinction will be made between the Kurdish problem and the Kurdish question.
The former refers to 'the domestic challenge' that the Kurdish nationalist
movement represents to the regional countries, whereas the latter refers to 'the
5
trans-state aspects of the Kurdish nationalist movemene.2
The thesis has been divided into four parts. Firstly, the context is provided in
part A, followed by part B's analyses of nation, nationalism and identity. Part C
deals with Iraqi Kurdistan in the regional and international state system, while
the final part D contains conclusions and prospects.
Just as it is important to approach the region afresh, it would be a mistake to do
so by disregarding the past. A political-historical account has to begin by noting
the fact that the centre of the Kurdish national movement has never been
permanent but has shifted between mainly Turkey, Iran and Iraq, to where the
political climate has appeared most favourable and allowed the greatest degree
of pro-Kurdish activity. Following the establishment of the Republic of Iraq by
General Qasim's 1958 coup d'etat, the Kurdish struggle returned to Iraq after
previously residing in Iran with the short-lived Mahabad Republic, created in
1946. 3 The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy was to be followed by more
coups in the 1960s Iraq, and not until 1968, a certain political stability was
achieved with the re-entry of the Baath Party as the ruling elite. Marking the
beginning of an uneasy relationship, the decisive coming to power by the
Baathists is where this political history of Iraqi Kurdistan will commence, after
the historical background to the permanently troubled relationship between
Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan has been briefly outlined. In following the
evolution of Baath-Kurdish relations up until the 1990s, and the developments
up to the present day, the context is provided for the forthcoming analyses.
The second chapter aims to examine the nature of the concepts of nation and
state and the ideology behind them, nationalism - itself a large and complicated
topic and the depth of which will be considered only insofar as its direct
relevance to the subject studied is unequivocal. The complicated (political)
phenomena of nation and nationalism have attracted the interest of a wide
variety of scholars, and explanations to the phenomena range from a God-given
2 . Olson (1998a), p. 11.
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division of society to social-psychological constructs. It will be argued that the
nation denotes a group of people from the same region of origin who share a
common history and culture and often also speak the same language. It is held
together with the state — the main political authority within a defined territory —
by the ideology of nationalism, a theory assuming that the citizenry of a nation-
state all belong to the same nation. Straightforward as it may appear, these
notions are far from clear-cut and simple. These political phenomena and
constructs will be assessed and the key concepts, generalised and specified
theories will then be used to analyse and explain the case of Kurdish
nationalism.
A large number of the theories available on the subject are based on the
European experience: the relevant ones among those ideas will be outlined and,
if needed, edited for application to the Kurdish case. Important to point out is
that it was the Europeans who played the leading role in the creation of the
international state system, the operative framework for all contemporary (and
potential future) states. It is argued here that in order to attempt an analysis of
the future shape and form of the state system (and the possible place of a
Kurdish state within it), it is necessary to outline that system's earlier history.
The discussion is based on the assumption that the Kurdish modern nation is
founded on pre-existing ethnic ties (the emphasis of which is also likely to have
served to increase the popular appeal of the nationalist ideology). Much due to
the active denial of their nation by surrounding states and dominant nations,
Kurdish nationalist intellectuals and politicians gradually realised the need to
engage in efforts at nation-building4 or 'nation-strengthening'. In view of the
general history of the Kurds, the task of advanced nation- and potential state-
building would appear to be more difficult and complex than in many other parts
of the world. The nation-building efforts in Iraq, for instance, have entailed the
3. For an account of this, see Archie Roosevelt Jr. 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad' in The
Middle East Journal, July 1947, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 247-260 and Willim Eagleton (1963), The
Kurdish Republic of 1946, London: Oxford University Press.
4. This term refers to the emergence of a sense of common national sentiments, loyalty to a
homeland, as opposed to state-building, denoting the creation of political institutions.
7
simultaneous 'nation-destroying' of the Kurds. 5 However, from a different
perspective the Kurds do not face a central difficulty of nation-building as did
many state elites in much of Africa and Asia, namely that of lacking a common
history and culture. The shared historical experiences were there in the collective
memory and the existence of an ethnic core in no doubt, which could
theoretically have provided for a smooth nation-building process, which in
practice, however, proved to be unattainable.
Chapter three deals with internal factors and its external manifestations.
Religion, language, tribe and class are complex dynamic processes of
interrelationship, not to be regarded as irrelevant to nationalism, quite the
contrary. One should, however, point out the difference between considering
them inherent to nationalism and specifying the elements in these social factors
that are useful for the current discussion, in which the phenomenon of
nationalism plays a large role. Each of these issues constitute important aspects
of Kurdish socio-political identity, and cannot be isolated from each other as
they are all theoretically and/or politically related to one another. There is a
sense of mutual interconnection between the sections. No particular theory
provides an adequate account of the development of contemporary Kurdish
class, language, tribal and religious relations and it has been necessary to
combine and extend existing theories in order to provide such an account. For
instance, religious, ethnic, and linguistic sentiments often coexist with tribal
identity in rural areas, just as tribal mentality influences and reinforces ethnic
belonging.
Throughout Kurdish history, the national struggle has taken precedence over any
class conflict. There are no clear indications that class conflict as such is a
prominent feature of Kurdish society, but one may expect that the dramatic
changes of the 1990s in the political arena have affected the social fabric of
society, possibly facilitating the emergence and consolidation of social groups
into classes.
5
. The concept of nation-destroying as borrowed from Walker Connor (1972).
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When accounting for the dynamics of Kurdish politics in the 1990s and beyond,
it would be a mistake to discard the element of tribalism, but equally one should
not make the mistake to put the blame for the regional crises and instability
squarely on the Kurds and their tribal inclinations. In the late twentieth century a
transformation of Kurdish society was under way, the speed of which increased
by the infamous Anfa/-campaign, and, particularly after the events of 1991, it
became clear that a significant change had taken place. Kurdish society is in
many respects still a tribal society, but the element of tribalism in Kurdish
politics has taken on a new dimension, nowadays referred to as neo-tribalism, or
tribalism 'in a new guise'. This implies that the mentality of traditional tribalism
still rules, but not in a strict geographical sense. Territoriality is no longer the
only basis for tribalism, as the phenomenon has advanced to areas away from the
tribal homeland. As modernisation gains ground in society tribesmen relocate to
cities and larger towns but it does not follow that the ties with their local tribal
leaders are cut. The changes that have brought about the emergence of neo-
tribalism are of human and environmental nature, not concerning the geography
of tribal divisions.
During the past decade of autonomous Kurdish rule in Northern Iraq, religion
does not appear to have been any of the greater divisive sources of the
disharmony so evident in the Kurdish socio-political arena. In view of this, it
appears legitimate to examine whether any radical Islamist movements,
prevalent in most countries of the Middle East, have established a firm presence
in Northern Iraq. In order to do that, however, it would be beneficial to provide
an investigation of the nature of Kurdish religiosity and how the development of
'Kurdish Islam' has impacted on its politics.
Lastly in chapter three, where the linguistic aspects of Kurdish politics are
examined, the focus is placed on the socio-political aspects of language. This
regards those matters lying outside the field of linguistics, hence making a
'communicative-symbolic distinction within language', i.e. there will be no
regarding of language as a communicative tool, rather 'as an emblem of
9
groupness, as a symbol, a rallying-point', 6 examining the notion that Kurdish
political claims are language-based. In industrial states, the advancements in the
fields of technology and communication facilitated linguistic unity and cultural
homogeneity.' Such development has yet to transform Kurdistan, and the lack of
substantial technological progress in many vital areas of Kurdish society appears
to be one of the reasons as to why the Kurds remain linguistically and culturally
divided.
The assumption that nationhood is based on differences between nations begs
the question of what distinguishes someone who identifies him/herself as a Kurd
from non-Kurds. In other words, what makes a person Kurdish? As chapter
three, in outlining the components of Kurdish socio-political identity, provides
the basis for answering that question, the fourth chapter attempts to tie them
together in order to show how they produce a variety of sub-identities that
together constitute what one may term the Kurdish national identity. Identity
formation is a continuously developing process and as such invokes various,
occasionally irreconcilable, identities. All of the components dealt with in the
third chapter, i.e. class, tribe, religion and language, can all in their own right be
regarded as a pillar around which national identities evolve, and each forms and
shapes the distinctive characteristics that make up the Kurdish national identity.
They also provide different bases on which to form an identity. Subsequently
there are perceptions of common interests in terms of class-consciousness, tribal
belonging, religious awareness, and language/dialectal differences. The idea of
or becoming actively conscious about one's various allegiances is tied to the
emergence and development of a national identity, and these sentiments are
interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
The fifth chapter attempts to clarify the mainstream discussions surrounding the
future of the nation-state and assess the Kurdish question in light of the previous
theories, leading up to concluding chapter's assessment of whether an
independent Kurdistan could be a theoretical and practical viable entity.
6. Edwards (1985), p. 17.
7. Linklater (1998), p. 145.
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The principle of self-determination will be taken as a starting-point for this
discussion followed by a pertinent, although brief, examination of the state
system, its origins and development, which provides the conceptual framework
for the subsequent focal points of the analysis — the debates on the future of the
state. These suggest that the twenty-first century will either witness a general
decline of the nation-state or see it cementing its position as the ultimate form of
political organisation. Initially outlined on a general level, these two distinct
schools of thought will be discussed in relation to the Kurdish question, and an
attempt will be made to analyse what bearing these processes might have on the
future of Kurdistan and the prospects for Kurdish political sovereignty.
The creation of a new country, an independent state in which their nation-as-
people 8 can flourish, is often what advocates of self-determination aspire for.
This is, however, amidst some indications that the roughly 190 states already in
existence9 are growing weaker by the day. Taken at face value, one may
conclude that we live in a border-less world where states have been reduced to
bit actors. Whether or not one supports this conclusion, it has become clear that
recent political changes, i.e. those brought about by the end of the Cold War,
combined with those that have emerged with the growing interdependence on a
global level, have in many instances brought the state and the international
community into collision over the sovereign rights of the state and the authority
of the latter. This reality calls for a re-evaluation of the nation-state concept, and
indeed of the whole system of states as building blocks of the present
international order.
The withering away of the state system and the emergence of a borderless world
may have positive consequences for the state-less nation of Kurds, but is the
nation-state to be viewed as redundant on a global scale? The process of
globalisation might help bring down state structures in the fully industrialised
part of the world, but whether this has the same effect in the Middle East is less
clear. Should the state break down, the Kurds may organise themselves in
8. A related term is nation-as-state. These two concepts are introduced in chapter two.
9. There are 189 states admitted as members of the United Nations. (See
www.un.org/Overview/brief.html)
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entities resembling the Kurdish principalities of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The prospects for the establishment of a Kurdish state, whether in the
shape of a microstate confined to Iraqi Kurdistan or a 'Greater Kurdistan' — even
the possibility of several Kurdish republics emerging in the new century are
examined in the concluding chapter. A more credible alternative, however,
seems to be that the present state structure in the Middle East is unlikely to
change drastically in the foreseeable future. Consequently the Kurds will have to
work their way around the current state system. This highlights the Kurdish case
as one where the right to self-determination clashes with the state's territorial
integrity.
There is a complicated mosaic of antagonistic entanglements characterising the
area, evaluated in the sixth and seventh chapters, which look at Iraqi Kurdistan
in broader regional and international perspectives. The value of the research lies
in that it examines a case crossing 'domestic' and international conflict and in
doing so it takes regional as well as global perspectives on the issue of the
Kurdish area of self-rule in Northern Iraq. Given the dramatic shifts in the
international political environment in the 1990s, it examines the responses of
neighbouring countries and global forces alike to developments in Iraqi
Kurdistan - responses that are largely characterised by attempts to balance
interest and principle against each other.
When examining the role of the neighbouring countries since 1991, the greatest
focus is kept on Iranian involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan. One weighty and
important reason for concentrating on the Islamic Republic's behaviour stems
from the fact that Iran is a regional player whose dealings with the Iraqi Kurds
has not been observed in much detail since the Iran-Iraq War. Naturally one
cannot exclusively study Iran - also Turkey and the Arab states have to be
considered. Nonetheless, the conduct of Turkey with its massive influence in the
area, have in many respects been accounted for, 1 ° whereas very little has been
10
. Apart from analysing the internal aspects of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, the following
works also deal with Turkey's role in Northern Iraq: Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow (1997),
The Kurdish question and Turkey: an example of a trans-state ethnic conflict, London: Frank
Cass; Michael Gunter (1997), The Kurds and the future of Turkey, Basingstoke: Macmillan;
Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller (1998), Turkey's Kurdish Question, Lanham, Md: Rowman &
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written about Iran in this context.
In part D, the conclusion revisits the themes of the thesis' main sections. The
major arguments put forward in the thesis are advanced, complemented by an
analysis of a significant question arising from the study: namely whether a
nation needs a state of its own in order to survive and prosper. The theoretical
implications of this study for the future of Iraq as a state are, moreover, assessed
(from an Iraqi Kurdish perspective), discussing how to merge the 'national
principle' with the 'state principle' in a re-modelled, post-Saddam Iraq. The
concluding proposition is that the most suitable means to achieve a permanent
solution to the perceived problem of Iraq and its Kurds is the establishment of a
federation of Kurds and Arabs.
Littlefield; Paul White (2000), Primitive rebels or revolutionary modernizers?: The Kurdish
national movement in Turkey, London: Zed Books.
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Chapter 1: A Political History of Iraqi Kurdistan
1.1 Geopolitics
Geopolitics is generally perceived as the study of international relations within
the subject area of political geography,' but it could also suggest a way of
examining politics through 'geographical dimensions'. 2 Politics, or rather certain
policy decisions, may generate geographical effects and conversely, geography
tends to influence politics under particular circumstances. In other words,
'politics and geography are autonomous spheres of life which interace. 3 That
this is reflected in reality is convincingly demonstrated in the Middle East
where, in particular, the somewhat awkward geographical position of Kurdistan
has not proved beneficial in the nationalist quest to establish an independent
Kurdish state.
1.1.1 Kurdistan in a geopolitical perspective
The geopolitical position of Kurdistan is indeed widely recognised as one major
reason why the Kurdish people still constitute a non-state nation. The
strategically important land of the Kurds has been the seat of war for centuries
between rivalling regional powers and the Ottoman-Safavid struggle over the
area in the sixteenth/seventeenth century has to all intents and purposes
continued to the present day. In the course of time the actors have crystallised
into Turks, Persians and Arabs, but the vital geopolitical importance of
Kurdistan has steadily increased.
An area roughly the size of France (cf. Figure 1.1.1: The Comparative Size of
Western Europe, Eastern United States, and Contiguous Kurdistan), situated in
the mountainous northern borders of the Middle East, Kurdistan is a territory of
I . Painter (1995), p. 139.
2.b Tuathail (1996), p. 15.
3. Painter (1995), p. 20.
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about 200,000 square miles. 4 It can be regarded as a `shatterbele , a
phenomenon Saul Cohen terms as being
A large, strategically located region that is occupied by a number of conflicting
states and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers.5
Due to physical, environmental, historical, cultural, and political differences the
shatterbelt is seemingly unable to achieve political and/or economic unity,6
which is an appropriate description of Kurdistan. These shatterbelt
characteristics of Kurdistan have encouraged neighbouring states to use it
indiscriminately as a buffer zone, and its vast areas with large quantities of
largely unexploited natural resources have always concerned regional and
international policy-makers alike.7
In the modern age, Kurdistan has been governed by five sovereign states, three
of which came into existence in the aftermath of the First World War - Turkey,
Iraq and Syria. The northern part of the Kurdish nation found itself constituting a
south-east corner of the new Turkish republic, whereas the second largest
portion of Kurdistan ended up within Iranian borders. A considerable amount of
Kurdish land, the Mosul district, was firmly placed under the supervision of the
British Mandate of Iraq, and neighbouring Syria, the French Mandate, received a
small percentage of Kurdistan, as did Armenia (or the former Soviet Union).
This geographical division gives rise to the interesting reflection that this
ethnic/national group of Kurds is indeed represented in some of the largest
geopolitical alliances and formations in the international political arena, namely
NATO (Turkey), until the early 1990s the Soviet bloc (Armenia), the
Central/Western Asian axis (Iran), as well as the Arab World (Syria and Iraq).8
Izady (1992), p. 1.
5. Cohen (1963), P. 83.
6. Ibid. p. 85.
7. See Maria O'Shea (ed.) (1992), Kurdistan: Political and Economic Potential, SOAS:
Geopolitics Research Centre.
8. Izady (1992), p.201.
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Figure 1.1.1: The Comparative Size of Western Europe, Eastern United States
and Contiguous Kurdistan9
9
. Izady (1992), p. 2.
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An understanding of power politics and how regional as well as international
interests swing back and forth is essential when evaluating the role of the Kurds
in the twentieth century. This notion is expressed by Mehrdad Izady in that 'the
Kurds are victims of their own strategic location and world geopolitical
concerns'.I°
In addition to this precarious geopolitical position, the existence of two detached
Kurdish enclaves of substantial sizes in present-day Iran and Turkey (established
in the sixteenth century, essentially a result of deportations and forced
resettlements' I ), has further complicated the geopolitical situation of the entire
Kurdistan. One of these enclaves is situated in central Anatolia, south of Ankara,
and the other one in north-eastern Iran, in the Khorassan province, (cf. Figure
1.1.2: Kurdistan in the Context of the Middle East, and Figure 1.1.3: The Seven
Major Internal Subdivisions of Kurdistan). Although these two major enclaves
pose no actual threat to the Iranian and Turkish Republics, they still constitute
important factors to take into consideration for the policy-makers respectively
when forming the national policies on Kurdish-related matters.
1.1.2 Specific geographical features of Iraqi Kurdistan
The Kurdish part of Iraq is mostly referred to as Southern or Central Kurdistan,
depending on the source consulted. In the present work the latter definition will
be employed, as Iraqi Kurdistan is considered much the centre in geographical
terms but also in the sense of being Kurdistan's political centre (cf. Figure 1.1.3:
The Seven Major Internal Subdivisions of Kurdistan). What characterises this
area in terms of specific geographical features is the transition from the strictly
mountainous and somewhat inaccessible domains of the north, into lowlands
with fertile plains in the south. The mountainous and riverine terrain of the area
represents a critical feature of the military geography, which is intertwined with
political activities, considering the paramilitary character of traditional Kurdish
politics.
I °. Ibid. p. 202.
11 . Ibid. pp. 1-2.
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Figure 1.1.2: Kurdistan in the Context of the Middle Easti2
Figure 1.1.3: The Seven Major Internal Subdivisions of Kurdistani3
12.Ibid. p. 4.
13.Ibid.
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The agriculturally rich land in the south of Central Kurdistan has for long
harboured an active peasantry, a settled non-nomadic faction of Kurds with a
different lifestyle usually not associated with the tribal Kurdish people. This
different geographic setting of Central Kurdistan may have facilitated the
development towards a more modern society.
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1.2 The origins of problems between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad
The problems between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds have deep roots and
essentially stem from the time of the creation of the Middle Eastern state system,
gradually reinforced through the growth of regional nationalisms. The noticeably
sharp differences along ethnic, sectarian and tribal lines in Iraq reveal the
complex nature of the challenges confronting Baghdad, with particular regard to
its Kurdish north, since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921.
1.2.1 The post-World War I settlements
At the end of the First World War the Allies were considering the establishment
of an Armenian state, alongside an Arab state, out of the ruins of the Ottoman
Empire. The Kurds chose to co-operate with the Armenians, which resulted in a
joint memorandum put forward at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The
Treaty of Sevres two years later recognised the two peoples' rights to form
sovereign states: 4
 This Treaty was a clear Kurdish victory, but it was viewed as
a humiliation for the Turkish people. At this time Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
emerged and salvaged what he could of the Ottoman Empire creating the
Republic of Turkey, in the process rejecting the Treaty of Sevres.I5
The success of the Kemalists prompted the setting up of a new peace conference,
which, unlike Sevres two years earlier, had no Kurdish, Armenian or even Arab
participation. This conference resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne being signed in
1923, a treaty that made no mention whatsoever of the Kurds, granted them no
national rights and its few stipulations for minorities applied only to non-
Muslims. To all intents and purposes the Lausanne Treaty put an end to Kurdish
ambitions for independence — a development that may not have been unrelated
14.Vanly (1993), p. 145.
15.About the Treaty of Sevres Vanly writes `[it] may have been a just treaty in that it guaranteed
rights of independence and self-determination to the non-Turkish nationalities of the Empire but
[it] was also grossly unfair towards Turkish Turkey, which it effectively reduced to the rank of a
protectorate under joint British, French, Italian and Greek military occupation'. Ibid. p. 146.
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to Britain's political needs in the region. As Othman Ali writes, Britain felt an
urgent need to improve its relations with Turkey in order to prevent Bolshevik
Russia from advancing southward towards the Persian Gulf and threaten British
interests there. At the Lausanne Conference Turkey had to be appeased in order
to preserve London's interests in the Middle East and by dropping its insistence
on Kurdish independence as it had pressed for in the Treaty of Sevres, Britain
secured the co-operation of Turkey against Bolshevik Russia. In other words,
'the fate of the Kurds was subordinate at Lausanne to the Anglo-Russian
struggle for influence in the Middle East'.I6
The independent Kurdish state as envisaged in the Sévres treaty concerned only
a small part of Kurdistan and excluded the important Mosul province as well as
Iranian Kurdistan. I7 At Lausanne the dispute over Mosul was not resolved but
referred to the Council of the League of Nations, which eventually that ruled the
province should be included within the recently established Iraq.
1.2.2 The formation of the state of Iraq
The newly independent Iraqi state, in the words of Ghareeb, 'inherited the
legacy of the Ottoman regime as well as the problems resulting from the rise of
nationalist sentiment among Arabs and Kurds, internal dissention, social and
economic unrest and foreign pressures and interventions'. I8 The near over-
emphasis on Arab nationalist sentiments in the aftermath of the First World War,
as engaged in since the very inception of the state of Iraq, did little to promote
the sort of climate needed for confidence-building efforts with regard to Iraqi
Arab-Kurdish relations.
Britain occupied central and southern Iraq, i.e. the provinces of Baghdad and
Basra, already in 1914 for the purpose of protecting the route to India as well as
British interests in the Gulf region. Four years later the Mosul province with its
16.Othman All (1997), p. 524.
17.Kendal (1993a), p. 35.
18.Ghareeb (1981), p. 1.
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vast oil reserves was firmly placed under British control, and in 1920 Britain
was officially assigned the mandate over Iraq consisting of these three ancient
velayets ruled by the British—appointed Arab King Emir Faisal. 19 In 1926 a
treaty was signed between Iraq, Britain and Turkey, attaching Mosul to the Iraqi
state, on the condition that certain cultural rights were to be granted the
province's Kurdish population.2°
As regarded the Mosul province, London aimed to set up autonomous or semi-
autonomous Kurdish regions that were to be loosely attached to the central Iraqi
administration. Britain was, however, not in full control of the Kurdish areas as
Shaikh Mahmoud, a British-appointed governor of Sulaymaniya province and
subsequently self-proclaimed but nonetheless popular 'King of Kurdistan',
revolted repeatedly and attempting to declare the establishment of a Kurdish
state in the north of Iraq.21
At the time of the termination of the British mandate over Iraq in 1930, relations
between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government grew progressively worse as
Baghdad gained increased powers to the detriment of the Kurds in the north.
Shaikh Mahmoud Barzinji led yet another rebellion demanding a Kurdish state,
while other Kurdish leaders ventured to Geneva seeking League of Nations
supervision for a Kurdish administration. 22 The troubles in the 1930s eventually
lead to the first Iraqi military coup, which in part was inspired by irritation over
the policy concerning Iraqi Kurdistan. It became clear with the departure of the
British that the Iraqi government had no intentions of honouring the
recommendations made by the League of Nations in 1926 with regard to the
Kurdish north of the country, and the strong sentiments of nationalist character
such conduct stirred among the affected Kurds proved enduring in nature.
19 . Vanly (1993), pp. 144-45.
2a . Kendal (1 993b), pp. 50-51.
21. Ghareeb (1981), pp. 29-30.
22. Ibid. pp. 30-31.
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1.3 The eventful 1970s
The Kurdish national movement was in 1970 at the summit of its power and
ability. It was more or less unified under the authority of Mullah Mustafa
Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and had through rather
successful guerrilla warfare forced the Iraqi government to the negotiation table,
where Kurdish demands were to be addressed. Despite the relative strength of
the Kurdish movement and its impact on the forming of state policies, Central
Kurdistan was in the 1970s characterised by a wave of Arabisation campaigns
carried out in large parts of its territories. This was a policy introduced by the
Iraqis in order to change the demographic status of the most strategically
important Kurdish areas. Initiated on a rather small scale following the March 11
agreement in 1970, it eventually developed into one of the most important and
sustainable non-military Iraqi measures aimed at the Kurds.
1.3.1 Baath rule and Kurdish national aspirations
The fall of General Qasim was brought about by a group of army officers in
early 1963.23 The Baathist advocates among the new rulers were, however,
brushed aside and not until five years later, in the bloodless coup of July 1968,
did they emerge as the undisputed rulers and established a firm Baath rule over
Iraq.24
In order to better understand the Iraqi position in its dealings with the Kurds, the
basic ideology of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (henceforth referred to as
ABSP), 25 will be touched upon. Just as Jasim Abdulghani asserts, the very core
23.Vanly (1993), P. 153.
24.Kutschera (1979), p. 264.
25.This is the name of a movement founded in the early 1940s by the Syrian intellectuals Michel
Aflaq and Salah al-Din Baitar, the former Orthodox Christian and the latter the Sunni Muslim,
under the name of Harakat al-Baath al-Arabi [The Arab Resurrection Movement], whose ideas
gradually spread to Iraq, mainly by students. (Ghareeb (1981), p. 45) An ideological and political
struggle came later to develop between Syrian and Iraqi Baathists.
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of Baathist ideology is the pursuit of Arab nationalism and unity. 26 Clearly this
strikes a discordant note with the interests and purposes of the Kurdish struggle,
since advocates for Arab unity possess no deeper sympathy towards politically
conscious and ambitious regional minorities in the midst of Arab territory. In
fact, 'the Arab homeland [is viewed] as constituting an indivisible ... political
unit'."
That a considerable part of Iraqi Kurdistan, as perceived by the Kurds, is not
acknowledged by Baghdad as Kurdish but Arab land has been the source of
irreconcilable views on behalf of Kurdish and Arab nationalists alike - views
that cannot easily be brought into harmony with each other. Moreover, the
radical pan-Arabist ideology on which the party was founded was hostile to the
non-Arab Kurds, who are linguistically, but also to a certain extent culturally
related to the Persians.
However, the contradiction between theory and practice of the Iraqi Baath Party
is striking, and this will be touched upon briefly as it is deemed relevant for the
discussion. As Saddam Hussein moved up in the ranks, and manoeuvred himself
into the highest and most prominent of positions, certain basic ideas in the
ideology of the ABSP gradually acquired different meanings. One example is
the concept of equality, much emphasised in early Baathist doctrine, which soon
lost its original meaning. Zuhair al-Jaza'iri explains:
there is no absolute equality between Ba'thists, because there is in fact a single
mountain peak that is Saddam Hussein; the rest are slopes. Equality is possible on
the slopes, but not between them and the mountain peak.'
This clearly illustrates that 'ideology is subordinated to the style of leadership',29
and indeed, as soon became apparent, Saddam Hussein, who was a political
giant already in the late 1960s, came to develop a notable style of his own.
Before consolidating new policies on the ideological base of the Baath party, on
26 . Abdulghani (1984), p. 30.
22 . Ibid. p. 32.
28.al-Jaza'iri. (1994), p. 42.
29.Morad (1992), p. 125.
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which he legitimised, and continues to legitimise his rule, Ba'thist ideology was
adjusted to suit Saddam Hussein's rule.
The political reasoning of the ABSP appeared early on as somewhat incoherent.
One example is how one chose to define 'the people', an important issue since
authority stems from the people. Saddam Hussein's concept 'the whole Iraqi
people', voiced in 1973, included Kurds and Arabs alike, but only as long as
they rallied under his particular leadership. Should they oppose him and subject
themselves to another political figure, they no longer remained part of the Iraqi
people. 3° Such were the criteria of belonging to Saddam Hussein's 'uniniah in
Baathist Iraq.
These were the political and ideological structures of the new Administration in
Baghdad with whom the Kurds were to conform. The new rulers and the Kurds
viewed each other on an equal level of mistrust and scepticism. The Baath, who
had had their party members killed by Barzani's forces in assisting Qasim to do
away with enemies after the 1958 coup, distrusted the Kurdish leader. Mullah
Mostafa was correspondingly suspicious about the government in its
negotiations with Nasser's United Arab Republic and how such high level talks
would affect the Kurdish aspirations in Northern Iraq. 31 Despite this lack of
mutual trust, the Barzani leadership had two representatives appointed to see to
Kurdish interests in the new government. However, before long they abandoned
their posts in Baghdad, 32 which was not a good sign for future relations between
the Kurds and the Baathists.
Barzani's personal and political antagonist Jalal Talabani and his urban
grouping, known as the KDP-Politburo, had a leftist policy similar to that of the
Baath-party. These leftists were co-operating with the Baath, 33
 which further
undermined improvement of relations between Baghdad and the Kurdish
leadership de facto. Barzani enjoyed a position as the official representative of
3 °. Makiya (1998), P. 133.
31.McDowall (1989), p. 20.
32.Ghareeb (1981), p. 74.
33.Talabani had a positive attitude towards the Baath, as 'it was the first ruling Arab political
party ... to recognize the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people' and who made 'every
effort possible to solve the problem peacefully ... in the spirit of brotherhood', Ibid. p. 75.
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the Kurds: apart from his historic appeal (based on his being one of the key
figures in the short-lived Mahabad Republic some 25 years earlier) he
commanded authority over a numerically strong force much based on tribal
loyalty: at that time one of the most important factors in Kurdish politics.
Material support from the outside, most notably Iran and the USA, also served to
heighten his position as a powerful player.
Despite an initial, pronounced desire by the Baath regime after achieving power
in 1968 to resolve the Kurdish problem peacefully, fighting broke out in April
1969, 34
 officially between the two Kurdish factions. However, Barzani was in
practice fighting the Iraqi government, as the latter supported and fought
alongside Talabani forces. The so-called Bazzaz Declaration (a suggested peace
plan drafted by a previous Iraqi government in 1966 35), presented by Baghdad
did not appeal to the Kurds, who rejected the proposal. This refusal led to
heavier military offensives being launched by Iraqi troops, until approximately a
year later, when the parties resumed negotiations that finally resulted in a peace
settlement.36
Edward Ghareeb points out that an evolution in Baathist thinking regarding the
question of minorities appears to have contributed strongly to the political
opening in the Kurdish question. The policy towards the Kurds was reviewed
throughout the 1960s at the Baathists' annual party congresses and certain
changes took place, 37 which might have influenced the measures taken when
regaining power 1968. In addition to that, however, it appears likely that the
Baath regime, having accomplished few, if any, objectives in its military
confrontations with the Kurdish militia felt the need to reach some form of
agreement with the rebellious north. 38 Baathist Iraq found itself in an inferior
34 . Abdulghani (1984), P. 135.
35 The main points of this agreement included recognition of Kurdish nationality, making
Kurdish an official language alongside Arabic in Iraqi Kurdistan, appointing Kurds as civil
servants in the relevant areas and achieve proportionate Kurdish representation in an elected
National Council. A general amnesty was also to be proclaimed and the government to undertake
a resettlement of those displaced and provide compensation for material losses suffered. Penrose
(1978), p. 340.
36.O'Ballance (1996), pp. 86-87.
37.Ghareeb (1981), p. 80.
38.Ibid.
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position with regard to regional strategic balance - Iran was at this time the
major power in the Gulf region - and experienced an increasing demand for a
political breathing-space to restructure its national policies and ponder on its
next move.
1.3.2 The peace agreement of 1970 and its implementation
The agreement of 11 th March 1970 provided for Kurdish autonomy within the
framework of unity for Iraq to be achieved over a period of four years. The
agreement offered more concessions and freedom than any previous
governments had ever considered granting the Kurds. It consisted of 15 articles
and was settled by Barzani's KDP and Baath's Revolutionary Command
Council. This manifesto is regarded as an important milestone in Iraqi Kurdish
politics, and the Kurds are always referring to this agreement whenever military
conflicts between the north and the central government are to be settled by
negotiations. Therefore, in order to form a base for further discussion, a concise
outline of the peace accord will be provided.39
Article one stated the recognition of the Kurdish language as the official
language in areas with Kurdish majority, alongside the Arabic language. The
second article called for full participation of Kurds in the central government,
including accession to key posts in the cabinet and the national Iraqi army.
Kurdish cultural and educational 'backwardness' is discussed in article three,
which promotes those two domains in general and the teaching in Kurdish in
particular.
Article four stipulates that in areas populated by a Kurdish majority all officials
should be Kurdish or Kurdish-speaking, 'provided the required number is
available'. In the fifth article, the Kurdish people are guaranteed the right to
establish their own student, youth, women and teachers organisations. Article six
39 . The following sources have been consulted when accounting for the contents of the
agreement: Ghareeb (1981), McDowall (1992), and Vanly (1993). Words and sequences within
inverted commas are quotations taken from the original statement, provided by the Iraqi Ministry
of Culture and Information, translated and featured in Short and McDermott (1975).
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authorises all officials, employers and workers to resume work regardless of
involvement in previous insurgencies, whereas the seventh article reveals the
allocation of a specific budget for the purpose of economically 'uplifting' the
Kurdish areas.
Displaced Arabs and Kurds alike are in article eight entitled to return to 'their
former places of habitation', which theoretically meant that Arabs residing in
Kurdish areas as a result of the government's Arabisation programme would
have to leave for the benefit of the Kurdish returnees.
The ninth article deals with the agrarian reform program and envisages 'speedy
measures' to be taken for its implementation in Kurdistan. Moreover, a
binational Iraq would be the result of an amendment of the constitution,
according to article 10, where equality of Arabs and Kurds would be
recognised.4° Article 11 pledges the Kurds to hand over the broadcasting
equipment (required for the clandestine Kurdish radio stations) along with the
heavy weapons to the government, while the twelfth article firmly establishes
that one of the vice-presidents should be a Kurd.
Article 13 lays down the necessity of amending the provincial law in order to
comply with the Manifesto. The 'national riches' of Kurdistan are mentioned in
article 14, which concerns the Kurds' 'enjoyment of self-rule,' naturally 'to be
achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic'. In the fifteenth article,
finally, the Kurdish people are promised judicial authority 'in a manner
proportionate to its population ration in Iraq.'
After the signing of the agreement, a bipartisan committee with representatives
from the Baath Party and the KDP was delegated the task of supervising its
implementation. This assignment proved to be difficult, mainly because
Baghdad was an untrustworthy partner (although Barzani reportedly maintained
contacts with the Shah of Iran as well as keeping American and Israeli channels
40 . Saddam Hussein stressed, however, that little importance was to be attached to this as the
Iraqi nationality was what really mattered: 'each one of us needs to change his angle of vision,
that is not to consider himself as a Kurd only or an Arab only, but as an Iraqi'. Hussein (1977), p.
23.
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of communication open41 ). In practice the ruling Baathists ignored many clauses
in several articles, and with few exceptions only minor changes were executed
by the government in the four-year period of transition. One of many violations
of the agreement refers to article one: the language of instruction stipulated to be
Kurdish in the areas concerned was with Baathist interpretation reduced to a
limited number of primary schools, and not at all implemented on secondary
school levels.42
Throughout the text of the peace accord there were frequent references to 'areas
with a Kurdish majority', concerning the regions where the new measures were
to be implemented. A definite clarification of these Kurdish majority areas, i.e.
which territories the autonomous area would incorporate, was not provided.
Thus arose the necessity to carry out a census of the population in certain
strategically important areas claimed by both sides, such as the oil-rich Kirkuk.
The Baath, however, postponed the holding of the vital referendum as its large-
scale resettlement measures were under way. The government's policy of
Arabisation of Kurdish areas had during the first few years of the decade
changed the demography substantially in favour or the policy-making elite in
Baghdad and to the great disadvantage of the Kurds. As a result, it was no longer
possible to give a realistic account of Kurdish presence in the oil-rich areas. 'The
major drawback of the March Manifesto', as Nader Entessar concludes, 'was its
failure to define the precise geographic boundaries of the area to be covered by
the autonomy provisions'.43
In early 1974 the few Kurdish ministers in the central government left their posts
in protest against the Baath Party and the Iraqi government's conduct of Kurdish
affairs. The Iraqi authorities responded by replacing the three Barzani-loyalists
with political opponents of Mullah Mustafa (who by joining the Baathists had
lost legitimacy in the eyes of most Kurds), which accelerated the deterioration in
relations between the Kurdish leadership and Baghdad."
41 . McDowall (1996), p. 330.
42,Vanly (1993), p. 156.
43,Entessar (1992), p. 92.
44,Ibid. p. 73.
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The government proved unable to fully implement the agreement of 1970 within
the stipulated period of four years, whereby a new plan for Kurdish autonomy
was announced, namely the Autonomy Law of 11 March 1974. This was a slight
modification of the previous agreement, but the areas considered for self-rule
were the same as before. Baghdad offered the Kurds 15 days to accept the
proposal, which, as expected did not include Kirkuk or other oil-rich areas in
Kurdistan.45 Since the plan fell short of Kurdish claims for Kirkuk, not only to
be incorporated in the autonomous region but also to function as its capital, the
Autonomy Law was rejected. In doing so, the Kurds were accused of invoking
history when they claimed that Kurds historically inhabited areas that were
excluded from the autonomous region proposed by Baghdad. The opinion of
Saddam Hussein was that referring to history was acceptable, however, 'not for
the purpose of the demarcation of the autonomy region', for which the following
comparison was provided: 'the Arabs cannot ask for Spain just because they
were there some time in the past' 46 - a blatant misrepresentation of the reality of
the state-sanctioned mass relocation of people executed by the government.
1.3.3 Resumption of fighting leading to the Algiers Accords of 1975 
In late spring of 1974 open warfare broke out between the Kurds and the
government. Mullah Mustafa received overt military assistance from the
Iranians, who, as David McDowall points out, might have held hopes for the
ousting of the Baath Party from power, as 1-iaa 'h
	 m >96.-S'.`1 
Iranian support continued in a steady flow across the border the Iraqi position
weakened considerably. Unless Iran could be persuaded to cease its military
operations alongside Kurdish peshmerga48 forces in Northern Iraq, the Iraqi
army had little if any chance of winning the war — rather, the hostilities were
likely to escalate into a full-scale conflict with Iran.
45.McDowall (1996), pp. 335-336.
46.Hussein (1977), p. 31.
47.McDowall (1996), pp. 337-338.
48.The Kurdish term for guerrilla fighter, literally 'the one who faces death'.
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American aid to the Iraqi Kurds was a prominent factor behind Iran's support of
the same, and such US action may have begun secretly already in 1969 (or even
earlier). It was, however, not until three years later that the documented phase
started as the CIA, entrusted with carrying our the program, over a three-year
period channelled some $16 million worth of arms and cash to the insurgents in
Northern Iraq. American guarantees had previously been sought by the Kurds,
distrustful as they were of Tehran, but even the political heavyweight
Washington in its economically largely symbolic role (US aid reportedly
constituted only a fraction of what Barzani received from the Shah) proved to be
a poor sponsor of the Kurds. The CIA abandoned the operation when the Shah
no longer found the Iraqi Kurds useful a tool to be used against Baghdad. 49 It is
possible that the Americans simply desired a continuation of status quo, i.e. that
the Kurds went on fighting indefinitely, gaining no victory. Indeed, a CIA-
document from 1974, made official in 1976, stated that
Iran and the USA hope to benefit from an unresolvable situation in which Iraq is
intrinsically weakened by the Kurds' refusal to give up their semi-autonomy.
Neither Iran nor the US would like to see the situation resolved either way.'
On March 6, 1975, Saddam Hussein and Reza Pahlavi met in Algiers (resulting
from mediation by Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Nasser), to
settle their differences. Iraq accepted Iranian demands of gaining half control
over the boundary river Shatt al-Arab, on the condition that the Shah
immediately withdrew all his support for the Iraqi Kurds. 5I And indeed, the
Shah's reasons for concluding a deal with Iraq — to prevent the emergence of an
autonomous Kurdistan, a desire to halt the progress in relations between Iraq and
the Soviet Union and for Iran to assume the role of the major power in the Gulf52
- appear to have been synonymous with those of the United States at the time.
Hence the CIA was a key actor in the swift change of fortune for the Kurds.
49 Ghareeb (1981), 138-140.
S°. Hermansson A rbetet, 10 February, 1991, originating from the Pike Commission Report to the
House of Representatives (19 January 1976), also quoted by McDowall (1996), P. 331.
si . Ghareeb (1981), p. 171.
S2. Vanly (1993), p. 171.
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Soon after the Algiers Accords the Kurdish national movement collapsed and
Mullah Mustafa disappeared from the scene of Kurdish politics. His sons Idris
and Masoud (the latter later emerged as the new KDP-leader) took over the
leadership of the party, which came to experience a certain disintegration, as
smaller groupings broke away and formed separate political entities. Jalal
Talabani and his associates, who had taken refuge in Syria, came to form the
most important of these break-away groups. Under his authority a new political
party was established in mid-1975, named the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK).53
The support base of the PUK was quite different from that of the KDP. The
different social bases of Kurdish identity 54 largely determined which of the two
major groupings one supported. While the KDP is characterised by a traditional
outlook, with the leading Barzani-family having strong tribal and religious
affiliations, the PUK gained followers from the upper strata in society, placing
less emphasis on tribal and religious factors. The differences in policy between
the two hence reflected the make up of their respective support bases.
The agreement reached in Algiers between Tehran and Baghdad was a severe
blow to the Kurdish national movement, but it cannot be regarded as the sole
reason for Mullah Mustafa's defeat. The Baathist regime had made some
political and military achievements: politically, the long-standing enmity
between the Barzanis and other tribes was skilfully managed by the Iraqi
government, as was its lobbying of the leftist intellectual faction among the
Kurds, who disliked the traditional leadership.
After the collapse of the Kurdish movement, the Iraqi government reinforced its
policies of Arabisation alongside the policy of deportation and resettlement of
Kurds. Meanwhile, a non-military process of reconstructing the Kurdish areas
socially and economically was undertaken by the Baathist leadership,55
presumably to rally Kurdish mass support for the government. However, one
53.McDowall (1996), P. 343.
54.This will be dealt with in much detail in chapter four.
55.Ghareeb (1981), p. 189.
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assumes that this intended social and political integration of the Kurds into the
Iraqi `ummah was not high on Baghdad's agenda of policy-making on its
Kurdish region.
In August 1977 an amnesty was proclaimed by the central government to
Kurdish militants in exile. This resulted in many Kurds returning to Iraq, where
in the autumn of 1979, six distinguished Kurdish leading figures took up
political positions in Baghdad, counselling on Kurdish affairs. 56 It would appear
rather unlikely that the opinion of these counsellors carried any weight in
Kurdish-related matters - their presence was merely symbolic, but nonetheless
important for Saddam Hussein, who could display Kurdish representatives in his
government, as the decade in which he successfully consolidated his rule came
to an end.
56 . Ibid. pp. 190-191.
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1.4 The decade of major regional unrest
In September 1980 the newly-established Islamic Republic with its pan-Islamic
ambitions was invaded by neighbouring Iraq. The secular Baathist regime,
which fiercely opposed the politicisation of Islam, felt threatened by the prospect
of Khomeini's revolutionary ideas gaining a firm foothold among the Iraqi
Shiites. The hegemonic aspirations of Saddam Hussein to dominate the Gulf and
annex the oil-rich and largely by Arabs inhabited Khuzestan-province of south-
western Iran (in Iran referred to as Arabestan) should, however, be regarded as
the more likely motives for the Iraqi aggression, which threw the Kurds into a
new chaotic decade of broken promises and alliances.
During the Iran-Iraq war the Iranians were fairly successful in 'exploiting their
Kurdish assets'. 57 By way of example, they succeeded in playing the KDP and
the KDP-I (the Kurdish Democratic Party - Iran) off against each other, resulting
in the Iraqi Kurds fighting the Iranian Kurds on behalf of Tehran. In the
meantime the Kurds of Iraq were subjected to intensified repression from
Baghdad, which culminated in the Antal campaign, aimed at an eradication of
the Kurdish population of Iraq.
1.4.1 Iraqi-Kurdish activities during the Iran-Iraq war
Throughout the eight-year long war Iran was the regional player whom the Iraqi
Kurds mainly had their dealings with and were exploited by. Just as the mullahs
incited the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, the Baathists seized every
opportunity to weaken the revolutionary Iranian regime by playing its Kurdish
card. That this was the case later confirmed by the exiled Iranian president Abol
Hassan Bani Sadr, stating that the Kurdish uprising and the subsequent war in
Iranian Kurdistan was linked to the Iraqi assault.58
57.Entessar (1992) p. 151.
58. See his My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the U.S. (1991),
London: Brassey's.
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The withdrawal of a substantial number of Iraqi troops from Northern Iraq in the
early 1980s, caused by an increased demand of military presence on the Iranian
front, enabled the Kurds to intensify their armed struggle against Saddam
Hussein's regime. This was further strengthened by the return of a great number
of peshmerga fighters from the exile inflicted upon them by the defeat in 1975.
They were joined by hordes of vindictive villagers, who had been forced by the
government to abandon their land and placed in so-called 'new villages' created
as part of the Baathists scheme of Arabisation and depopulation for Kurdistan.59
The prospects thus appeared good for a strong Kurdish offensive against the
Iraqis, had it not been for the clear divisions within the Kurdish movement. The
PUK controlled the southern and eastern parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, Sooran,
whereas the KDP was in charge of Badinan, the north and west. This power
struggle appeared to ease off a little following the formation of the National
Democratic Front, an umbrella organisation for Iraqi opposition groups,
consisting of nineteen Iraqi parties and movements. However, the agreement,
reached in Tripoli in February 1983, promoting unity against the Baathists in
Baghdad were soon violated by the dissenting partners, who, apart from the
Kurdish parties, consisted of Arab nationalists, Shiites and communists. This
breakdown for the Iraqi opposition movement had a spillover effect on political
activity in Kurdistan, where fighting resumed between the two main adversaries
in the spring of 1983.60
Notwithstanding the inter-Kurdish fighting, the pressure on the Iraqi army
tightened as the perhmergas scrupulously guarded and defended the borders of
Kurdistan. This they did rather successfully and to such an extent that their
respective areas could be rightfully described as 'liberated zones'. However, at
this time, the PUK appeared to have been the more pressurised group, facing
attacks from the two regional powers at war as well as the KDP. The need for a
military breathing-space was acute for the PUK leadership and it embarked upon
59 . Karadaghi (1993), P. 220.
60 , Ibid. pp. 220-221.
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clandestine negotiations with the Iraqi government, with whom it reached an
understanding in December 1983.61
The PUK put forth demands, which, inter alia, called for the suggested Kurdish
autonomous region to be extended in order to include, most importantly, the oil-
rich city of Kirkuk. Moreover, an allocation of 30 percent of its oil revenues was
further claimed for the purpose of developing Kurdistan. The Iraqi authorities
were also to end the Arabisation and depopulation of Kurdish areas, and grant
the Kurds certain autonomous powers as well as accepting the peshmerga militia
as the national defence force of the autonomous entity.62
However, in retrospect, everything indicated that this provisional agreement was
in reality merely regarded as a means to gain valuable time and restructure their
own organisation, particularly considering that the treaty was never publicly
reported. 63 Before long the negotiation partners were at loggerheads, engaging in
military action towards the autumn of 1984.
Negotiating directly with Saddam Hussein had discredited Jalal Talabani
substantially among the Kurds and this popular discontent with the PUK was
clearly in favour of the KDP, which rapidly gained influence in areas
traditionally controlled by the former. The Kurdish Democratic Party under
Masoud Barzani had in the mid-1980s allied itself with the Islamic Republic and
the two even co-ordinated their military activities against Iraq. The KDP also
developed close ties with the radical Turkey-based Kurdistan's Workers Party,
the PICK, a coalition, which represented 'an interesting alliance of traditionalist
and hard-line leffist ideology'.64
This and other political and military co-operation among Kurdish groups and
organisations was however made difficult by the existence of jash, 65 denoting a
specific kind of mercenary serving the government, normally tribal Kurds with
61.Ibid. p. 202.
62.McDowall (1992), P. 104.
63.Entessar (1992), p. 132.
64.McDowall (1989), p. 25.
65.Aka forsan, the former Kurdish for donkey, the latter Arabic for knight.
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no political motivation. These had been operating in Kurdish areas prior to the
1980s, although in smaller numbers, and were during the war with Iran recruited
en masse by the Iraqi regime. They were assigned to track down peshmergas
operating in the mountains, an undertaking which earned them a great deal of
money, privileges and arms. 66 These paramilitary jash were regarded by the
peshmergas as a dangerous element, since they, unlike regular army troops, were
familiar with the mountainous terrain and guerrilla warfare.
In May 1987, the establishment of the Kurdistan Front was announced.° This
new formation consisted of six Iraqi Kurdish parties, and was strongly supported
by Tehran, hoping that unity among the Kurds would demand a greater Iraqi
military presence in the north and thus reduce the intensity of warfare at the
fronts. And indeed, to the satisfaction of Iran, 'during 1987, two out of Iraq's
seven armies were tied down in dealing with the Kurdish threat', 68 accordingly
easing the military tensions on the Iranian border.
Following the Iran-Iraq cease-fire in August 1988, Saddam Hussein decided to
increase the use of his extensive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. He
launched massive offensives that brought the Kurds to their knees, and rendered
further Kurdish resistance well-nigh impossible. This new type of warfare
revealed that even their sole friends, the mountains, could no longer give them
protected shelter from the aggressor.69
1.4.2 Depopulation and genocide in Iraqi Kurdistan
The term genocide 70 was coined in 1944, when the extermination of the
European Jews could not be described by any existing vocabulary. As Yves
Ternon remarks, the word genocide is, historically and etymologically, closely
66.Karadaghi (1993), P. 222.
67.Ibid. p. 224.
68.McDowall (1989), p. 27.
69. This refers to the frequently cited Kurdish proverb 'the Kurds have no friends but the
mountains'.
70.It is a combination of the Greek word genos, meaning race or tribe, and the Latin cide, killing.
Kuper (1982), p. 2.
37
associated with Nazi ideology and its theories of racial hatred?' but even so, the
Holocaust is regrettably not the only deliberate killing of a nation or race of
people throughout history. Genocide has become known as
an elaborate, complex programme, a co-ordinated aggression against every
feature of a national group to render it vulnerable, annihilate it and impose on the
survivors the national pattern of the oppressor.72
Article two of the UN Genocide Convention singles out acts committed 'with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such'. 73 Such atrocious deeds are to be regarded as crimes under
international law to be condemned and punished by an international penal
tribunal. However, the exclusion of political groups in the convention is notable,
and makes it possible for the Iraqi regime to evade allegations of genocide on its
Kurdish population from the international community, allegations based on the
UN convention, in maintaining that the Kurds constitute a non-conformist
political and social grouping. The Kurds are not a 'biological problem', as were
the Jews under the Nazis, but purely a political one, and constitute an alien
element to the Iraqi Baathists attempts to create a sound Iraqi national identity.
Zygmunt Bauman considers 'modem' genocide, (that is within the framework of
the territorial state) to be 'an element of social engineering', 74 and this is
presumably how the Baathists perceive their strategy of transforming the Iraqi
state. In implementing its Arabisation policy, which had begun on a small-scale
as early as l963, the Iraqi government has acted in ways similar to the old
colonial powers. The Kurdish people have been uprooted from their territories
and repopulated elsewhere, such as in the southern deserts, just as settlers of
Arab origin were installed on Kurdish land. The objective of the Iraqi
government was to confine the Kurdish population to the large cities in the north
or to place them in the new towns created under army supervision. This was
71.Tenon (1989), p. 132.
72.Ibid. p. 129.
73.Kuper (1982), p. 2.
74.Bauman (1989), p. 91.
75.Human Rights Watch/Middle East (1995), p. 24.
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Baghdad's idea of how the Kurds ought to be controlled - in reality the Baathists
had created a dangerously explosive situation.
Depopulating Kurdish areas was no insignificant project for the Baghdad
regime, as displayed in many reports on the subject, which reported
approximately 4,000 Kurdish towns and villages to have been levelled with the
ground. 76
 The human tragedy aside, in the perspective of political economy, this
policy strikes the observer as being completely irrational. At enormous costs the
country destroyed its own major source of foodstuffs, resulting in the previously
self-sufficient Iraq being forced to import large amounts of food.77
The depopulation of Kurdistan was apparently the backbone of Baath's policy
on the Kurdish question, a policy later supplemented with chemical weapons in
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which outlawed the use of all poison
gases. 78 Kurdish sources claim that substantial chemical attacks by Iraqi
authorities began as early as 1984, 79 statements endorsed by the UN
investigators, who reported use of mustard and nerve gas in the same year.°
Rural Kurdistan was being destroyed both demographically and ecologically, a
human and environmental destruction, which took place in many parts of
Northern Iraq. The Iraqi authorities did not restrict the mopping-up operations to
its proclaimed 10-km wide safety corridor on the Iranian border, but also
attacked other Kurdish areas (cf. Figure 1.4.1, The Triangle of Death).
As the atrocities carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1980s clearly were a state
crime, as committed by the government, it appears appropriate to define Iraq as
an ethnocratic genocidal state, using Leo Kuper's terminology. In such a state
the victimised group has become an active player as they try to free themselves
from discriminatory measures imposed on them, claim political rights and even
76.ForsstrOm DN, 23 March, 1990, (This specific article named 3,968 ruined villages, with other
sources providing similar numbers, i.e. between 3,900 and 4,000.).
77. David McDowall notes that the Kurdish parts of Iraq 'produced approximately half Iraq's
wheat crop and one third of its barley', (1996), p. 390.
78.Ibid. p. 361.
79.The Kurdish Program, March 1989.
80.Simons (1996), p. 316.
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demand a degree of autonomy. 81 Saddam Hussein's genocidal state is
characterised by Antal, a highly organised and comprehensive extermination
campaign directed towards the country's Kurds, which was thoroughly planned
for several years before implementation. Despite it being such a well-planned
administrative process, which involved implementing systematic administrative
measures in successive steps, the Iraqis must have wrestled with an 'efficiency
problem', as expressed by Raul Hilberg:
There are not many ways in which a modern society can, in short order, kill a
large number of people living in its midst. This is an efficiency problem of the
greatest dimensions, which poses uncounted difficulties and innumerable
obstacles.82
The three major criteria to determine a case of genocide, put forward by Kurt
Jonassohn, are certainly met with regard to Baghdad's Anfa/-campaign, namely
1.There must be evidence ... of the intent of the perpetrator.
2. There must be a group whose victimisation threatens its survival as a group.
3. The victimisation must be one-sided.83
The second and third criteria have been dealt with in detail above, but perhaps
the issue of evidence and intent needs further elaboration. The obvious physical
evidence resulting from gas attacks visible on survivors - the thousands of Kurds
taking refuge in Turkey, bringing their chemically-injured animals with them
across the border" - left nobody questioning what kind of warfare had been used
against the Iraqi Kurds by the government in Baghdad. In addition to this highly
convincing evidence, authentic written data originating from the special
governmental Anfa/-committee was seized during the Kurdish revolt in March
1991, when the insurgents unexpectedly got their hands on large quantities of
secret Iraqi documents regarding the campaign - 18 million lbs of documents or
4.5 million pages, which were never meant to see the light of day. This detailed
Si . Kuper (1990), p.33.
82 , Hilberg (1961), p. 4.
83 . Jonassohn (1992). P. 19.
84 , McDowall (1992), p. 128.
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first-hand material proved beyond any doubt the horrific intentions of Saddam
Hussein's regime in dealing with its Kurdish problem. 85 The very bottomline is
that the Kurdish people were targeted for being just Kurds, and their struggle for
survival as a distinct ethnic group, appeared to be without parallel when the
objectives of Anfal became clear: Saddam Hussein had decided to deal with the
Kurds - a quarter of Iraq's population, en masse, as a people.
Figure 1.4.1: The Triangle of Death
Map identifying the sites of the Iraqi chemical attacks against Kurdish civilians in the
third and fourth phases of the Anfal-campaign, i.e. August 1988: the triangle Dohuk,
Zakho and Amadiya. Noteworthy is that the area in question is in the immediate vicinity
of the major highway and railway connecting Iraq with Europe via Turkey and the vital
Iraqi-Turkish oil-pipeline.86
85.Human Rights Watch/Middle East, (1995), pp. xix-xx.
86.The Kurdish Program, March 1989.
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This military campaign was named after the eighth sura (chapter) of the Quran,
al-Anfal, meaning 'spoils', as in the spoils of battle. This has generally been
regarded as 'a blasphemous abuse of Quranic injunctions'," since the Baathist
regime is secular in nature and hardly renowned for its religious piety. Important
to point out nonetheless, is that the genocide became legitimised by using the
religious language, an ever so important tool in the war propaganda. Portrayed
as a counterinsurgency to the revolting Kurds, Anfal was implemented in four
stages, each having a distinct beginning and an end. They ran from February to
September 1988 and 'took the form of mass, indiscriminate air raids, followed
by ground assaults'. 88 However, this extermination campaign is believed to have
lasted much longer, as the state-sanctioned and highly organised savagery was
not limited to the seven-month period in 1988. Human Rights Watch, the
organisation, which was entrusted with the huge amounts of evidence, claims
that the operation lasted from March 1987 to April 1989.89
The first phase included the infamous massive attack on Halabja. On 16 March
1988, Iraqi Mirage Fl planes dropped substantial amounts of chemical bombs,
including lethal cyanide, nerve and mustard gas on the lively city of 70,000, a
strike that claimed up to 5,000 dead, an overwhelming number of the victims
being civilians. 90 The gassing of Halabja was primarily retaliation for the role of
the Kurds in a series of Iranian conquests in Iraqi Kurdistan. 'Islamic fighters',
i.e. Iranian troops, were the previous day reported to have 'liberated the religious
people of Halabja from the domination and tyranny of the Baathist oppressors'.9I
The horrific attack appears to essentially have been a display of military power:
Saddam Hussein evidently wanted to make it clear that the Kurds' only choices
were submission or annihilation. Following the bombing, Iranian authorities
invited foreign journalists to the scene of crime, to witness and report the
atrocities carried out by the Iraqis, and had it not been for Iranian propaganda
87.McDowall (1996), P. 357.
88.Karadaghi (1993), P. 225.
89.Human Rights Watch \Middle East, (1995), p. 1.
9° . Ibid. pp. 70-71.
91 . Quoted from page three in the Teheran War Information Headquarters propaganda-style
leaflet The Bloody Friday: Chemical Massacre of the People of Halabja by the Iraqi Regime,
(1988 Teheran). Also other, somewhat more independent sources confirm that the Iranian army
seized Halabja in the days preceeding the Iraqi gas attacks: e.g. McDowall (1996), p. 357.
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purposes, the Halabja tragedy - the Kurds' Hiroshima - may never have come to
international attention.
Amnesty International and the Iranian government joined forces 'to prompt a
wide-spread outcry against Iraq's use of poison gas'. 92 This created international
indignation which, however, failed to transform into anything but hollow
rhetoric. Naturally this was a consequence of realpolitik. As the end of the Iran-
Iraq war seemed to be drawing nearer, Western governments began competing
for the lucrative deals bound to arise concerning post-war reconstruction of
particularly the Iraqi infrastructure. 93
 In that situation, a condemnation of
Baghdad's treatment of the Kurds would clearly jeopardise future financial
dealings with the economically so important Iraq and consequently the regime's
use of chemical weapons was overlooked.
Following the UN-brokered cease-fire in mid-July 1988, military operations in
Northern Iraq were intensified as Anfal went into its third and fourth phases, in a
decisive attempt by Saddam Hussein to retaliate against the Kurds who had
opposed him during the war. These attacks were so severe in nature, that the
Kurdish leadership could no longer maintain their resistance against the Iraqi
troops, but were forced into exile for the remaining two years of the decade.94
Facing the merciless Iraqi attacks, the Kurdish leaders teamed up and established
a coalition, the United Kurdish Front. According to the KDP-leader, Masoud
Barzani, in an interview dating from 1989, this was 'an ideal time for unification
to be practically achieved'.95
The chemical warfare of Iraq forced more than 100,000 civilians, (an estimate
by the Kurdistan Medical Association in Sweden, who reported on the issue) in
the Northern parts of Central Kurdistan to leave their homes and approach
Turkey for more secure future prospects. However, on Turkish territory the
civilian men, women and children were all collectively referred to as
peshmergas. Despite the fact that these people fell into a genuine refugee
92 . Ezell (1992), p. 97.
93 . McDowall (1996), p. 362.
94.Karadaghi (1993), p. 226.
95.Laizer (1991), p. 132.
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category, they were not given refugee status by Turkish government. 96 The
authorities in Ankara considered them only as 'temporary guests in Turkey',97
guests who were kept in strictly guarded military camps, and provided with
insufficient quantities of food, tents and clothing. This was the hopeless
situation, which prevailed when the decade of major regional unrest was about to
give way to a new era in Kurdish politics.
96. Notable is that Turkey in the aftermath of World War II when signing international
conventions granting political refuge to asylum seekers, specifically excluded refugees coming
from countries on its southern and eastern borders. Randal (1998), p. 65.
97.Ahmad (1989), p. 4.
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1.5 A turning-point in Kurdish history
During the second half of the twentieth century it gradually became clear that the
repression against the Kurds constitutes a substantial threat to security and
stability in the entire region. 98 This reality has perhaps never been more
pronounced than in the early 1990s, when the aggressive anti-Kurdish measures
taken by Baghdad in the wake of its defeat in Kuwait, created a major regional
crisis. At a heavy cost, the anonymous Kurds and their sufferings under the reign
of Saddam Hussein were brought to light. Rather suddenly, the oppressed people
found itself in the focus of the world's attention, being presented with 'the offer
of a lifetime': an internationally sanctioned and supported Kurdish autonomous
entity in Central Kurdistan.
1.5.1 The Kurdish uprising and the establishment of 'Free Kurdistan'99
The defeat of the Iraqi army in Kuwait in February 1991 by the UN-sanctioned
forces generated outbreaks of armed rebellion in the south as well as north of
Iraq. The people of the Kurdish provinces followed the example set by the Shiite
population of Basra and Karbala, revolts strongly favoured and openly
encouraged by, above all, the Americans. President Bush repeatedly called upon
the Iraqi people 'to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein,
the dictator, to step aside'. 1 °° Contrary to general belief and high expectations
among the insurgents, no military intervention from the multinational forces was
provided in support of their efforts to bring about the downfall of the Iraqi
president. The Security Council mandate, under which the USA-led coalition
operated, applied only to the liberation of Kuwait, and did not relate to how the
Iraq was to be governed. 101 This was the official explanation as to why Baghdad
98 . Sami Zubaida elaborates on why this is the case. See his 'Introduction' in Stefan Sperl and
Philip Kreyenbroek (eds.) (1992), The Kurds. A Contemporaly Overview, London: Routledge,
W. 1-9.
. Cf. Figure 1.5.1 — The De Facto Autonomous Kurdish Region - for the area specifically
designated as the Kurdish safe haven.
1 °°. Bulloch and Morris (1992), pp. 11-12.
1 ° 1 . Cf. UN Resolution 678, November 1990. For the full text of all UNSC Resolutions, see the
UN Documentation Centre at http://www.un.org/documents/.
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was given free hands to deal with its insubordinate people as deemed appropriate
by the Baathists. These events, however, came to give much impetus to the
discussion on whether massive violations of human rights are to be treated as a
matter of internal affairs.
After crushing the revolt in the South, the troops loyal to Baghdad moved up
north in order to restore governmental control in the Kurdish areas. By that time,
in late March, the insurgents in the north had gained control of virtually all of
Iraqi Kurdistan, including the strategically important Kirkuk and its oil
installations. 102 The long-term objective of the insurrection appears to have been
a revival and full implementation of the autonomy agreement of 1970. The
establishment of an independent Kurdish state was not advocated, knowing that
such a proposition would meet fierce opposition from Turkey and Iran.
However, leaders of other Iraqi groups opposed to the regime in Baghdad were
contacted, and a discussion about the formation of an anti-government
movement was initiated. As a result of this, in mid-March, the Kurdish United
Front of Iraq together with other Iraqi opposition groups consisting of Shiites,
communists and various others, gathered in Beirut for a conference, in which
great emphasis was put on the importance of unity and solidarity within the
opposition. It was agreed to establish a democratic and federal state of Iraq, to
overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, and in doing so, abolish the Arab
Baath Socialist Party. 103
Early on it became clear that the Kurdish rebellion lacked sufficient organisation
to succeed. Initiated by the people themselves rather than any of the political
groupings, the latter were faced with the difficult task of trying to organise a
spontaneous public revolt already under way. Confronted with the refusal of the
Kuwait-deployed multinational forces to provide any form of military assistance
for the uprising, the Kurds were unable to keep their liberated areas for longer
than approximately three weeks. There was another dimension in the 1991
uprising. The insurgency of 1991 was initially supported by those who
previously had been loyal to the system. Soldiers of all ranks as well as civilian
102.Laizer (1996), pp. 4-5.
103.Gestrin, Huvudstadsbladet, 6 April 1991.
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administrators joined the revolt, but as the Kurds avenged the former Saddam-
followers, the rebellion was doomed to failure. Defections from the Iraqi army
ceased which gave Saddam Hussein the opportunity to restructure his forces and
silence the rebels with severe brutality.
The Iraqi armed forces had in early April recaptured Kirkuk, Arbil, Dohok and
Zakho in offensives, which reportedly had tens of thousands of Kurds killed,
guerrillas as well as civilians. 104 Just as the Anfa/-campaign had been deployed
three years earlier at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in order to punish and eliminate
disobedient Kurds, Baghdad made clear that such measures were still on the
agenda. 1 °5 So great was the fear of a renewed genocide based on previous
experience that the majority of Kurds living in Iraq fled before the Iraqi army
across the mountains into Iran and Turkey.
Figure 1.5.1: The De Facto Autonomous Regioni°6
104. Ibid. p. 373.
105.In late autumn of 1990, during the Western build-up in the Gulf, Saddam sent a senior aide
from Baghdad with the message, 'If you have forgotten Halabja, I would like to remind you that
we are ready to repeat the operation.' Bulloch and Morris (1992), p. 9.
106.McDowall (1996), p. 374.
47
This enormous refugee problem and horrendous human tragedy created almost
over-night, found no parallels elsewhere. As the UNHCR noted, never before
had the world experienced such large numbers of people leaving their homeland
in such a short time. It was reported that the number of Iraqi Kurds in Iran
between the seventh and eighth of April increased from 563,000 to incredible
771,000, in less than 24-hours. 1 °7 Pressurised by the destabilising situation on
their borders, Ankara and Tehran sought international assistance and urged the
United Nations to find a solution to the humanitarian crisis.
On 5 April, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which condemned
the repression of Iraqi civilians, and demanded of Baghdad to ensure the
international humanitarian organisations full access to people in need of aid.
Shortly afterwards relief operations were set up, 108
 enabling the Kurdish
refugees to safely return to Iraq, being protected against further onslaught by the
Iraqi army. The general amnesty offered by Saddam Hussein to all Kurds was
not taken seriously - after all, how could anyone determine who was to be
regarded as a 'criminal element', and as such exempted from the amnesty
proclaimed by the Iraqi president?I09
The horrifying living conditions of over a million Kurds, representing every
strata of society, all of whom overnight turned into panic-stricken refugees,
created a strong public opinion reaction in the Western world, particularly in
Europe, which called for resolute international action to be taken in favour of the
displaced people. The role of the media was crucial in this regard and in
particular massive television coverage was instrumental in creating and
sustaining the pressure that came to be exerted on European and American
politicians and decision-makers. As Jonathan Randal puts it, `the Kurds owed
their salvation first and foremost to television, that blunt instrument which
quickly won over public opinion'. I I ° It was indeed the force of popular opinion
that made US Secretary of State James Baker on a courtesy visit to Turkey
following the end of the war go to see a refugee camp in the border area. In spite
107 . von Hall, SvD, 1 April 1991.
100 . Frelick (1993). p. 235.
109.Chua-Eoan, Time, 15 April 1991.
110.Randal (1998), p. 59.
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of it being the briefest of visits, the exposure made a deep impression on Baker,
who seemed to have realised that substantial and concerted international efforts
were needed in order to solve the crisis. 111 Meanwhile, the Europeans were
entertaining the idea of safe havens for the Kurds. On an extra summit meeting
in early April 1991, Britain under Prime Minister John Major, presented a
proposal to the European Community (EC), suggesting the establishment of an
UN-supervised region for the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq, an idea, which
was originally that of the Turkish president, Turgut Oza1.112
The EC member states endorsed the British proposal of a Kurdish safe haven in
Northern Iraq and urged the UN to sanction the European initiative. 113 A week
later Washington followed Europe's lead and committed troops to protect the
Kurds. In an immediate reaction to the EC announcement, Iraq strongly rejected
what it labelled a conspiracy, and condemned it for being interference in the
country's internal affairs. The Iraqi Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi alleged
that 'creating and inflating this problem is deliberate and is part of the chain of
plots against Iraq's sovereignty'. 114 A more positive response to the EC plan
came from Masoud Barzani, who described it as 'a great humanitarian gesture'
and 'a big step forward,' although cautioned that a safe haven could only serve
as a temporary measure until Saddam Hussein was ousted from power.115
As the Kurdish crisis had unfolded, the Gulf War allies had committed troops to
establish and maintain refugee camps in Northern Iraq for those Kurds who had
sought refuge across the Iranian and Turkish berders. 116 Baghdad was
subsequently warned that military retaliation was to be expected if the Iraqis in
any way interfered in relief operations undertaken north of the 36 th parallel, and
by the end of April Kurdish refugees were returning to Iraq in large numbers. By
then, several non-governmental organisations along with some UN-agencies had
taken the responsibility for the provision of essential services in the area.117
In . Ibid. p.67-68.
112,Entessar (1992), p. 153.
113,Petzell, SvD, 9 April 1991.
114,Ibrahim, /HT, 10 April 1991 (quoted by INA — the official Iraqi press agency).
115,Ibid.
116. Ullenius, SvD, 18 April 1991.
117.McDowall (1996), pp. 375-376.
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In order for the international community to effectively supervise the area,
including the provision of humanitarian aid, and enforce the Iraqi air exclusion
zone north of the 3 6th parallel, a surveillance system was established. Within the
framework of NATO, French, British, Turkish and US aircraft operated from a
military base in southern Turkey, Incirlik, with a military co-ordination centre
located in the northwestern city of Zahko, under a mandate which came to be
reviewed every six months in the Turkish parliament.118
During the discussions in the UN as how to create and maintain secure
conditions for the Kurds within Iraq, Saddam Hussein was reported to have
invited a Kurdish delegation to Baghdad for negotiations on the future status of
Iraqi Kurdistan. I19
 The KDP and the PUK differed in their views on the central
issue: whether to sign a limited autonomy agreement with Saddam Hussein,
which was advocated by Barzani, or to demand more territory and more political
concessions from Baghdad, as Talabani promoted, 12° and eventually these talks
failed to produce any result.
1.5.2 The first free Kurdish elections
Since the establishment of the security zone, the divided leadership of the
Kurdistan Front administered Northern Iraq. Due to constant political infighting
and veto power of each of the eight parties constitu'erng The Fron't,v1\ a MlNC..\1-
needed central authority was all but non-existent. With the announcement of
general Kurdish elections to be held in May 1992, people anticipated an end to
this economic and political chaos, resulting from the absence of a negotiated
autonomy agreement with the Iraqi government. A 105-member National
Assembly, (with five seats reserved for Christian Assyrians), were to be
appointed as well as a supreme Kurdish leader for the area.122
I Is . Kutschera, The Middle East, November 1995.
119.Mallet, FT, 26 April 1991.
120.Hitchens (1992).
121.McDowall (1996), p. 380.
122.SvD, 5 June 1992, (author unknown).
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All eight parties constituting the Kurdish Front participated in the electoral
process, although none of the smaller groups managed to gain any seats in the
Assembly, due to failure to obtain the seven per cent quota of votes needed to be
represented in the parliament. The KDP and the PUK hence dominated
completely in the elections, with Barzani and Talabani contending for the
presidency alongside two more symbolic candidates, the leader for the socialist
party, and a leading religious political figure.123
Baghdad reacted with fury to the proposed parliamentary elections in the north,
and threatened with reprisals to what the Baathists perceived as being illegal
activities. Also Turkey felt a certain apprehension about the forthcoming
elections, as did Syria and Iran, but the Iraqi Kurds strongly denied any
suggestions that it would be stepping-stone on the path to Kurdish independence
and proclamation of statehood. Instead, the Kurds stressed how the elections
would serve the great need to fill the administrative vacuum in the north, caused
by the Gulf War and subsequent withdrawal of the Iraqi civil services. It also
appears quite likely that there was a real fear among Kurdish leaders to proclaim
an independent state as that might have prompted Iran and Turkey to close their
borders — the virtual lifeline for the Iraqi Kurds.I24
On Election Day, 19 May 1992 (postponed 48 hours due to an administrative
failure), a group of international observers, consisting of West European
parliamentarians, human rights activists and journalists were present 2t‘‘m.
polling stations. They had been invited by the Kurds in order to supervise the
first Kurdish steps towards democracy. I25 The elections were reported to have
been fair, and they were far more substantial than previous ones held in
September 1989. The then local Kurdish parliament, established in 1980 in
Arbil, with its 50 elected MPs, assigned the task of running the internal affairs of
the Kurdish province, was in reality under the strict control of Baghdad. I26
 In
1992, however, there was no such Iraqi interference and the Kurdish elections
123.BostrOm, DN, 15 May 1992.
124.Hedges, IHT, 7 February 1992.
125.Mktensson, GP, 6 June 1992.
126.Lundeghd, DN, 11 September 1989.
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were conducted in a satisfying manner, according to the independent observers
present.
Being the first free election ever in Kurdish history, virtually everyone was eager
to register his or her vote, resulting in just about the whole electorate turning up
at the polling stations. None of the smaller Kurdish parties were particularly
successful, as only the KDP and the PUK achieved representation in the
Assembly. (See Figure 1.5.2 Results of the May 1992 Parliamentary Elections.)
The two political adversaries received an almost equal number of seats, but the
50/50 power share between the two created tensions, which came to prove
untenable. The concurrent election for a paramount leader was also a close run.
Reportedly 48 per cent of the voters favoured Masoud Barzani in the top
position, whereas Jalal Talabani received the lower figure of 45 per cent. I27 (See
Figure 1.5.3 Results of the May 1992 Head of the National Liberation Movement
Election.) A run-off election to produce a clear victory for one of the two
candidates was outlined, but that plan was never materialised.128
127 , McDowall, (1996), p. 381.
128 . Kakai (1994), p. 127.
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Figure 1.5.2: Results of the May 1992 Parliamentary Elections
Participating Parties
Votes received
(in numbers)
Votes received
(in per cent)
The Democratic Party of
Kurdistan (KDP)
437,879 45.27
The Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK)
423,833 43.81
The Islamic Election Alliance
(IBR)
49,108 5.1
The Socialist Alliance
(KSP+PASOK)
24,882 2.54
The Iraqi Communist Party -
Kurdistan Section (IKP-KS)
21,123 2.18
The Kurdistan Popular
Democratic Party (KPDP)
9,903 1
Independent Democrats 501 0.1
The total number of votes were 971,953 of whom 4,724 were declared invalid.
Figure 1.5.3 Results of the May 1992 Head of the National Liberation Movement
Election
Leader-candidates
Votes received
(in numbers)
Votes received
(in per cent)
Masoud Barzani (KDP) 466,819 48.5
Jalal Talabani (PUK) 441,057 45.5
Othman Abdul-Aziz (IBR) 38,865 2.5
Mahmoud Othman 23,309 2.5
The total number of votes was 982,649 of which 12,599 were declared invalid.'
129 . Statistics for the two tables found in Institut Kurde de Paris' Information and liaison bulletin,
No 86, May 1992, pp, 2-3.
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At the beginning of October 1992, the Iraqi Kurds announced the formation of a
Kurdish federal state, with the aim to become incorporated as a member of a
future Iraqi federation. This proclamation was fully recognised by the Iraqi
National Congress (INC) in December the same year. I3° The Kurdish view on
federalism in Iraq, as spelt out in the October-announcement, significantly
stressed 'essentially a territorial view ... [which] envisages rights for Kurds that
are constitutionally enshrined', I3I that is, the territorial integrity of Iraq would
not be endangered. Despite repeated assurances from the Kurdish leaders in
Northern Iraq that an independent Kurdish state was not contemplated or sought
after, neighbouring Turkey, Iran and Syria became visibly nervous by the
developments.I32
1.5.3 The outbreak of civil war
An armed conflict broke out in late December 1993 between the PUK and the
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, IMK, as the latter tried to increase its influence
in traditional PUK-territory. Talabani was successful against the militarily
weaker IMK, but accepted mediation offered by the KDP, which brought the
warring parties to the negotiating table to sign a peace accord. 133 Tree
Kurdistan' was, however, to experience far more serious friction, as hostilities
between the KDP and the PUK erupted in May 1994, effectively dividing the
region into two zones. A trivial conflict over land-ownership developed into an
all out war, for which the long-standing divide between the parties and the
failure to resolve it, was the underlying cause. I34 The major source of discontent
had for long been the control of the customs duties levied on all traffic crossing
the northern border to Turkey. Situated in traditionally KDP-controlled territory,
and administered by the same, Barzani was criticised for not fairly allocating the
funds. These revenues were allegedly spent on financing their own party
organisation rather than the common Kurdish Administration. This border
1313 . Sheikhmous (1993).
131 . Allawi (1994), p. 214.
132 , The preventive action taken by these regional countries are examined in chapter six.
133 . McDowall (1996), p. 387.
134 , Hirst, The Guardian, 14 May 1994.
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crossing in the north is far more lucrative than in the south-eastern parts of the
area of self-rule, where the PUK controls the less profitable cross-border trade
with Iran. Talabani's organisation was, on the other hand, accused of embezzling
large sums from the joint Kurdish ministry of finance and collaborating with the
government in Baghdad.135
Thus, despite the promising development following the Kurdish uprising and
exodus of the spring of 1991, the situation in the autonomous Kurdish region
came to deteriorate severely after approximately two years of democratically
elected institutions. Despite repeated attempts throughout 1994 by the INC to
put an end to the infighting, a hopeless state of affairs prevailed, whereby the
region increasingly came to be seen as being 'ruled by the people with the most
impressive weapons'.136
In late February 1995, a massive car bomb exploded in the KDP-controlled town
of Zakho killing some 80 people. Barzani instantly proclaimed that the PUK
planted the bomb, an accusation strongly rejected by Talabani. 137 However, it
would not be far-fetched to suspect a foreign agent on a mission from Tehran,
Baghdad or Ankara to have been responsible for the terrorist action, in an
attempt to further destabilise the Kurdish area of self-rule. Despite the PUK
denying all responsibility for the attack, the relations between the two
antagonists suffered as a result of it.
The internecine fighting between the PUK and the KDP enabled the Kurdistan's
Workers' Party to increase its presence significantly on the Iraqi side of the
Turkish border. This prompted Turkey to make a massive invasion into Northern
Iraq in the spring of 1995 in an effort to hunt down PKK-fighters and destroy
their bases. Largely unsuccessful (the Turkish army came to return several times
in the following years), it did nothing to stem the Kurdish infighting that
increased in scope and intensity. As the PUK and KDP resumed their armed
conflict in late summer of 1995, it was now Iran's turn to offer its Islamic
135.Waller, Time, 27 March 1995.
136.Kutschera, The Middle East, November 1995.
137 . Iran News, 1 April 1995 (author unknown).
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government's services for mediation between the parties. This attempt by the
eastern neighbour to broker peace between the warring factions prompted
American diplomats to intervene, as Iranian influence in the area was not felt to
serve the interests of the international community in the wider region: 38 One of
the most urgent issues to resolve was how to deal with the PKK, i.e. to find a
common approach to the Kurdish Workers' Party, with whom the KDP had
clashed militarily, and whom the PUK supported. Moreover, the allocation of
the vital customs duties levied on all traffic crossing the Turkish border needed
much discussion, as did the issue of demilitarisation of the capital Arbil, which
was under several months of occupation by Talabani's forces:39
Accordingly, Washington took the initiative and organised a peace conference
on Ireland in August 1995, with a second round of meetings in September.
However, the US-sponsored peace negotiations made negligible progress on
these important questions. Apart from a new cease-fire, which had a short life
expectancy, no general agreement was reached in the September talks. m° There
seemed to be a general awareness of the importance of enlarging the Assembly,
to incorporate independent observers as well as representatives from other
Kurdish parties in the parliamentarian organisation, who could be assigned the
task of working out a plan to break the deadlock in the peace negotiations, but
how to deal with this issue seemed to be beyond the capacity of both parties.
Meanwhile, Barzani continued to receive support from Turkey for the purpose of
fighting the PKK operating from KDP-controlled territory, and in its pursuit of
Turkish-Kurdish guerrillas, fierce clashes between the two Kurdish parties
occurred. In the meantime, the PUK approached Iran and received similar
support from Tehran as did the KDP from Ankara, the only difference being that
with the Iranians came the revolutionary Islamic dimension, which was not part
of the Turkish parcel.
138.Such regional issues are dealt with in part C of the thesis.
139.Jarrah, MEI, No 506, 4 August 1995.
140.Id. 22 September 1995.
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Following a brief Iranian incursion into Northern Iraq in the summer of 1996,
the US made yet another effort to reconcile the rival groups. A peace conference
in London was organised, but broke down due to the Iraqi invasion on 31 August
into the area of Kurdish self-rule. I41 In response to a formal request from
Barzani, I42 who felt pressurised by the military threat from Tehran, to which the
limited military capacity of KDP was unable to respond forcefully, Saddam
Hussein was pleased to offer the services of his armed forces. 143 Seizing the
golden opportunity, the Iraqi government also declared its wish to reassert Iraqi
sovereignty over the Kurdish autonomous region, which would also involve the
restoration of trade links with the northern parts of the country. Arbil was
quickly captured and the troops, estimated to around 40 000 — the largest Iraqi
military operation since the Gulf War — advanced to Sulaymania. As Baghdad
was forced by international pressure to withdraw its forces on 2 September,
control of the recaptured areas was entrusted to the KDP.I44
With the departure of the Iraqi army from the Kurdish security zone, fierce
fighting broke out between the PUK and the KDP. As the latter managed to seize
control of Sulaymania, a massive flow of refugees was created, and tens of
thousands of Kurds fled to Iran. However, the power balance in the autonomous
region was soon back to the previous status quo, as the PUK had regained much
of its lost territory by mid-October, but fears of repeated intervention by
Baghdad kept Talabani from attacking Arbil.145
At the end of October, the PUK and KDP were once again called upon to attend
peace negotiations in Ankara, as arranged by the US. Reportedly, the two
opponents agreed to refrain from seeking the help of external actors and work
decisively towards a permanent cease-fire. They were also reported to have
accepted the deployment of an internationally sanctioned peace monitoring
force, including northern Iraqi Turkmens and Assyrians, and the re-
141.This event contributed strongly to the OPC being brought to an end. See chapter seven,
section 7.2.1.
142.See for instance Hugh Pope, ME!, No 533, 6 September 1996.
143,Lundegard, SvD, 22 September 1996.
144,Id. 3 September 1996.
145 .
 Nuttall, The Guardian, 15 October 1996.
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establishment of a common Kurdish Administration. I46 Since then, each side has
persistently accused the other of violating previously reached agreements, while
secretly making attempts to establish contact with Iran as well as Turkey and
Iraq. This state of affairs continued, more or less, until a sustainable agreement
was reached in September 1998 in Washington D.C.
1.5.4 Developments after 1998
In September 1998 the KDP and the PUK with American direction agreed to a
settlement of their armed conflict. Known as the Washington Agreement, it was
cautiously and wearily reported as yet another agreement in the long run of
tentative peace treaties signed by the warring parties. 147 Defying most
predictions, however, the mutual decision to end the devastating inter-Kurdish
war agreed upon in the Washington talks of September 1998 has not been
seriously challenged since, even though the practical implementation of the
actual agreement has not been forthcoming. As Michael Gunter writes,
the accord was really just an ambitious agreement to agree. It set forth a timetable
for re-establishing a unified regional administration, contained provisions for
regional elections by the summer of 1999 and for revenue sharing based on the
needs of the population, and, in a gesture toward Turkish fears concerning the
PKK, provided for the security of the Iraqi Kurdish borders.'"
A notable element recently has been the growing Islamist dimension in Iraqi
Kurdish politics. As noted in the Figure 1.4.2, the results of the May 1992
parliamentary elections showed that the Islamic party, the IMK, were the third
largest political grouping in Northern Iraq. Based in the southern-eastern part of
the Kurdish self-ruling region, this group has clashed repeatedly with the PUK.
In September 2001, a militant Islamic group was established in the autonomous
region. Resulting from a merger between several extremist splinter groups of the
146.Cockburn, The Independent, 2 November 1996.
147.Dabrowska, ME!, No 584, 2 October 1998.
148.Gunter (1999), p. 108.
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IMK, who had been outlawed through a collective PUK-KDP effort, fund al-
Islam (`The Army of Islam'), with alleged ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan and
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida organisation made Halabja its area of control.'"
In the early days of the coalition-building effort following the World Trade
Centre bombing, the Iraqi Kurds began promoting international intervention
against Iraq, 15° and amidst the subsequent activities of fund al-Islam in their
area, both parties have been clamping down heavily on the radical Islamists. It
is, however, the PUK that has taken the heaviest blow due to its direct
involvement in fighting the Islamists. There have also been reports of Saddam
Hussein supporting and promoting groups such as fund al-Islam.I51
This issue of the growing Islamic dimension in Iraqi Kurdish politics will be
revisited in the fourth chapter. Against this background of the quest of the
Kurdish political movement and the area in which it operates, the discussion will
now move on to examining the concepts of nation and state and theories of
nationalism.
149 , Hiwa Osman, BBC, 2 October 2001.
15°, Pope, N., MEI, No 660, 12 October 2001.
151 , E.g. Michael Rubin, 'The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan', Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin, December 2001.
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PART B
Nation, Nationalism, Identity and the Kurds
60
Chapter 2: Notions of Nation, State and Nationalism
2.1 Nation, state, nation-state?
[a nation] links individual and community, past and present; it gives to cold,
impersonal structures an aura of warm, intimate togetherness. In other words,
nationhood is hard to define not because it is confused and nonsensical, but
because it is extremely subtle, and, moreover, because ... an element of myth is
essential to it.'
2.1.1 The nation: a multifaceted phenomenon
The term nation can be understood in two interrelated ways since it carries the
meaning of nation-state as well as that of the people living within the state. The
linkage between these two meanings exposes the general ideology of
nationalism, which is based on the widely held principle that 'any 'nation-as-
people' should have their `nation-as-state". 2 This principle assumes the
existence of units such as national peoples, or nations. A quick look at the vast
literature on the subject makes it abundantly clear that it is unattainable an aim
attempting to find a scientific precise definition of the nation, let alone one that
leading experts agree upon.
A national people or nation is, according to Anthony Smith, 'a named human
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights
and duties for all members' . 3 Admittedly reasonably all-inclusive, it shares the
self-differentiating aspect of a definition offered by Walker Connor who regards
self-consciousness as being the nation's defining attribute: the 'essence of the
nation', he says, 'is a matter of attitude, the tangible manifestations of cultural
I . Canovan (1996b), p. 76.
2. Billig (1995), p. 24.
3. Smith (1991), p. 14 (italics original).
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distinctiveness are significant only to the degree that they contribute to the sense
of uniqueness'. 4 Such idealistic possibilities are not dominant in other definitions
of the term. Deutsch, for example, identifies the nation with a people constituted
as a state. His proposal of the nation being 'a people who have hold of a state',5
is supplemented by Giddens, who suggests that a nation 'only exists when a state
has a unified administrative reach over territory over which its sovereignty is
claimed'. 6 Reducing the nation to merely the institutional form of social
organisation and omitting the notion of nation-as-people appears far too
restrictive, particularly in a context where a nation(-as-people) clearly exists, but
has not been endowed with a state.
The possible ways of interpreting this term seem endless and the definition of
the nation certainly presents far greater difficulties than those encountered when
defining the clear-cut concept of the state. Instead of settling for what is likely to
be an inadequate definition of the nation, it may be a wiser to employ, as
Margaret Canovan does, a more dialectical method, trying to acquire an
understanding of the phenomenon by approaching it from five different angles.'
Firstly, as Deutsch and Giddens asserted, nations may take the form of states.
However, their definitions suffer a marked lack of nuance as one concept is
equated with the other. As Seton-Watson points out, 'there were states long
before there were nations, and there are some nations that are much older than
most states that exist today'. 8 In other words, far from all existing states are
nation-states and similarly, many nations exist without a corresponding state.
That a political dimension is somehow part of the concept, however, is
succinctly expressed by Anthony Smith in saying that 'Whatever else it may be,
what we mean by "national" identity involves some sense of political
community, however tenuous'.9
4. Connor (1994), p.43.
5. Deutsch (1969), p. 19.
6. Giddens (1985), p. 119.
7. Canovan (1996a), p. 51-60.
B . Seton-Watson (1977), p. 1.
9 . Smith (1991), p. 9. For more on 'national identity' see forthcoming chapter four: Kurdish
Identity Formation.
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Secondly, the view of nations as cultural communities is epitomised in Fichte's
statement that 'Wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nation
exists'. I ° However, the assumption of such close connection between language
and the spirit of a people does not explain why nationalists in places as diverse
as Ireland and India are using English as their preferred form of verbal
communication. This contradiction prompts the application of a looser definition
of culture, a conception that takes on an anthropological perspective."
Thirdly, nations can be conceived of in terms of the subjective identities of
individuals. Accordingly, it may be consciousness, or 'willed adherence',I2
rather than the seemingly objective characteristics laid out in Anthony Smith's
definition above that makes a people a nation. Then, clearly, the claiming of
nationhood raises many issues of subjective and objective definition. Nationalist
ideologies for logical reasons devise objective characteristics of their nations,
but their definitions do not hold 'since none of these characteristics is essential
for national unity, and they all play different parts at different times'. I3 Nations
appear unlikely ever to be 'objective communities' since they are not and cannot
be constructed around clear, objective criteria adhered to by all national
members. More appropriately, they may be considered 'imagined communities',
in the anthropological spirit of Benedict Anderson, whose influential book treats
the nation as an imaginary identity-construct. It is an imagined political
community 'because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds
of each lives the image of the communion'. I4 Basically the same sentiment can
be found in a preceding standard work on nations and nationalism. Hugh Seton-
Watson wrote in 1977 that 'a nation exists when a significant number of people
in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they
1 °. Fichte (1922), Addresses to the German Nation, Chicago: Open Court, p. 215, as quoted in
Canovan (1996a), p. 52.
11 . As to why an anthropological perspective is essential for a full understanding of nationalism
and its underlying concepts, see ch. 6 of Thomas Hyl land Eriksen's Ethnicity and Nationalism.
Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto Press (1993).
12 , Gellner (1983a), p. 53.
13.Vogler (1985), p. 62.
14.Anderson (1991), p. 6.
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formed one', I5 in which 'consider themselves' may be translated into 'imagine
themselves'.
For Anderson the nation is imagined as limited 'because even the largest of them
has finite, if elastic boundaries beyond which lie other nations'. It is moreover
imagined as sovereign in that it challenges the legitimacy of both religion and
monarchy. It is finally imagined as a community because 'regardless of actual
inequality, the nation is conceived of as a deep horizontal comradeship'. I6 This
imagined community that embraces the inhabitants of a particular territory
stretches through time with its uniquely own past and future, a dimension that
ensures the nation to maintain a sense of its own history, separate from
everybody else's.
This sort of imaginary nature of the notion might have been taken a step too far
by Walker Connor in the quoted passage above, singling out attitude as the
essence of a nation. After all, as Canovan excels in conveying,
although a nation would cease to exist if all its individual members ceased to
think in national terms, its existence confronts any particular member as part of
objective reality. The nation I belong to may be all in the mind, but it is not all in
my mind and I cannot alter the situation by an act of will.17
Fourthly, nations can also be seen as ethnic groups or extensions of such
groupings. Anthony Smith has to be singled out as the most ardent proponent of
the idea of nations having ethnic origins, contending that an ethnic core provides
the nation with the historical depth necessary for its proper functioning in
modern politics. The ethnie, as Smith terms the ethnic community, is then the
ancient social formation from which the modern nation has developed. That the
origins of a national community are to be found in pre-modern ethnic sentiments
can be linked to the primordialist view, which maintains that the political
modernisation of nation building often stimulates the solidification of
15.Seton-Watson (1977) p. 5.
16.Anderson (1991), p. 7 (italics added).
17.Canovan (1996a), p. 55.
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presupposed cultural ties and strengthens 'primordial attachments 1 . 18
 The
resilience of this type of consciousness should not be underestimated argues
Smith, and cautions against the belief that nations are modern products. I9 Later
developing these thoughts, it is noted that this is not to say that 'every modern
nation must be founded on some antecedent ethnic ties ... but many such nations
... are based on such ties, including the first nations in the West ... and they
acted as models and pioneers of the idea of 'nation' for others'. 2° This approach
for understanding the growth of nations is termed 'ethno-symbolic'.21
Fifthly, nations are by some viewed as being products of modernisation. Ernest
Gellner is unquestionably the leading authority among the modernists, and his
influential analyses are based on the assumption that nations are invented rather
than being authentic formations.22
Worth noting in passing is an unusual approach to the nation provided by Bauer,
who questions the widely held assumption that the nation is a unit that is cultural
and political in nature. Instead he analyses it in a historical and materialist light
and argues that the cultural character of the nation develops historically,
resulting from the sharing of common conditions of material life. As the
conditions of material life vary, the national character is also subject to changes
— hence it is not appropriate to define the nation as a fixed or static entity.23
While not contesting its dynamic nature, there is no wish to settle for any
particular interpretation of the concept, since it is recognised that the shape and
structure of the nation is always open to interpretation.
Of the five approaches considered here, each contains 'some truth but leads
18.A concept most often identified with Clifford Geertz and his primordial model of ethnicity.
See for example The Interpretation of Cultures, (1973), New York: Basic Books. (This is also
discussed, although briefly, in forthcoming chapter four: Kurdish Identity formation.)
19.Smith (1986a): argument introduced and outlined in the first chapter.
20. Id. (1999), p. 40.
21.A. D. Smith provides more insight into 'ethno-symbolism' in chapter eight of his Nationalism
and Modernistn. A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism, London:
Routledge (2000) [1998].
22.See in particular his Thought and Change (1964).
23.Bauer (1978), pp. 106-17.
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ultimately into blind alley', 24 which highlights the mediating role of the nation.
Indeed, it would appear that the key to its complex nature lies in its 'ability to
mediate between different aspects of social and political life'. 25 Therefore,
instead of attempting to carve a fixed definition out of these conflicting
interpretations of a phenomenon that indeed 'links individual and community,
past and present', 2b the assumption is that it is the convergence of these five
different elements that forms the basis of the nation.
2.1.2 To develop a nation into a state - the idea of the nation-state
Considering the major difficulties encountered when attempting to find a
definition for 'nation', defining the state is rather unproblematic an exercise. The
predominant definition of the state - defined mainly in institutional terms but
containing a clear functional element, is one originally put forward by Max
Weber. It holds that the state is a distinguishable set of institutions and people
that advocate centralism insofar as the centre exercises control over a
territorially demarcated area over which it has a monopoly of authoritative
binding rule-making. Another defining characteristic of the state, as emphasised
by Weber, is that it also has a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical
force.27 As summarised by a Weberian scholar, the generic definition of the state
reads as a political body comprising 'a set of differentiated, autonomous and
public institutions, which are territorially centralised and claim jurisdiction over
a given territory, including the monopoly over coercion and extraction'.28
The difficulties absent from the definition of the state, however, begin to arise
when 'nation' and 'state' are put together creating the concept of the nation-state
- considered 'naturally' to combine the two terms. This often creates
complications. As 'the specialisation and concentration of order maintenance',29
the state is bounded but often weakly rooted whereas the nation may often be
24.Canovan (1996a), p. 50.
25.Ibid.
26.Id. (1996b), p. 76.
27.Weber (1968), p. 64.
28.Smith (1986b), p. 235.
29.Gellncr (1983a), p. 4.
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poorly demarcated but vibrant. 30 Together they would ideally transform into a
bounded vibrant nation-state.
This idea that the state should serve the nation was first brought up for
discussion at the Congress of Vienna in 18 15, 31 and as Giddens has emphasised,
war came to be central to the emergence and development of this new type of
political body. 32 The basic idea of the nation-state is thus one that indicates a
tight correspondence between nation and state: that each sovereign state should
be a nation-state of people who share all the characteristics of a nation. What this
notion stipulates, i.e. for the state and the nation to stand for one organic whole,
has, however, proved difficult to uphold in practice. There is a wide gap between
ideal and reality. In reality most states are polyethnic in composition and the
term nation-state is therefore not wholly suitable. As Walker Connor has shown,
less than ten percent of all contemporary states can be described as being
homogeneous, one-nation states, where the boundaries of the state coincide with
the boundaries of the ethnic community.33
Indeed, very few nations are coterminous with existing states. When this
situation occurs, the nation is said to be state-reinforcing. In large empires,
however, such as the Ottoman or Russian, nations were much smaller than state
boundaries, so they become state-subverting. A third condition arises when the
nation is bigger than any existing state, as was the case in the seventeenth
century German and Italian parts of Europe. The role of the nation would then be
state-creating.34
i The nation-state evidently combines the cultural and political ideas of the nation
and this political-territorial construct may be 'the product of a common
consciousness which was derived far more from living in common and sharing
30.Mann (1995), p. 46.
31.Navari (1981), p. 14.
32.Cf. Giddens (1985).
33. Connor (1972), p. 320. Even though Connor's estimates were done in the early 1970s (the
number of states was at that time 132, out of which only 12 were considered genuine nation-
states) the general trend is not thought to have changed substantially.
34.Mann (1995), p. 46.
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common ideals than from any racial, linguistic or cultural inheritance'. 35
 History
shows that such nation-building, leading to the creation of a nation-state, is not a
harmonious process, in which the nation-as-people naturally matures and
gradually grows into its new role of nation-as-state. On the contrary, nation-
states were often created out of older loyalties. As expressed by Billig, 'the
peoples whom nation-states were claiming to represent often had nurtured a
sense of peoplehood before the age of nationhood, even if this was not co-
extensive with the peoplehood, claimed by the state'. 36 It was this nurtured sense
of peoplehood expressed through the people's ethnic characteristics (those of
language, traditions and customs but also religion) that gave unity to the nation.
When the sense of peoplehood was not very pronounced or even non-existent,
self-awareness, as argued earlier an important element in the process of building
a 'self-sustainable' nation, increased in significance. Tivey explains: 'many
difficulties — such as lack of a common language, or a short history — may be
overcome if people in a particular place become convinced of their
nationhood'. 37
 Since this type of nationhood seen in many multinational states
would often prove to be a constructed one, as a major measure to facilitate the
transfer of primary allegiance from the various sub-state nations to the state, 'the
sine qua non of successful integration' as Walker Connor puts it, 'the true goal is
not "nation-building" but "nation-destroying" ,38
A widely debated issue is which of the two was first to appear: the nation-as-
people or the nation-as-state. While Gellner acknowledges that throughout
history both states and nations have emerged without the support of the other, he
argues that 'it is more debatable whether the normative idea of the nation, in its
modern sense, did not presuppose the prior existence of the state'. 39 Following
this line, one would go from the political to the cultural, assuming the nation-as-
state arrived first on the scene. Some nation-states have certainly created their
desired national communities, but it is equally true that national identities have
been created long before there was any nation-state to politically enforce them.
35.Cobban (1969), pp. 121-22.
36.Billig (1995), p. 26.
37.Tivey (1981a), p. 6.
38.Connor (1972), p. 336.
39.Gellner (1983a), p. 6.
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Many of the current states of the Middle East would be placed in the first
category. Perhaps with a lesser degree of consciousness, but essentially in the
same spirit as the famous Italian nationalist Massimo d'Azeglio, who after
Risorgimento declared: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians',40
as Iraq was being formed, massive social engineering is required because its
national identity had to be invented. This situation implies that the nation-state is
an ideological construction, that it 'represents a concentration of authority within
territorial boundaries and the imposition of common values on the society'!" A
not so authentic nation-state may moreover find it difficult to carry out one of
the essential tasks of the state, namely its integration function, i.e. to 'bind
together its various social and territorial segments into an effective whole', a
horizontal exercise for territorial groups.42
While an analysis of nationalism is to follow below, one aspect of the general
use of the term is of great relevance here and will be examined accordingly.
Nationalism can be found under different guises, and in certain cases it has lost
its original meaning, i.e. that it represents loyalty to the state, and not, properly
conceived, to the nation. It is this use of the term nationalism that causes
conceptual confusion between nation and state. The origin of this confusion, as
suggested by Yael Tamir, is that 'it is part of a deliberate attempt to obscure the
difference between the claim that every nation ought to have a state — or rather,
that every state ought to derive its legitimacy from a nation — and the claim that
a nation is a state'. 43 Tempting as it may be to develop that hypothesis further,
we will instead turn to the issue of disentangling the two concepts used.
The state is to be fundamentally distinguished from the nation because it is a
political unit that is an independent power externally and a supreme authority
internally. As Seton-Watson properly emphasised, a state is 'a legal and political
organisation with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens,'
while the nation is 'a community of people, whose members are bound together
40.As quoted in Hobsbawm (1992), p. 44.
41.Keating (1988), p. 23.
42.Taylor (1985), p. 113.
43.Tamir (1993), p. 60.
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by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness'." In other
words, the state is a political and territorial entity, whereas the nation includes a
wide range of subjective components, such as being an 'imagined community'.
It is generally not possible to identify one with the other (with the exception of a
few cases, as Walker Connor has shown), but if doing so it is important to note,
as Keating rightly does, that 'in so far as the nation is identified with the state,
then any weakening of the latter entails a weakening of the former'. 45 Loyalty to
the nation may well coincide with loyalty to the state, but that only occurs when
the entity in question is a nation-state. Hence confusion is bound to arise when
considering the correlation between nation and state.
It is in terms of common territory and citizenship that state and nation
conceptually overlap, but as Anthony Smith notes, 'the nation is a political
community only in so far as it embodies a common culture and a common social
will'.46 The belief that while 'the term state can be defined independently of the
term nation, the term nation cannot be defined independently of the term state'47
suggests that for a people to think of their community as constituting a united
nation is to think of it as a potential state. Such thinking is encouraged and
facilitated by the political ideology of nationalism, a subject that is now to be
examined.
44.Seton-Watson (1977), p. 1.
45.Keating (1988), p. 24.
46.A. D. Smith, (1992) p. 62.
47.Tamir (1996), p. 86.
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2.2 Nationalism
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though
long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes
pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and
often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality"
2.2.1 The nationalist doctrine
Myth and reality are much debated in the study of nationalism, which serves as
the tool for constructing the modern, political form of the nation. Nationalism is
hence a doctrine in essence based on the idea that every nation should have its
own state. This idea emerged in the eighteenth century, grew into a major
political force in the nineteenth century and became the dominating factor in
politics of the twentieth century. The long-established political and cultural
entities of France and England had long been in existence at the time of the
emergence of the idea and they may be taken as prototypes for the type of
political entity envisaged by the new doctrine. This belief of nations being the
natural political units, the base on which states and governments were to rest
became an ideal, and were to be fulfilled in the twentieth century throughout the
world. It stipulated that sovereignty lay with the people, rejecting the personal
authority of the monarch over the state's sovereignty. These ideas of popular
sovereignty were brought into existence by the French Revolution, and
essentially carry the meaning that if political reality were a reflection of the
nationalist image of the world, 'the map would consist of states based on
culturally distinctive groups occupying homogenous, compact and mutually
exclusive national territories'.49
Accepting the doctrine of nationalism to have emerged with Europe's modern
age, it would be appropriate to take the French Enlightenment and the German
Romanticism as parallel starting points. The Enlightenment believed that the
48.Gellner (1983a), pp. 48-49.
49.Orridge (1981), P . 45.
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state created the nation, whereas the Romantics argued that the nation, its
people, created the state. The type of nationalism represented by the French was
characterised by individual liberty, equality and a perspective of
cosmopolitanism. This emerged alongside the French nation-state, formed in
1789. The German nation-state, established in 1870, was based on an ideology
that had emerged in the first decade of the nineteenth century and its Romantic
principles, ethnic and cultural in character, was in stark contrast with the French
ideas.
The core doctrine of nationalism, which is regarded as general to all
nationalisms, argues that a great many different individual nations constitute the
world. This mosaic of nations should be organised in a system of nation-states so
as to secure world order and peace. Moreover, nations are portrayed as the
natural units of society, having particular characteristics and displaying a
cultural homogeneity based upon shared interests and shared experiences. In
order to genuinely express its culture, each of these nations needs its own
sovereign state, a claim consolidated by the fact that all nations have an
indisputable right to the territory constituting its homeland. The nation is
moreover the source of all political power, and loyalty to it takes priority over all
other loyalties. The doctrine further holds that every individual must belong to a
nation, in which his or her primary loyalty lies, as it is only through the nation
that the individual can find and express true freedom. 5° Hence the central
element of 'general' nationalism is 'the notion that there is or should be some
intimate connection between broad cultural similarities and political
organisation'. 51 In other words, there is a need for nations and states to coincide:
the causa sine qua non for individual and collective freedom and peace is the
strengthening of the nation-state.
In addition to this general, basic notion that has a very broad application despite
its shortcomings, every nationalism has its particularities, its own character,
termed special secondary theories. 52 These will be examined below and referred
5°. Tivey (1981a), pp. 5-6 and A. D. Smith (1973), p. 10.
si . Orridge (1981), pp. 39-40.
S2. Smith (1982), p. 150.
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to as classification of nationalisms.
The roots of the complex political phenomenon of nationalism may indeed be
found long before it reached its present form. The 'ideological' idea of nations to
have existed since ancient times may be termed 'retrospective nationalism' or,
from a different perspective, simply `patriotism'. 53 Its characteristic modem
form, the ideology, was conceived in the early nineteenth century, as Elie
Kedourie asserts: 'Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning
of the l9' century'. 54 Also Anthony Smith (who holds a perennialist view and
derives modern nations from fundamental ethnic ties) agrees and states that
'nationalism, as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon'.55
Any pre-nineteenth century nations could then be said to have been waiting to
come to life, as ethnic groups possessing the relevant characteristics but lacking
its, from the outside, most important feature. These may be regarded as pre-
national groups or potential nations. 56 'A nation must be an idea as well as a fact
before it can become a dynamic force' Barker claimed, 57 but perhaps these
potential nations develop into nations rather than first lacking, then acquiring
this consciousness. It would therefore not be proper to speak of nations as
dramatically materialising overnight. Transforming from an ethnic group into a
nation requires a self-conscious desire for autonomy.
Ernest Gellner, however, argues that 'nationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist', 58 and
discards the idea that the nationalist doctrine signifies the awakening of nations
to self-consciousness. On the contrary, he says, nationalism is 'the crystallization
of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using
as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-
53.A. D. Smith coined the former (1999, P. 38) whereas Ernest Gellner would confess to the
latter. Gellner in fact views nationalism as 'a perennial part of human life ... which becomes
pervasive and dominant only under certain social conditions, which in fact prevail in the modern
world, and nowhere else' (1983a,), p. 138.
54.Kedourie (1960), p. 9.
55.Smith, A. D. (1986a), p. 18 (italics added).
56 , Connor (1978), p. 385.
57.Barker (1927) p. 173.
58.Gellner (1964), p. 168.
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nationalist world'. 59 Gellner links the progress of nationalism to the processes of
modernisation and industrialisation and the subsequent emergence of a national
bourgeoisie. An increasingly modernised and industrialised society supposedly
required a united, standardised culture and a common language for the majority
of the population. Hence, according to Gellner, in a theory centring on the way
in which the role of culture in society changed with modernisation, nationalism
is a product of industrialisation. However, if nationalism were indeed an
unquestionable result of industrialism, it may have been expected to have
gradually decreased in strength and relinquished its position as a major political
force in an age of highly advanced industrialism. The fact that nationalism in
this new millennium appears to be stronger than ever before calls for some
modifications of Gellner's theory.
Just as difficult as capturing the essence of nation, is finding a 'right' approach
to its political ideology, and the huge range of explanatory and definitive
attempts made differ substantially. A classical definition of nationalism is that of
Kenneth Minogue, who in 1967 characterised the idea as 'a political movement,
which seeks to attain and defend an objective we may call national integrity'.60
He put great emphasis on nationalism as political programme, a programme for
political action. Gellner's theory, as we have seen, puts the greatest emphasis on
material conditions in forming political thought and social change, and suggests
an essentially economic reason for the rise of nationalism. Moreover, he
maintains that nationalism was successful largely because it met the needs of the
time. Michael Mann has a similar approach and argues that nationalism
developed in response to the development of the modern state. 61 Whereas the
modernists believe in the modernity of nationalism, Anthony Smith, from his
perennialist perspective, centres on ethnicity as its foundation, arguing that the
essence of the novel thoughts leading to the creation of national consciousness
and nationalism were present in pre-national communities.
59 . Id. (1983), pp. 48-49.
69 . Minogue (1967), p. 25.
61 . Mann (1995).
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Unlike Gellner, Benedict Anderson emphasises the emotional appeal of
nationalism, as does Hans Kohn, considering nationalism to be 'an act of
consciousness'. 62 Indeed, to adopt an entirely functional approach, such as that
of Gellners, to explain nationalism, would leave the substantial emotions it
engenders unaccounted for. Also Anthony Giddens adheres to this thought. In
contrast to his strictly institutional definition of a nation, he regards nationalism
to be 'in substantial part a psychological phenomenon', which, he continues,
'feeds upon, or represents an attenuated form of those 'primordial sentiments' of
which Geertz speaks in tribal societies or village communities'. 63 Because of the
imaginary nature of the nation, (a notion Giddens, however, would not seem to
be naturally supporting) nationalism is endowed with this psychological
component, which makes it a largely non-rational phenomenon. Such a
characteristic may, however, not be exclusive to nationalism as an expression of
`groupness'. Hayes suggests that as 'social animals', it is natural for human
beings to live in and be loyal to groups. Such entities do not necessarily have to
be nationalities, on the contrary, during much of recorded history, these groups
have taken the shape of tribes, clans, cities, provinces, or associations of various
kinds. Accordingly, Giddens' nationalism is 'but one expression of human
instinct', and as such not 'more natural or more "latent" than tribalism' (as one
fitting example).64
James Mayall identifies three great ages of nationalism: first, the early
nineteenth century establishment of new Latin American states, second, the
enlargement resulting from Versailles, and third, the great expansion following
decolonisation.65 To this John Hall has added a fourth era, namely what the
collapse of the Russian empire has brought about, in terms of the creation of new
nation-states and nationalist revival.66
In the general development of the ideology, three main phases can be
distinguished. The first phase, referred to as 'intellectual', sees the development
62.Kohn (1944), p. 10.
63.Giddens (1981b), p. 193.
64.Hayes (1949), p. 292.
65.Mayall (1990), p. 64.
66.Hall (1993), p. 4.
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of a cultural basis: concerning language, common history and traditions, initiated
by the intellectual middle class. What follows on this is the `agitatory' phase,
when politicisation and mass mobilisation occur, resulting in the third phase of
political mass movement. 67 The 'masses' would then not be directly responsible
for the rise of nationalism. It would first get under way in the 'intellectual ranks'
and to have received decisive impetus from the support of the middle classes
before reaching the 'masses'. Important to note is that in order to achieve
popular effects, not only does the seed have to be good, it also has to fall on
fertile ground. In other words, for the idea (preferably crafted by individuals
influential with the people) to take root people need to have a basic
consciousness of nationality, a basic sense of belonging to the group —
`peoplehood'.
Nationalism has, in its four classic types, evolved from a humanitarian prototype
through the periods of Jacobinism, Traditionalism and Liberalism into an
integral form that can take on many different expressions. As an essential part of
the Enlightenment, humanitarianism served as the basis of Jacobin nationalism,
which aimed at protecting and extending the liberty, equality and fraternity
established during the period of the humanitarian democratic nationalism. This
was largely based on the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and came to develop
into a supreme sort of nationalism relying greatly on force and militarism,
marked by fanatical religiousness and intolerance of internal dissent. Mainly
associated with the extreme actions and sentiments of the French Revolution,
Jacobinism also featured some remarkable achievements, such as the new
educational institutions used for patriotic purposes. 'An abiding legacy of
Jacobin nationalism', as expressed by Hayes, is its secularisation of Christianity,
which has contributed a great deal to the strength of nationalism during the
following centuries. 68 The basis of the revolutionary Jacobinism, reason and
revolution, was countered by history and tradition of its 'counter-nationalism',
the evolutionary Traditionalism, which 'sought to reconcile loyalty to the
67.P. 121 in Miroslav Hroch (1968), Die Vorkeimpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen
Veilkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der
patriotischen Gruppen [The Champions for the national movements of Europe's smaller nations.
A comparative analysis of the social strata in patriotic groups], Praha, quoted in Tagil (1995b),
p. 25.
68.Hayes (1949), see chap 3 on Jacobin nationalism and pp. 75-76 for quote.
76
national state with continuing loyalty to ... locality and ... traditional
Christianity' 69
Liberal nationalism is, as Hayes puts it, 'midway between Jacobin and
traditional nationalism'. 70
 With its origins in eighteenth century England, it
endeavoured to combine national and liberal characteristics with democratic
ones. National self-determination of peoples was promoted unconditionally:
indeed, every nationality was to have its own independent state, which called for
a total redrawing of the political map of the world. This would in effect mean
'the dissolution of each imperial domain into its constituent national elements
and at the same time the unification of disjointed parts of a nationality into a new
commonwealth'. 71 Such a development was viewed to be serving the true
interests of all of humanity.
Integral nationalism has often been termed 'the last classic type of nationalism'
and 'a reaction to Versailles'. 72
 It is the opposite of liberalism and is to all
intents and purposes based on ethnicity, epitomised in early twentieth century
German nationalism. Contrary to humanitarianism, Jacobinism in its initial form,
and liberal nationalism - all concerned with exploited or subjugated nationalities
— integral nationalism deals with politically independent and united nationalities
and places individual interests as well as those of humanity as a whole firmly
underneath national interests. 73 Of these four forms, liberal nationalism is
potentially the most interesting one for the purpose of outlining a positive
development of nationalism alongside the rather certain survival of the more
destructive forms of the ideology, and as such it will reappear further down
under the classification of nationalisms.
Nationalism is not a phenomenon in passing. Within established nations the
ideological habits are constantly reproduced, and the nation is daily 'flagged' for
69 • Ibid. p. 111.
7°. Ibid. p. 120.
71 . Ibid. p. 135.
72 , Hall (1993), P . 12.
73 . Hayes (1949), pp . 165-166.
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its people — in other words, nationalism is an endemic condition. The modern
state may be on the decline (an issue examined in the following chapter) but
there is no corresponding decline on the horizon for the force of nationalism.
Rather, the fact that post-modern nationalism seems to have simultaneously
emerged with the devaluation of the nation-state concept indicates that this
phenomenon is not restricted to the narrow framework of the modern nation-
state. Neither is it restricted to one easily distinguishable shape, but appears in a
great many versions and under different names.
2.2.2 Classification of nationalisms
Nationalism unified Germany and France, consolidated France and restored
political independence to Greece, Finland and Norway, to name a few. The same
force was also responsible for breaking up large empires such as the Ottoman
and Russian. Historical events such as these give a face to the different forms of
nationalism, and also point at the 'political power of nationalisms' that Benedict
Anderson contrasts with 'their philosophical poverty and even incoherence', 75 as
the foregoing discussion indicated.
Neither clearly definable an ideology nor one that in its entirety is transferable
from one place to another, nationalism is adopted as well as adaptedm in the
widest range of situations by political leaders who choose very different
elements of the loosely defined original models. The ideas of nationalism are
therefore in a constant state of being modified, deconstructed as conditions
dictate and reconstructed to suit new circumstances in different environments. A
general type of nationalism does not encompass the multitude of situations in
which the notions of nation, nationality and state and the relationship between
them gain importance.
74,An expression borrowed from Billig: (1995), p. 6.
75,Anderson (1991), p. 5.
76,Orridge (1981), p. 53 (italics added).
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Hence it must be acknowledged that the full spectrum of nationalist possibilities
is unlikely to be encapsulated in any one definition or explanation of nationalism
offered to the form it takes in society. Those analysts who have typologised
nationalisms seem to have distinguished between nationalism in general and
specific nationalist movements in history. By classifying and distinguishing the
different forms of nationalism one can get a picture of how the concepts of
nation, state and the ideology of nationalism have been applied in practice.
For the purposes of the current study, several different forms of nationalism have
been distinguished in an attempt to evaluate the wide range of feasible
nationalist expressions. The ones identified are state nationalism, unification
nationalism, separation nationalism, liberation/anti-colonial/anti-imperialist
nationalism, renewal nationalism, ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism, liberal
nationalism and minority nationalism.
2.2.2.1 State nationalism
The key examples of state nationalism are England and France, where state
preceded nation or even produced nation. This would be regarded as the first and
certainly most influential kind of nationalism and resulted in what Orridge terms
prototype nation-states. 77
 Such states could be identified with particular cultures,
and the state and the culture carried the same name. 'The state itself does not
merely reflect the qualities of nations: it fashions them', as Tivey expresses the
circumstances. 78 At this point in history nationalism as an ideology was not fully
developed, hence it would be fair to say that, in this case, nation preceded
nationalism. In these states the primary political loyalty of the majority of the
populations was to the state and this internal unity at the core prevented any
large-scale rebellions and separatist tendencies. Modern nationalism argues that
all states should develop along the same lines as these prototype nation-states,
portrayed as the ultimate model for successful state-formation efforts.
77.Ibid. pp. 42-43.
78.Tivey (1981a), p. 5.
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2.2.2.2 Unification nationalism
Unification nationalism traces its roots from pre-Napoleonic wars Europe where
Germany and Italy were mosaics of small independent states, established by the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1649. After 1800, nationalism became the justification
for uniting most of the German autonomous entities under Prussian leadership
creating an all-encompassing German nation-state, a development that also saw
the transformation of the Italian units into an Italian nation-state." These
examples have all the typical qualities of unification nationalist ideology, and
the German and Italian experiences remain its central most important models.
2.2.2.3 Separation nationalism
The overwhelming majority of successful nationalisms have involved the
disintegration of existing sovereign states. Particularly the Ottoman, Russian and
Austro-Hungarian Empires fell victim to separation nationalisms when a large
number of new states emerged during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.° Considering various recent developments around the world, it
becomes clear that this type of nationalism is not a phenomenon of the past.
There are serious separation nationalist movements in 'core countries' like
Britain (Scotland) and Spain (Basque country), 'new' or modern-day nationalist
movements that are substantially different from those of the nineteenth century.
Tom Nairn argues that the loss of the empire and with that, the loss of prestige
and economic advantage, was an important reason as to why peripheral regions
in the United Kingdom felt less committed to the central state. 81 Neither the
Scottish nor the Basque have been successful in their bid for independence, but
have nonetheless been granted political concessions within the framework of the
existing states.
79 . Orridge (1981), p. 44.
so. Ibid. pp. 45-46.
81
. Tom Nairn (1977), The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism, London: New Left
Books.
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2.2.2.4 Liberation/Anti-colonial/Anti-imperialist nationalism
The probably most common form of nationalism is the one representing the
break-up of European overseas empires. Virtually all such movements for
independence have emerged as national liberation movements in protest of the
colonial powers. 82 This type of nationalism is one of the main forms taken by the
ideology. It has indeed as Breuilly states 'developed in a vast range of societies
and its successes have transformed the political map of the world'. 83 In
liberation, anti-colonial or anti-imperialist nationalism, aspects of both
cosmopolitan French nationalism and anti-enlightenment German nationalism
can be detected, as both models have influenced the character of national
movements and emerging nation-states everywhere. Chatterjee views that as
profoundly contradictory since
It is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates... It is imitative in that it
accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it also involves a
rejection ... of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also
cherished as marks of identity."
Original liberation/anti-colonial/anti-imperialism nationalism was largely based
on opposition to suppression by an alien power, which meant that the
nationalists were united only in their desire to shake off colonial rule. The state
that was created as result of this was often found to precede nationalism in that
there existed no other common identity for its citizens than anti-colonialism.85
This sort of nationalism would then after independence from the colonial power
be likely to transform into state nationalism. Hence it would be appropriate to
conclude that liberation/anti-colonial nationalism is a temporary form of
nationalist expression, not genuine nationalist movements since 'their potential
is exhausted with the achievements of their goal of independence from the
colonial power'.86
82.Orridge (1981), pp. 48-49.
83.Breuilly (1993), p. 156.
84.Chatterjee (1998), p. 2.
85.Cf. views of Hans Kohn (1944).
86.Smith, A. D. (1991), p. 108.
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2.2.2.5 Renewal nationalism 
Peripheral areas possessing ancient cultures that were never seized by a
European empire often went about imitating state nationalism of the core using
methods similar to unification nationalism. Such countries had a long history as
ethnic communities, old cultures that made it easy to build a new or renewed
nationalism. 87 Past greatness was seized upon for this nationalism of renewal,
exemplified by Iran - once a supreme political and military nation long before
Western great powers came into existence - rediscovering its Persian heritage.
2.2.2.6 Ethnic nationalism
In the twentieth century, as modernisation and industrialisation got under way
and the theory of individualism gained ground in society, it would have been
reasonable to believe that the importance of ethnicity in combination with
nationalist thought would decrease radically. This, however, would be an
incorrect assumption. On the contrary, politically expressed ethnicity has grown
in significance throughout the world, particularly in the second half of the
century. Such a development may not have been completely unexpected since
nationalism could easily be understood as an expansion of ethnic sentiment to
include desires for political autonomy, to make the boundaries of the ethnic
group coincide with those of its self-government. As an extension of ethnicity, it
essentially attaches the desire for political autonomy to the shared
characteristics. As argued by Edwards, 'both notions rest upon a sense of
community which can have many different tangible manifestations'.88
Ethno-nationalism, a term launched by Connor, 89 is a dynamic concept that
'focuses on the self-determination of the historically given ... community of
87.Orridge (1981), pp. 49-50.
88.Edwards (1985), p. 15.
89.Walker Connor (1973), 'The politics of Ethno-Nationalism', Journal of International Affairs,
Vol. 27, pp. 1-21.
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culture and of ancestral belonging'. 90
 It appeals to people on the basis of
ethnicity and, interlinked, language and in certain cases also religion. It is about
turning an ethnic community into a political nation. 9I A person's deepest
attachments are, according to the doctrine of ethnic nationalism, inherited and
not chosen (as civic nationalism holds — see below). The individual is, moreover,
defined by the national community, not the reverse, which creates a situation
where force rather than consent form the basis of communal unity by a
nationalist regime that easily becomes more authoritarian than democratic in
nature.92
An ethno-nationalist movement would almost certainly be territorially based,
and making such a clear distinction between 'ethnic nationalism' and 'territorial
nationalism' as Anthony Smith does, appears rather debatable. 93 To a greater or
lesser extent, all nationalisms contain elements of ethnicity, whereby it may be
more precise to 'distinguish between nationalisms which claim territory on the
basis of putative common ethnicity and those which attempt to construct ethnic
commonality within an already-occupied territory' .94
Ethnic nationalism is the type of nationalism that is most under scrutiny for
being likely to take on malign nationalistic expressions. It may be categorised as
vicious in nature and entirely destructive, but, seen from a different perspective,
the ethno-nationalists could also be regarded as representing David against
Goliath. It is not unusual for ethnic nationalism to feature in a minority
nationalist movement.
2.2.2.7 Civic nationalism
Civic or territorial nationalism, also termed 'constitutional patriotism' and 'post-
90.MacCormick (1999), P. 126.
91.Smith, A. D. (1999), p. 41.
92.Ignatieff (1994), p. 5.
93.As evident in his Theories of Nationalism (1971).
94.Jenkins (1997), p. 146.
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nationalism', 95
 promotes a sense of common belonging among the citizens of a
society and regards the nation as 'open to all who come under and accept the
jurisdiction of the civic institutions'.96
A nation's composition in terms of ethnicity, language, race and religion is
irrelevant in this form of nationalism, which maintains that the unity of the
nation comes from the patriotic attachment of its equal rights-bearing citizens to
a shared set of political practices and values. It is a 'nationalism of order and
control'. 97 Sovereign state nationalism, as outlined above, could be interpreted as
promoting every sovereign state to actively inspire in its citizens a one-nation
civic nationalism.
2.2.2.8 Liberal nationalism
Considered a successor to Herder's cultural pluralism, liberal nationalism refers
to the post-sovereignty politics of a new nation-state when the need arises to
'neutralise' the particularism of its nationalism, to redefine the nationalist
principle in an acceptably universalistic manner: that is, 'to pursue a national
vision while remaining faithful to a set of liberal beliefs'. 98 As was the case with
the liberal nationalism that emerged two centuries ago, emphasis remains on the
absolute sovereignty of the national state, but the implications of the principle
are to be regulated by an equally strong emphasis on individual liberties within
each national state. However, the utopia of the eighteenth century liberal
nationalists in promoting that each and every nationality should transform into a
political independent entity with its own constitutional government finds little or
no support in contemporary scholarship.
Modern liberal nationalists seek to incorporate the thoughts of liberalism, which
calls for a widely acknowledged view of the rights individuals are entitled to,
with those of nationalism that retains particular rights for its people, in other
95 . Fine (1999), p. 149.
98 . MacCormick (1999), p. 126.
97 . Smith, A. D. (1999), p. 41.
98 , Tamir (1993), p. 5.
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words 'to define the content of a nationalist principle or principles in a
satisfactorily universalistic way'. 99 Since liberal nationalism holds that as culture
and belonging to a nation are communal features, their full value can only be
adequately recognised and enjoyed to the fullest together with those feeling the
same attachments and making the same choices. Therefore, as liberals recognise
these significant features held sacred by nationalists, the latter could be expected
to acknowledge the importance of individual rights and personal autonomy.ioo
2.2.2.9 Minority nationalism
Minority nationalism is a wide notion and has, like any other nationalism,
certain structural characteristics. Specified by Colin Williams, the generalisable
features of minority nationalist movements number about ten, the first one
naturally being defence of the homeland, the unique territory over which a
continuous struggle persists between the minority political movement and the
hegemonic state. Intimately connected to that is defending the specific culture
and identity of the minority: language and religion being the most common
diacritical markers of the nationality, indicating their separateness from the
majority of the state.
A minority nationalist movement fiercely resists any centralist trends aimed at
integration of the national homeland into the core state, and it is relatively
powerless concerning decision-making. It moreover holds a perception of
systematic exploitation and underdevelopment - what Williams terms structural
discrimination. Another characteristic feature is the sometimes aggressive
resistance to outsiders in the shape of immigrants, settlers or colonisers, often
seen as representing hegemonic ambitions of the state in its wish to spread and
consolidate its dominant culture. Concomitant with such resistance is the fear of
losing the dominance and influence held locally, a loss that may be induced
through cultural attrition.
99 . MacCormick (1999), p. 130.
' 00 . Tam ir (1993), pp. 6-8.
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Minority nationalism is further characterised by ethnic dissent, which may take
violent as well as non-violent forms. The persistence of inequalities between the
minority nation and the majority nation(s) constituting the state shapes the
minority's nationalist ideology and defines its contemporary identity. The
questioning of the political legitimacy of the regime in power often constitute
the political rationale for minority nationalist movements to emerge and prosper,
targeting their political action at forming a new basis for legitimacy. 101
um . Williams (1994), PP. 234-8.
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2.3 The paradoxical force of nationalism: benign or malign?
Just as a classification of nationalisms was deemed to be constructive, so it
appears appropriate to distinguish between various aspects of nationalism, as it
has shown itself to be a phenomenon with more than one face. Nationalism
could be an integrative force but it also has very divisive potentialities. This
political doctrine is responsible for the creation of cohesive national
communities and legitimate nation-states, but it also represents a darker side to
humanity, i.e. that of aggressive antagonism, prejudicial behaviour and
belligerence. Such different expressions to the same phenomenon should not
astonish considering that it was the same process that created the nation-state
and its dialectical opposite, the concept of statelessness.
If accepting Benedict Anderson's theory of the nation as an imaginary identity-
construct, nationalism could be seen as a method to represent history. If history
is being reinterpreted to suit the current collective needs of the community,
nationalism becomes a very selective and distortive ideology, and as such, a
malign force. With an imaginary identity-construct constituting its base,
nationalism becomes 'a mode of representation of history, a history that itself is
being continually reinterpreted in the light of the constructs of nationalism'.IO2
This approach emphasises the 'mythic' quality of the idea of the nation, at the
root of which lie ideas associated with German Romanticism. In this 'ethnic
shape', nationalism by definition establishes a distance to other people. It
encourages an 'us-and-them' thinking that entertains the idea of superiority of
the own group over all other nationalities. To refer to oneself as Kurdish, for
instance, draws a psychological boundary around oneself and those claiming the
same Kurdish identity. This practice of shutting others out is one of the less
desirable features of the doctrine. These elements of inclusion and exclusion are
inherent in nationalism, since the ideology has such a strong element of group
identification.
102 , Smith, A. D. (1986b), pp . 240-241.
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The disastrous potential of nationalism can be seen in many places, perhaps most
notably in the modern history of Europe. m The imperialistic nationalism of
powerful states has often harassed internal minorities, 'defining enmity so as to
justify territorial aggrandisement and enhanced state power'.''inward-It is the i
and backward-looking perspective of nationalism that has been the focus of
criticism: its inherent disdain of other groups. Its emphasis on groupness (in the
meaning of allegiance) can interfere with the rights of the individual to full
recognition and liberation and in this sense nationalism is 'a danger to the
integrity of individuals' rather than 'an element of their individuality'. 105
 As
nationalism elevates the nation over individual members it in the process curtails
the freedom of the individual. A staunch nationalist's devotion to his/her cause
virtually abolishes the division between individual and group and this easily
causes mistreatment of individual members. This tendency of the doctrine to de-
emphasise the rights and interests of the individual may be summed up as
follows: 'the nation may do whatever it will; the individual may do only what
the national state determines'. 106 In addition, in some nationalist thought, the
interest of the nation is put before those of humanity as a whole, making it a
potentially very dangerous ideology.
The creation of a nation-state — 'the triumph of a particular nationalism d07 -
signifies acquiring the monopoly of the means of violence, which in the process
is used aplenty in defeating alternative nationalisms. Hence violence is
intricately bound up with the active practice of nationalism. Such an
interpretation of the ideology was not contemplated by the nineteenth century
intellectual Ernest Renan, who put forward a 'sensible' type of nationalism. His
very balanced view of this political phenomenon was that the different
perspectives of a large variety of nations provided for the emergence of an
overall humanity. This was to be the ultimate contribution of nations. 108 Such a
global outlook is not adhered to by the majority of nationalists, but it represents
1 °3 . As convincingly argued by Keduorie (1961), pp. 138-139.
104 . MacCormick (1996), p. 47.
los .
 Ibid. p. 34.
106 , Hayes (1949), p. 69.
mi . Billig (1995), p. 28.
los , See H. Psichari (ed.) (1947 org. 1882), Oeuvres completes de Ernest Renan, Paris: Calmann-
UN'Y'
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one form of nationalism which could be good for humanity.
In a similar positive vein, Smith contemplates the 'advantages and blessings' of
nationalism, which he sees as inspiration to all kinds of cultural activities,
having produced cultural manifestations of great significance. Thus, he
concludes, it would be wrong to consider only the negative features possessed by
nationalism. 109 Indeed, to conceptually limit nationalism to a purely political
movement as does John Breuilly, 110 is unjustifiably restrictive, since features
with indisputable and direct relevance to the concept, such as culture and
identity that substantially add to its power, remain unaccounted for. A vocal
critic of such an approach is John Hutchinson, who emphasises the significance
of cultural forms of the doctrine and offers an important insight into 'a cultural
nationalism that seeks a moral regeneration of the community'. 111 Cultural
nationalism (as set forth in Herder's writings) is indeed a force in its own right
and one that tends to alternate in strength with political nationalism (connected
with the teachings of Rousseau) with which it constantly influences and in turn
is influenced by. This could mean that cultural nationalism would follow when
political nationalism has come to a dead end, and in doing so may even reach
and mobilise members of the nation thus far unaffected by the national spirit.112
The thought of cultural nationalism is therefore essentially to provide some
legitimacy and space for national aspirations of mainly a cultural character,
providing a benign sort of nationalism that would adopt as its basis principles of
universalism rather than those of particularism.
The argument of Kohn that cultural nationalism was succeeded by a 'rational'
political nationalism in mid-nineteenth century once a middle class had emerged
on the political scene, 113 cannot be approved without reservations. Conditions in
one place are seldom duplicated in another, but viewing the benign cultural and
the malign political nationalism as competing forces on the political arena — the
1 °9 . Smith, A. D. (1971) P. 14.
11 °, Breuilly (1993) (His position is fully outlined in the introductory chapter of his book.)
l l I , Hutchinson (1994), p. 41,
112.Such a development is in the Irish case scrutinized by Hutchinson in chapter four of his The
Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation
Stale, (1987), London: Allen & Unwin.
113.Kohn (1944), chapter 7.
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former communitarian and the latter state-oriented - may be more suitable an
approach. They may even operate in alternating cycles, as Hutchinson
suggests.'
That nationalism is not an inherently negative phenomenon may be true in
theory. In practice, however, the self-consciousness characterising the nationalist
doctrine inevitably appears to lead to the exploitation of others. Herder's cultural
form of nationalism, which envisages a world of political units founded
exclusively on nations, accompanied by a desirability to preserve cultural
diversity, is as benign as any powerful idea could conceivably be. It is, however,
often when failing to realise the nationalist ideal to its full extent that peace is
put at risk and instability likely to ensue. 115 Gellner acknowledges the positive
potential of the doctrine but believes that the peaceful implementation of the
nationalist principle is difficult due to 'the specific nature of the world we
happen to live in, which militates against any impartial, general, sweetly
reasonable nationalism'.II6
Since the basis of shared allegiance is constitutional principles rather than
common ethnicity, civic nationalism is often regarded as the opposite of the
potentially exploitative ethnocentric exclusionary nationalism. However, civic
cannot be used interchangeably with benign as concerns nationalism. Michael
Ignatieff explains: 'In societies where a majority ethnic group defines the
content of national symbols and traditions to the exclusion of others, it is easy
for 'civic' values to become an instrument of oppression'. I 17 Recognising the
heterogeneity of the modern nation-state, the nonetheless generally inclusive and
tolerant civic nationalism may be the only antidote to exclusive and intolerant
ethnic nationalism. In the civic nationalistic worldview the state defines the
nation, whereas ethno-nationalists maintain that nation defines the state. As
Robert Fine puts it: 'in the dualism of 'civic' versus 'ethnic' nationalism, the
latter appears to the former as backward, but the former appears to the latter as
114,Hutchinson (1994), chapter 3.
115,Smith, A. D. (1981), p. 199.
116 . Gellner (1983a), p. 2.
Ill Ignatieff (1999), p. 144.
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the bearer of a new 'orientalism'. I I 8
Michael Mann believes aggressive nationalism to be 'a perverted form of the
drive towards democracy'.' ' 9 This he contrasts with the democratically achieved
mild nationalism. Mann thus considers exclusionary nationalism to be largely the
product of unsuccessful attempts to institutionalise democracy, and achieving
federal, inter-regional democracy would do away with aggressive forms of
nationalism. I20
 This may address the circumstances where nationalists, in
seeking to rectify their national situation characterised by inequalities and
imperfections caused by past injustice, in their quest for improvements often
create more of the same.
As for the terminology of the positive and negative dimensions of the ideology
Ignatieff makes an interesting distinction, which is worth noting in passing. He
distinguishes between patriotism, as being the benign sort of nationalism
exemplified by love of country and national solidarity, and nationalism, with the
malign characteristics of intolerance and violence. The difference between the
two is that 'a patriot loves a country which already exists, whereas a nationalist
often loves a country which does not.' Hence 'patriotism', he continues, 'is the
privilege of those with states', while nationalism is the language of the
stateless'. 12I With this terminology a nationally conscious Kurd, for instance,
would be a nationalist, (under present circumstances) not a patriot.
To conclude this brief discussion on the benign and malign features of
nationalism, it appears fair to say that nationalism is intrinsically neither good
nor bad, although the negative impact of the ideology is more in evidence than
its positive effects. As Michael Ignatieff notes,
it is not one thing in many disguises, but many things in many disguises;
nationalist principles can have dreadful consequences in one place, and innocuous
118,Fine (1999), p. 153.
119,Mann (1995), p. 44.
120,Ibid. pp. 62-63.
12 ', Ignatieff (1999), p. 142.
91
or positive ones in another place. Context is al1.122
There will always be certain principles that people adhere to worldwide, but
equally certain is that the differences that exist between people producing those
exclusive particularities are bound to persist. This reality explains why
nationalism is to be a permanent fusion of the universally accepted and the
objectionable particular. Nationalism is also an expression of identity, the
underlying components of which are now to be identified and examined.
122 . Id. (1994), p. 9.
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Chapter 3: The Components of Kurdish Socio-Political Identity
3.1 Class
The term class indicates a division of society, a system of social ranking and
distribution of power. Class structure may also imply conflict, suggesting
domination and dependence.' Although the significance and political weight of
the Kurdish class system may still be rather limited, it is deemed that bringing
this element into the discussion will contribute to the formation of a solid
understanding of crucial aspects of the structure of Kurdish society, and build on
the previous discussions of nationalism and its development in Kurdistan.
3.1.1 Classical paradigms
When theorising and conceptualising class, the writings of Karl Marx are an
appropriate starting-point. 2
 According to fundamental Marxist thought, a class is
defined by its relationship to the means of production. Economic relations are
based on property: a class either controls a factor of production - as does the
bourgeoisie - or it does not — as characterised by the proletariat. Marx believed
that economic domination and political domination are firmly linked insofar as
control of the means of production generates political control. The division of
classes thus represented a division of both property and power, which was
manifested in relations between 'exploiters and exploited' and 'oppressors and
oppressed' (frequent terminology in particularly the Communist Manifesto). The
following quotation illustrates this relationship:
I . Berld (1986), P. 9.
2 . 'Its importance is due to its intellectual influence on subsequent theories of class and to its
political influence on the revolutionary direction taken by certain societies inspired by his
writings as a whole, and by his unfinished theory of class in particular. Thus, Marx's analysis of
class represents an exercise in both theoretical and applied sociology.' Edgell (1993), p. 2.
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The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal,
patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties
that bound man to his 'natural superiors', and has left remaining to man no other
nexus between man and man than naked self-interest...3
This radical theory was somewhat moderated by Max Weber, who developed
Marx's theory of class into what later became known as the concept of social
stratification. This indicates a division of society into several strata, arranged in
a hierarchical order. Unlike Marx, who focused on conflict between and
polarisation of the classes, the Weberian perspective highlights the class
structure in terms of its problematic nature and inclination to fragmentation.4
Giddens builds on this further and suggests a structure of three main classes: the
property-equipped upper class, the middle class distinguished by knowledge and
skills, and a working class, with its labour-power'. 5 These classes are however
likely to be internally divided, and the number of class fractions that may
emerge out of this makes Giddens model less clear than it would seem at first
glance.
In a wider context, Marx believed that class relations were not affected by
nations and national boundaries, and any importance these held would be even
more reduced with the continued evolution of capitalism. The state was, in
Marxist terms, perceived to be
shaped by its dual internal and external roles of, respectively, inter-class
domination and inter-class competition. Internally ... basically an apparatus
which ensures the domination of ruling classes and the cohesion of class-divided
societies ... externally ... an apparatus of competition between territorially
delimited ruling classes.6
3.Marx and Engels (1888/1998), P. 5.
4. Giddens provides an informative and detailed overview of Weber's theories on social
stratification in his The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, (1973).
5.Giddens (1973), pp. 107-112.
6.Cochrane and Anderson (1986), pp. 211-212.
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Marx's internationalist theory held that the working class, or the proletariat, was
basically an international class, which rejected the notions of nations and
nationalism as well as those of classes and capitalism. 7 Class-consciousness
emerged together with nationalism and although in various ways under different
national and international conditions, the two concepts are linked and
interrelated. 'Nationalism', as Breuilly contends, 'redefines the nature of
legitimate authority'. 8 This comes about since nationalism is often the force that
through change brings new political elites to the centre stage and in the process
supersedes the established ruling class. 'Nationalist politics' can in some
circumstances denote 'crisis politics', 9 and such political crises could make the
ruling class disapprove of nationalism as an ideology and as a movement,
presenting a formidable opposition not easily overcome by advocates of the
national movement.
The development in nineteenth century Europe suggests that class struggles were
fought on a national rather than international level, and as such reinforced the
nation-state politically, culturally and economically as a sovereign unit. In this
process, classes were unified within the boundaries of the state and separated
from their fellow strugglers in foreign lands. This development was not quite
what Marx anticipated, with the nation-state being strengthened rather than
abolished — a development which reflects the previous discussions on the
subject.
3.1.2 Class formation in the Middle East
The nature of class relations within nations and regions differs, and in order to
provide an appropriate background on which to base further analysis, class-
related developments on the regional level will be briefly outlined, as they are
felt to be reflected locally.
7.Outlined in The Communist Manifesto (1888/1998).
8.Breuilly (1993), p. 25.
9.Ibid.
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The traditional classes in Marxist thought, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,
did not clearly emerge in Middle Eastern societies. 1 ° The feudal society, for long
dominant in many areas of the Middle East, characterised by its strict
hierarchical organisation, is by definition divided in strata. In such a setting
political integration tends to be stronger than economic integration, since
'classes do not emerge as a societal wide economic actors'. 11 The feudal class
society gave way in Europe to the capitalist class society, but that pattern was
not followed in the Middle East. Neither the Marxist nor the Weberian
paradigms are wholly suitable for analysing the social composition of Middle
Eastern societies, and the fluidity in the nature of class structure does not
facilitate the application of those Western models to this region.
Landowners together with merchants have been the only permanent classes
indigenous to the region, but their roots can only be traced back to the mid-
nineteenth century. The extensive agrarian reforms that were carried out by
regional governments, such as in Iraq after 1958, stripped the traditional land-
owning classes of their landed assets, but their members did not disappear from
the political stage, as they moved into the commercial or industrial sector.
Richards and Waterbury identify three sets of actors to have emerged after the
agrarian reform, namely the 'new' capitalist farmers, the medium-size
landholders, and the large mass of smallholders. The first group is often
represented by urban dwellers, whose rural interests are commercial in nature.
The next rural stratum controls smaller land holdings and produce mainly for
family subsistence, which means less diversified economic interests. The last
grouping is struggling to make ends meet and these farmers are distinguishable
from landless farmers and rural labour in that they own land, and for that reason
their social status tends to be higher.I2
From this discussion one may reach the conclusion that conventional Marxist
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie is not discernible in Middle Eastern societies.
Another scholar to recognise the weakness of the polarised bourgeoisie and
10.Ayubi (1995), for instance, concerns himself with the 'missing bourgeoisie': see pp. 158-162.
11.Vogler (1985), p. 181.
12.Richards and Waterbury (1990), pp. 403-404.
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proletariat in this region is Ayubi, who points out the absence of these 'polar
classes' and acknowledges the significance of the intermediate social entities.13
Richards and Waterbury point at the petty bourgeoisie as being the social group
to have emerged as the economic and political driving force. This social entity
constitutes 'property-owning, mainly self-employed entrepreneurs in trades,
services, petty manufacturing, and farming, who seldom hire labour'. 14 They are
moreover characterised by 'the small-scale trading and manufacturing segment,
the lower echelons of the new middle class, and those drawn from both segments
but of specifically rural origin', 15
 and the two scholars emphasise that the petty
bourgeoisie is far from a static dynamism.
If it is a class, it does not wish to remain as it is but aspires to some other status...
It does not seek to reproduce itself as a class. Its role ... has been to push its
children on to higher education ... The petty bourgeoisie not only tries constantly
to cast off its skin, but it is ideologically changeable as well. Its constant is a
penchant for activism.16
Thus, it can be concluded that the petty bourgeoisie in the Middle East is hardly
to be viewed as a class, rather an intensely dynamic actor. As a political force,
the petty bourgeoisie is known to have been significant - an illustrative example
would be the bazaaris of Iran who for long have been important actors on the
domestic political arena.
3.1.3 The 'class-divided' society of Kurdistan
As suggested above, a conventional class analysis does not appear to be the most
appropriate instrument with which to examine the fundamental structure on
which the organisation of Kurdish society rests - hence a theory with greater
potential for applicability to Kurdistan has to be identified.
13.Ayubi (1995), pp. 177-178.
14.Richards and Waterbury (1990), p. 410.
15.Ibid. p. 413.
16.Ibid. pp. 413-414.
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Kurdish society could be regarded as resembling what Anthony Giddens terms a
'class-divided society' (as opposed to the class society, brought about by
capitalism). This concept concerns non-capitalist civilisations and describes
societies that are divided along class-lines but show no structure or organisation
according to class divisions. 17 Thus, even if we accept that classes are existing
elements in Kurdish society, it is debatable whether the Kurdish population is
class conscious. 18 The people themselves may not be aware of the social
divisions that theorists say divide their society or may not feel that they belong
to a particular social rank. In other words, 'the members of a class may not be
class-conscious in their behaviour, but their behaviour could nonetheless be
class-conditioned'. I9
 Such a Kurdish reality could well be subject to change in
the future, depending on the direction of political but also economic
development. These sentiments may even be reinforced if the Kurdish region
achieves independence, or conversely subdued if there is long-term continuance
of status quo. In case of the former, one may point to a fact recognised by Samir
Amin, namely should a firm structure of social classes be established within a
state, it does not automatically mean an instant 'entrance of that society into the
central (complete) or peripheral (dominated) capitalist era'. 2° Such a
development in Kurdistan does not seem to be imminent, and should a
'restructured' Kurdish society emerge it is likely to remain on the margins of an
integrated capitalist world community for some time.
The idea of a well-developed class system aside, social cleavages certainly exist
in the Iraqi Kurdish areas. These cleavages have expanded in recent years and
are now manifested in different loosely formed groups as well as between the
ruling elites (especially the KDP and the PUK) and the general population. In
addition to these cleavages, noticeable social divisions have also evolved
between the internal refugees, the Kurds deported from Baghdad-controlled
territories of Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Mosul, 21 and the existing population of the
17.For a discussion of this, see Giddens (1981a), pp. 105-108.
18. See Giddens (1982), pp. 163-168 for a pertinent elaboration on the concept of 'class
consciousness'.
19.Batatu (1978), p. 7.
20.Amin (1980), p. 46.
21.In particular the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk have been subjected to a large-scale depopulation
campaign by the Baathists, aimed at changing the demography from Kurdish to Arab in an area,
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autonomous region.
Brass notes that an economically dominant class may find it to its advantage to
co-operate with external authorities as a means to enhance its own power. 22 This
has been a recurrent theme in Iraqi-Kurdish relations 23 with powerful Kurdish
leaders exchanging the Kurdish cause for the Iraqi/Arab upon being presented
with the right incentives. Such self-interest by the ruling class, or rather
individuals, clearly causes a weakening of the national movement, but again, this
is no indication of an orderly division of the population into classes.
The polarisation of class differences within nations and reduction of differences
between nations as Marx's Communist Manifesto in essence argued for, is not
reflected in Kurdish society, or in Kurdish-Arab relations. On a broader level,
class struggles have not been waged in the international arena, rather on a
national level, which suggests that should Kurdish society in time become more
class-oriented, any conflicts of a class-related nature are unlikely to engage the
masses of the region, let alone internationally. Rather, the nation-state may gain
strength from such a development and expand as opposed to diminish in
importance and influence. This is recognised by Carolyn Vogler in stating that
'class conflict has been associated with a strengthening and expansion of nation-
states and a polarisation of differences between nations'.24
Should the autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq develop into an
independent state, class interests would, in all likelihood, remain subordinated to
national interests whilst the communal interest of strengthening the national
economy is likely to take priority over any aspects of class interests. The
emergence of distinct social classes would also reflect 'the extent of
which has long been considered part of Kurdistan. Thousands of Kirkuld Kurds were uprooted
and directed towards the autonomous region, particularly the area of Suleymaniya, where the
Kurdish authorities on an already tight budget were forced to cope with this massive influx of
refugees. For a detailed account of this ethnic cleansing, see Talabany (1999).
22.Brass (1991), p. 26.
23.There are similarities with Turkey, where particular Kurdish regions have seen economic
integration into the national framework through the co-operative (or submissive, depending on
one's perceptions) actions of powerful Kurdish figures. This is explained by Kendal (1993),
'Kurdistan in Turkey' in Gerard Chaliand (ed.) A People without a country. The Kurds and
Kurdistan, London: Zed, pp. 38-94.
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interdependence established by economic activity, which [would not necessarily]
correspond with states as political units'. 25 It is true that national sovereignty
would encourage the emergence or consolidation of class struggles, but the
continued existence of a nation-state would also hinge on those class relations
being regulated or contained within the national boundaries. Any economic and
cultural ties are likely to extend across political boundaries, so any chances of a
coherent definite class structure to develop and solidify in an independent
Kurdistan confined to the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq would have to be
regarded as slim.
Patterns of social stratification in Kurdish society may well be best understood
in the light of regional analyses, and examined in terms of power relations. As
Ayubi notes, 'very often aspects of horizontal stratification (i.e. class, elites, etc.)
are intermeshed ... with aspects of vertical differentiation (e.g. tribe, sect, ethnie,
etc.)'.26 The vertical differentiation of tribe in particular is interesting in this
context of Kurdish societal organisation, and due consideration will
subsequently be given to tribalism as a dynamic force in Kurdish society.
3.1.4 Summary
As a general rule, struggles between nations seem to take priority over and
moderate class conflict within them,27 and Kurdistan is no exception. The
outbreak of a revolutionary class conflict, as envisaged by Marx, between a large
marginalised and alienated work force and a small wealthy employer-class in
Iraqi Kurdistan, seems unlikely to occur. Likewise is the Leninist idea of a
classless society in which nationalism would disappear but ethnic consciousness
preserved not wholly applicable to Kurdish conditions.
24.Vogler (1985), P. 3.25.ibid.
26.Ayubi (1995), p. 175.
27.The suppression of any symptoms of class conflict in the Palestinian movement is illustrative
in this context and relates well to the Kurdish case.
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Kurdish society is not homogeneous, but socially stratified. To assume that this
social stratification indicates a clear division into a class system would, however,
be premature a judgment. The large Kurdish diaspora is not believed to have
altered this picture in any substantial way.28
Class divisions within nations that struggle to establish themselves on the
international level (or even regional level) are clearly of lesser significance than
differences between nations. National interests instead assume great importance
and are the moderating factors in any potential class conflict. In view of this, it
appears as if the overall national struggle of the Kurds has continued to take
precedence over class conflict also after the developments of the early 1990s.
But are the social cleavages that have arisen during the past decade likely to
undermine the tribes and the tribal structure? In order to address that question,
there is a need to analyse the workings of the tribal system.
28. Concluded through substantial consultation throughout the community of politically active
Kurdish exiles in Sweden.
3.2 Tribe
Kurdish politics has for long been described simply in terms of its authoritative
tribal nature, and the belief that influential and robust tribal leaders completely
dominate the domestic political scene with their overarching influence seems as
cemented as ever. This reflects the traditional view of tribalism 29 as being
understood in geographical terms, i.e. the idyllic notion of a traditional tribal
leader, who, positioned on a mountaintop or in a valley, serves as the guiding
authority for all the tribesmen in all conceivable situations. Despite being greatly
simplified, this understanding may be useful as a basis for an analysis of how
Kurdish politics has been conducted in the past. However, in an assessment of
the current dynamic political arena and its present characteristics, this
impression needs to be thoroughly revised.
In order to understand the complexities of tribal influences in Kurdish politics,
an insight into how tribes generally function in political contexts is likely to
prove useful. Any such analysis would, however, be country-specific, but it is
felt that a certain degree of generalisation is required if the aspirations for
comparative elements to enrich the overall discussion are to be achieved. Most
of these comparative studies consist of observations made in the Arab world and,
as is sometimes pointed out by various authors, might not apply to societies on
the fringes of the region, such as Iranian tribes, but their applicability to the
Kurdish Middle East is, as will be suggested, in certain instances clear.
3.2.1 Comparative perspectives on tribalism
The term tribe can be understood as either a political unit or a cultural
community. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, tribe will in this discussion
be treated as a political organisation, which is also in agreement with the
observations made by Gellner on Middle Eastern tribes primarily manifesting
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themselves as political units with a subservient cultural role. 3° It is, however,
important to emphasise that Kurdish tribes do not organise themselves
independently, but tend to seek political space within the framework of the
political parties. In other words, tribes come to rely on the modern organisation
of the political parties.
A common factor for all tribal discussions is that tribes have been where they are
for centuries and this fact raises pertinent questions of what sort of social entity
they are that ensures their survival over such long periods of demographic and
political change.
Patricia Crone succinctly defines a tribe as 'a society which relies on descent for
political integration'. 31
 This can be explained as tribesmen originating from one
patriarch, which makes them all brothers and as such, a cohesive social unit. All
the people of a tribe share ancestry - a single past and a communal future, which
encompasses their collective life at present. No clear borders exist. The tribal
order is characterised by a somewhat specific 'structural logic'. Paul Dresch,
who based his work on tribes in Upper Yemen, made the following observation:
The tribes themselves are territorial entities. Usually the territory of each is
contiguous, each has known borders with its neighbours, and there are very few
points within 'the land of the tribes' which do not belong clearly to one tribe or
another.32
A system based on tribal values and traditions contains potentially democratic
elements, since the tribal majlis may serve as a forum for consultation and
decision-making. 33 It is, however, important to note that there are various forms
of tribalism: some with more and some with less of such a democratic element.
An important factor determining the level of democracy is the environment —
29 . This phenomenon is also referred to as parochialism and communalism, but here tribalism
would be the most appropriate term to use.
39 . Gellner (1983b), p. 436.
31.Crone (1986), p. 51.
32.Dresch (1989), p. 75.
B . This is for example noted by Joseph Kostiner in his discussion on tribe and state in Saudi
Arabia: Khoury and Kostiner (1990), p. 245.
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whether mountainous, rural lowlands or a city milieu.
Dresch noted in a discussion of the continuity of tribes that people might transfer
themselves between tribes and as this occurs, there seems to be 'a system of
redefinition [which] combines geographical and political units in new
patterns'. 34 An example of such occurrences may be found in the history of the
powerful Qashqa'i tribe in southwest Iran,: 5 a case, which highlights the fact that
tribes are generally geographically fixed, while men and families need not be. In
the words of Dresch, 'territorial fixity is definitive of collective identities, while
families and particular men can move and take their names with them'. 36 Thus
tribes may merge with other tribes in the spirit of brotherhood, which results in
this change of identities — a practice which appears to be of long standing. From
this it becomes clear that there is a need to distinguish between the tribe as an
enduring social and political unit, and the people who at any time constitute it,
since tribes as such by far outlive their individual members who may display a
certain mobility.
The genealogical structures of tribes are sometimes fluid, insofar as a person
who displays unfettered loyalty to a tribesman may eventually assume the
position of a 'related' kinsman, whereas blood-relatives on the other hand who
prove themselves disloyal may lose their status as close kinsmen. Davis refers to
this as the principle of 'kinsman is as kinsman does', 37
 a feature whose presence
in Kurdish society is supported by van Bruinessen, stressing that 'actual political
allegiance to a lineage becomes [over time] more important than real kinship'.38
However, actual or constructed the descent claimed, the general pattern is
dominated by the inevitability of lineage: in other words, the generational model
of 'inheriting' obligations and rights from one's ancestors and of one's
descendants to exercise those same loyalties. Davis again: 'the obligation to
support certain other people, and to die with them if necessary, is part and parcel
34.Dresch (1989), p. 328.
35.Beck (1980), p. 223.
36, Dresch (1989), p. 332.
37.Davis (1987), p. 61.
38.van Bruinessen (1992), p. 51.
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of existence' .39
A tribe is not a cohesive, homogeneous unit, but one, which is divided in a
number of sections. Between these sections there are 'intertribal' differences that
are emphasised and de-emphasised according to the political climate. In times of
conflict the nature of relations within a tribe changes dramatically, and this is
when the segmentary character of the tribal structure becomes visible. The
normal relationship between the different sections characterised by opposition to
one another sometimes leading to fragmentation would instead transform into
processes of re-alignment and unity of the whole tribe. In the face of an external
threat the common identity of the sections, which usually is of minor relevance,
suddenly assumes great importance.° Internal disputes are thus 'put on hold'
when faced with external aggressors in similar way as class conflicts are
suspended within a nation when it tries to assert itself on an international level.
Another common factor for tribal units in different areas is the position of
shaykhs and their importance to the tribe. They have no formal power as such,
but as respected elders and kinsmen they are 'able by subtlety and firmness and
example to persuade people to act in ways which would maintain or increase
their collective prestige'. 41 A capacity for peace-keeping is one of the most
important functions of a shaykh, and one may say that 'the resolution of conflict
rests on self-help'. 42 When faced with external aggression, which called for
concerted action to defend the tribe's common territory, shaykhs from different
sections consult each other, harmonise any differing views and decide on the
best course of action. The shaykh then acts as the 'face' of the tribe, as Dresch
puts it, who summaries the prominent standing of a shaykh as follows:
Someone must proffer the rifles or bulls, someone must call the tribesmen
together, someone must speak for them as one group, call on another for support
against a third or for mediation. There is no settled sense to what is occurring
until someone steps forward and puts into words who is related how and to
39.Davis (1987), p. 61.
40.Dresch (1989), p. 346.
41.Davis (1987), p. 96.
42.Crone (1986), p. 50.
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whom."
What distinguishes tribally organised people from non-tribal people the most in
the eyes of tribesmen is the belonging to a specific entity and the quality of
honour that it brings, as explained by Dresch again:
The honour of the tribe or section depends on maintaining the 'inviolability' of its
territory, a concept which includes rather more than simple defence of the border
line. ... The arable land is privately owned. ...none is held in common by sections
or whole tribes, but the possession of arable land is essential to one's standing as
a tribesman. ... One shares honour, which must then be defended and kept
inviolate, primarily because one shares borders, which define the tribe's or
section's territory.44
3.2.2 Tribes and state formation
Tribes relate differently to the distinct political constructs of 'nation' and 'state'.
Tribal units may generally be regarded as positive components in the nation-
building process, but could potentially obstruct efforts at state-building,
constituting loose elements. An examination of this in the Kurdish context may
prove particularly illuminating of the roles of tribes in these political processes:
the Kurds constituting a nation, in which tribal influences and structures are
dominant features, possibly moving towards establishing itself as a state among
others on the international arena. In such a scenario of nationhood being
transformed into statehood, the activities and attitudes of tribes have to be
addressed and evaluated.
Nation-builders are faced with a difficult task trying to redirect the loyalty of
tribesmen traditionally devoted to their tribes to serve the nation. The ideological
objective for state-builders would then be to incorporate tribal leaders in the
state organisation in an attempt to tie those strong allegiances to the state, a
43 . Dresch (1989), p. 99.
". Ibid. pp. 80-82.
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system sometimes referred to as 'political tribalisne.45 An illustrative case of
this is the process of building the modern state of Saudi Arabia, where the power
of the government was in effect extended by gradually and subtly subjugating
tribal leaders. Leading figures of the state associated themselves with influential
leaders from the tribal establishment, and the co-operation that ensued, the
nature of which was characterised by tribal values, carried with it the necessary
element of familiarity through which the people sensed continuity in their
society undergoing rapid change. This is articulated by Joseph Kostiner in the
following paragraph:
Tribal values did not replace state administration but modified it, making it softer,
easier to absorb. Thus, paradoxically, they became an important factor in
spreading the authority of state institutions46
In relation to power and the sources of power, we will again turn to the authority
on tribes, Dresch. He points out that there is a tendency (in the Western
hemisphere) to 'equate power and identity, as if, for example, state and nation
were the same',47 but he stresses that this is not how one should view tribes.
Rather 'power is elaborated on the basis of tribal identity, and that identity far
outlives power's demise, retaining the memory and repute when the substance
has gone'. 48
 Hence, one may conclude that tribes as such are not threatened by
power, as wielded from external, superior structures such as a state. In other
words, it is not an easily accomplished task to annihilate tribes as political and
social entities from the state territory, regardless of how strong and powerful the
state may be.
Moving on from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa, the tribal organisation in
Libya through the work of John Davis will be looked at. Similarities between the
two Arab regions can certainly be found, but the Libyan context is also
profoundly different in the sense that 'it [the tribe] connoted a radical alternative
45.Or al-qabaliyya al-siyasiyya as coined by al-Naqib in his Al-Mujtama' wa al-dawla fi al-
khalif wa al-jazira al-`arabiyya [Society and the State in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula],
(1987) Beirut: CAUS, and elaborated on by Ayubi, N. (1995), pp. 240-253.
46.Kostiner (1990), p. 246.
47.Dresch (1989), p. 354.
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to the state ... the tribalism of many Libyans was not a simple survival, an
inability to adapt, to change, but was a self-conscious contestation of a
government and its works'.49
Tribes in remote areas of Libya hence lived without any state intervention, and
were in that sense stateless. The maintaining of social order and peace in their
communities was contingent upon keeping within the strict pattern of social
organisation of the tribe, producing strong sentiments of solidarity which were
contrasted with the 'impersonality' of states. This Libyan idea of statelessness
has both positive and negative elements to it. Of a positive nature is the central
role of kinship and deep-seated loyalty — 'they depend on past domesticities and
cannot be altered' - that provides support and security for each tribesman. This
support, however, makes the protective state superfluous and any national
government redundant. The fragility of this balance is easily disturbed and
creates an atmosphere of fear, as Davis puts it, 'social order based on deterrence
requires constant vigilance and is not flexible', 5° an observation that reflects the
atmosphere reigning in many Kurdish tribal areas.
A traditional tribal society (being present in Kurdish as well as Arab society of
Iraq) does not readily acknowledge the authority of state-appointed figures. This
signifies the importance of establishing a wide national political platform, which
can accommodate also the traditional forms of political and societal
organisation. In the discussion of a Kurdish independent state, it is appropriate to
return to a question that was posed earlier, i.e. the assumption that tribes may
facilitate nation-building but severely obstruct efforts at state-building. Tribal
Kurdish society appears to be comparable to that of Yemen, where Dresch
observed that for tribes 'autonomy was the prime concern ... its precondition
was the exclusion of non-tribal people defined by birth, a conception at odds
with the language of modern politics'. 51 This implies that if certain tribes
opposed Iraqi authorities they may also oppose central Kurdish authorities.
48.Ibid.
49.Davis (1987), p. 182.
50.Ibid. pp. 41-42.
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In order to achieve mass mobilisation of rural people, communal partisanship, as
a means to involve different groups of a community most of whom identify with
interests which they regard as being inimical to the values of their communal
traditions, has been invoked by many a nationalist movement. Kurdistan is no
exception. Commitment to the traditional values on which much of the tribal
society rests is not a recognised theme of pantribalism (as outlined below), but
communal partisanship as a means through which to channel tribalism has been
frequently utilised in Kurdish politics. The Kurdish movement during the
decades of the leadership of Mustafa Barzani owed its organisation and structure
more to tribalism than nationalism, and the KDP under Mullah Mustafa's
management operated on a basis of communal partisanship.
In areas where traditionalism remains the strongest element and has not given
way to efforts at modernisation and attempts to introduce a process aimed at
achieving sustainable social change, communal partisanship may be regarded as
a form of tribal movement similar to a political party. Members may view the
party as an extension of their societal establishment, the social aspects of which
encapsulates the particularities of traditional tribal organisation manifested in
spiritual and sentimental attachments. The party thus becomes an alternative
expression of the traditional tribal social order: a political platform with an
added dimension of the integration of a comprehensive system of values, a
system whose traditional values may also include elements of nationalism.
However, in comparison with political parties, 52
 it must be stressed that in terms
of being stable and sustainable entities, any such ideological formations cannot
match a tribal order. Members of tribes do not defect from the organisation
should they disagree with the philosophy or beliefs of the leadership (although
they can of course depart or be exiled for other reasons). In the words of John
Davis, 'lineages are not opinion-based groups'.53
51.Dresch (1989), P. 395.
52. Here referring to 'a voluntary association of individuals, united for common political
purposes': Scruton (1996), pp. 405-406.
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Tribal forces dominated the Kurdish political arena through arrangements
characterised by communal partisanship until the mid-1970s, and in the more
traditional Kermanji-speaking areas in the rural north of 'Free Kurdistan',
communal partisanship still appears to be the most useful basis through which to
mobilise large segments of the population.
New ideologies, such as that of nationalism, established themselves on the
Kurdish political scene in the twentieth century, and the impact was felt mainly
in the urban milieus. In these areas young people were able to advance their
academic interests by attending universities, presumably not an activity greatly
favoured in a traditional tribal society. It would appear likely that higher
education may over time enable tribesmen to build a different platform from
where they could exert a new form of political leadership accompanied by an
ideology - a sharp contrast to the tribal organisation. Such an educated class
would be a threat to the continued power-position of the tribes, in the sense that
the tribe had always been the sole invoker of group mobilisation.
Resulting from this emergence of nationalist ideologies, people's awareness of
belonging to specific tribal groupings and having different orientations in terms
of religion, ethnicity and language weakened. The intellectual Kurdish
leadership that emerged in such an urban setting in the late 1970s had put tribal
affiliations aside (those who had any) and regarded the force of tribalism as the
internal enemy, 'the native oppressor', 54 of Kurdish nationalism. Their views
reflected the popular assumption that tribalism is incompatible with the
constructive development of a nation socially and politically. Tribally structured
societies traditionally feature old and deep-seated loyalties, the persistence of
which may hinder the emergence of national solidarity. Tribal movements based
on ethnic group loyalties are seen to inevitably undermine the emergence of
broader loyalties essential to form the basis of nation-states. In the eyes of many
nationalists and scholars of the subject alike, these tribally organised individuals
often fail to exhibit sufficient enthusiasm for trading their separate tribal
identities to that of the nation to which they belong and in doing so they
53 . Davis (1987), p 61.
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incapacitate the state and are hence viewed with scepticism. This view is,
however, contested by Richard Sklar in his study on Nigeria, in which he
redefines the relationship between tribal practice and nationalist ideals, asserting
that tribalism has contributed in crucial ways to nationalism. The tribal society
of this West African country bears resemblance to that of Kurdistan, and
provides an historical example of contemporary relevance.
Sklar discerns a clear manifestation of tribalism: namely pantribalism, which he
argues has served as an impelling force to the development of mass political
parties as well as a promotor of national independence. Being secular in nature,
the idea of pantribalism focuses on the creation of a common platform for people
with similar culture but different tribal affinities. As Sklar writes: 'the pantribal
spirit was ardent in the breasts of those who felt the most urgent need for unity
beyond the parochial confines of their tribes'.55
This pantribalism manifested itself in the formation of a broad based political
party alongside a pantribal cultural organisation, a committee of paramount
chiefs, whose sanctioning of governmental decisions provided important moral
support for the policies of government. It was also in a position to mediate in
conflicts between tribal units, that the government would have been unable to
handle successfully. Hence it was a 'crucial link between ... [the government],
the chiefs, and other men of influence to facilitate the implementation of party
policies ... with a minimum of difficulty or resistance'.56
Similar to Nigeria in the 1960s, tribal leaders in Kurdish areas are often the most
influential opinion-makers, and their co-operation is crucial for a political party
seeking support in an area under the control of a particular tribe. Despite
differences, tribes experience common interests and in order to safeguard these,
attempts to bring tribal leaders together in a political party with pantribal
overtones may well prove successful. The support of traditional authorities
normally means support of large numbers of people of their following. While
54.Hassanpour (1992), p. 61.
55.Sklar (1960), p. 416.
56.Ibid. pp. 410-411.
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some tribal leaders might be attracted to the cultural message of pan-Kurdish
unity in tribal disguise, others might find the political and economic power of
the pantribal elite appealing. Thus if utilising the potential of tribalism, this
'difficult' force can indeed be incorporated and positively contribute to the
national movement.
3.2.3 Tribalism and Kurdistan
Tribalism in Kurdistan developed out of nomadism — regarded as the original
form of Kurdish social organisation. A feudal structure of society then evolved,
the gradual transformation of which further gave way to landlordism57
(signifying land owned by wealthy aghas, chieftains, whose ancestors were
feudal lords). In order to contextualise this there is a need to go back to the wider
region and the establishment of the state of Iraq.
Under the decentralised Administration of the Ottoman Empire, most areas
(including the Kurdish) were governed chiefly by local authorities, whose
sources of power were often rooted in the conventional society, i.e. that of tribes.
Tribal leaders made up the most notable and influential elements among the
ruling cliques in these local administrative units. However, throughout the latter
part of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans initiated a process of detribalisation,
as an attempt to break Kurdish power. 58 This 'modernising' trend was reversed
by Great Britain, who during the Mandate period 1919-1932, launched a policy
whereby many tribal leaders regained the power and authority that was taken
away from them by the Ottoman government. 59 The British even introduced
separate legislative measures for the tribal areas. Due to these major efforts, by
the mid-1920s, tribal leaders once again emerged as the rural areas' most
powerful political and administrative units. This was important for the British as
co-operation of tribal chiefs ensured political stability in the rural areas. From
57.Pelletiere (1984) equates this term with detribalisation, as he writes 'the essence of tribalism
is that a tribe owns its land in common; landlordism is the antithesis of that principle' (p. 18).
58.Pelletiere (1984) offers a long discussion on this Ottoman policy: see pp. 31-41.
59.For an account of the enthusiastic re-tribilising measures of the British, see chapter eight, 'The
Kurds, Britain and Iraq' in McDowall (1996).
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this one may conclude that the British appeared to support state building only
when it coincided with its colonial and imperial interests.
The power structure created by the British government during the Mandate
period was characterised by an emphasis on the stark contrasts between the
people constituting the Iraqi state, and this policy affected inter-ethnic relations
of the post-Mandate years. There were thus no efforts at trying to integrate the
tribes in the state formation process, as Nelida Fuccaro recognises:
Independent Iraq inherited from the Ottoman and British administrations a long-
standing conflict between cities and the countryside, which reflected a dichotomy
between the sedentary and tribal worlds.°
Following in the footsteps of the British and also the Hashemites, the Baathists
were resolute in pursuing tribalisation policies to advance their wider aims and
objectives. A post-1975 retribalisation of society was enforced by Baghdad's
efforts at forming jash-contingents. As David McDowall points out: 'It was
Baghdad ... which deliberately fostered tribalism by co-opting the chiefs to raise
militia forces against the Kurdish national movement'.61
Baghdad with its Anfai-campaign played havoc with the economic base in many
areas of rural Kurdistan, and as a result of this some tribes had little option but to
accept rather unethical offers from the government to serve state interests. As al-
Khafaji writes, these tribes 'became mercenaries (eg Zibari, Hirki) to secure the
means of preserving and enhancing their authority' 62 This policy of turning
some prominent tribes into mercenaries was successful insofar as the regime
managed to create sharp divisions among the Kurds, which weakened the
Kurdish national struggle. This employment of tribalism as a tool to aggravate
inter-Kurdish belligerence was not a newly formulated policy by the Iraqi
government but one, which appeared to be as aggressively pursued throughout
the 1980s as in the preceding decade.
Fuccaro (1997), P. 561.
61 . McDowall (1995), 'The Struggle for Kurdistan', MEI, No 498,14 April, pp. 19-20.
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Increased social mobilisation may be a contributing factor to the dissolution of
tribal loyalties. If people are no longer confined to strict tribal territory, chances
are their tribal awareness becomes less prominent over time. As large numbers
of Kurds rushed to the relative safety of the cities following Baghdad's massive
depopulation and resettlement campaigns targeted at Kurdish areas, it would be
easy to assume that the power and influence of tribes has weakened significantly
over the last two decades. This may, however, not be the case.
With the new developments of the 1990s, there has been a general trend to
discard the element of tribalism in analyses of Kurdish society and its impact on
politics. However, Iraqi Kurdistan has been an area where the new phenomenon
of neo-tribalism, or rather the re-emergence of tribalism, has occurred, referred
to as tribalism 'in a new guise'. This does not indicate that the geography of
tribal divisions has changed, or that the influence of tribal leaders remains
unaltered. Various political figures on the Kurdish political arena still act in line
with traditional tribal custom, but the difference is that both human and
environmental settings have changed, which is an effect of neo-tribalism.
As indicated above, the urbanisation of large segments of the population in the
1980s caused a transformation of the societal organisation, in the process of
which the tribally inspired loyalties lost their appeal to many former tribesmen.
In the urban milieu the mediating functions of a tribal leader — in the past, the
most indispensable of his duties — were no longer in demand. However, this
development does not incorporate the notion that the need for supportive patrons
among ordinary Kurds has expired. Rather, dependence on patronage to
accommodate their basic needs is still largely a feature of mainstream Kurdish
rural as well urban life, the difference being that responsibilities, formerly held
by the tribal chieftains, are now shouldered by the KDP and the PUK. In their
respective areas of authority the two party leaderships have sought to secure the
allegiance of the people by seeing to their needs in the areas of employment,
provision of housing and building materials, the supplying of various goods, and
62 . He also points out that in their heyday these battalions numbered more than 250 and
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protection - in other words networks of patron-client relationships have
developed. David McDowall explains:
The similarities between old and new are striking: both operate through intensely
loyal retinues and, through these, command the loyalty of several 'tribes'. Such
tribes are today less visible to outsiders than traditional ones. Some are tribal
groups in the traditional sense. But many are old jash contingents, or peshmerga
groups headed by a local commander. Some are dependably loyal to the
paramount, others trade on the best offer they can get, and switch allegiances
when advantageous.°
This neo-tribalism is not an isolated phenomenon in Iraqi Kurdistan, but one that
is also discernible in Iraq proper. In order to reaffirm his grip on power at a time
when the uprising of 1991 had seriously challenged his authority, Saddam
Hussein approached the old tribal chieftains and sought to strengthen his
position through allegiances with these local notables. This focus was primarily
on the Sunni-dominated central parts of the country, but also the Shia south was
important as tribal recruiting ground. Capitalising on the reigning climate of fear
and suspicion, measures such as this indicated that the Iraqi president aspired to
solidify national unity under his authoritarian rule to ensure that further popular
revolts were to be avoided.64
The concept of neo-tribalism may not be as 'new' as some suggest. In an
African context, observations were made already back in 1971 of territoriality no
longer constituting the sole basis for tribalism, and the phenomenon had
'extended to areas ... far removed from the tribal homeland'. 65 As a result of
modernisation, the tribesmen might not have lived in the same area, but that did
not prevent them from 'still identify[ing] with one another in specific
contexts'. 66 This relates to the analyses above regarding neo-tribal tendencies in
Kurdish politics, and indicates that although Kurdistan is highly specific in many
regards, the developments there tend to reflect developments elsewhere.
incorporated some 100,000 Kurdish tribesmen. See al-Khafaji (1994), P. 27.
63.McDowall (1995), MEI, No 499, 28 April.
64.Amazia Baram has painstakingly examined this in his 1997 article.
65.Mafeje (1971), p. 259.
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3.2.4 Summary
The basic features of Kurdish tribalism seem to be similar to tribal structures and
organisations elsewhere in the Middle East, but in terms of practices, Kurdish
Northern Iraq does differ in certain regards. For instance, in a Central African
context, tribalism is described as an effect of weak and corrupt states, not the
cause of it, 67 which would not accurately describe the situation in the Kurdish
areas. Another dimension that sets Africa clearly apart from the politically tribal
Middle East is that the African tribes in being less tightly integrated come across
as cultural rather than political units, which contrasts the Kurdish tribe, which
has been perceived as a primarily political community.
In a North African or Maghreb Arab context, tribalism is the result of people
evading the state and, as indicated above by John Davis, statelessness is a
positive notion for these peoples. Again, this situation diverges from Kurdish
sentiments and reality. Moreover, in the Arabian peninsula, the force of tribalism
was well capitalised on when the modern states were being established, insofar
as co-operation between state figures and tribal leaders brought about a natural
transfer of political power. Perhaps this development relates best to the Kurdish
setting, and how the tribal factor in Kurdish politics may be approached and
utilised.
Closer to home, the Iraqi regime's use of tribalism is manifested in that Saddam
Hussein is not concerned with ideology. By avoiding the use of ideological
indoctrination, a dependence on kinship and strong sentiments of unfettered
loyalty to the Leader and his Administration develops. The leaderships of the
two Kurdish parties do not carry this to the same extremes, but in essence it is
the same idea utilised by Kurdish and Arab leaders.
66 . Ibid.
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Tribal divisions have always been present in Kurdish society, but instead of
making concerted efforts to heal the rifts and lessen the divides, the KDP and
PUK have through various loyalty-schemes' aimed at various parts of the
population in fact exacerbated the same. The tribal leaders that have been
incorporated in their respective party systems represent a group of people of
KDP or PUK standing, rather than individuals of Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole.
Political activity channelled through tribal systems has been a recurrent theme
throughout Kurdish history, and a practice which does not appear to be on the
decline.
Century-old political loyalties are important as a basis on which to mobilise
large sections of the population in a short time. Tribes are, in the words of
Dresch, very much 'a pact built around protection', 68
 the need of which did not
cease with modernisation of the society and urbanisation of the people, although
there are those who argue for the non-sustainability of a tribal system.
Sathyamurthy, for instance believes that 'traditional structures are susceptible to
erosion inherent in the size, mobility and organisation of a modernising or
industrial/technological society'. 69 The complete erosion of tribal structures
could be contested by pointing at the length of time tribes have existed, and that
alone would be indicative of the unlikelihood of seeing these entities disappear
in the near future. Dresch sums it up eloquently in the following paragraph:
Formations of power rise and fall in the tribal system without changing much part
of tribal classification. Tribes seldom, if ever, win or lose definitively. The course
of power is of vital concern to understanding events in the short term and
guessing who will support whom at present. But if the tribal system is to be seen
as a source of problems for modern politics, it has also been capable of absorbing
and indeed containing an extraordinary range of conflicts imposed on it from
elsewhere in the course of the last thousand years. Its resilience has, in its own
way, been as great as that of, say, the great religions and philosophies whose
combinations of a few clear principles with an indefinitely wide range of practice
87 . Maybury-Lewis (1997) has elaborated on this, see particularly pp. 53-55.
68 . Dresch (1989), P. 346.
89 . Sathyamurthy (1983), p. 73.
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gives the illusion of unchanging permanence."
A question of great relevance is whether modernity, as implicated in the
formation of a nation-state, is compatible with such a traditional element as that
of tribalism. Modernity has weakened tribal relationships and social cleavages,
as examined in the previous section, do seem to in the long run undermine the
tribes and the tribal structure. It would appear that 'the tribe and the modem state
represent two opposite ends of an organisational spectrum', 71 but in contrast to
conventional wisdom it may prove conceivable to achieve a combination of
continuity and renewal, which the two concepts basically stand for.
7°. Dresch (1989), pp . 354-355.
71 . Crone (1986), p. 77.
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3.3. Religion
Politics and religion are distinct, but they depend upon each other for their
healthy functioning. If political action mediates religious faith, religious faith in
its turn mediates a truly humane politics.72
Few, if any, societies can claim that religion has no impact on their societal
development in the sense that the political discourse is free from all forms of
religious influence, connotations and symbolism. As Haynes in his analysis of
the relationship between the political and religious spheres of societies observes:
'the relationship between religion and politics is both dialectical and interactive:
each shapes and influences the other'. 73 This is clear to see in the Kurdish socio-
political order, where all political leaders have also been religious by tradition.
The population of central Kurdistan is overwhelmingly Muslim, so the religious-
historical evolution of this relatively traditional society, as well as the role
played at present by this basic component and shaper of Kurdish politics, will be
examined from a Sunni Islamic perspective. The existence of religious minority
communities in the area, however, gives rise to the question whether religious
cleavages are discernible within society. These may not be of a serious nature
but such divisions may prove conflict-generating, and threaten Kurdistan's long
history of religious pluralism and tolerance.
3.3.1 The religious plurality of Kurdistan
Providing an in-depth account of the different religious denominations and their
interaction throughout Kurdistan is a much too ambitious task for the current
section and its purposes. Consequently a more concise analysis of the beliefs in
the area of immediate interest will be attempted.
72.Davis (1980) p. 153. For a pertinent and detailed discussion on the language of religion and
the language of politics, see his chapter 6.
73.Haynes (1998), p. 5.
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The vast majority of Kurds profess Sunni Islam and by adhering to the Shafi'i
school of law, they distinguish themselves from their neighbouring Turks and
Arabs (who out of the four schools of Islamic law follow the Hanafi rite).74 Even
though the differences between these two schools of thought are by no means
significant in terms of religious practices, the Shafi'i belonging provides some
Kurds with an important marker by which they maintain their ethnic identity
towards hostile external elements.75
The other main branch of Islam, Shi'a, is also represented among the Kurds, but
in relatively small numbers. Kurdish Shiites, generally referred to as Fayli-
Kurds, are in Northern Iraq mainly to be found in the districts of Khanaqin and
Mandali. They constitute a fair share of all Kurds in Iraq, but their numbers have
dwindled considerably after the accession of the Baath party to power in Iraq.76
Ahl-e Haqq ('People of God/the Truth'), also known as Kakai in Iraq, live in
districts south of Kirkuk, and van Bruinessen believes that they are 'the
remnants of a much larger community all over the area that is now southern
Kurdistan and Lorestan'.77
Another heterodox sect, often in an erroneous and insulting manner referred to
as 'devil-worshippers', is that of the Yazidis. They appear to have originated
from the Sunni branch of Islam, but resemble more an extremist Shiite
denomination. More than any other religious sect the Yazidis have been subject
to severe persecution by other Muslims. Only found among the Kurds, the
Yazidis speak Kurmanji, and reside mainly in the mountainous areas southwest
and east of Mosul and in Sinjar, by the Iraqi-Syrian border.78
74.van Bruinessen (1992), P. 23.
75.Kreyenbroek (1996), p. 93.
76.Between 1969 and 1988 more than 130,000 Fayli-Kurds were deported from Iraq to Iran
under the pretext of them being of Iranian origin (due to their unfortunate ethnic-religious
combination of being Kurds and Shiites), despite the fact that they had been living in Iraq for
generations. Salih (1994), p. 196.
n. van Bruinessen (1992), p. 23.
78 . Kreyenbroek (1996), pp. 96-99.
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With regard to Jewish elements in Kurdish society, they have for long
constituted lively communities throughout Kurdistan, primarily functioning
within the more specialised economic spheres of society, together with the
Christians. As for Jewish presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, their numbers dwindled
considerably in the mid-twentieth century when a majority of the Kurdish Jews
migrated to the State of Israel after its establishment in 1948.
Prior to external engagement in the Kurdish areas of powers alien to the region,
there were three distinct Christian communities in Kurdistan, namely the Syrian
Orthodox, the Assyians, and the Armenians. Of these, mainly Assyrians lived in
what is today Northern Iraq, a large number of whom after conversion by French
Catholic missionaries in the seventeenth century, were called Chaldeans.
Numerous Christians were later to flee the region after hostility towards them —
not unrelated to the interference of Russia and Britain under the pretext of
protecting the local Christians - led to bloody massacres. 79 Many Kurds viewed
the missionaries as 'the forerunners of direct military intervention', sentiments
which served to exacerbate the tension between the two ethic-religious groups in
Kurdistan.8°
This demonstrates how religion was turned into a divisive and conflict-
generating factor by foreign powers well before the division of Kurdistan
following the First World War. External interference in Kurdistan created
heightened tension and socio-cultural divisions that may not otherwise have
emerged, or at least may not have assumed such great proportions.
3.3.2 The development of 'Kurdish Islam' and the political role of shavkhs
Islam is very much an integral part of the societies of the Middle East, and
Kurdistan is no exception. Michael Gilsenan explains how Islam is such a
dynamic force and a powerful transformer of social structures within society in
the following paragraph:
79
. van Bruinessen (1992), pp. 24-25.
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Part of the vitality and dynamism in Islam in society springs from the tensions,
competition, and contradictions inherent in the ranks of the different specialists
and holy men, who may at one moment be completely and publicly at odds,
asserting their sole control of a given power or path to blessing, and at another
moment be happily cooperative or even unified."
A discussion on such 'holy men' — with reference to the previous section —
would in a Kurdish context be translated into shaykhs, religious leaders, and
their political functions. As already stated, shaykhs serve as important mediators
and act to prevent inter-tribal disharmony from reaching its full military
potential. Often they hold double roles as spiritual and political leaders, and
early on made religious practice in rural areas a powerful force. In the words of
Mesut Yegen, the shaykhs 'fulfilled the role of a mediator between the religion
of Islam and Kurdish nationalism' •82
Two general patterns are discernible in the historical development of Islam in
Kurdistan: one manifested in an 'official and institutionalised Islam', and one in
what may be termed a 'popular Islam'. Many Kurdish chieftains associated
themselves with the institutionalised religion without emphasising their national
and/or ethnic belonging. In the fringes of the areas controlled by the official
religious authorities, a different form of Islam existed in the shape of mystical
Sufi orders under the leadership of shaykhs. As van Bruinessen points out, 'there
was not a clear-cut distinction here between official and popular religion', and
since the different interpretations enriched and complimented the other 'they
were not seen as rival traditions but as parts of the same complex'.83
Kurdish religiousness is largely characterised by the prominent position of Sufi
brotherhoods and their peculiar practices, which is not found among many other
Muslim communities, where more formalised religion is practised. The Kurdish
image of Islam has strong mystical overtones and many Kurdish `ulama have
been associated with a tar*, or dervish-order, led by a shaykh. In traditional
80.Ibid. p. 229.
81.Gilsenan (2000), pp. 29-30.
82.Yegen (1996), pp. 219-220.
83.van Bruinessen (1982), p. 285.
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Kurdish society the religious leader has a strong position, and being perceived as
a link between God and the human being, he often found himself in a favourable
situation which could successfully be capitalised on in order to acquire power
and influence.
Observed by van Bruinessen, the shaykh has not one but multiple roles. First and
foremost, however, he is a 'holy man, [an] object of popular devotion'. Due to
this, he enjoys great respect, which makes him the ideal intermediary in conflicts
- a position that generates political leverage. 84 With the complete disappearance
of the autonomous Kurdish principalities in the mid-nineteenth century, many
conflicts between tribes flared up. In this context the shaykh was the only
Kurdish personality who stood above tribal affiliation and who could mediate in
conflictual situations. 85 The Sufi orders and their shaykhs were therefore
considerably important as they managed to 'generate a more general awareness
of ethnic unity overriding tribal and regional differences'.86
Religion and politics are widely perceived as being inseparable in Islam. This
perception derives from the fact that the Islamic community, the umma, holds
simultaneous functions as a religious and a political body. Against this
background it seems natural to expect any religious figures to pursue political
activities and goals. It would appear inaccurate to claim that the consciousness
of the Islamic `umma since the time of the autonomous sixteenth and
seventeenth century Kurdish principalities has outdone national consciousness.
Rather, it has complemented it. During the late nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century, at a time when the force of nationalism began to
gain ground in Kurdistan, the spiritual leaders came to assume greater
importance in the political sphere. 87 Through their Sufi order, the shaykhs could
reach his devoted followers over a large area, which gave him the capacity to
mobilise significant numbers of enthusiastic supporters should the situation
84.To this it can be added that his potential of a mediator was further strengthened by the fact
that as many shaykhs do not tend to live in the area of their birth they have no allegiances to any
of the local tribes. van Bruinessen (1982), p. 286.
85.Salih (1994), p. 200.
86.van Bruinessen (1992b), p. 51.
87. On the various ways that the shaykhs gained political and economic influence through
religion, see van Bruinessen (1992) pp. 205-208.
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require.88
It has often been claimed that the radical and secular nature of nationalism
renders traditional religious authorities hostile towards this ideology, but as
Breuilly points out, any such hostility depends on 'the position the nationalist
movement takes towards established religion'. 89 If it is a case of fighting the
same enemy, nationalists may well ally themselves with the religious authorities.
Moreover, 'nationalist definitions of the nation were often suffused with
religious terms', 90 and the Kurdish experience is a case in point, as previously
indicated. In Kurdistan the clergy, perhaps less institutionalised and more
popular than in many other places, has indeed played a vital role in the
nationalist movement.
Of the many Sufi orders that exist in the Islamic world, two in particular have
been of importance in Kurdistan: the Qadiriya and the Naqshbandiya orders. The
first Kurdish revolt with nationalist overtones in 1880 was lead by the
Naqshbandi Shaykh Ubeidullah, and the major one in the 1920s by Shaykh Said,
representing the Qadiriya-order. 9I As for the modern Kurdish leaders in
Northern Iraq, the late Mullah Mustafa Barzani (of Naqshbandiya) and Jalal
Talabani (of Qadiriya) have made good use of their families' traditional religious
roles in their political careers, although not themselves shaykhs.92
3.3.3 Religion as a mobilising force in Iraqi Kurdistan
Religions are hardly static ideologies but dynamic philosophies and as such in
constant processes of change - 'consequently their relationships with politics
also vary over time'. 93 The role of religion played in Kurdish politics in the early
days of nationalistic fervour has been looked at, and as we turn to more recent
times, the question is whether modern Islamic movements can yield the same
88.van Bruinessen (1992), p. 210.
89.Breuilly (1982), pp. 311-312.
9°. Ibid.
91.For an account of this see Olson (1989).
92.Salih (1994), p. 199.
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influence and power over Kurdish politics as religious leaders did in the early
twentieth century. Shaykh Said's revolt in 1925 relied heavily on religion as its
main basis for mobilisation and propaganda. 94 Could any of that be seen today?
Are the symbols for Kurdish nationalism, as expressed in Northern Iraq, still of a
religious nature?
All over the Middle East, religion is viewed as instrumental in legitimising
power for many regimes, be they monarchies or republics, and this frequent use
of religious references to is not unknown to Kurdish politics. Apart from the
legacy of traditional elements of religious character and their impact on the
political discourse, religious references have also been used as a response to
regional developments. Not only the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, but also
deliberate policies by Saddam Hussein to legitimise his rule in religious terms,
have impacted on the Kurds and their resort to religious references.
Marxist-Leninist thought was a strong element in Kurdish political discourse
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but due to the upsurge in radical Islam in the
region in the mid- and late 1980s, Kurdish organisations (mainly the PKK but to
a lesser extent also those in Northern Iraq) were compelled to appear more
accommodating in their attitudinal and practical approach to religion, as a result
of the political climate in the Middle East.
At the time when a rebellion led by the chieftain Simko challenged the Iranian
State in the 1920s, two important ideologies emerged that had a wider appeal
than tribal loyalties: pan-Islamism and Kurdish nationalism. These movements
offered the tribal leaders ideological and material sources of power similar to
that of the state, but the difference was the Islamists and nationalists relied on
the tribes for military power. 95 When Islam turned into a political force in
Iranian Kurdistan, the tribes were needed for their military prowess, a historical
parallel that begs the question whether today's Islamist movements operating in
93.Haynes (1998), p. 5.
94.Olson (1989), p. 153.
95.van Bruinessen (1983), p. 378.
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Northern Iraq are in a similar need of a tribal base in order to make any impact
on Iraqi Kurdish politics.
In many parts of the Middle East where political Islam has become a force, it
tends to emanate from the urban society and recruits mainly from a marginalised
youth. Also in Northern Iraq, the influence of these groups can be seen only
among the most needy, who appear to accept the Islamists' authority because of
the financial gains. The radical Islamic movement trying to establish itself in
Northern Iraq has to impose itself as a social actor, challenging the power of the
local shaykhs and Sufi orders, hence engaging in somewhat of a 'social contest'.
Due to the nature of Kurdish religiousness, such neo-Islamism hence faces
constraints that other Islamist movements in the region do not have to concern
themselves with.96
Hence politics, religion and military still appear to be closely intertwined. The
new religious elements' lack of a political and military base, in other words
tribal base, hinders their efforts to gain an influential position in the politics of
Iraqi Kurdistan (the EVIK is admittedly the third largest party in the self-ruling
entity, but it does not rival the 'big parties'). Many of their difficulties stem from
the fact that these new religious political groupings are regarded as agents acting
on behalf of foreign powers, in particular the Iranian and Saudi regimes, and are
strongly disliked by intellectuals and grass roots alike who are 'religious in their
hearts'. The mainstream population can be divided into two groups regarding
their negative attitudes towards the `neo-Islamic' micro-movements: firstly the
older generation, the traditionally religious people who are not easily influenced
by any new ideas, and secondly the younger generation who become politically
active but cherish little if any traditional religiousness and tend to reject the
advances of these new religious movements.97
There are also important geographical differences in the acceptance of neo-
Islamic influences. As David McDowall points out, the Islamic movement
enjoys its strongest support in Sorani urban areas ...[which] suggests that the
96
. Compare the views of Oliver Roy (1994), The Failure of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris.
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Islamic impulse is felt less strongly in more traditional zones, the mountains and
the Kermanji area'. 98 Jund-al-Islam, as noted earlier, is indeed operating in the
south-east of the autonomous region.
Hamit Bozarslan in a discussion on political Islam in Kurdistan stated that
Kurdish Islamism is likely to affect the region mainly in two ways. There is a
risk of further internal division of Kurdish society if Kurdish Islamic groups
adopt a universalistic approach and establish unifying links with forces outside
the Kurdish context, be it Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi or any other Islamic body (a
fear exemplified by Jund al-Islam's alleged connection to the al-Qaida
organisation). Islamism is by definition no comprehensive ideology for a
national struggle, and the link created between nationalism and Islamism may
create an ambiguity in the political discourse and lead to non-Islamist political
groups making use of religious references to legitimise their hold on or
aspirations for power.99
In spite of the vast majority of Kurds are Muslims, religious fanaticism has been
conspicuous by its relative absence from Kurdistan. Before the emergence of
Jund al-Islam, those religious movements formed within the Kurdish region,
have tended to be moderate, even progressive in character, compared with
Islamic groups elsewhere and those 'exported' to the area. Following the 1979
revolution in Iran, Islamic extremism started to appear on a small scale
throughout Kurdistan, but this was regarded as the result of outside intervention
in order for a certain regime to establish supporting organizations amongst the
Kurds, or simply to encourage inter- and intra-Kurdish hostilities, by introducing
a new fomi of highly politicised Islam. 1 °° Jund al-Islam may well be regarded as
a modern phenomenon in so far as it is a reaction to modernity among the
uneducated masses.
97.Explained by Dr Latif Rashid, London 1999.
98.McDowall (1995), 'The struggle for Kurdistan', MEI, No 499, 28 April
99. Bozarslan (1998), 'Minority Nationalism and Political Islam: the Kurdish Case', paper
presented at the Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and
objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
100.For more on this see forthcoming chapter 6, Iraqi Kurdistan on the regional scene, on the
role of the regional powers.
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Republic of Iran to establish and consolidate Islamic political parties in Northern
Iraq, groupings that have not survived for long, in spite of financial as well as
military support from Tehran. 1 ° 1 The most enduring Islamic force is Shaykh
Muhammad Khalid Barzani's Kurdish Hizbullah. The support for his party is,
however, thought to be based on the traditional loyalties to the Barzani-shaykhs
rather than on the Islamic ideology. ' 02
3.3.4 Summary
The rise of political Islamist movements in the Arab world can be understood
against the background of the Arab military defeats, in particular that of 1967, as
elaborated on by Piscatori, but they are also appear to be reactive against a
secularising and modernising of society, which is perceived as generating a
decline in Islam's social importance. 1 °3 In Kurdish society, however, such a
situation of social and political crisis does not appear to have occurred. Due to
the aforementioned nature of Kurdish religiousness with the strong elements of
sufism, the significance of religion in the social spheres of life appears unlikely
to decrease. Transferred to the political spheres, religion as such cannot be
regarded as a divisive force. As van Bruinessen, who has carried out most
extensive research on the social and political organisation of Kurdish society,
concludes: `the religious factor, although important, ... does not seem to be
decisive by itself in the political alliances and oppositions')"
The theocratic doctrine on the divine origins of power, that the king owes his
power from God and not from those he rules — in the Islamic world most clearly
embodied in the Shi'i doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini's velayat-e faqih - leads
to a strong position for the religion in the state. Religion has never quite
achieved such overarching influence in Kurdish politics — it is traditionally an
101.The Iranian involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan will be examined in forthcoming chapter six.
102.Salih (1994), pp. 204-205.
103.James P. Piscatori, (1986), Islam in a World of Nation-States, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 26-34.
104.van Bruinessen (1992), p. 23.
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inclusive element and, crucially, intertwined with tribalism, but not in itself a
strong element.
The importance of Islam in Kurdish socio-political development may find its
parallels in Arab society, as the 'prophet had worked among tribes, their tribal
and religious values reinforced and validated each other'. 1 °5 This points at the
profound importance of not looking at the religious factor in isolation, but
viewing it against the background of the tribal organisation and socio-political
structure of society.
In a traditional society such as the Kurdish where religion is still a powerful
force in peoples' lives, it is important to recognise the dichotomy between the
psychologically separate town and village/tribe, the latter of which bows more to
the influence of religious authorities. As Sathyamurthy points out, 'political
consensus is an offshoot of religious (communal) consensus or ijma' expressed
on behalf of the community by the mujtahed or the ulama. The entire process of
legitimisation — religious and political — rests on the ijma'. 106 Such a situation is
not ideal for a nationalist leadership seeking to bring the whole nation together
with the aim to reach a permanent state of national unity. Wrestling the people's
loyalty from the ulama requires a meticulously tactful approach by those
wishing to extend the popular base of the Kurdish national movement, not to
mention the difficulties of gaining the following of the tribally conscious for
whom the imagined community of Kurds is likely to be remote. Sathyamurthy
concludes, 'the ideology of nationalism with all its emphasis on modernity,
material progress and politically viability is constantly subject to the vagaries of
an equally vital but fundamentally different force in the form of an entrenched
religion' I07
los , Crone (1986), p. 75.
106 , Sathyamurthy (1983), PP. 79-80.
107 . Ibid.
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3.4 Language
To a people fighting for their lives and control of their land, their own language is
a very precious thing. Not all Kurds are fair with European features; some look
like Arabs. Not all Kurds wear their traditional baggy trousers or many-coloured
dresses; some work in the city and attend universities in Western clothes. But
until now, nearly all Kurds, educated or uneducated, fair or dark, living in Turkey
or Iran or Iraq or the USSR, have spoken Kurdish.1°8
Despite the failure to adopt a lingua franca in the Kurdish-speaking areas, the
Kurdish language is regarded as a major component of nation- and state-
building. One needs only to look at the division of India into a number of
regions to understand the influence of language on nation- and state-building
ideologies. The importance of language has increased greatly due to the rise of
various nationalisms in many parts of the world, and also in the case of the
Kurdish national movement, the language aspect has given added weight to
political aims. The linguistic variety of Kurdistan is substantial but despite this,
the common language provides a broad basis for nationalism.
3.4.1 Language as a political factor
A distinct language is for people a cultural marker of the highest value, as it
often represents the most cohesive factor for the collective national identity.
Language has always had a particularly important role in defining nationality.
As the creation of a state is often accompanied by a struggle for hegemony this
may be articulated in 'the power to define language': in the words of Billig,
'more is at stake in drawing the boundary of a language than linguistics'.109
Hence the importance of a language extends beyond mere linguistics and
transforms into a political factor, often in response to the repression that
concentrates on the language and culture, preventing its development.
108 . Kahn (1980), p xii. Some 20 years later this situation has changed slightly, with many Kurds
(particularly those living in Turkey) having a rather fractured command of Kurdish.
1O9 , Billig (1995), p. 32.
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Language is thus very much a source of power, and as such a major component
of nationalism. It plays a vital role in the operation of ideology and in the
framing of ideological consciousness.' I ° Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson single
out language as a key dimension in societal planning aimed at reinforcing
dominance of a particular ethnic/linguistic/political group at the expense of
another. They write that 'language is used increasingly ... in maintaining,
legitimating, effectuating and reproducing an unequal division of both structural
power and material resources'.111
The rise of linguistic nationalism has its origins in the thoughts of the German
philosopher Herder in the latter part of the eighteenth century, who believed that
the nation's 'very existence is inconceivable without its own language'. 112 Also
Fichte placed a great deal of emphasis on the nation as a cultural community —
'Wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nations exists') 13 From
its modern inception many would indeed regard nationalism as inextricably
bound up with language. Language was seen as 'an outward sign of a group's
peculiar identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuation': 14 The
relationship between language and nationalism has remained very close, with
language being a clearly defined marker of those differences that distinguish
nations from one another.
In order to ascertain how great a role the Kurdish language plays in the national
movement it may be useful to draw some historical parallels with Europe, where
these ideas originated. Hobsbawm observes that 'for Germans and Italians, their
national language was not merely an administrative convenience or a means of
unifying state-wide communication, as French had been in France ... It was the
only thing that made them Germans or Italians, and consequently carried a far
heavier charge of national identity than, say, English did for those who wrote
II °. Ibid. p. 17. This was strongly argued by the influential Russian social science theorist
Mikhail Bakhtin, whose writings are scrutinised in Michael Holquist (1990), Dialogism. Bakhtin
and his world, London: Routledge.
III . Skutnabb—Kangas and Phillipson (1999), P. 29.
112. Quoted in Edwards (1985), p. 23.
na . Fichte (1922), Addresses to the German Nation, Chicago:Open Court, p. 215 (quoted in
canovan (1996a), pp. 52-53).
114 . Kedourie (1961), p. 71.
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and read the language'." 5 One may say that for the Kurds and the Kurdish
identity the language factor takes up a middle position between these German-
Italian and English cases, considering other factors that determine and make up
Kurdishness.
Hobsbawm asserts that to different degrees it is of importance for linguistic
nationalism to require 'control of a state or at least the winning of official
recognition for the language'. He goes on to say that 'at all events problems of
power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture,
lie at the heart of the nationalism of language'. 116 An interesting example of this
is the Jewish nationalist movement in its successful attempts to revive Hebrew.
That the Zionists opted for a language that was not spoken by anyone reconfirms
the above statement that communication was not at the core of the issue.
There is evidence to suggest that those mostly concerned with maintaining and,
if necessary, reviving a language, are nationalist intellectuals from the urban
middle class, a social class not traditionally represented in Kurdistan. These
individuals may not be representative of the heartland native speakers, as such
persons may 'have in fact assimilated successfully into the majority
mainstream'.117
Many Kurds in the Turkish parts of Kurdistan speak poor or no Kurdish, but as
Yalcin-Heckman notes, 'knowledge of the language is a less important factor
than one's attitude toward the language'. 118 Particularly when a people's identity
is perceived to face great uncertainties, language easily becomes a focus for
nationalist sentiments.
A prominent linguist, Einar Haugen, firmly tied the development of a language
to the rise of nationalism in his now widely accepted model of language
115.Hobsbawm (1992), pp. 102-103.
116.Ibid. p. 110.
117.Edwards (1985), p. 71.
118.Yalcin-Heckman (1989), p. 119.
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standardisation.' 19 Standardisation is 'the process of one variety of a language
becoming widely accepted throughout the speech community as "a supra-
dialectal norm", 120 i.e. the most 'superior' form of all dialects. The creation of a
standard form of a national language is a complex process. Karl Deutsch
observed that 'a standard language is not merely a standardised simple local
form [but] a combination of several idioms'. 121 Moreover, `the national standard
language is itself the result of economic, cultural, and political co-operation and
affiliation'.122
When examining the issue of language standardisation of the Kurdish language,
it is useful to include a brief regional comparison. In contrast to Persian and
Arabic, Kurdish has not experienced a transformation into 'a uniform, generally
binding national language of all Kurds', mainly due to the lack of a state
apparatus to oversee and direct such a development, a problem compounded by
the combination of the existing linguistic differences and official repression.
Kreyenbroek observes that 'while Kurdish remained mainly a spoken language,
the differences between regional forms of speech did not present a problem'.
However, 'in the years immediately preceding and following the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, when the creation of an independent Kurdish state was a real
possibility, the need for a standard written language was evidently felt more
acutely'. 123 This illustrates why a standardisation of the Kurdish language(s)
ought to be promoted by the Kurdish leadership(s), just as language
standardisation was an important concept in Arabic-speaking countries.
119.Einar Haugen (1966), 'Dialect, Language, Nation', American Anthropologist, Vol. 68, No. 6,
pp. 922-35.
120.Ferguson (1983), p. 31.
121.Deutsch (1942), p. 536.
122.Ibid. p . 537.
123.Kreyenbroek (1992), p. 69.
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3.4.2 The Linguistic diversity of Kurdistan — language and boundaries
In certain areas of the world, notably Europe, national boundaries also serve as
linguistic boundaries. The Pyrenees, for instance, naturally separate French and
Spanish speakers, and in a similar fashion there is a correspondence of political
and linguistic borders in the case of Sweden and Norway. Not all borders,
however, being of a linguistic, international or ethnic character, are clearly and
distinctly demarcated. This has resulted in 'mixed language zones', I25
 of which
there are many in the Middle East.
Kurdish in all its varieties has for long existed in mixed language zones. Kurdish
is an Iranian language, distinctly different from Arabic and Turkish. There is an
impressive number of Kurdish dialects, some of which are not mutually
understandable. I26 The most common division is between the two main dialects,
or dialect-groups: Kurmanji, (or northern Kurdish) spoken in the Turkish parts
of Kurdistan and the northernmost areas of Iraq and Iran, and Sorani (or
southern Kurdish), spoken in Central and southern Kurdistan, i.e. Northern Iraq
and northwestern Iran (cf. Figure 3.4.1: Kurdish language areas in Iraq).
Besides these two major idioms, there are two smaller dialects, Zaza and Gurani,
the former with speakers in Turkey, and the latter spoken in southern and
southeastern Kurdistan. Each of these vernaculars is subsequently subdivided
into further dialects. It is important to note, however, that no clear boundaries
exist between these languages and dialects, as van Bruinessen observes, 'dialects
merge gradually; groups speaking one dialect may live among a majority of
speakers of another' .127
The division of Kurdish into the main dialects Kurmani and Sorani has (despite
the terms being modern), been maintained and reinforced throughout history by
the combination of geopolitical realities, which has led to the creation of two
national literary languages: the former using the Latin alphabet while the latter
being expressed in a modified form of the Arabic script. Bridging the gap
125.Fischer (1980), p. 413.
126.A comprehensive list of Kurdish languages, dialects and sub-divisions and how they
linguistically relate to one another can be found in Izady (1992), p. 169.
127.van Bruinessen (1992) p. 22.
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between the Sorani and Kurmanji appears rather insurmountable a task, and the
standard forms of the two main dialects that have developed independently of
each other would have to be viewed on an equal basis if a 'proper'
standardisation is attempted. The process of standardisation does have its limits
insofar as language 'defines the conditions under which minor and major
adaptations can be made across a horizontal spread of linguistic diversity in
order to maintain national viability on a larger scale'.128
Hence the idea of creating a standard form of Kurdish, one Kurdish lingua
franca to be accepted by all Kurds, appears almost too ambitious to be realised.
In agreement with Hassanpour that Kurdish is a '1)i-standard' language, 129 there
is a greater likelihood of a continued development towards and consolidation of
one standard form of Kurmanji and one of Sorani. This is in essence based on
the assumption that unifying a bi-standard Kurdish language would prove too
great a challenge, considering that the pure linguistic aspects would in most
probability be side-stepped and overrun by political issues. For the Kurds,
'political unification seems to be the primary condition for dialectal
unification'.130
In an independent Kurdish state, even in the case of a microstate, 131 Kurmanji
and Sorani respectively would have to be adopted as official languages, as
hegemony on neither side is likely to bring overall satisfaction to the 'other'
language group. Furthermore there will need to be more than a general
acceptance of the co-existence of other Kurdish languages/dialects, whose
specific language functions will have to be supported by a central Kurdish
Administration.
For the Kurds standardisation of their languages would not be an end in itself, as
Hassanpour rightly points out. Rather it would be 'employed as a means of
linguistic and national survival', 132 highlighting the fact that language is a highly
128 . Sathyamurthy (1983).
120 . Hassanpour (1992), p. 436.
130.Ibid.
131.Such a possibility is discussed in the concluding chapter eight.
132.Ibid. p. 35.
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politicised factor in Kurdish politics. The creation and maintenance of two
lingua francas would be greatly facilitated by a Kurdish language academy.
Conspicuous by its absence from Kurdistan, language academies have in
different parts of the world served as solid foundations for nationalists to build
upon. 133 History has witnessed a Kurdish academy, which existed in Iraq during
an eight-year-period in the 1970s, an institution whose establishment and life
expectancy was wholly determined by political circumstances. 134 Should the
Kurds of Iraq prove successful in their state-building efforts, a new apolitical
Kurdish language academy may see the light of day. There is an urgent need for
such an institution to supervise the dynamic on-going process standardisation of
a language represents.
In every language, irrespective of whether its standard has been established only
recently or not, the standard keeps evolving: standardisation is not a task that
would once occur and then disappear when satisfactorily solved.135
It is a difficult task trying to clarify the situation whether the two main forms of
Kurdish are to be regarded as separate languages or just comprise a large variety
of dialects, particularly in view of the fact that many of the experts in the field
find it difficult to harmonise their views on the matter. Within the field of
linguistics the general distinction commonly drawn is that dialects 'are mutually
intelligible varieties of one language, while languages are mutually
unintelligible'. 136 Izady, for one, emphasises the fact that the basic similarity
between (what is here referred to as) Kurmanji and Sorani is 'very strong', and
its speakers can communicate 'to a reasonable degree'. 137 There are others,
however, who analyse the situation differently and from a linguistic point of
view, based on the differences in vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation
between the two, advocate that `Sorani and Kurmanji differ as much from each
133.Relevant comparative cases are the Arab language academics in Syria, Iraq and Egypt and
their importance for the Arab nationalists, which is discussed by Altoma (1974), 'Language
education in Arab countries and the role of the academies' in Fishman, J. (cd.), Advances in
Language Planning, The Hague: Mouton & Co. N.V.
134.For an account of the rise and fall of this institution, see I Iassanpour (1992), pp. 448-451.
135.Ibid. p. xxxi (Ladislav Zgusta's introduction: 'Introduction: Language, Nationhood, and
Minority Status').
136.Edwards (1985), p. 18.
137.Izady (1992), p. 170.
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view, based on the differences in vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation
between the two, advocate that `Sorani and Kurmanji differ as much from each
other as English and German' - hence it is more suitable to term them different
languages.138
Hassanpour seems to reach the middle ground between these two positions when
he states that 'speakers of the two dialects do communicate, with difficulty, in
normal conversational situations ...[but] ... until they have had considerable
previous contact, the speakers of Kurrnanji and Sorani are not able to
communicate effectively in all contexts'. 139 With regard to inter-dialectal mutual
intelligibility, one could also point to the fact that there are different degrees of
intelligibility insofar as some speakers of a certain dialect may understand the
other dialect well, whereas others may not. Another obstructive factor that
renders a conclusive statement on this issue difficult is that neighbouring dialects
may be mutually understood, while Kurmanji-speakers in the northernmost areas
of Kurdistan may not understand the Sorani-speakers residing south of
Sulaymaniya.
If one places the discussion in a political context, additional observations can be
made, and in doing so there will be a return to the above-mentioned issue of
national and linguistic boundaries. The classification of languages and dialects
tends to follow the politics of state-making suggested by Michel Billig, whose
views are worth quoting at length:
Where national boundaries are established, then, the differences in speech
patterns either side of the boundary are more likely to be seen as belonging to
distinctly different languages by the speakers themselves, their national centres
and the world in general. ... The common practices of naming languages [i.e.
ascertain whether dialects or languages] tend to emerge through struggles for
hegemony. 140
138,Kreyenbroek (1992), P. 71. In fact, Kurdish with its enormous variety of dialects would be
the ultimate language for an exercise in meticulous subdivision which would produce an end
result of innumerable idiolects - 'the speech of one person' (Edwards (1985), p. 20).
139,Hassanpour (1992), P. 24 (italics original).
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Sorani and Kurmanji are thought to have developed 'along parallel lines' up
until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.I41
Following the subsequent division of Kurdistan, Sorani was allowed to flourish
in Northern Iraq, (as opposed to the complete ban on Kurmanji in the Turkish
Republic), and as the most well-developed literary dialect of the two, Sorani
enjoys a more elevated position in Kurdistan proper than does Kurmanji.I42
Given the current trends, it is conceivable that this in a future scenario of
Kurdish independence from Iraq may result in Sorani-advocates adopting a
hegemonic position towards northern Kurdish and its speakers and in doing so
instigating an internal struggle for linguistic domination. Alternatively, national
leaders may choose to downplay the importance of language or dialect, so as not
to alienate Kurds of different ethno-linguistic background. An exaggerated
emphasis on language would positively turn away potential nationalist
enthusiasts supporting the notion of an independent Kurdish state, who consider
themselves Kurds but do not speak Sorani. I43
 A struggle for linguistic
domination between advocates of Sorani and Kurmanji is already under way in
the diaspora. The latter, largely developed in exile, claim that the Latin alphabet
is far more appropriate for the Kurdish language than the Arabic, used for
Sorani, and advocates of each dialect vigorously promote the suitability of their
favoured version.I44
140.Billig (1995), P. 33.
141.Hassanpour (1992), P. 436.
142.Kurmanji, whose 'real development still takes place in almost entirely in exile' (italics
added), Kreyenbroek (1992), p. 75. Based on a 1947 estimation of the Kurdish-speaking regions
of Iraq, the Sorani-speakers account for approximately 70 per cent of the population and
Kurmanji-speakers about 25 per cent.
143.The issue of how to avoid the emergence of linguistic hegemonic ambitions on either side of
the Sorani-Kurmanji-divide has been dealt with in a creative manner by the 'Kurdish Voice of
America' radio-station. Michael Chyet said the following:
For us, the most important thing is not just broadcasting solely in either Kurmand or Sorant We
try to use both dialects together. We want our listeners to hear both dialects. For instance, a
Kurdish radio broadcasting out of Baghdad broadcasts for an hour in Kurmanci, then an hour in
Sorani. And so someone who just wants to hear Kurmanci listens for that one hour only. But we
don't give our listeners such a choice. Whoever listens to our program on a daily basis will
understand both dialects, whether intended or not. I believe that, in this way, a better relationship
can be established between those who use each dialect. Perhaps the first time one listens it's
difficult, but with time, one becomes able to benefit from both dialects.
'Interview with Dr. Michael Chyet: A silent people should make their voices heard' by Mesut
Dodan, Ozgur Politika, May 21, 2000.
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As is often the case in efforts of purifying a language, there has been a
Kurdisation of the Kurdish language when loanwords previously adopted,
formally or informally, from the dominant languages are cleared out. This
process began in 1920s Iraq. Despite the fact that the Kurds of Iraq comprise
only 18 per cent of the total Kurdish people, 145 Kurdish cultural life is very much
centred on Iraq, as commented on by Kreyenbroek in the following manner:
the successes of the Iraqi Kurds in the field of language and education have ...
enabled them to create an impressive literature and a fully adequate written
language, and have produced a generation of Kurds whose primary and secondary
education have been in Kurdish. Such achievements will undoubtedly help the
Kurds of Iraq in their future efforts to preserve their cultural and ethnic
identity. 146
The media is instrumental when it comes to promoting or suppressing a
language. As regards language planning, the ruling ethnic group, or in this case
the central government, would use their monopoly of the media to ensure the
language and culture of the Kurds were suppressed by way of ignoring its
broadcasting potential in television and radio, recognising that 'radio and
television are among the most powerful means of national integration'. 147 With
the launch of the first Kurdish satellite television channel MED-TV in 1994
(later banned and renamed MEDYA-TV), licensed in the UK with studios in
several EU-countries, the Kurds succeeded in establishing a strong and useful
tool of communication among themselves, which also served to impair the
cultural hegemony the regional states held over the Kurds. 148 This successful
initiative launched from and based in Europe, was complemented through the
efforts of the Iraqi Kurds. Themselves in charge of the media, their enthusiasm
abundantly displayed in establishing especially new television-stations, has kept
the Kurdish language alive and well in Northern Iraq.
	—
144.Such a linguistic struggle is evident in Kurdish academic circles in Sweden, which harbours
the cream of Kurdistan's intellectual elite.
145.Blau (1992), p. 49.
146.Kreyenbroek (1992), p. 79.
147.van Bruinessen (1998), p. 48.
148.For an account of this see Amir Hassanpour's article 'Satellite Footprints as National
Borders: MED-TV and the Extraterritoriality of State Sovereignty', Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, Vol. 18, 1998.
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3.4.3 Language shift vs language maintenance
The position of the Kurdish language is not one of great strength. Resulting from
various degrees of assimilation, forcibly or voluntarily undertaken, a large
number of Kurds lack adequate knowledge of Kurdish (particularly in its written
form), and often prefer to communicate in Turkish, Arabic or Persian. This has
led some observers to question the long-term survivability of the Kurdish
language, in other words, whether a language shift is likely to occur in Kurdish-
speaking areas. The complexities involved in such an analysis is expressed in in
the following paragraph:
Different languages have different political rights, not by virtue of any inherent
linguistic characteristics, but dependent on the power relationships between the
speakers of those languages.149
Language shift means that 'a community gives up a language completely in
favour of another one'. 150 This is sometimes also referred to as language death,
and indicates major changes in the circumstances of those speaking the
language. Language shifts occurred frequently throughout Europe in medieval
times, and a pertinent example is the linguistic transformation that took place in
Spain when Arabic gradually retreated in the fourteenth century.I51
It has been said that 'language shift will occur only if, and to the extent that, a
community desires to give up its identity as an identifiable socio-cultural group
in favour of an identity as a part of some other community'. I52 Manoeuvring in
such direction would indicate a sense of inferiority towards another linguistic
community, a process, which, in view of Kurdish history, looks unlikely to be
embarked upon by the Kurds. However, there are circumstances in which the
Kurdish language may be ascribed a degree of linguistic inferiority, namely the
religious perspective, although within Islam any non-Koranic language is given
a lesser status, so Kurdish should not be singled out in that sense.
149
. Slcutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1989), p. 60.
15 ° , Fasold (1984), p. 213.
15 1 , Bartlett (1996), p. 132.
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One should also point out that a linguistic minority grouping might involuntarily
find itself in a subordinate position by actions taken by the majority group. To
illustrate this, Hechter's theory of internal colonialism will prove useful, (as was
the case in the preceding chapter). According to Hechter, there is a dichotomy
between the core and the periphery and as the more advanced group politically
dominates the periphery from their position at the core, this dominance subjects
the peripheral population to a clearly inferior status by means of political
exploitation in all its various forms. I53
 Hence the language may appear inferior
to the surrounding languages.
Fasold identifies certain socio-economic conditions that may either favour or
complicate a shift to a language of greater use, based on case studies as varied as
the Scottish Highlands, Hungary, French-speaking Canada and New Mexico - in
its diversity the findings thought to be applicable also to the Kurdish case. Urban
people, limited in numbers and concentrated to industrial or commercial centres
will find it more difficult to maintain their language than rural-based
communities living in isolated geographical areas. Improvements in
transportation and communication tend to promote a shift of language 'with the
centres of culture associated with the incoming language'. 154 Among the factors
that weaken a language already in decline is naturally the 'outmigration from
linguistic heartlands', but also what Edwards terms 'in-migration of foreign
speakers' plays an important role. I55 These observations relate to Kurdistan
insofar as the heavy Arabisation with its influx of people from the larger ethnic
group - if allowed to continue — may, in the long term, be a cause for language
shift. The current status of Kurdish, however, exhibits sufficient strength to
avoid being 'put to death' by Arabic.
Language shift may, however, be said to have occurred in Kurdistan, though
resulting from the conflictual development between two Kurdish vernaculars,
rather than being a consequence of the prestigious status or linguistically
intimidating dominance of Arabic/Turkish/Persian over Kurdish. The language
152,Fasold (1984), p. 240.
153,Hechter (1975).
154,Fasold (1984), p. 241.
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in question is that of Gurani, which Kreyenbroek regards as nearly extinct,186
whose demise, however, cannot be attributed to the linguistic murder theory.
Formerly a literary language of high standing, I57 Gurani gradually came to be
replaced by the Sorani dialect. This development got underway in the eighteenth
century 'with the onset of the socioeconomic disruption ... through wars and
deportations', I58 highlighting the fact that 'language decline does not occur in a
vacuum but is accompanied by changes in the entire social fabric'. I59 With the
political decline of the ruling Ardalan-princes, and its replacement by a new
dynasty, the environment in which Gurani once flourished irrevocably changed.
Still alive in small pockets of Iraqi Kurdistan, Gurani in northwestern Iran is
'under great pressure from South Kurmanji speakers', and Izady points out that
'with the avalanche of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees, nearly all speakers of South
Kurmanji, into eastern and southern Kurdistan in Iran, the process of Gurani
dilution and assimilation has been hastened tremendously'. 16° Not only did
Gurani loose prestige as a literary language in the nineteenth century, it has ever
since also experienced a steady decline to the point of near extinction.
Languages are known to have declined and finally to have died away if 'an
inadequate concentration of speakers [are] faced with economically powerful
and technically sophisticated neighbours'. 16I This is not quite reflected in the
Middle East, where modernisation has yet to transform the regional states into
powerful players in the combined fields of economy and technology. However,
there may be sufficient grounds on which to fear modernisation because of the
impact it may have on a national language, insofar as 'language shift often
reflects pragmatic desires for social mobility and an improved standard of
living'. 162
 Opting for the dominant language may be regarded as long-term
beneficial but also essential by many people. However, important to note is that
improvements of one's status in society do not automatically follow a shift of
155.Edwards (1985), p. 71.
156.Kreyenbroek (1992), p. 82.
157.'The language of polite society and belles lettres in most of Kurdistan' and spoken by 'the
Kurdish princely house of Ardalan [1168-1867]', Izady (1992), p. 175.
158.Ibid. p. 173.
159.Edwards (1985), p. 86.
16°. Izady (1992), p. 174.
161 . Edwards (1985), p. 50.
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language, if the person is not regarded to be of the right ethnic mix.
The use of the dominant language often appears to be of great significance in the
most vital areas of life for the future for many people, and it is debatable
whether people would unreservedly support the maintenance and retention of a
cultural marker such as language, if it does not benefit them economically.
Turkish Kurdistan is a case in point: an underdeveloped area, which in economic
terms has become equated with simple-mindedness and destitution of its people,
in turn associated with the language spoken, i.e. Kurdish. Such linguicism'
('linguistically argued racism' 163) found in Turkey is not quite paralleled by
state-policies and public sentiment in Iraq, where government-sanctioned
repression in this respect has been less intense due to the political resistance of
the Iraqi Kurds, which has lead to relatively favourable conditions for the
development of their language.
Rather than to concede defeat to Arabic, it appears more accurate to visualise an
active policy of language maintenance 164 in Northern Iraq, with a continued use
of the Kurdish language that has for long been the means of communication, in
spoken as well as written form, on a collective basis by the community.
3.4.4 Summary
Sorani and Kurmanji appear sufficiently able resist the linguistic influence of
their powerful neighbours, but the Kurdish language would still have to be
ascribed the status of an endangered language due to the official linguicidal
policies of central governments. There are many examples of language shifts to
have occurred throughout history, and the difficulties experienced by the
Kurdish language underlines the role of state policy.
162.mid.
163.A concept coined by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas in 1988 and outlined in her 'Multilingualism
and the Education of Minority Children' in Skutnabb-Kangas and Cummins (eds.), Minority
education: from shame to struggle, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 9-44.
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Nationalist Kurds may choose to use the Kurdish language to 'de-Arabise'
Kurdistan with the view to reverse the socio-political Arabisation-trend, should
that policy continue unabated. I65 However, it is of great importance not to equate
Arabisation with modernisation, as the Kurdish region is not being modernised
by the large numbers of Arabs being resettled there. If the two concepts of
Arabisation and modernisation are closely associated, it may have the effect of
transforming a pro-Kurdish language movement, nationalist in character, from a
potentially dynamic process to a static entity — one that is perceived as being
backward and conventional.
The absence of a standardised Kurdish language has created confusion and even
doubts regarding the Kurds as a nation, and it has been very much in the national
interest — beside the purely linguistic interest — to try to rectify this situation. The
Kurds are yet to attain an unquestionable political existence, and until that
happens, the chances of their language achieving a standardised form should,
however, be regarded as slim. This highlights the importance of linguistic issues
to be given a place in the national movement as well as in any examination of
the region's political development.
164. A prominent example of language maintenance is the French-speaking people of Quebec in
Canada, the case of Montreal as outlined by Fasold (1984), pp. 227-231.
165.For language-related aspects of Arabisation, see Hassanpour (1992), P. 123.
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Chapter 4: Kurdish Identity Formation
4.1 Identity-building on national, collective and individual levels
When discussing identity formation, it is of great importance to distinguish
between political-institutional identity on the one hand, and ethno-cultural
identity on the other. As Parekh underlines, 'the identity of a political
community is located in its political structure, and not in the widely shared
personal characteristics of its individual members'. 1 A politico-institutional
approach is most suitably employed here since 'ethno-cultural characteristics are
too vague to specify and agree upon, are rarely shared by all or even a majority,
pertain to their private lives, at best define a people and not a political
comrnunity'. 2 There exist a multitude of markers of group identity of which the
factors mentioned above - class, tribe, religion language are but a few. This
discussion on identity formation and its components is illustrated in Figure 4.1.1:
Identity Diagram I. The four major components previously described, i.e. class,
tribe, religion and language, all serve as the basis for cohesion of the Kurdish
people. In addition to those major identity constructs, there are other
determinants that also exert considerable influence over the formation of
Kurdish identity. The last two variables on the chart have previously been dealt
with and the one concerning external interference will be outlined in the ensuing
section D. This theoretical model applies in its original form to a state and has
therefore been altered slightly to suit the current case study, which may be
termed a sub-state entity. In building on the third chapter and its discussion on
the establishment of a Kurdish state, there is in addition Figure 4.1.2 - Identity
Diagram 2 - which demonstrates the change of the role of identity from a
dependent to an intervening variable in forming the conduct of the state. This
shows the interplay between internal and external dynamics as identity in this
different setting represents a crucial intervening variable.3
I . Parekh (1999), P. 69.
2. Ibid.
3. These two diagrams are inspired by an illustration originally put forward by Theophylactou:
see p. 6, (1995).
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4.1.1 The construction of a national identity
Identity is essentially a 'people's source of meaning and experience', a meaning
which 'is organised around a primary identity ... that is self-sustaining across
time and space'. 4 More specifically national identity, which suffices as the scope
of analysis, concerns identification with 'a particular community based on a
shared loyalty ... and participation in its collective self-understanding'.5
There appears to be a widely held assumption in nationalist circles regarding
identity that a continuity exists from ancient times until the present, thus
'romanticising' the inheritance of identity (much the same as is done with the
term nation). Most observers of identity politics, however, point to the fact that
identity is anything but a static entity but characterised by dynamism, always in
a process of change. Keith and Pile suggest that identity should be regarded as
'incomplete', and 'understood as a process rather than an outcome' . 6 The
construction of a national identity normally assumes historical, social and
political dimensions, and if one takes the same position as Keith and Pile, this
incomplete process implies constant reshaping, reforming and recombining of
factors employed.
Invented tradition is often relied on when creating and maintaining a national
identity, a vital element in order to achieve and maintain social stability.
However, it may also be utilised by nationalist groups so as to strengthen the
basis on which their political aspirations rest. The concept of invented tradition
is perceived as 'a set of practices ... which seek to inculcate certain values and
norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with
the pase. 7 Hobsbawm identifies three types of invented tradition: firstly those
advancing social cohesion of the community, distinguished from those forming
institutions and sanctioning them legitimacy, and traditions assigned social
functions (- 'the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of
4 .Castells (1997), p. 6.
5.PareIch (1999), p. 69.
6.Keith and Pile (1993), p. 28 (italics added).
7.Hobsbawm (1983), p. 1.
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behaviour'). 8
 This invention of tradition is not unknown in Kurdish politics of
identity formation, and one may relate to O'Shea's suggestions of the 'unifying
myths' underpinning Kurdish identity: those regarding language, topography and
rural idy11. 9 The latter indicates a heavy focus on the rural at the expense of the
urban life, creating images of a Kurdish national identity based on pastoral
themes - some accurately depicted, others less accurately - which may not be
representative of the current social organisation in Kurdistan, but enhances the
cohesion of national sentiments and strengthens collective consciousness.
Invented tradition in the Kurdish context then appears to be principally aiming at
advancing the community's social cohesion.
A defined and well-identifiable past can help to cement an identity in so far as it
reminds the community of common origins, values, aims and interests, and
emotional experiences. If a national identity were perceived to be under threat, a
dispirited community would often look to the past for inspiration, which is when
the usefulness of tradition-invention becomes clear: the community can be
reminded of its identity by re-creating the past. The past is hence crucial in
creating and preserving identities. Identity can only survive with constant
reference — implicit or explicit — to the past. As already emphasised, identity is
not something monolithic, on the contrary, it is in constant flux - it changes both
according to internal dynamics and as a response to outside influences.
Historical episodes are discovered, discarded, appearing, reappearing or
disappearing from the collective memory.1°
Of CasteIls' different forms of national identity-building, one is particularly
applicable to the Kurdish case, namely that termed resistance identity:
'generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or
stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and
survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those
8.Ibid. p. 14.
9. Paper presented by Maria O'Shea, 'Imagining Kurdistan' at the Kurdological Conference
Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and objects of political and social processes,
May 29-31 1998, Berlin.
10.Connerton (1989), p. 51.
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permeating the institutions of society' . 11 This identity by resistance is regarded
as a very important, or even the most important type of identity-building insofar
as 'it constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable
oppression'.12
Identity may be seen as the combination of all the features that are thought by
one group of people to distinguish it from other groups. A process of identity
formation is largely influenced by the interaction with outsiders of various kinds,
and there is always a need for 'the other' against whom one's own identity is
formed. Identity is therefore 'other-related' 13
 and presupposes difference. The
development of any strong identity is quite inconceivable without identifying
and marking the differences that define others. Inconstant and relational a social
force, identity would appear to change in response to the difference defining the
identity of 'the other'. In simple terms, one may say as Cohen does, 'you know
who you are, only by knowing who you are not', 14 which would appear to be
applicable also to the national identity of a community.
Relating to post-Westphalian Europe, the 'Turkish danger', i.e. the Ottomans,
represented 'the other' in Europe's political life and as such served as a
prerequisite for the European identity. The way in which the Europeans acted for
the defence of Europe against the 'Turkish danger' in the post-Westphalian era,
making the Ottomans a constantly present element in the European political
culture, highlights the fact that the existence of an external enemy always
strengthens group solidarity — often translated into identity. The way the
Europeans denoted the Ottomans 'the other', makes for parallels to be drawn to
the Kurds separating themselves from their 'others', namely Arabs, Turks and
Persians. However, since difference from others is often the basis of the identity
of a people, an overemphasis on this element means one's identity becomes
'other-directed'. In other words, 'others become its constant frame of
reference', 15 causing a loss of focus for one's own identity, which is a hazard in
II . Castells (1997), p. 8.
12. Ibid. p . 9.
13.Keller (1992), p. 141.
14.Cohen (1994), p. 1.
15.Parekh (1994), p. 503.
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the development of Kurdish national identity.
The idea of defining one's own identity against that of others assumes greater
dimensions in the volatile region of the Middle East in general and Kurdistan in
particular. In 1994 Kanan Makiya touched upon this when observing how the
'spiralling logic of violence' experienced in the recent past is 'both cause and
effect of the increasing inability of individuals and political groups to establish
an identity for themselves that is not exclusively reactive and hostile to others in
its origins, . 16
 The environment in which a sustainable Kurdish national identity
could be created has not presented itself, and considering the harsh
circumstances under which the Kurds have asserted their identity, perhaps it is
fair to state that theirs, even more than other national identities appears reactive
and hostile to 'their others'.
4.1.2 Individual vs. collective identity
Collective identity is acquired and maintained by collective experience and
collective memory. Such experiences have often been accumulated in the course
of a group's existence, and have been passed on to the succeeding generations
through history, literature, material, culture, ceremonies and so on — in short,
through the traditions of society. The collective memory contains experiences
that a substantial number of group members have undergone in the more or less
distant past. Its content constantly changes. Shared experiences for Kurds for
instance rest on common suffering - the long-established persecution of Kurds
by Iraqi Arab Baathists was itself likely to have been a factor provoking the
Kurds to assert their identities - but positive experiences also shape the
collective memory of the Kurdish nation. Collective memory could, however, be
quite selective in nature, as likely to be myth as reality, and this is where the
influence of invented tradition may leave its mark. Important to note is also that
'what people choose to remember depends on their current situations and
aspirations'.17
16.Makiya (1994), p. 198.
17.UNRISD (1995), p. 95.
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The concept of a collective identity indicates 'a sense of shared continuity on the
part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to shared
memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit':
two components that produce 'a collective belief in a common destiny of that
unit and its culture'. 18 From this one may conclude that class, tribe, religion,
language, ethnicity, territory, per se, do not suffice to create a strong national
identity — shared experience does.
An important distinction between individual and collective identification is that
for individuals, identity would normally be 'situational', whereas a collective
identity tends to be 'pervasive and persistent ... less subject to rapid changes and
... more intense and durable'.19
Notwithstanding the clear differences between these two main forms of identity,
one still needs to recognise the need to place individual and collective identities
in a unified analytical framework, as Jenkins calls for. This is because 'even the
most private of identities is not imaginable as anything other than the product of
a socialized consciousness and a social situation ... [and] ... even the most
collective of identities must, in some sense, exist in the awareness of individual
actors'. 20 In other words, the 'collective cannot be "real" without the
individual'. 21 Ultimately the collective, or the sense of groupness, depends on
the individual identity. That individual and collective identity is essentially one
that was also advocated by Herder, who examined this issue in the light of the
development of language, and proposed that 'it is through language that the
individual becomes at once aware of his selfhood and of his nationhood ... in
this sense individual identity and collective identity become one' 22
18.Smith (1992), p. 58 (italics added).
19.Ibid. p. 59.
20.Jenkins (1997), p. 72.
21.Ibid. p. 166.
22.Barnard (1969), p. 7.
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4.2 The identity dimension of politics
The identity dimension of politics in Iraqi Kurdistan carries great significance in
its potential to either reinforce or tear apart the cohesion of the social fabric of
society. A versatile tool, the politics of identity can thus be utilised in a way as
to strengthen the community, but, employed less wisely it may also serve to
impair the unity of the people.
Identity politics should not be regarded as 'some sort of surface froth that floats
around on top of more important social processes'. 23 Rather it is a vital aspect to
take into account when analysing political developments in general and those of
unstable areas in particular, where identity clashes can cause the beginning of
conflicts and perpetuate their durability. As will be argued below, it is neither
always possible, nor desirable for that matter, to delineate a domain of the
religious/linguistic/economic/tribal to be distinct from other elements in the
process of shaping a national identity, as they frequently interact and influence
each other.
4.2.1 Identification with the state
With the rise of the nation-state came the idea that there should be one identity
central to the political community — a shared identity to serve as the social bond
between the people that constituted the new state. However, as is now a well-
known fact, creating a nation-state is one thing, but making the people who live
there believe in it is quite another — abundantly clear at the time of the creation
of the modern Iraqi state out of the British mandate in 1932. The way Iraqis had
to be made, or how the people had to be transformed into Iraqi citizens with a
common Iraqi identity was a substantial problem and this project of social
engineering resulted in the manufactured character of the Baathist Iraqi identity.
23 . Keith and Pile (1993), p. 31.
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The new reality of a 'formal identity' that membership in a nation-state provides,
may appear somewhat confusing for many people of a traditional lifestyle.
Sathyamurthy discusses these differences between simple and modern societies,
and asserts that a person's position in simple societies 'is determined by the
social niche which he or she occupies in society, which in turn is determined by
occupation, family or lineage, clan membership, tribal identity'. 24
 In other
words, this is the basis for nationality: smaller group-membership leads to larger
and more inclusive group-memberships. This stands in sharp contrast to the
system of modern societies, where 'an individual possesses citizenship directly
and not as a logical result of prior membership of "some organic sub-part" of the
nation-state'. 25 This form of legal and technical citizenship is alien to the way
people of traditional societies perceive belonging, with the result that 'in many
cases such formal identity diverges from "real", "internalised" emotionally-felt
membership' 26
At present described in toponymic or ethnonymic terms - the former describing
the place, region or country one inhabits (i.e. the Iraqi part of Kurdistan) and the
latter indicating ethnic and cultural belonging — Kurdish identity would assume
different dimensions should developments in the autonomous region go in the
direction of Kurdish political independence. National identification could then
be expressed in politonymic terms — indicating a way of describing people
according to the political entity to which they belong. In other words, 'Kurdish'
would then take on the meaning of a citizen of a Kurdish state.27
The `us-them' divisions that identity-formation creates (in terms of 'the other')
is not necessarily harmful to the state, but that would only seem to apply if the
national feeling for the overall nation is more powerful than any divisive call for
particular regions that strong local identities create. Emphasising one's own
cultural identity and adhering to larger, more inclusive national identity may not
24.Sathyamurthy (1983), pp. 72-3.
25.Ibid.
26.Ibid.
27. Terms borrowed from the Russian ethnographer Y. V. Bromley (1984), Theoretical
Ethnography, Moscow: Nauka Publishers.
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necessarily be incompatible. 28 However, there has to be recognition of the fact
that the viability of a state, particularly a newly formed one, does to a great
extent depend on its national identity being embraced by a majority of its people.
The frailty of the Iraqi national identity is a main reason for the high degree of
tension and recurring violence in Iraq, an existing potential also in a Kurdish
institutionalised national identity that does not satisfactorily accommodate the
different sub-identities.29
The roots of particularly tribalism and religion are so deep that the imposition of
a new national identity is likely to be met with strong resistance. It may even
appear unrealisable an idea trying to make people with many different and deep-
rooted allegiances identify with a newly formed state. Resulting from the
nationalist project of nation-building many Kurds appear to generally identify
with the imagined 'Greater Kurdistan', and a sense of belonging to Kurdistan (as
opposed to Iraq or even Iraqi Kurdistan) rests on feelings of hope, culture and
history: a sense of being a part of the Kurdish nation. 30 In reality, however, most
Iraqi Kurds recognise that they are a part of Iraq (although outside its legal
structure for the past decade), as changes there affect them in a way that changes
elsewhere in Kurdistan may not. Emotionally, and perhaps even ideologically,
they may feel a part of the greater Kurdish nation that extends across Iran, Iraq,
Syria and Turkey, but factually the identification is with Iraq.31
4.2.2 Globalisation and the politicisation of identity
An effect globalising trends may have on Iraqi Kurdistan, as in many other
places, is the tendency to shrink 'the definition of "we" to include only like-
minded others and enlarging "they" to include everyone else'.32
28.Cf. Connor (1972), P. 345.
29.A fear expressed by Iraqi Shi'a Kurds. Iranian Kurdistan March 2001.
30.As became clear in consultations with a variety of members of the exiled Kurdish community
in Sweden.
31.Unambiguous sentiments found in many Iraqi Kurds. (Iranian Kurdistan, March 2001).
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In this globalised world a national identity must, in the words of Michael Billig,
'compete with other identities on a free market of identities'. 33 One effect of
globalisation is to diminish differences between nations, but there is also a
tendency of that same process to cause a fragmentation of the unity, imagined or
real, within those nations. Should the state experience a decline in its abilities to
exert power, it would also lose the ability to impose a uniform sense of identity,
which may lead to the emergence or consolidation of new identities. In a
previous chapter it was concluded that the process of globalisation is unlikely to
cause immediate decline in the power of the states in the Middle East, and it is
debatable whether the ability to implement uniformity of a national identity has
ever been firmly in the hands of the various governments ruling Kurdistan.
The existence of overlapping identities, as explained below, presents the ruling
elites with opportunities to shape the nation's identity according to their political
interest. When so utilised, political expediency often inspires disproportionate
emphasis on one particular identity at the expense of others — the choice being
expedient rather than principled. Such practice has been common for
authoritarian regimes - the obvious example being Saddam Hussein's Iraq - as
'centralising dictatorships, lacking a broad institutional base, need to rely greatly
on mobilisational efforts, such as appeals to identity'.34
Kurdish identity has been suppressed, and remains so under Baghdad's
Arabisation- and resettlement-programs. 35
 The politicisation of Kurdish identity
has for long constituted an important tool utilised by regional states to further
their foreign policy objectives, largely made possible due to the subordinate
position the Kurds hold in the region. Certain historical observations can be
made with regard to how state ideologies have influenced the shape and form of
32.Rosenau (1995), P. 193.
33.Billig (1995), p. 133.
34.Darwisha (1999), p. 555.
35. There are numerous examples of ethnic groups who have been subjected to harsh state
policies with regard to identity. One case is the Turkish community in Bulgaria, whose identity,
as described by a Human Rights Watch report of 1989, was systematically destroyed by the
Bulgarian authorities, claiming that 'Turks are in fact Bulgarians whose ancestors were forcibly
converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.' Human Rights Watch (1989), Destroying Ethnic
Identity: The expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks, New York, NY: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee,
p. 5.
156
Kurdish identity. During the Ottoman era, for example, it was the over-arching
Islamic identity that connected people, a religious unity that was discontinued
with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the
ideologically secular nation-state. Following the creation of the Sunni-ruled Iraqi
state, the religious element gradually took the form of an (to the governing elite)
oppositional (Shiite) identity, and identification with the Baathist doctrine was
not readily forthcoming throughout the country.
It is clear that the definition of identity has served as a primary lever to secure
Baathist regime survival in Baghdad, but this may not be so for a Kurdish
government, as the conditions are somewhat different in Kurdistan. However,
there is no room for complacency regarding the power of identity politics, as it is
quite conceivable that a government may be brought down if playing the cards
of tribal identity with less subtlety than required. The same is true for linguistic
identity, where a large chunk of the previously proposed microstate of Northern
Iraq may turn against the government if their dialect does not find itself on equal
footing with Sorani.
4.2.3 Ethnicity as an ethno-political identity
Ethnicity is a social resource, to be drawn upon or exploited in varying contexts.36
It may appear natural that ethnicity first and foremost defines a national identity.
In the case of the Kurds, `Kurdishness' has of course been a powerful affinity
but it is only one of several loyalties that have created the multitude of Kurdish
identities. However, when ethnicity becomes politicised 'all of the other
components of social identity are subordinate to the ethnic components'. 37 This
comes about as 'the particular power of ethnicity ... lies in its potential to
"totalize" — to transcend other loyalties and obligations and become the sole
basis of identity' 38
36.Jenkins (1997), p. 90.
37.Yalcin-Heckman (1989), p. 120.
38.UNRISD (1995), p. 195.
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As a social identity, ethnicity assumes collective as well as individual aspects,
'externalized in social interaction and internalized in personal self-
identification'. 39
 It has been suggested that ethnic identity more than any other
form of identification is 'like an overcoat — something to be taken on or off, or
even swapped, as external conditions dictated'. 4° This can perhaps with the most
clarity be seen among Kurds in Turkey.
Jenkins singles out ethnicity as being constructed as 'an attribute of the Other',41
(echoing the basis for identity building as described above) although it is mostly
concerned with the identification of 'us', since the categorisation of 'them'
would describe the convictions of racism.42
Birch sees ethnicity as an independent variable, giving rise to identities and
loyalties which persist over long periods, largely regardless of other factors.43
Edwards views ethnicity primarily as 'a matter of belief," a belief shared by the
members of the ethnic group of being of common descent. This belief in
common ancestry is by Weber thought to be
a consequence of collective political action rather than its cause; people come to
see themselves as belonging together — coming from a common background — as
a consequence of acting together. Collective interests thus do not simply reflect or
follow from similarities and differences between people; the pursuit of collective
interests does, however, encourage ethnic identification.45
Yalcin-Heckmann reflects on the difficulty to distinguish ethnic structures and
identity from tribalism, primarily in rural areas: 'the unmistakable mixture of
ethnicity together with kinship and tribe makes the local political phenomena
distinct'.46
 With reference to this distinction, Edwards states that 'ethnic
39.Jenkins (1997), P. 14.
40.van Bruinessen (1996).
41.Jenkins (1997), p. 14.
42.As argued by M. Banton in his, Racial and Ethnic Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1983.
43 Birch (1978), pp. 333-334.
44.Edwards (1985), p. 8.
45.Jenkins (1979), pp. 9-10 accounting for the views of Max Weber from his Economy and
Society, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1978.
46.Yalcin-Heckmann (1991), p.40.
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membership ... differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed
identity' .47
The conspicuousness of the visibility of ethnicity in the Kurdish areas of Iraq
and the high level of awareness of their specific ethnic belonging is an indication
of its powerful influence. The emergence and politicisation of the concept of
Kurdish ethnicity is best explained from the primordialist approach, as outlined
by Hakan Yavuz, explaining that in the ideology of primordialism 'ethnic
identity is an objective entity with inherent features such as race, territory,
language, and kinship'. 48 Viewed in this primordial light, ethnicity is then an
aspect of human nature, a socially unconstructed phenomena. It is also
conceivable to view Kurdishness from an instrumental angle, as something
situationally defined (and as such manipulable for strategic and/or tactical
purposes) and changeable - in other words socially constructed. Jenkins debates
this 'situational ethnicity versus primordiality' and he recognises that 'ethnicity
is neither static nor monolithic [and] it should not be taken to mean that it is
definitively and perpetually in a state of flux' .49
47.Edwards (1985), p. 389.
48.Hakan Yavuz (1998), p. 10.
49.Jenkins (1997), p. 51.
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4.3 The multiplicity of Kurdish identity
A community's identity is ... a cluster of interrelated and relatively open-ended
tendencies and impulses pulling in different directions and capable of being
developed and balanced in different ways.5°
The Kurdish identity consists of several 'layers of conflicting and overlapping
identities' 51 and these multiple layers should be emphasised when outlining the
meaning and substance of Kurdish identity. The complexities of a social identity
is expressed through these subidentitites, and inherent as they are in all forms of
identity, they are perhaps more prevalent in the Kurdish context of identity-
building than many other national identities. Since major identities do not neatly
coincide but rather crosscut or overlap with one another, Kurds are provided
with an (un)enviable ability to invoke different identities 'at the mercy of
events', to use Dresch's formulation. 52 As most individuals possess most of
these sub-identities, a plethora of different permutations of identity is created,
highlighting the lack of a basis a cultural-ethnic identity would command. The
different identities of Kurds cannot be clearly distinguished from each other, and
their complex structures comprise many contradictory elements. 53 In addition to
that, it is not possible to separate identities and their conditions, since 'there is
no identity outside its context'.54
Just as there are high levels of interclass personal mobility, as previously
suggested, an inter-identity mobility is clearly discernible in Kurdish society.
The existence of such a multitude of identities does not facilitate an analysis of
Kurdish politics. For instance, tribal affinities provide a range of potential
identities rather than constituting a solid base for a clear-cut collective identity.
Morover, tribal identity has been identified as being of an oppositional nature,
50 . Parelch (1994), p. 504.
5 '. Hakan Yavuz (1998), p. 10.
52.Dresch (1989), p. 346.
53.An evaluation of how each subidentity relate to each other, however, is beyond the scope of
this study, and such an analysis, moreover, has to be explored empirically rather than
theoretically.
54.Keith and Pile (1993), p. 28.
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further complicated by the fact that the identity of individuals and that of
families often is separate and differentiated from collective tribal identity. A
religious identity, in addition, may not interact particularly well with other
principles of identification such as those connected with economic interests.
It would appear, as Kurds are educated in Iraqi/Arab schools, they gradually
come to adopt a national Iraqi consciousness. This is, however, balanced by their
socialising within the ethnic (Kurdish) community, which enhances their ethnic
awareness leading to an overall identity encompassing distinct traits of both
national and ethnic affinities. This is reflected in Yalcin-Heckmann's
observation that 'simply by raising one's level of social unit one can invoke
feelings of likeness, unity and solidarity between people'. 55 Such an overall
identity, composed of Iraqi and Kurdish sentiments, is further complicated by
the subidentities characterised by religion, tribe, dialect and, to a certain extent,
also class-interest. These various identities 'tend to fluctuate based on context
and time dimensions, among other variables'. 56 These different forms of identity
would appear to be upheld simultaneously, but also selectively separately
exhibiting different degrees of enthusiasm, intensity and belief - 'it is only when
an identity meets a specific need or circumstance that [other] ties become
important' .57
The social organisation of identities can be seen as hierarchical, and as such
illustrated by the Russian doll-metaphor. 58 Each doll contains a smaller doll, and
as the dolls grow smaller and smaller the more specific becomes the focus of
identification. Few, if any, identities can be so neatly arranged and ranked, and
such simplicity is unlikely to produce a satisfactory result in the Kurdish case.
As opposed to a hierarchical arrangement of identities, which produces a
dominance of one category over the others, identities may be systematised
laterally, as Handelman proposes. 59 Such an organisation shows that all
identities are of equal significance and pertinent to the Kurdish case, as the
55.Yalcin-Heckmann (1991), p.39.
56.Theophylactou (1995), p. 58.
57.UNRISD (1995), p. 97.
58.Jenkins (1997), p. 85.
59.Clearly outlined in his 'The organization of ethnicity', Ethnic Groups, 1(1977), PP . 187-200.
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people of Northern Iraq can be categorized in different ways in different
situations and settings. This relates well to situational identity, as described
above, how an individual 'constructs and presents any one of a number of
possible social identities, depending on the situation ... as the context deems'.6°
This can be useful, but may also be manipulated insofar as the outward
appearance is concerned, while language, dialect or manner may be more
difficult to alter.
A danger of having a strong set of multiple identities is that it may easily lead to
dual loyalties, the most obvious conflict arising when loyalty to the state and
solidarity with the ethnic community, within or outside the borders of that state,
leads to political confrontation, almost always to the detriment of the Kurdish
people. In this sense, identities competing with each other place the people in
awkward situations, 'torn between the claims of competing communities and
identities'. 61 A variety of identities makes 'a kind of guerrilla warfare against the
powerful' possible insofar as it 'authorizes all kinds of alliances and tactics'.62
However, as Keith and Pile point out 'unfortunately, this may be unable to
distinguish between important and irrelevant struggles, and it may create
counter-productive alliances between groups who should not be "bedfellows".63
To refer to the previous discussion on the autonomous Kurdish principalities that
were allowed to flourish during the Ottoman era, these entities may also be
viewed as providing the impetus for Kurdish national identity. This is suggested
by Yegen in that 'these entities constituted and defined the politico-social space'
of `Kurdishness'. 64 The removal of the emirates that some two centuries later
was followed by the dissolution of the Caliphate, had, according the Yegen, a
considerably disruptive effect on Kurdish consciousness, eroding 'the social
space wherein Kurdishness was constituted' 65 The fragmented nature and great
diversity of the Kurdish national identity were intensified by the conflict
between nationalist movements and their respective 'others', difficulties
60.Cohen (1994), p. 205.
61.Smith (1992), p. 59.
62,Keith and Pile (1993), p. 35.
63,Ibid.
64 . Yegen (1996), p. 218.
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compounded by conflicting interests with their counterparts across national
borders.
Just as Anthony Smith compared European identity to national identities, one
can use his example for the Kurdish case. Smith suggests that the contradiction
between the two may not be as great as it first appears. As he writes, 'it rather
depends on the version of nationalist doctrine held'. A doctrine coloured by
thoughts from the Romanticism, with its perception of the nation as 'a seamless,
organic cultural unit', would enhance any contradicting tendencies, whereas a
more pluralistic understanding, viewing the nation as 'a rational association of
common laws and culture within a defined territory', would leave very little
room for any dissension. In such an environment 'competing focuses of identity'
would be given some manoeuvring space, enabling people to identify with their
nation without alienating them from a looser overarching Iraqi identity. In the
Iraqi case, however, what could be regarded as a Romantic doctrine has been
employed, creating contradictory identities on a constant collision course.66
Despite the multiplicity of identities in the Kurdish political arena, there appears
to be a strong awareness of a common Kurdish identity among Kurds. 67 The
pressures on the Iraqi Kurds as a result of the long periods of hostilities between
the Kurds and the central government, raised their national consciousness to
high levels, compared to that of other subidentities. However, the gap created by
differences in tribal belonging, religion, language and just general attitudes have
prevented common action and has obstructed the creation of a solid base on
which to conduct politics, and these multiple axes of identification has caused
the shape of Kurdish identity to be vague and has given it a 'fuzzy frontier'.68
More specifically, Iraqi Kurdish identity is separate from 'other' Kurdish
identities, similar to the way Palestinian identity is separate from Arab identity.
65.Ibid. p. 221.
66.Smith (1992), P. 56.
67.Iraqi Kurds, as consulted in Europe as well as Iran, whether in exile or temporarily outside
Northern Iraq, showed strong indications of this. Moreover, among Kurds in exile — no matter
where in Kurdistan individuals are originally from — the evidence of such a common Kurdish
identity is clear.
68.The concept originally denoting the British identity. Cohen (1994), p. 35.
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The ascribed Iraqi identity imposed on them sets them apart from their Iranian,
Turkish and Syrian counterparts. The Kurds are hardly alone in possessing
multiple identities. Some attribute 'differentiation and movement between
identities [as] characteristic of modern societies'. 69 Marx' idea that all social
identity could be reduced to class identity, clearly is not pertinent to the Kurdish
case, and, one is inclined to believe, has generally been rendered quite
inapplicable as a concept.
The identity of Kurds may be compared to that of Arabs in Israel, who possess a
similar set of subidentities. The way the Arabs of Israel experience estrangement
from non-Israeli Arabs" is reflected in the way Iraqi Kurds sometimes have
been noticed to distance themselves from non-Iraqi Kurds (however, mostly in
political matters).
With Kurdish national identity being so multidimensional, many Kurds could in
chameleon-like manner invoke different identities from their impressive range of
identities, depending on what the circumstances demand. As Kurdish national
identity is such a slippery and peculiar concept, trying to untangle its complex
nature of multiple loyalties and identities is an intricate task. This difficulty,
compounded by the existence of a large Kurdish diaspora, also makes the
definition of Kurdishness elusive, since Kurdish identity is claimed with pride in
places that lie far beyond the geographical boundaries of Kurdistan. Due to this
reality more clarification is needed in describing the Kurdish identity than any
other 'firmly established' national identity.
Identity is very much an evolving concept, and without a past there can be no
genuine identity. From this it follows that neither can there be any greater
durability of an identity without a present or a future: the nation does not only
look backward to past achievements but also forward to the future. Kurdish
national identity therefore rests on the past, and draws on past experiences in
order to shape a brighter future, which contrasts with the not infrequently
gloomy present. Such a long-term transformation of identity is important for the
69 . Bondi (1993), p. 86 (reflecting the views of Marx).
7° . Hofman and Rouhana (1976), p. 79.
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political culture of Iraqi Kurdistan. The reformation of one's identity means
lessening the grip on the past, allowing the products of the past to sustain any
progress of nation-building.
Iraqi Kurdish identity may be more linked with language than religion, 71 and of
the previously mentioned components of Kurdish socio-political identity,
perhaps language is the element of identity that is most susceptible to change,
and that in its communicative sense. If the perceptions of a group's identity are
altered, this may lead to desires for a language shift. As argued in the previous
chapter, however, such a development is unlikely to get under way in Central
Kurdistan, but sufficient evidence has been presented to suggest that the Kurdish
identity has good chances to subsist even if being deprived of its language. This
is a reflection of Edwards' thoughts on the issue, who states that `groupness is a
tenacious quantity and is capable of surviving the loss of any objective marker,
including language' 72
A central point with regard to identity formation in Iraqi Kurdistan is that the
construction and maintenance of identity, in the words of Castells, 'always takes
place in a context marked by power relationships'. 73 In autonomous Northern
Iraq the all but relaxed inter-Kurdish power relationships are further complicated
through influence and interference by the neighbouring powers. This external
element in identity formation is perhaps of greater significance to the Kurdish
case than that of other peoples.
Anthony Smith's remark that identification on a national level in the modern era
has 'become the cultural and political norm, transcending other loyalties in
scope and power', 74 is certainly applicable to Europe. The Kurdish process of
identity-formation, however, has as of yet not reached that same stage. Many
subidentities, particularly tribal ones, may still come across as stronger and more
powerful than an all-embracing national Kurdish identity, but given time,
71.Whereas for the Iranian Kurds, as being Sunni among the Persian and Azeri Shiites, ethnic
identity is supposedly more linked with religion.
72.Edwards (1985), p.160.
73.Castells (1997), p. 7.
74.Smith (1992), p. 58.
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primary identification with the national imagined community may become the
cultural and political norm also in Kurdistan.
As maintained by an authority on the Kurds, Kurdish nationalism is the politics
of the affirmation of Kurdish national identity, an identity that is
characteristically transnational in nature. 75 Should the political conditions in the
region change in favour of the Kurds, the potential of this transnational identity
may be fulfilled in the shape of a 'Greater Kurdistan'. This is conceivable
considering its capacity to rise above the current fragmented political and
cultural character of the various Kurdish identities. In present circumstances this
is only a theoretical possibility, but one that should be considered in a long-term
perspective.
Since the definition of 'the other' is an essential part of the definition of the self
of the group, Kurdish national identity of Central Kurdistan has not developed in
isolation, but in tandem with the Baathist Iraqi identity. Not only do Kurds have
multiple identities, they also share them with the neighbouring states and
peoples. Iraq, but also Turkey and Iran have many a time exploited some of
those identities in efforts to achieve their various aims. In addition, global
powers have attempted to manipulate those identities for their own interests, a
theme that will be revisited in the following section D. Just as identity can be a
force dividing and disuniting in nature, it could also hold the key to conflict
resolution, insofar as some of the identities extend to other groups within other
political structures in the region. As Theophylactou perceptively concludes in his
discussion on Cypriot identity-formation: 'the common denominator in both
conflict and conflict resolution may well be identity'.76
75.Stated by Abbas Vali in his paper 'The nation-state and its "other": Kurdish national identity
and the politics of denial and exclusion in Turkey', presented at the Kurdological Conference
Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and objects of political and social processes,
May 29-31, (1998), Berlin.
76.Theophylactou (1995), p. 16.
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Part C
Iraqi Kurdistan in the Regional and International State
System
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Chapter 5: The Kurds and the State System
5.1 The principle of self-determination
The Kurds' latent desire for an independent state contextualises the principle of
self-determination, a brief discussion of which is deemed valuable to serve as an
introduction to the current chapter. The Kurdish right to self-determination,
'their call from below', making those 'above' uncomfortable, to use Hroch's
phrasing, 1 would indeed be a natural starting point for an analysis of the state
system, its evolution and how Kurdistan can be accommodated within it.
This idea to unify the national community with its own political unit is in fact
unhelpfully vague, since what exactly is the 'self' of a nation who can express its
will? A sense of national identity provides the pre-political background to the
emergence of sentiments of self-determination, an issue that has been examined
above.
The right to national self-determination has to be distinguished from the right to
self-rule, Yael Tamir points out. Derived from the theory of (liberal)
nationalism, the former is essentially about 'the demand for a public sphere in
which the cultural aspects of national life come to the fore', whereas the latter
with roots in democratic theory is 'the right to take part in the political
institutions that govern one's life' •2 The demand for self-determination thus
concerns cultural rather than political rights - those of preserving the existence
of a nation as a distinct cultural unit. Viewed in this light, demands for national
self-determination are not tantamount to demands for political independence.
Differently interpreted, however, in cases where advocates of national self-
determination envisage and insist on full sovereignty for their nation, the right of
self-determination would prove incompatible with the maintenance and
protection of territorial integrity. In such circumstances these two concepts
I . Hroch (1995), p. 65.
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clash, as a review of the authoritative Charter of the United Nations indicates.
Article 1 in the first chapter of the UN Charter that deals with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations emphasises the 'respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. Article 2, however, states that
'the organisation [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its Members' .3
The strong opposition to any violation of territorial integrity would appear to
override most claims for political self-determination, regardless of the validity
and righteousness of those claims. If one is to judge the position of international
law by the record of the United Nations, one may conclude, as does Hakan
Wiberg in internationalising the issue of self-determination, that 'it has little
support to offer populations living inside the territories of recognised sovereign
states, when they strive for independence or autonomy'. 4 The East Timor
experience of 1999, however, provides a rare exception to this general
observation, highlighting that 'the aura of nationhood always operates within the
contexts of power' .5
Demands for self-determination and self-rule alike may produce substantial
divisions in society, as overlaps in land (as frequently is the case) often lead to
disputes that could over time achieve greater dimensions. As a result of the
turbulent developments in the early 1990s, when more than a dozen new states
appeared on the international political arena, international politics began to show
indications of 'statehood fatigue'. Countries likely to be affected by further or
intensified statehood demands responded with greater swiftness and innovative
policies to any possible separatist tendencies. A fitting example of this is the
novel approach Iran, Turkey and Syria opted for in co-ordinating their reactions
to the intimidatingly democratic developments marking the beginning of the
autonomous 'Free Kurdistan'.
2,Tamir (1993), p. 9.
3, See Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the UN at http://www.un.org/aboutunicharter/index.html .
4 . Wiberg (1983), p. 50.
5 , Billig (1995), p. 5.
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The Kurds' right to self-determination rests on shared characteristics (similar to
those that characterise a nation) based on there being a distinct people
experiencing a common kind of historical experience, a common culture,
language and social organisation, and a geographically distinct territory. 6 There
are also rights which stem from protection, where severe oppression by the state
and even genocidal policies call for a high degree of protection which could be
provided by having a state of their own. These common criteria the Kurdish
people fulfil with ease. The difficulty lies in obtaining recognition, which also
implies support — moral but also military and economic — from the international
community, an issue revisited further down.
6 . These factors were de facto acknowledged in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, and despite the fact
that the relevant article never materialised, this Treaty is of tremendous importance as it
implicitly recognises the Kurdish right to statehood.
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5.2 The state system and its origins
In any analysis of the modern state, it is important to recognise the fact that these
political entities do not exist in isolation and should not, in the words of Colin
Barker, be treated 'as if it existed only in the singular': rather they constitute 'a
world system of states'. 7 It would appear inconceivable to consider states outside
of this conceptual framework. This state system that came into existence in the
seventeenth century is based on the Treaty of Westphalia, which, concluded in
1648, marked the end of the Thirty Years War in central Europe. This peace
treaty was a central historical event in many regards — not least because of its
long-term consequences for international politics. It outlined the structure of the
European state system, the basis for the international order, which still prevails.
It laid the foundations of a system making the territory the base for the exercise
of power - as opposed to previous dynastic orders when power was not primarily
based on control of the territory. 8 For all intents and purposes, 'Westphalia was a
modus vivendi, an agreement ... [based] upon the mutual obligation of political
authorities not to interfere in one another's territory', 9 hence, frontiers, which
had been of lesser significance, now became important.
A durable model for co-existence between sovereign states, and the first step
towards a standardised and regulated international society, the Westphalian
order determined the structure of conflict-management and the balance of power.
This dynamic system, with the central concepts of power, state and sovereignty,
implies an accumulation of power of the state and correspondingly a weakening
of transnational as well as subnational structures. These sovereign qualities
swept away the old feudal systems and the principle of sovereignty deprived
local rulers of their power-positions. Instability, which had been a common
feature of the old order, was to be overcome and replaced by a stable society,
created and maintained by a strong capable government through the exercise of
7.Barker (1978), P. 118.
8. Rather, it was based on the simple belonging to a certain family: when succession of rulers is
determined by blood relationship, the political character becomes more limited in scope - the
politics of a Safavid monarch might be explained by his being a Safavid.
9.Philpott (1998), p. 89.
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sovereignty. The capacity to prevent disorder hence derived from establishing
sovereignty over territory and people.
The balance of power is an important feature of the state system. This institution
for the control of violence has helped shaping and preserving the system of
states by safeguarding the independence of individual states during the past
centuries. In the process, it has contributed to the promotion of stability in the
international arena. In the classic European state system a most important
element, which facilitated the maintenance of the balance of power, was the
shared culture, which 'encouraged understanding and acceptance of the
objectives and instrumentalities of the balance of power'. 1 ° As the state system
expanded and a new international community came into being, there was no
longer one single culture with which all actors could identify. Indeed, 'the
cultural homogeneity which gave the European state system its distinctive
flavour has disappeared'. 11 So in combination with the emergence of other
determining factors such as ideology, the smooth operation of the balance of
power has been made difficult.
The concept of an international state system does not imply a rigid, static set of
relations, but the notion of 'system', as Immanuel Wallerstein's world system
theory holds, in contrasting the realist school of thought, may indicate an
existence alongside a world economy, which could exercise some control over
the system of states. The degree to which the political processes are determined
and influenced by the world economy has been widely debated, and for this brief
discussion it will suffice to merely touch upon the world-system perspective of
Wallerstein and the alternative, conflicting theory of one of his main critics,
Theda Skocpol.
Wallerstein did not intend his world-system to be understood in geographic,
global terms. Rather, he perceived it as 'a "world" system, not because it
encompasses the whole world, but because it is larger than any juridically-
I °. Berridge (1987), p. 152.
H . Ibid. p. 153.
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defined political unit'. 12 Moreover, 'it is a "world economy" because the basic
linkages between the parts of the system are `economic". 13 Wallerstein focuses
on economic processes on a wider scale when explaining state development, an
approach, which suggests that states do not act as independent actors, but strictly
operate within the fixed structure of a world capitalist economy. This perception
of states as secondary phenomena to the capitalist world economy is contested
by Skocpol, who lays great emphasis on political determinants in state
development, and maintains that states were instrumental in the making of a
world economy. Markets and patterns of trade are, according to Skocpol,
unlikely to 'be understood in their origin, functioning, or effects except with
reference to changes in class and political structures'. 14
The world-system theory seems to suffer from a lack of flexibility insofar as it
disregards and excludes the formation of dynamic interrelationships between
internal forces within the state on the one hand and with the world economy on
the other. One is inclined to believe that political factors have had a greater
impact on the formation of the state system than acknowledged by Wallerstein,
although Skocpol appears to overemphasise the significance of such political
factors.
It would appear that the current world order of states, based on the Westphalian
principle, is a logical construction for the purpose of accommodating the
organisational needs of humanity. As such, the state system may prove to be a
permanent feature of human organisation. The international state system is,
however, in a wider perspective a comparatively recent development, and as
previous political institutions have proven vulnerable to human creativity it may
be reasonable to expect also this form of political organisation to be transitional
in nature. There appear to be two main challenges to the Westphalian order: the
element of globalisation and the threat constituted by various emerging sub-
nationalisms.
12.Wallerstein (1974), p. 15.
13.Ibid.
14.Skocpol (1977), p. 1087.
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5.3 Threats to the Westphalian order: is the nation-state becoming
redundant?
Despite the fact that the number of nation-states has increased this past decade,
there are indications of their control being greatly reduced, largely due to the
force of globalisation. Through internationalisation of national economies the
nation-state has lost part of its sovereignty, particularly with regard to the
economy, and some go as far as to say that 'the authority of states has, like
money, moved offshore'. 15 This has come about through global transfers of
labour with large-scale migration across national borders, the internationalisation
of capital, but perhaps most significantly, the development of global
communication systems. In the words of Michael Billig, 'the flow of information
across electronic networks knows of no national boundaries'. 16 However, what is
important to note is that not only does the world globalise in areas of economics
and culture: the state is in itself also affected by globalisation. In this sense it
may be said that the combination of all factors mentioned above serves to reduce
the autonomy of the nation-state and infringes upon its sovereignty.
Often viewed as great threats to the state and seeking its displacement are the
transnational or non-state actors — 'non-governmental organisations, which
operate internationally'. I7
 These have in the second half of the twentieth century
steadily increased their presence and influence on the international political
arena. The transnational actor that appears most powerful to challenge the state
on both international and domestic levels is the multinational, or transnational
corporation, a term, which indicates that its operations are conducted in more
than one country, and deals with foreign direct investment. I8 First and foremost
an economic institution, the transnational corporation is nonetheless territorially
based in that its headquarters is firmly established in a chosen place where it has
a history and legal presence. Lacking a 'state-defined' territorial base, however,
15.Rosenau (1995), p. 193.
16.Billig (1995), p. 130.
17.Berridge (1987), p. 23.
18.Ibid. p. 24.
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it is able to exert extensive influence on the political arena in the following
ways:
firstly, through influence, or even control, over both the foreign and domestic
policies of its host states — at least in matters where its interests are affected;
secondly, through its employment as an instrument of the foreign and domestic
policies of its host states; thirdly, through influence, or even control, over the
foreign political and foreign economic policies of its home state towards its host,
or potential host, states; and fourthly, through its employment as an instrument of
the foreign political and foreign economic policies of its home state towards,
amongst others, its host states, irrespective or whether or not it has also
contributed to shaping these policies.°
With so much potential power the multinationals are clearly in a position to exert
great influence over the state, 2° although it is important not to stress this
potential too far — their control is by no means unlimited. The state is 'politically
buttressed against the multinational by nationalism [and so] its countervailing
power is considerable'. 2I If the multinationals had been able to exert unlimited
control over the policy-making processes of states, trade would rarely have been
used as a political weapon. An example of this is the unilateral sanctions the
USA have applied to Iran through its D'Amato law/Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,
passed in 1996, aimed at impeding nations from trading with Iran. Not only
foreign companies are targeted, but also influential American corporations are
banned from signing any deals to develop Iran's rich oil and gas fields. These
kinds of policies are economically ineffective and politically counterproductive,
and if multinational corporations exerted such power over states as is sometimes
claimed, economic warfare would not be so frequently utilised in international
politics.
19.Ibid. p. 25.
20.The relations between the multinationals and the states resemble relations between church and
state from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. For an interesting account of this, see
Strange (1986), P. 310.
21.Berridge (1987), p. 26.
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Globalisation may be perceived as a force that in the long run undermines the
nation-state, 22 contributing to a process of these entities eventually being
absorbed into larger units and finally superseded by a world government. Held
shows that this development begins at the economic and cultural level, where an
increase in connections lessens the ability of the government to exercise power
in an effective manner. A multifaceted growth in transnational processes leads to
a further decrease in state power - a development that brings about co-ordination
internationally or intergovernmentally in areas traditionally controlled and
operated unilaterally by the state. As a result, full sovereignty is effectively
compromised as participation in various political and economic constellations on
the international level becomes greater. Economic necessities may prove strong
enough to compel states to surrender parts of their sovereignty to supra-national
organizations, rendering the emergence of 'global governance' possible. Such an
order is characterised by an overarching system of policy-making and
administration, in which individual states' exercise of power may diminish even
further should a supranational state with extensive powers emerge on the
international arena.23
This development has precipitated what Rosenau refers to as 'pervasive
authority crises', which indicate the lack of efficiency and capability regarding
the implementation of policies. He writes that states 'can still maintain public
order through their police powers, but their ability to address substantive issues
and solve substantive problems is declining as people find fault with their
performances and thus question their authority, redefine the bases of their
legitimacy, and withhold cooperation'.24 This became evident following the
dramatic transformations that have occurred since 1989, but it is not only the
areas of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that have experienced
these authority crises. Rosenau believes that they are to be found in most parts of
the world, but points out that they manifest themselves in different shapes and
forms. One example he presents is Canada, where 'the authority crisis is rooted
22.For an analysis of why globalisation is an irreversible process, see Walter B. Wriston,
'Technology and Sovereignty', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, Winter 1988/89, pp. 63-75.
23.Held (1991), pp. 207-9.
24.Rosenau (1995), p. 207.
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in linguistic, cultural, and constitutional issues as Quebec seeks to secede or
otherwise redefine its relationship to the central government'.25
The Middle East and in particular the Kurdish-inhabited areas are certainly not
alien to authority crises as defined by Rosenau. The basic feature of
globalisation — the increased flow of economic and cultural exchanges — is
admittedly difficult for the Middle Eastern states to curb throughout Kurdistan.
When the governments in Tehran, Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus find
themselves unable to regulate the flow of ideas and commodities at their Kurdish
borders, their internal policy instruments are rendered ineffective. Exerting this
control was difficult already in the 1980s, and with the creation of the
autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq in 1991, was made well-nigh
impossible.
In order to retain some degree of state power in relation to the Iraqi Kurdish
areas, and to prevent the intensification of transnational processes between
different Kurdish regions, the respective governments have made their presence
felt by firmly establishing their security and intelligence services in the
autonomous region. 26 This, in combination with repressive measures of various
degrees directed at their own Kurdish populations, keep any pan-Kurdish
sentiments from gaining momentum, at least in the short term.
Due to prevailing globalising trends, there appears to be a strong desire to
control regional institutions and limit any developments that might undermine
national sovereignty. Resistance to the emergence of competing power centres
that could result in divided loyalties is another sign of the state attempting to
counter globalisation. Since the involvement of these states in international
organisations and multilateral treaties is reasonably limited, they are not forced
to surrender much sovereignty, if any, for the purpose of co-operation on a
regional or international level. The Middle Eastern states with sizeable Kurdish
populations seem to have steered clear of the supranationalism that may
characterise other parts of the world and any system of 'global governance' does
25 . Ibid. p. 207.
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not appear to have gained a foothold in this region. That is not to say that these
states are not affected by globalisation, but the extent to which they have bowed
to influence by international forces on the global arena is proportionately
limited.
A fundamental consequence of globalisation is that developments in one country
create a reaction in another place, far beyond the borders of that country. Hence
decision-making on the sole basis of domestic economic or political conditions
is rendered impossible, making consideration of regional and international
developments necessary. This is highly relevant when dealing with the Kurdish
question, and particularly with regard to developments in Iraqi Kurdistan over
the past decade.
In particular for regimes of a more authoritarian character - to a greater or lesser
extent describing the nature of the Kurdish-populated states - the feature of
globalisation in its external environment could potentially be a very problematic
one, since it is a process that, as has been described, threatens territorial
sovereignty by reducing the control exerted by the state. Keeping globalising
forces and influences at bay would then have to be combined with efforts to
curtail the other main threat to their existence as nation-states: i.e. the internal
threat of sub-nationalisms.
The sovereign prerogatives of states are not only vulnerable to the actIvifies of
global forces, but demands from domestic sources also challenge their authority
and territorial supremacy. Such tendencies do not form in isolation from events
on the global level, as observed by Kolinsky, 'the changes occurring 'above' the
level of the state, are not without consequence for the patterns of authority and
political integration within national structures'. 27 Through the ethnification of
nationalism, or materialisation of identity politics, the political basis for the
modern nation-state has been undermined. There seems to be a growing concern
that today the threat of conflicts between states may not be as great as the danger
26.This will be discussed in chapter six.
27.Kolinsky (1981), p. 86.
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of internal friction and collapse due to the rise of ethnic and cultural loyalties
that were for long subordinated to state allegiances.
5.3.1 Beyond Westphalia
The state system was effectively kept in place and sustained by the Cold War,
during which time the general atmosphere of hostility between the great powers
prevented subnational and transnational expressions from emerging, the growth
of which may have reduced the state's capacity to carry out its essential
functions.28 The end of the Cold War unleashed subnational as well as
transnational forces of varied strength and intensity previously prevented from
flourishing: a development, which begs the question whether the complete
dissolution of the state system is to be expected.
Those who assert that we are moving towards a new era where borders as such
become fluid and ever-changeable as they once were in European medieval
times, envisage the emergence of a supranational world in which the nation-state
will cease in importance as an operational entity, giving way to a borderless
world. 29 Such a development would imply that the main points of Westphalia -
i.e. the elements of national sovereignty and political territory (the legitimate
basis for the state) would need to be reconsidered or even discarded if a post-
Westphalian or neo-Westphalian order is to be created. It is beyond the scope of
this discussion to theorise in depth about the general appearance of such a
system on the international level, but a brief outline may be useful.
In a neo-Westphalian order the fusion of sovereignty, territoriality and
nationality would be subject to substantial changes. Hegel argued that the firm
consolidation of the modern state as a permanent institution and basis for an
international order owed its success to the fact that 'it struck the correct balance
between individual rights and loyalties to the community, the market economy
28.See for instance Rosenau (1995).
29. A vocal advocate of this theory is Eric Hobsbawm. See particularly his, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (1992), Cambridge University Press.
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and social welfare [and] state sovereignty and international order'. 3° The
collapse of this critical balance, argues Carr, has brought about the crisis of the
state, in particular caused by the collision of the forces of nationalism and
internationalism.3I
Seeking to reinstate an equilibrium, Carr envisages new state structures, which
would balance 'respect for national differences and cosmopolitan sentiments',32
and where sovereignty 'would endure yet relinquish much of its classical
significance'. 33 As Linklater observes, 'nations would continue to be important
in the new structures of cooperation, but the connection between nation and
sovereign statehood would be severed'. 34 The new configuration of state
structures would be more cosmopolitan, more respectful of multiple identities
and more strenuously involved in combating economic inequalities than any of
its predecessors.35
Central in Can's writings is that post-nationalist political structures promote the
welfare of individuals rather than the interests of states. Linklater builds on
Can's analysis and suggests that 'a post-Westphalian framework can develop
where like-minded societies are keen to establish closer forms of political
cooperation to integrate shared ethical norms into the structure of social and
political life'.36
 Such co-operation would mean relinquishing parts of their
sovereignty as the type of international governance conceived by Linklater is not
based on the fusion of sovereignty, territoriality and nationality. However, states
will retain the form of sovereignty although in a watered-down version of the
concept, but in a post-Westphalian global order, significant powers on the
national level will be transferred to authorities on an international level. There
will be a multitude of political allegiances and an absence of a central sovereign
3°. Linklater (1998), p. 147, referencing Hegel (1952), The Philosophy of Right, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Bull argues in a similar vein: see chs 10-13 in his The Anarchical Society: A
Study of Order in World Politics (1977), London: Macmillan.
31.Analysed in part two of his Nationalism and After (1945), pp. 38-70.
32.As quoted in Linklater (1998), p. 159.
33.Ibid. p. 163.
34.Ibid.
35.Can (1945), p. 43.
36.Linklater (1998), p. 167.
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authority, which will create an array of diverse loyalties and prevent the
emergence of authoritarian projects with hegemonic ambitions.
As for nationality, an international society of a post-Westphalian style would
create a 'transnational citizenry', which, as Linklater puts it, would 'break the
nexus between sovereignty and citizenship'. 37 On the whole, 'a post-
Westphalian society promotes greater universality and diversity by striving to
balance demands for the recognition of deep diversity with the ideal of
transnational citizenship' .38
Post-Westphalian forms of world political organisations are unlikely to develop
in all parts of the world simultaneously. It should come as no surprise that it is in
Europe, 'the birthplace of the modern territorial state', that political innovations
are under way. 39
 Should this development towards a European federation
continue, Europe may well come to serve as the model of a post-Westphalian
political organisation, to be reproduced in other parts of the world. This would,
however, be a lengthy process, and it is debatable whether these ideas have the
capacity to be applicable on a global scale. Emulating developments in Europe
would, in any case, not appear imminent in the Middle East.
It is conceivable that in the Kurdish context a modified form of a pre-
Westphalian order may be characterised by modern alternatives to the extensive
sixteenth and seventeenth century Kurdish principalities.° These emirates,
situated in the border areas of the Ottoman and Safavid empires, enjoyed
considerable autonomy and due to their peripheral but strategic location they
commanded substantial leverage as the empires made frequent attempts to win
them over and form allegiances in order to ensure their frontier security.
Resulting from Persian defeat in the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, most of
Kurdistan fell under Ottoman jurisdiction, although several emirates were
37.Ibid. p. 175.
38.Ibid. p. 176.
39.For an interesting account of this development, see Falk (1994), p. 136-137.
4°. Martin van Bruinessen provides a detailed discussion on the Kurdish emirates and their
setting: (1992c) pp. 145-175.
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located within the Persian sphere of influence. 41 The Safavid Shahs desired to
rule their Kurdish areas through centrally appointed administrators of Turkoman
or Persian origin, whereas the Turkish Sultans adopted a pragmatic approach —
undoubtedly realising the extreme difficulties of enforcing central control in the
fringes of their empire - and granted the Kurds more autonomy in accepting
local chiefs to serve as rulers. A new administrative system was set up in the
region based on the `Kurdo-Ottoman pact', where sixteen independent Kurdish
principalities were recognised by the Ottomans. 42 Whether being the result of
Turkish pragmatism or the failure of Persian methods (Esfahan43 was forced to
accept that instating centrally appointed non-Kurdish governors was unworkable
a policy), the Kurdish ruling princes enjoyed a status of virtual independence for
their emirates.
The relative stability in the political structure of Kurdistan at this time has been
mythologised by Kurdish nationalists,44 but this perception is to some extent
illusory. It is fair to say that conditions for a more stable political climate were
created in the Kurdish areas when maintenance of the strategic balance of power
between the Turks and Persians was sought by most parties. The administrative
system based on the `Kurdo-Ottoman pact' was, in the words of David
McDowall, viewed 'as the ideal balance between localism and imperial
government' .45 However, the instability in this arrangement lay in the recurring
ambitions of all parties concerned - Ottomans, Safavids and Kurdish chiefs — to
increase their own domains at times of greater individual strength and capacity,
which hardly promoted a sustained peaceful environment.
In visualising a post-Westphalian order in the Kurdish Middle East, an
organisation similar to the one outlined above comes to mind, suggesting
extensive autonomy with no or a deliberately weak central government. The
recurrence of such a mosaic structure in the region would ideally exclude highly
destabilising elements such as that of intense rivalry between competing regional
41.See McDowall (1996), pp. 25-31 on the Kurds' role in the Ottoman-Safavid relations.
42.Kendal (1993), p. 14.
43.Esfahan served as the capital of the Safavid dynasty, and remained the focal point in the
Persian Empire for several centuries.
44.An issue examined by O'Shea (1998) p. 139.
182
powers where the Kurds might yet again find themselves acting as a buffer
between the competitors.
On a wider level, such a loosely defined political order could possibly deal more
successfully with today's stateless nations such as the Kurds. Statelessness has
otherwise been somewhat of an alien concept to the system managers. The term
statelessness — with its idea of displacement - does not necessarily signify
aggravating dimensions of anarchism and a social order in disarray. This is
particularly discernible in tribal societies where the impersonality of states is
contrasted with the strong bonds of loyalty and solidarity between the tribesmen,
among whom this interdependence represents the foundation on which peace
and order of society rest. A cosmopolitan community committed to the
promotion of welfare internationalism, as envisaged by Carr, would ensure due
consideration of the interests of those politically weak — in other words, those
nations without a state, and perhaps the Kurds, would fare better in a
restructured post-Westphalian world.
45 . McDowall (1996), p. 28.
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5.4 Is the Nation-State still a potent force?
Contrasting the theories of the redundancy of the nation-state is the view that
this powerful form of political organisation represents a more resilient
construction than sometimes may appear, and is unlikely to vanish. Not denying
the aforementioned 'crisis of the state', it might be hasty to conclude that what
may appear to be nationalist (as that supporting state ideology) sentiment on the
decline necessarily implies a permanently enfeebled nation-state. There is no
denying that the nation-state is a vulnerable structure, but the very factors that
seemingly have an adverse effect on the operational functions of the state, i.e.
the supranational entities of international organisations and transnational
corporations, may, upon close scrutiny, prove to be imperative to ensure the
continuation of the nation-state in its present form.
The strength of the nation-state lies in its merging of the distinctive concepts of
'nation' and 'state'. As Gordon Smith points out, these two notions 'bring
together conflicting sources of legitimacy': the nation(-as-people) being a
product of cultural and ethnic considerations and hence, in the words of Smith,
presents a 'non-rational idea', sharply contrasted with the modern state, which
'embodies the principle of "legal rationality".46
Just as a state may be created by a nation, a nation may be fabricated by a state -
a process, which tends to subjugate "sub-state" national expressions that could
threaten the emerging "national" unity'. 47
 As indicated above, an illustrative and
fitting example of such a process is Iraq, where the state has attempted to create
an Iraqi nation consisting of Kurds and Arabs, but also Turkmens and Assyrians
with the added divisive religious element of Sunnis and Shiites. Hardly a
monoethnic state, Iraq may even be termed a nation-state-project, which would
imply its striving towards the ideal of political organisation where nation,
territory and state were as one. Again in the words of Gordon Smith, it
attempted to 'foster an attendant nationhood, to make nationalism a dependent
46 . A. D. Smith (1981), p. 197.
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variable, Which would bring with it the natural consequence of enhancing state
legitimacy'. 48 This is not to suggest that Iraq was the only country in the region
to embark on such a course of devising its complementary nation.49
Considerable ethnic, religious and linguistic diversities characterise the nature of
many states in the region, and all these factors combined into what is quite
inappropriately termed a 'nation-state' represents a challenge to the statesmen
seeking to establish an all-embracing, often new, nationality.
5.4.1 Devaluation of the nation-state concept
It is clear that developments in the second half of the twentieth century, and
particularly of the past decade, indicated a reinterpretation of the territoriality
and sovereignty of states. Many of the nation-states that were created in the de-
colonisation era as well as the large number of new states coming into existence
in the 1990s were following an established pattern and, it seemed, automatically
applied 'the nation-state formula' 5° as a natural course of action. It is doubtful
whether any of these newcomers on the international political arena would have
been able to achieve statehood in earlier ages, when sustaining an independent
existence — i.e. 'to defend its territory and to provide physical security for its
citizens' 5I - was one of the main functions of the state. This deflationary
development may be referred to as 'lowering of the threshold requirements' 52 - a
phrase used by Joseph Rothschild describing the gradual undermining of the
institution of the nation-state - which suggests the appearance of a difference
between the more recently created nation-states and their older counterparts.
47.Ibid. p. 198.
48.Ibid.
49.A clear example, among many, of a 'nation-state-project' is the United Arab Emirates, where
the state has attempted to construct a new nation out of the different emirates.
5°. A. D. Smith (1981), p.200.
51.Ibid.
52.In discussing the problematics confronting state authority in the late twentieth century Europe,
he writes that the issue of the viability of states 'has waned as the international community has
lowered its threshold requirements and definitions of what constitutes viability'. Rothschild,
(1979) p. 37.
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One could even go as far as to question whether these new states are 'proper'
nation-states, identifying them as 'broken-backed' states, as does Tinker. This
term signifies the emergence of a new pattern of state, a major feature of which
is the centre's inability to extend its authority to all areas of the state. 53 Iraq fits
Tinker's broken backed states pattern in that parts of the country have at
different periods been under the control of armed opponents of the central
government.
The fact that the nation-states of the late twentieth century appeared to lack
sufficient capacity to fully attend to their traditional functions does not, however,
seem to indicate an immediate disappearance from the political scene. The basic
functional needs are secured through multilateral arrangements, the military
nature of which guarantees the defence of the state. Alliance-formations would
often reflect the worldwide strategic interests of leading countries, and this
expansion of their networks reinforces the individual state's military capacity.
Entering into alliances primarily serve the state's own interests to survive as an
independent state-formation. Hence the ability of the single state to ensure its
own physical security, or the lack thereof, would not appear to reduce its life
expectancy.
5.4.2 Globalisation re-examined
Globalisation does not represent a process that has emerged in recent times,
rather, in the words of Michael Smith, 'it reflects a lengthy process of historical
development characterised by intense political competition and reflecting the
exercise of power in a variety of forms'. 54 This view is supported by Anthony
Giddens, who sees a strong link between the appearance of globalisation and the
development of modern societies. 55 Often perceived as automatically generating
cultural uniformity, this long-standing process of globalisation may do the
opposite - make new levels of diversity appear. The existence of nation-states
53.Tinker (1964), pp. 6-7.
54.Michael Smith (1992), p. 254.
55.See his The Consequences of Modernity, (1990) Cambridge: Polity Press.
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around the globe provides a basis on which societies can be connected with one
another. Therefore it is possible for ethnic identification to survive, since
globalisation does not necessarily imply homogeneity and integration. In the
words of Michael Billig, 'the forces of globalization are not producing cultural
homogeneity in an absolute manner. They may be eroding differences between
national cultures, but they are also multiplying differences within nations'.56
Malcolm Waters entertains this idea that a globalised polity does not have to
take the form of a world government. Alternatively, he writes, 'a globalised
polity can have the characteristics of a network of power centres ... co-ordinated
because their controllers shared common norms and common interests'. 57
 Such
co-ordination is rendered necessary since international trade and national
economies through the process of globalisation have become heavily linked to
each other - an interdependence that implies a considerable difficulty for any
state to exert exclusive control over its own economic system and keep its
economy completely separate from others.
Out of necessity as well as resulting from strategic considerations, economic co-
operation across the borders is promoted, but this co-operation may not
necessarily proceed towards 'supranational integration' as suggested above.
Rather, in their capacity of being the basic components of political organisations
of any significance, it is conceivable that states enrol in joint ventures because
they regard it as 'the best way of preserving their own national interests and,
ultimately, of maintaining their position, even existence, in the world
community'. 58 In the same vein it may be argued that international organisations
are 'extensions of the existing states', and 'in its role as coordinator and
mediator of policies at both national and transnational levels, central government
remains in a key strategic position'. 59 Viewed in this light, the institution of the
nation-state seems cemented and even underpinned by the very forces of
supranationalism that sought to dispose of it.
56.Billig (1995), p. 132.
57.Waters (1995), p. 111.
58.A. D. Smith (1981), p. 202.
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As stated above, economic globalisation makes the state vulnerable and forced
to co-ordinate its financial policies with other state and non-state actors in the
international arena, but the state far from surrenders its control to other states or
forces in this system of interdependence. One might conclude indeed, as
Kolinsky does, that 'no state gives all: its general willingness to coordinate
policies is tempered by the reserve of seeking competitive advantage where
possible and by its anxiety to minimise its vulnerability to unpredictable changes
in the external world. A finger is given, a hand held back'.6°
Globalising trends in politics only vaguely resemble economic globalisation in
terms of intensity and power. The state remains 'a critical arena for problem
solving', which may be explained by politics as being 'a highly territorial
activity'. 61 Territorially-based, the state is bolstered by the wide powers this
brings, and in the Middle East in particular, borders are very much underpinning
the current state system.
This discussion generates a subject matter worthy of investigation — i.e. that
concerning the prospects for Kurdish statehood in the regional state system. This
will be thoroughly examined in the concluding eighth chapter, outlining the
possibility of a Kurdish microstate, a 'Greater Kurdistan' or even the prospect of
several Kurdish republics emerging. That pertinent discussion, however,
demands an analysis of the nature of Kurdish nationalism: not only tracing its
origins and evaluating its general development, but also providing a
classification based on previous exercises.
59 , Kolinsky (1981), pp. 100-101.
60 . Ibid . p . 99.
61 , Waters (1995), p. 122.
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5.5 State and Nationalism in a Kurdish context
The Kurds constitute a single nation, which has occupied its present habitat for at
least three thousand years. They have outlived the rise and fall of many imperial
races: Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Turks. They have
their own history, language, and culture. Their country has been unjustly
partitioned. But they are the original owners, not strangers to be tolerated as
minorities with limited concession granted at the whim of the usurpers.62
5.5.1 Origins and development of Kurdish nationalism63
An understanding of the essence of Kurdish nationalist thinking, as summed up
in Edmonds' much quoted paragraph, is necessary in order to explain the way
Kurdish politics is conducted on the local as well as the regional level. As a
societal organising idea, it lies intermediate between two ways of looking at the
developments in the vast area of Kurdistan — on the one hand, Kurdistan as a
whole and on the other, the Kurdish nationalism of each Kurdish region as a
specific product of its own particular historic and socio-economic circumstances.
Accounting for each regional variety of Kurdish nationalism is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Rather, the origins and development of the general phenomenon
will be examined, while keeping the focus on Iraqi Kurdistan. It is, after all, in
Iraq that the largest degree of success and with that, persistence, has been
accomplished by the nationalist movement, since Iraq is the only country where
the Kurds receive legal and official recognition, which grants them certain rights
qua Kurds."
62.Edmonds 1971, P. 88.
63. For a comprehensive history of the Kurdish nationalist movement, see Jwaideh, Wadie
(1960), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development, Unpublished Ph.D
Thesis, Syracuse University.
64.Edmonds (1971) presents a number of facts from which this 'exceptional situation derives',
many that are closely connected to the policies of the former Mandatory Power. In 1918, for
instance, the British favoured the establishment of semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces, only
loosely attached to a central administration. Moreover, the League of Nations stipulated in 1925
that Kurdish was to be the official language for teaching in and administration of the Kurdish
areas. As Iraq subsequently applied for admission to the League in 1931 and was admitted a year
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Since its character and development are closely related to the historical
processes of nation-state formation in the region, an analysis of the Kurdish
national movement cannot be examined in isolation and must be raised from its
local level. As pointed out by Sathyamurthy, 'nationalist movements, during the
post-war period, must be viewed in their international context as well as against
the particular historical background in which they develop'. 65 This context could
be placed in the thoughts of Richard Jenkins, who explains that
The local has to be understood alongside, and analytically integrated into, the
regional, the national and, these days, the supra-national (even the global). ....
Nationalist movements are not things unto themselves, and their history is shared
with other peoples and places within a context of metropolitan expansion, power
and the struggle for contro1.66
Accordingly, while Kurdish nationalism may be regarded as the product of
largely internal developments, a look at history indicates that it is to a
considerable extent shaped by conflicts with adversaries external to Kurdish
society. Turkish, Iranian and Arab nationalisms are not known for their mild
characters, and that Kurdistan is positioned where these three (arguably four, if
distinguishing between Syrian and Iraqi Arab nationalism) national ideologies
meet has impacted profoundly on the development of Kurdish nationalism. The
centralising, secular Kemalism has always considered the Kurds a threat to the
unity of the Turkish state, and the forcible assimilation of the backward Kurdish
population was accompanied with modernisation efforts to create a modern
Turkey in which there was no room for any alien ethnic minority. In Iran there
was a similar situation, where the Iranian Kurds were a bothersome tribal
element obstructing the Shah's policies of modernisation. In addition, there was
the religious aspect, which became a more prominent feature after the
Revolution 1979, when the Sunni Kurds became national obstacles to the
promotion of Shiite universalistic ideas. Baathist nationalism was not driven by
the same ethnic intolerance, but granted the Iraqi Kurds constitutional status as a
later, those stipulations became part of the Constitution and, crucially, 'a matter of international
concern'. (pp. 92-93)
65.Sathyamurthy (1983), p. 229.
66.Jenkins (1997), p. 139.
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national minority with certain language rights concerning education and media.
However, as explained above, 67 Baath rule does not accommodate Kurdish
national aspirations, and its ideology, like Kemalism and Khomeinism, is
irreconcilable with that of Kurdish nationalism.
Haji Qadir Koyi was the first Kurdish intellectual who in the late nineteenth
century voiced views about the establishment of what has developed into the
concept of a pan-Kurdish state. In considering the traditional leaders to be
'obstructive and misguided irrelevancies', 68 his ideas were, however, regarded as
somewhat bizarre at the time.
More enduring ideas of nationalism were brought to Kurdistan essentially by the
British, who supported the creation of a separate Kurdish political entity through
the post-WW1 Treaty of Sevres. The growth of Kurdish nationalism after the
First World War was also influenced by the plans of the victorious Allies for the
creation of an Armenian state. 69 The important Treaty of Sevres, concluded in
August 1920, contained two articles regarding the Kurdish nation, which
explicitly acknowledge the existence of the Kurdish people granting them an
independent state." Despite this treaty never being ratified, it is held sacred by
Kurdish nationalists and these two articles remain at the heart of their claim to a
sovereign Kurdistan.
Kurdish nationalism was certainly influenced by the nationalist movements of
revolutionary character in Russia, Persia and Turkey in the first decade of the
twentieth century. The liberal political climate that prevailed in Istanbul at this
time facilitated the formation of the first Kurdish political organisation, which
was followed by many more. These associations were, however, presided over
by the feudal aristocracy and several decades were to pass before middle class
elements began to gain access to its leaderships — a process that Hassanpour
notes is still in the making.71
67.See chapter one, section 1.3.1.
68.Izady (1992), p. 56.
69.Pelletiere (1984), p. 61.
7°. See appendix 1 p. 129 'The Treaty of Sêvres 1920' in Sheri Laizer, (1991).
71 . Hassanpour (1992), p. 58.
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It was the development of the nationalist ideology that made it possible to
influence nation-building efforts in an active fashion. Kurdish nationalism in the
Ottoman Empire was poorly developed, as were the national movements of
fellow subjects Arabs and Armenians, and as the neighbouring nations-as-people
organised themselves around the nation-state principle, the Kurds followed suit.
In a regional perspective, however, Kurdish nationalist ideology came to
develop rather late. The Kurds were not consciously utilising this instrument
until the early twentieth century, making the politicisation of Kurdish ethnicity
coincide with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the
modern nation-state system in the Middle East, the latter as introduced by the
colonial powers. These developments provoked the erosion of traditional
systems of authority and as Kurdish nationalism emerged as a political
movement, it sought to accelerate the decline of tribalism so as to elevate the
people's loyalties above those of religion and tribe to the all-encompassing level
of nation. Indeed, as the idea of separation from the Ottoman Empire progressed
among the urban nationalists and the 'imagined nation' began to acquire
territorial dimensions, the lower strata of society were encouraged to actively
connect with the forming movement.72
In Central Kurdistan there existed by the early 1920s Kurdish nationalist
organisations, but if they chose to remain distinct from powerful traditional
authorities such as Shaikh Mahmoud Barzinji of Sulaymaniya, they came to
exert very limited influence over the population. The commoners joining tlie
uprisings were, as van Bruinessen points out, most of them 'motivated by loyalty
or obedience to their tribal or religious leaders, not by a sense of belonging to a
Kurdish nation'.73
The Kurdish rebellions that occurred in Turkey in the years following the
formation of the Republic ought to be considered when examining the general
development of Kurdish nationalism. These were of the feudal type and none
was entirely nationalistic in character, although there were nationalist
undertones. In protesting against the ending of the Caliphate, the Shaikh Said
72
. van Bruinessen (1992b), p. 51.
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rebellion in 1925, for instance, was at the same time religious, tribal and
national:14 Shaikh Said served as the leader of the rebellion, as he commanded
considerable support of the masses, but the idea and tactical planning was that of
the Kurdish nationalist organisation Azadi (Freedom) whose desire was to set up
a Kurdish independent state. For many of the leading tribal and religious
individuals in this rebellion, nationalist motivations were not of paramount
importance but were secondary to tribal and religious considerations. The
disappointment with the abolition of the Caliphate meant that 'the peasants were
more receptive to religious Islamic than to nationalist Kurdish agitation'.75
Tribal politics played a vital role in this and subsequent rebellions over
Kurdistan and continued to exert considerable influence in the development of
Kurdish nationalist thought.
These modern nationalist ideas came into being and flourished largely due to the
major changes that in post-World War II years took place in the social and
economic areas of Kurdish society, illustrated by the rapid growth of
urbanisation and the rise of a new middle class. A natural consequence of these
changes were the significant political developments of the rise of a modernist
leadership and the simultaneous weakening of traditional centres of power
represented by feudal lords and religious leaders.76
With the end of the feudal system in the mid-twentieth century, the Kurds started
to come together as the common sentiment of nationalist aspirations created an
ideology, Kurdayeti, which united the four major parts of Kurdistan. This
'coherent system of thought', Hassanpour explains, 'means the idea of and
struggle for relieving the Kurds from national oppression by uniting all parts of
Kurdistan under the rule of an independent Kurdish state', 77
 in essence summed
up in Edmonds quote above.
73.Id.(1998), p. 39.
74.Olson (1989), pp. 153-155.
75.van Bruinessen (1982), p. 292 (He also provides an interesting account of the interplay
between Shaylch Said and the Azadi group on pp. 287-88.)
76.Ibid. p. 61.
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Kurdish nationalism, with its strong Sunni components, was from the beginning
tied to religion, 'the overarching solidarity of Islam', 78 in the same way as the
peoples of the Ottoman Empire were attached to their ruler by the common
religion of Islam. Attempting to nationalise the Islamic faith was problematical,
as that would mean defying basic tenets of the world religion, and an exercise
that would undoubtedly be met with fierce resistance from many loyal subjects.
The abolition of the caliphate, however, changed the situation considerably. It
was the Sufi-leaders who adopted nationalist ideas, the acceptance of which
were greatly facilitated by the fact that they were presented to the people through
their traditional Muslim leaders. This effectively created a distinctively Sunni
nationalist movement, a constitution it maintained until the 1960s, when a more
secularly inclined leadership made it desirable for Shi'ia Kurds to play a part.
The following decade the Kurdish nationalists began to successfully integrate
religious minorities into the Kurdish national movement.79
Modern Kurdish nationalist ideology barely considers religion, is secular in
nature and has since the 1980s adopted a wide range of ideological and political
tendencies such as 'populism', 'socialism', 'national democracy', and 'national
socialism'. The Kurdish elite largely behind the advancement of Kurdayeti has
periodically been receptive to influences of Marxism-Leninism 80 and its
emphasis on eliminating national oppression as well as social-economic
injustice. Marxist ideas have, however, diminished in importance, due to the
difficulty with which these can be combined with nationalist ideology, as
evident in PKK-policy (the PKK a prominent example of a Kurdish Marxist
party), which paid noticeably less attention to Marxist ideas in the 1990s.
Van Bruinessen contends that the roots of Kurdish nationalism are to be found in
two different social strata, one of which was the educated classes in the urban
milieu, those who were responsive to the modern political ideologies that
spurred on the nationalisms of their Arab and Turkish brethren. The other base
of nationalist sentiment was that of the rural tribal setting. Far from being
77.Hassanpour (1992), P. 62.
78.van Bruinessen (1998), p. 40.
79.Id. (1992b), pp. 52-53.
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isolated from the other, these social strata are related since the tribal milieu was
where the urban intellectuals originated. 81 Despite leaving the tribal area for the
big town, ties to the respective chieftain, (characterised by loyalty and
obedience) were not severed, and as these original tribesmen turned into
urbanised politicians, tribal obligations did not diminish in importance. This had
another dimension: unless the urban intellectuals managed to shore up support
from the tribes, the likelihood of them growing into a powerful political force
would be minimal. Therefore the modern form of Kurdish politics has often seen
these officials appeasing the tribal chieftains, seemingly in order to accomplish
policy objectives. In doing so 'they have strengthened the powers of these
chieftains over the rest of the population, and contributed to the social and
economic polarisation of Kurdish society' 82
This dependence on the tribal elements severely hampered the development of
Kurdayeti into an integrative political force as the urban intellectuals and the
tribes differed substantially on many issues of political nature. To achieve co-
operation along a tribal spectrum would appear as almost impossible a task due
to the permanent tension and conflicts that raged between certain tribes, forcing
some chieftains (if not opting to remain neutral) to join the other side should a
rival chief commit himself to the Kurdish movement. Hence, the choice to side
with the Kurdish national movement or joining forces with Baghdad was not
done out of political conviction but was a result of tribal conflicts.
An illuminating example of the political opportunism that seemed to be a
defining characteristic of some tribal chiefs is the political experiment of the
Mahabad Republic, where some held 'double allegiances' to the Republic as
well as to the Iranian government. 'This persistent tolerance was not tactical', as
Abbas Vali points out. 'Rather it signified the bitter realisation by the Kurdish
leadership of the pivotal status of the tribal landowners in the structure of
political authority in the Republic', in other words, 'the survival of the Republic
80.Hassanpour (1992), P. 64.
81.van Bruinessen (1986), p. 16.
82 , Ibid. pp. 43-44.
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depended largely on their cooperation' 83 Although challenged and relatively
weakened with the passing of time, this pattern of conduct has continued to
present day, as has its negative influence over Kurdish nationalism. The urban-
intellectual pole, on the other hand, has at times been in opposition to and in a
similar fashion betrayed the majority in the Kurdish movement when reaching
agreements with the central government.84
Similar to the situation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe when 'many
seemingly ancient traditions were invented', 85 a related pattern can be found also
in Kurdistan as nation-building efforts gathered pace. Resulting from the
repressive nature of these aggressive and state-sponsored nationalisms of the
neighbouring countries, Kurdish nationalists began creating their own ancient
history, presumably largely as a reaction to the Turkish, Persian and Arab
assimilationist historiographies, which denied the Kurds any meaningful place in
history. This Kurdish history was traced back to the Aryans and their empire
Media, around which nationalist intellectuals created many myths. 86 The
construction of a national history is more important for the Kurds than for many
other peoples, emphasises van Bniinessen. With so many historical personalities,
events, ancestries, customs, etymology and festivals contested by the political
and intellectual elite of the surrounding nations, the Kurds feel a greater need to
assert themselves and their history. One example is the nationalist
(mis)treatment of Salahaddin, mostly known as a great Kurdish warrior, a
military commander who led the Islamic army to a decisive victory over the
Crusaders, and following that established the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt.
Depending on the position taken, the symbolic role of Salahaddin ranges from a
Turkish hero to an Iraqi nationalist, or simply a great Muslim leader. For
83.Vali (1996-1997), p. 11.
84.Both these tendencies appeared in the first chapter: the former when describing the jash, and
the latter exemplified by both leaders' attempts to appease Saddam Hussein: Talabani markedly
in 1983 and Barzani notably in 1996.
85.Billig (1995), p. 25 (For more on invented traditions in Kurdistan, see chapter 5, section 5.1.
The Construction of a National Identity.)
86. As explained by Amir Hassanpour in his paper 'The racialisation of Kurdish National
Identity', presented at the Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as
subjects and objects of political and social processes, May 29-311998, Berlin.
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nationally aware Kurds he no longer functions as a symbol of their own nation.87
Interesting to note in passing is that in the 1970s, the Kurdish national
movement began promoting the Yazidi religious belief and presented this
element of Kurdish culture as the Kurds' original religion. 88 An element in the
Kurds' own nationalist history-building, it could also have been an attempt by
the nationalists to widen the popular base for Kurdish nationalism. This way of
constructing and/or reconstructing history represents a potentially malign feature
of nationalist activity, and one that can be traced also in the development of
Kurdish nationalism. It is because nationalism seeks to reinterpret history and in
doing so improve the current conditions for the people constituting its nation,
that it is inward-looking and contemptuously disapproving of the way things are.
As Edwards notes, 'the drive to the past ... reveals an inability to come to grips
with present realities and, more specifically, the social evolution which connects
past to present'.89
As previously noted, the first Kurdish associations of a cultural-political nature
were formed in the big cities, a trend that has continued. Kurdistan itself has not
been the main arena for the publishing of Kurdish journals or the advancement
of Kurdish nationalism. The migration from Kurdistan to the big cities as well as
foreign countries has in fact contributed significantly to the growth of Kurdish
national awareness, now a mass phenomenon that no state repression is likely to
reverse. This flourishing of Kurdish culture has been made possible due to the
exile, and has been facilitated by the advancements made in the fields of
information and communications technology. Contemporary ethno-nationalism
such as the Kurdish has benefited greatly from this, and in addition to an
intensified nationalist struggle, improvements in various forms of
communications as well as government repression have solidified the Kurdish
nation.
87.van Bruinessen (1998), 'The Kurds as Objects and Subjects of their History: Between Turkish
Official Historiography, Orientalist Constructions, and Kurdish Nationalists' Recuperation of
their History', paper presented at the Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial.
Kurds as subjects and objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
88.Fuccaro (1997), p. 575.
89.Edwards (1985), p. 43.
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The large number of Kurds that live outside Kurdistan proper 9° must be
considered when examining Kurdish nationalism, due to the impact the exiled
nationalists have on the shape taken by contemporary Kurdish nationalist
thought. Territorial nationalism, the quest for full political independence, is no
longer advocated by any larger Kurdish grouping. Rather it is cultural
nationalism, which is not upsetting the delicate geopolitical balance in the region
that has become the dominant form of mainstream Kurdish nationalist thought,
coupled with more low-key political demands for regional autonomy, equal
opportunities as well as representation in state institutions at a proportional level.
About the role of the (in Europe and North America) exiled politically active
Kurds, or the West-based Kurdish lobby, van Bruinessen concludes that 'those
who have voluntarily or involuntarily left Kurdistan have perhaps [indirectly]
contributed more to the strengthening of the Kurdish movement than they would
have done had they been able to remain there'.91
5.5.2 Evaluating Kurdish nationalism
As indicated above, it is feared that if attempting binding definitions of nation
and nationalism, those conceptual devices will later be rendered inadequate for
explaining the Kurdish case. Hence, the most suitable approach has been that of
indicating the need for a 'hybrid theory' of nationalism in Kurdistan.
One of the more authoritative definitions of the nation presented above, such as
Smith's 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and
common legal rights and duties for all members' , 92 is most fitting for the
classical nation-state, and does not smoothly apply to a nation such as the
Kurdish. As an ethnic group, this large population constituting the Kurds would
possess cultural differentiae, territorial contiguity (but not with unhindered
internal mobility) and considerable group sentiment and loyalty. Lacking from
90. Van Bruinessen puts the estimate at a quarter or even a third of the overall Kurdish
population. van Bruinessen (1992b), p. 67.
91.Ibid.
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what may further characterise a nation are in particular external political
relations, equal citizenship rights and the possibility for economic integration
into a common system of labour. 93 However, if employing a less political
interpretation of the term, and focusing more on the meaning of nation-as-
people, one can easily conclude that the Kurds are not one of the region's
colonially created nations.
Important to note is that the sharing of an historical territory, which is a basic
criterion for a nation in most definitions, does not automatically mean that those
individuals consider themselves being of the same nation. Rather than unifying
an element, as often assumed, it could have considerable divisive effects as
when there is a competition for the same piece of land. This is most clearly
illustrated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but could also apply for Kurds and
Iraqi Arabs in the area of Kirkuk, the majority of its population originally
Kurdish but with the city gradually Arabised the two nations have not blended
into one, but instead reinvigorated individual claims - each fiercely contesting
the other's historical right to the (oil-rich) land. 94 Moreover, of the nation's
several characteristics, members of the Kurdish nation may only share two
unequivocally, namely that of territory and culture. As for religion, not all Kurds
are Sunni Muslims, 95 and in terms of language, there are many proud Kurds who
communicate in Turkish and Turkish alone. Then there are those living in the
diaspora, who do not relinquish their Kurdishness although they no longer share
territory with their fellow Kurds and may have altered their culture. These
examples of the Kurdish nation show clearly that certain shared objective
features do not suffice when describing a nation - the subjective element of
national consciousness is vital. The best way appears to be to follow in
Canovan's footsteps, to endorse her rejection of a brief definition of the term
nation, opting for a more 'phenomenological characterization' ,96 which is more
suitable to the Kurdish case.
92.Smith, A. D. (1991), P. 14.
93.Id. (1992).
94.This was explained by a Kurd originally from Kirkuk but living in Iran. (March 2001).
95.See chapter three, section 3.3 on religion.
96.Canovan (1996b), pp. 75-76.
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Kurdish nationalism, the ideology and movement, evidently appeared in the
early twentieth century. It was this idea of nations being the natural political
units and the base on which states and governments were to rest, which
stimulated the emergence and development of a Kurdish nationalist ideology - a
wholly modern phenomenon indeed. But would it be correct to term the pre-
twentieth Kurdish people only a pre-national group or potential nation, in
Connor's terminology? If transforming from an ethnic group into a nation
requires a self-conscious desire for autonomy, this may have been the case
already in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when the Kurds were
politically organised in Kurdish principalities.97
These principalities, situated in the border areas of the Ottoman and Safavid
empires, 98
 enjoyed considerable autonomy and due to their peripheral but
strategic location they commanded substantial leverage as the empires made
frequent attempts to win them over and form allegiances in order to ensure their
frontier security. Resulting from Persian defeat in the battle of Chaldiran in
1514, most of Kurdistan fell under Ottoman jurisdiction, although several
emirates were located within the Persian sphere of influence. 99 The Safavid
Shahs desired to rule their Kurdish areas through centrally appointed
administrators of Turkoman or Persian origin, whereas the Ottoman Sultans
adopted a pragmatic approach — undoubtedly realising the extreme difficulties of
enforcing central control in the fringes of the empire - and granted the Kurds
more autonomy in accepting local chiefs to serve as rulers. A new administrative
system was set up in the region based on the `Kurdo-Ottoman pact', where
sixteen independent Kurdish principalities were recognised by the Ottomans.10°
Whether being the result of Turkish pragmatism or the failure of Persian
methods (Esfahan m was forced to accept that installing centrally appointed non-
Kurdish governors was unworkable a policy), the Kurdish ruling princes enjoyed
97 . Van Bruinessen (1992) pp. 145-175 provides a detailed discussion on the Kurdish emirates
and their setting.
99 . For a detailed map of the location of the Kurdish principalities of early modem times, see p.
53 of Izady (1992).
99 . See McDowall (1996) pp. 25-31 on the Kurds' role in the Ottoman-Safavid relations.
1 '. Kendal (1993), p. 14.
1 ° 1 , Esfahan served as the capital of the Safavid dynasty, and remained the focal point in the
Persian Empire for several centuries.
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a status of virtual independence for their emirates.
In these principalities the people shared a culture and were ruled by co-
culturalists, in other words, the Kurdish principalities could conceivably have
filled a nation-supporting function. It was during the early days of the
principalities that the national Kurdish epic Mem a Zin was written by Ahmadi
Khani (in 1693-94): the first source in which a Kurdish nation distinct from
Persians, Arabs and Turks, is articulated. 102 The princes may well have
mobilised the masses on religious grounds against the Shiite Persians while
capitalising on ethnic differences when confronting the Ottomans. However,
since each prince was supposedly concerned only with his own territory and
possessed no greater concerns for other parts of Kurdistan, the 'national'
sentiments induced in the population were geographically limited and, as has
been argued by Hassanpour, amounted to 'feudal nationalism'. This is
distinguishable from the modern variant of middle-class nationalism emerging in
the twentieth century. 103
Even if the latter is an ideology decisively modern in character, significant
divisions remain regarding the origins and nature of the nation. Hugh Seton-
Watson distinguished between the 'old, continuous nations' and the consciously
created, new nations, those termed 'nations by design' by Charles Tilly - a
distinction associated with the emergence of the political ideology of
nationalism. 104 The Kurdish nation can be identified with Seton-Watson's 'old,
continuous nations' that existed well before the end of the eighteenth century, a
time when nationalist ideologies and movements began to form and promoted
their own 'designed' nations, in this regional context epitomised in the Iraqi
nation (although formed in the twentieth century). Although Seton-Watson made
his distinction between old and new nations within a European framework, his
account is applicable to the Kurdish nation that came to evolve gradually over
102.Hassanpour (1992), P. 56.
103.Ibid. pp. 56-57. Hassanpour's ideas are not endorsed here. As argued above, it is highly
questionable whether the term nationalism can be used prior to the twentieth century in Kurdish
political thought.
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several centuries. The relevance of the historian's observations becomes clear
from the quoted passage below.
The process of formation of national identity and national consciousness among
the old nations was slow and obscure. It was a spontaneous process, not willed by
anyone, though there were great events, which in certain cases clearly accelerated
it.105
Indeed, when examining a case such as the Kurds it is difficult to fully endorse
the modernist view that nations are not old, a view purportedly less applicable to
the Middle East than Europe, where modern nations are said to have arisen from
the eighteenth century onwards. Building on the argument of Anthony Smith,1°6
not all nations-as-people, such as the Kurds, have been invented or created. The
Kurdish nation is not artificial and its national ideology could be referred to as a
retrospective nationalism. Moreover, capitalising on his perennialist (deriving
modern nations from original ethnic ties) and ethno-symbolic approach to
nations, it has become clear that in the process of consciously forming the
Kurdish nation and its nationalism, ethnic components have been prominent
factors and have also antedated nation-building efforts. Such a perennialist
approach for analysing the Kurdish nationalism would draw more on German
Romanticism than French Enlightenment, since the Kurdish nation, its people,
would be the driving force behind the creation of its state, not the converse.
John Armstrong, in arguing that the terms 'ethnic' and 'nation' form a
continuum, emphasises the point that regardless of their changing shape, they are
collective perceptions and sentiments that persist over time. 1 °7 This insight is an
important one and compliments Anthony Smith's elaborations on the subject.
That ethnicity and nationhood is continuous seems to apply well to the
emergence and development of the Kurdish nation. Indeed, an 'imagined
community' of Kurds, as van Bruinessen argues, 'a well-defined Kurdish ethnie
1 °4 . Seton-Watson (1977), pp. 6-13 and introductory chapter in Tilly (1975) (`Reflections on the
history of European State-making', pp. 3-83).
Ibid. II 8.
106.As reasoned in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) as well as a previous work: The Ethnic
Revival, (1981), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
107.Armstrong (1982), p. 5.
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has existed for many centuries, although its definition was perhaps less inclusive
and populist than the present one'.108
The de-centralism, in economic, administrative and cultural terms, that
characterised the autonomous existence of the Kurdish emirates under the
Ottomans, allowed the formation of and encouraged the development of a social
consciousness of the emirates' Kurdishness. However, whereas the ruling elites
of the Kurdish principalities are likely to have been aware of Kurdish ethnicity,
it is unclear whether that was felt equally strongly by the masses.
Gellner admits the existence of cultures (often overlapping and intertwined) and
political units of all conceivable forms and dimensions, but insists that two did
generally not converge. 109 However, in the Kurdish case they indeed seem to
have converged. In acknowledging that a Kurdish nation, albeit a 'primitive'
version of it, existed at the time of the principalities would mean discarding
Gellner's idea that the nationalist doctrine signifies the awakening of nations to
self-consciousness and likewise any suggestion of the modern ideology of
Kurdish nationalism having invented a Kurdish nation.
Kurdish nationalist behaviour is evidently not adequately accounted for in the
nationalism-theory of Gellner, the historical analysis of which gives an
exemplary description of the emergence of nationalism in industrialisation's
Europe. In a largely non-industrialised region it becomes difficult to find in
Gellner's theory an explanation for the appearance of nationalism. Rather, it
would have to be complemented by theories such as those of Hans Kohn,
Benedict Anderson and Anthony Giddens, who concern themselves with its
psychological dimensions.
Stressing the critical role of industrialisation for the growth of nations and
nationalism as Gellner does, hence fails to make an impact on the development
of Kurdish nationalism. The emphasis on economic-material conditions causes
his theory to underestimate the strength of ethnic identity and the resilience of
cultural elements. His theory is, however, applicable in that he points at how
108
. van Bruinessen (1992b), p. 48.
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factors of modernisation caused the weakening of traditional social structures,
which gave room for the development of nation and national identity. Denying
that the Kurdish nation is a product of the developments of modern times in
technological and economic areas does not mean discarding these other aspects
of Gellner's theory. The mass appeal of Kurdish nationalism, for instance, may
well stem from Gellner's argued social and economic commotions resulting
from labour migration, but the nationalist thought was not brought about by the
same forces.
For an analysis of Kurdish nationalism, Anthony Smith's examination of the
transformation of the ethnie to nation through popular mobilisation is highly
relevant to the Kurdish case. The increased influence of the state acted as a
politicising force in that it activised and politicised a previously passive
population. This does not necessarily mean that the movement itself — including
its actors and their objectives — was genuinely nationalistic. Important is that the
politicising conflict (i.e. the increased influence of the state) and the activity of
resistance in different forms of the national movement around this conflict
considerably facilitated the transformation of the Kurds from an ethnic
community to a nation. In addition, it was not only a conflict between the rulers
and the ruled within the state, but also a conflict within the ethnic community, an
internal conflict. As a nationalist asserts that political boundaries should
correspond with cultural boundaries, it is when the political leaders of an ethnic
movement begin to make similar demands the movement can be said to have
transformed into a nationalist movement. This process was thus greatly
facilitated by the repressive activities of the state.
European classical nationalism, as has been argued by many scholars, was
brought about by modernity, and came to develop alongside the emergence of
civil society and democracy. Kurdish nationalism contrasts with this
development as it rests on the suppression of civil society in the Kurdish areas.
Abbas Vali calls this a 'dialectic of denial and resistance', (as regards the official
denial of Kurdish identity in imposing the various national identities and the
109 . Gellner (1983a), p. 49.
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Kurds' resistance to these policies), which defines the political structure and
character of Kurdish nationalism.110
As a national community that from the outset was actively prevented from
remotely satisfying its aspirations, Kurdish nationalism falls into the category
classified by Seton-Watson as unsatisfied nationalisms: national movements
whose demands are not properly addressed. 111
 Any solutions put forward to
satisfy Kurdish aspirations, such as federalism, proportional representation and
autonomy have failed to meet their needs. In Iraq, the prevailing feeling many
times among the leadership has been that Baghdad is merely trying to buy time
by suggesting any of the above measures, the acceptance of which would not
remarkably improve the situation of the Kurds. The expectation and desire of the
unsatisfied nationalism is that it one day will achieve political independence for
its people. As Seton-Watson points out, it is the dissatisfaction with the centre
that explains the resurrection of nationalist movements in Western Europe, in
essence the same objections voiced by the Kurds to the central government.
On a concluding note, it is significant that despite the lack of unity —the (semi-)
independent Kurdish principalities never actively sought consolidation of the
Kurdish nation - foreign domination was successfully kept at bay for
considerable time. After the division of the Kurdistan in 1918, however, the
Kurds were reduced to the status of a non-state nation under the direct rule of
centralist states, causing much resentment and increased nationalist tendencies.
Both 'feudal' and modern Kurdish nationalism demonstrate some higher form of
sovereign political status. The former featured the Kurdish principalities that had
held onto their semi-independent positions for several centuries, whereas
modern Kurdish nationalism displayed the 12 month-long experience of the
Mahabad Republic in 1946.
Since the spirit of nationalism shows no signs of abating even in well-
established nations where it is noticeable on a daily basis, it is certain to continue
11 °. Vali (1998), 'The nation-state and its "other": Kurdish national identity and the politics of
denial and exclusion in Turkey', paper presented at the Kurdological Conference Between
Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and objects of political and social processes, May 29-
31, Berlin.
111 . Seton-Watson (1971).
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to flourish in oppressed nations. This, what Billig calls 'banal' nationalism,
bolsters the people's identity with the nation, on a conscious and well as
unconscious level. In times of crisis it can easily be transformed into 'hot'
nationalism, which could be the call of support by the politicians for waging a
new war or the inspiring by the leadership of an oppressed minority to take up
arms against the state. 112 On this basis one may conclude that Kurdish
nationalism, which circumstances shaped to be more 'hot' than 'banal' (although
that may be subject to change) is certain to be kept alive and to continue to form
the national consciousness of the Kurdish people.
Previously touching upon malign aspects of Kurdish nationalism, its benign
expressions also have to be mentioned, although briefly. Nationalism may offer
a security to which people, literally uprooted from their land, adhere to in times
of uncertainty. It is something to believe in, to belong to. For those Kurds (and
their number is believed to be substantial) who feel threatened by influential and
strong neighbours, their nationalism serves as a positive force.
5.5.3 Kurdish nationalism classified
As became clear by the general discussion on the nationalist doctrine,
nationalism normally appears to be a response to a particular set of
circumstances. And as the circumstances frequently change in Kurdish politics,
Kurdish nationalism possesses characteristics of many of the types classified in
the second chapter. Just as the various types of nationalism examined are not
completely different in kind, several types can be displayed by a nationalist
movement, at the same time or sequentially, as clearly shown in the Kurdish
case. (The following analysis will reflect the classification carried out above, in
terms of the order of appearance of the different types of nationalisms listed.)
Kurdish nationalism is certainly not one of state nationalism. The prototypes of
England and France evolved over a long period of time in the direction of the
112 . Billig (1995), pp. 43-49.
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nation-state, and the Kurdish nation-as-people has not been able reach the status
of nation-as-state. It is not deniable that at the core lies a sizeable population
with a cultural similarity, but instead of this element increasing in intensity it has
decreased as time has gone by, largely due to the partitioning of Kurdistan. An
important aspect of the prototype nation-states was that nationality was the
primary political loyalty, whereas in Kurdistan tribal and religious-social
loyalties still reign supreme. Even though Kurdistan's core possession
constitutes Kurds, it does not automatically mean that a Kurdish state would be
less open to rebellion and disaffection to foreign rivals. Hence, the prototype of
the French nation-state and state nationalism is not applicable to the Kurdish
political scene.
Kurdish nationalist ideology has changed greatly in character over the past
century, a development that has resulted in it acquiring several types of
nationalisms, with more types likely to emerge in the future. An envisaged
future type is a nationalism of unification if the different Kurdish national
movements were to broaden their bases. This is an issue that will be returned to
in the following chapter.
In going back to the past, as the Kurds became politically aware, one of the first
nationalist expressions is thought to have been one of separation, as it can be
perceived to originally have been a separatist movement against the Ottoman
Empire (as were many of the nationalisms in the Balkans alongside Arabs and
Armenians) when it began to whither. More generally, since some forms of
Kurdish nationalism hold that the nation of Kurds should be constituted as a
Kurdish state, it would mean the disintegration of existing sovereign states
should the ideology be successful. Hence the Kurds would engage in separation
nationalism.
In the spirit of many former colonies in Africa and Asia that rose up against their
European masters, the Kurdish national movement, or parts of it, has spoken of
Kurdistan as colonised by the Arabs, Turks and Persians, suggesting that the
Kurds may embrace some sort of liberation nationalism. Such nationalists'
assertion that Kurdistan's standing in relation to the central regions of Iraq is that
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of a colony is difficult to unconditionally accept. Radical Kurdish nationalists
claim that the continued power of tribal leadership in relations with the state
represents a colonial phenomenon. The tribal elite is accused 'of being
collaborators enabling the continued "colonial exploitation" of Kurdistan by "the
Turkish, Arab and Persian bourgeoisie" 113 - extremely simplified a view, but
still with certain similarities with former colonial activity in Africa and Asia.
Baghdad's 'internal colonialism' finds parallels in the writings of Michael
Hechter. Indicating a condition of structural dependence, his theory states that
with the advent of modernisation the core region is likely to become dominant,
as the inequalities created by the new development will consign the peripheral
regions to inferior positions. This creates hostility to the core and a growth of
nationalist tendencies if the peripheral regions are national in character. In
Hechter's theory the English presented the core, while the peripheral nationalist
regions were those of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 114 This could with
relative ease translate into Sunni Arab central Iraq being the 'coloniser' and the
Kurds 'the colonised'.
The Kurdish movement, however, differs substantially in nature from the
national liberation movements in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s in that the
Africans needed to re-invent themselves as nations in order to shake off the
shackles of colonialism. Kurdistan has not been subjected to colonisation in the
traditional sense, but there is nonetheless an element of liberation nationalism
insofar as the coming of the nation-state is regarded as the striking away of the
chains of foreign rule and all that this has meant in social and moral deprivation
for the Kurdish nation. Moreover, the anti-colonial nationalism of the African
liberation struggles was chiefly concerned not with the nation-state itself, but
rather with justice and equality, human rights and dignity, prosperity and
freedom from domination, themes that are prominent also in the Kurdish
nationalist expressions. Kurdish nationalism is, however, not only based on
opposition to subjugation by an alien power, and there is more to unite the
nationalist Kurds than a desire to throw off Arab/Persian/Turkish domination.
113
. van Bruinessen (1992a), p. 45.
114 Michael Hechter (1975), Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development, 1536-1966, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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Nationalist sentiment among the Kurds shows that their nationalism clearly
precedes any state they may achieve to form," 5 since the Kurdish nation already
possesses a foundation of common religious, cultural and linguistic elements.
As was the case with the African, Asian and American dependent nationalities of
Europe, where 'the strength of the metropolitan power was at least as important
as the support of the nationalist movement or movements in determining the fate
of a colony', 116 a Kurdish nationalism of liberation may owe an overwhelming
degree of its success or failure to the strength of the Iraqi, Iranian or Turkish
'colonial' power. In defining themselves as an oppressed nationality, the Kurds
would attack Arab imperialism - Baghdad's policy of extending its power and
influence not so much through political relations as through military force
throughout Central Kurdistan. However, such an effort of the Kurdish national
movement to liberalise Kurdistan would have little or no comparison to the
dissolution of the great European empires in the 1950s and 1960s, which were to
a greater or lesser extent disbanded voluntarily. Just as one cannot put the
Kurdish nationalist struggle on an equal footing with the African mid-twentieth
century nationalists who fostered a feeling of common distance from the white
rulers among the people, rather than a sense of common belonging, there are
nevertheless traces of this type of liberation nationalism insofar as there is a
distinct lack of a sense of internal unity in Kurdish nationalism amidst a strong
feeling of hostility towards the alien ruler. In that sense, an independent 'ex-
colony' of Kurdistan could face severe problems of internal unity, just as did
many former European dependencies. In addition, it would appear that the basic
liberal arguments about freedom and a simple plea for a representative
government appeal as much as nationalistic arguments to the long oppressed
people of Kurdistan.
After the formation of the modern nation-states of the Middle East, the Turkish,
Iranian and Arab assimilation and integration processes brought about the
growing apart of the Kurds. When ethno-nationalism emerged as a modern
115.Sentiments evident in the vast majority of Kurds consulted formally and informally, even in
the most apolitical individuals, in and outside their homeland.
116.Orridge (1981), p. 48.
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phenomenon in the 1970s, it also engulfed the Kurdish nation, with the result
that the 'repressive measures directed at the expression of Kurdish nationalist
sentiment [from the central governments] have had the effect of strengthening
rather than eliminating it' . 117 Hence it is fair to state that Kurdish nationalism
certainly has elements of atavistic behaviour, one of the marks of ethnic
nationalism. Kurdish nationalists are not unknown to relate to the behaviour of
their ancestors in the distant past, which was often tribally belligerent. As shown
more clearly in the case of the Kurds than many other nationalities, common
ethnicity does not by itself create social cohesion, a fact that may prompt ethnic
nationalists to try to achieve and maintain unity by force rather than consent -
the essence of ethnic nationalism. The difficulties of solving the problems
arising with Kurdish ethno-nationalism (as with all ethnic nationalisms) reflect
the complex nature of the multiple identities of the Kurds, to be discussed later.
Should the Kurds of Northern Iraq achieve independence, Kurdish nationalism
may seek to acquire the characteristics of civic nationalism in order to
successfully accommodate the ethnic and religious minorities in its midst and
make them subscribe to the nation's political creed. Creating and maintaining a
sustainable democracy, the government must allow sovereignty to rest with the
people — the essential idea of civic nationalism. This would reformulate the key
struggle of the Kurdish movement, to expand the previous notion that the
(Kurdish) nation should be home to Kurds only, to include those who, according
to the zealous nationalists, lack the crucial requirements. In other words, there
should be 'no bar to belonging'.118
After independence liberally minded Kurdish nationalists may wish to transform
the exclusionary aspects of their nationalism, as liberalism requires a
universalistic view of the rights to be enjoyed by man. Should the Kurds succeed
in forming and adhering to a liberal nationalism, they would set an example to
the region. Instead of operating on the assumption that the identity of individual
Kurds is defined exclusively by their national membership and their personal
will totally submerged in that of the nation - as understood by 'organic
117
. van Bruinessen (1998), p. 39.
210
interpretations of nationalism' 119
 - a combination of the particularity of Kurdish
culture and the striving for personal autonomy of each individual could be
striven for.
Despite constituting clear majorities in the areas in which they reside, the Kurds
are to be considered national minorities in the states they inhabit, a situation that
has influenced Kurdish nationalism into acquiring several characteristics of a
minority nationalist movement. Throughout Kurdistan's often violent history
collective defence of the homeland has been a key objective of the struggle,
reflecting the classic aspect of place-centred politics. The struggle over land has
indeed dominated the relationship between the central government and the
Kurdish movement.120
Their historical experience of suffering and oppression by a powerful state is
moreover a central element of Kurdish nationalistic expressions, and the unique
cultural heritage of the Kurdish people is notably defended and promoted by its
nationalist intellectuals. The Iraqi Kurds have a history of resistance to centralist
developments and have quite successfully resisted excessive state integration.
The sharing of power in the central political system has been an incentive for
integrating the Kurdish areas in the Iraqi state apparatus, but as of yet such a
power-sharing formula has not been found.
The perception among the Kurdish population of their region being
systematically exploited and underdeveloped by successive governments in
Baghdad (structural discrimination, as termed by Williams), has been fostered
by Kurdish nationalists, and in doing so have influenced the people into
believing that their future will be indefinitely more prosperous if achieving
independence. This would come about, they argue, 121 since prosperity and
positive development would then be created from within the nation, rectifying
118.Fine (1999), p. 150.
119.Tamir (1993), p. 79.
120.Cf. for instance the issue of Kirkuk in the non-sustainable peace agreement of 1970.
121.A notion made obvious in a consultative conversation with a Iraqi Kurdish political activist
(declined to be named) in Sanandaj, Iranian Kurdistan, on 19 March 2001, arguing for the long-
term inevitability of a Kurdish independent state resulting from the current autonomous
arrangement.
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the current situation where it is denied from without.
With the demographic changes that have taken place in Northern Iraq through
forcible resettlements of the population, the Kurds have reasons to fear and try to
resist further population transfers instigated by Baghdad. The tendency to resist
'outsiders' from settling in Kurdistan, which would adversely affect the Kurdish
majority in key (oil-producing) areas is an indication of Kurdish nationalists
adopting further traits of minority nationalism. It is mainly through similar
population transfers that the Kurds have come to fear losing their local
dominance, already undermined by the strategic advantage gained by the
Baathists, exemplified in the construction of military use nuclear power plants
on several locations in the heart of Kurdistan.122
The Kurds have made their dissent well known over the years and in light of the
apparently self-sustainable culture of violence that dominates Iraq, ambitiously
engineered by Saddam Hussein, Kurdish nationalist aspirations as expressed
through violent ethnic minority dissent could prove impossible to bring to an end
until absolute independence is achieved.
As elaborated on above, Kurdish intelligentsia has reconstructed historical
discourses, largely to restore the Kurds to their rightful place in the history of the
Middle East, but in all likelihood also in an attempt to explain contemporary
inequalities in view of major historical oppression. The Kurdish national
movement in Iraq has time and again questioned the political legitimacy of the
regime in Baghdad and has, like many other minority nationalists, initiated
political action against the state hoping to contribute to a new basis for
legitimacy in which they would be key players.
Minority nationalism is not a straightforward analytical phenomenon. In the
context of colonialism, for instance, nationalism is quite an uncomplicated
122 . For an overview of where dangerous and regime-sustaining industries of military nature have
been strategically built throughout Iraq, see the detailed map on Iraqi weapons plants p. xv in
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concept (with the world divided into colonisers and the colonised), but it
becomes more complex in a minority community, where it indicates cultural
identity and uniqueness, often strengthened by linguistic distinctiveness that
unites the population inspiring a nationalist movement.
Since Kurdish nationalism can be coupled with so many of the classifications of
nationalism provided above, it might be viewed as a 'superideology' 123 with
great potential for mobilisation among the population, a capability not to be
underestimated. In order to succeed in the post-modern world, however, it has to
deal with the issue of 'how to combine civic patriotism with cosmopolitanism,
national pride with respect for other nations, and national belonging with
individual rights and freedoms' , 124 a challenge difficult to meet, highlighting the
conflicting and cross-cutting nature of Kurdish nationalism.
Another challenge difficult for Kurdish nationalism to meet, and one also
mentioned throughout the current section, is that of the regional nationalisms,
and how to accommodate Kurdish aspirations in the regional system without
upsetting its powerful neighbours. This will be looked at in the following
chapter.
Kenneth R. Timmerman, (1992), The Death Lobby: How the West armed Iraq, London: Fourth
Estate Limited.
123 . Concept borrowed from Tagil (1995b), p. 24.
124 , Fine (1999), p. 149.
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Chapter 6: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Regional Scene
6.1 Co-operation and rivalry on the Middle Eastern scene
As a new state is being formed, the actions of other states, particularly
neighbouring countries, but also greater world powers, are of immense
significance for its development. Appreciating the dynamics of relations when
appraising Iraqi Kurdistan (as illustrated in Figure 7.1: The Dynamics of
Relations over Iraqi Kurdistan, incorporating both regional and global countries)
is crucial for understanding the broader implications of the creation of a semi-
independent Kurdish political entity in the region. It is frequently also the case
that the boundaries (political as well as cultural) dividing the internal from the
external are vague. The area of self-rule of Northern Iraq is admittedly not a
nation-as-state, but ever since the very idea of an autonomous Kurdish entity in
Iraqi Kurdistan was conceived by the international community, external
influences from the neighbouring states have been overwhelming in scope and
intensity. In a volatile area such as the Middle East, one state's security is
practically by definition another state's insecurity, a state of affairs that
translates into the regional states' security being the Kurds' insecurity.
Insecurity, moreover, produces a power struggle, which not uncommonly results
in war. 1 In order to safeguard their security, the regional states have been forced
to accept Northern Iraq becoming the focal points of many of their key concerns,
producing policies that the current chapter will attempt an analysis of.
To some analysts, the fighting between the KDP and PUK witnessed in the
1990s is in essence to be blamed on tribal conflicts. The stereotypical belligerent
character of the Kurd has been perceivably well-maintained by the Kurds
themselves (particularly manifested throughout the four-year conflict in the
1990s), but without the enthusiastic encouragement from the neighbouring
countries this conflict might have been shorter and less intense.
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The conventional theory of balance of power with its focus on the need of the
state to deal with external threats from other states 2 does not fully suffice when
addressing the behaviour of the regional states and their policies towards
Northern Iraq. The threat perception is not one-dimensional, but highly diverse
in that external threats are coupled with internal pressures, which both have to
be addressed. Not only is it necessary to balance against other states to prevent
the emergence of actual and/or potentially dominant, divisive ambitions, but in
order to safeguard the state's own survival there is also a need to pacify actors
and groupings in the domestic political environment. For such circumstances,
where balancing is of equal importance in domestic as well as international
politics, Steven David's theory of `omnibalancing' is suitable. Omnibalancing
proposes that 'rather than just balance against threats or power, leaders of states
will ... align with secondary adversaries so that they can focus their resources on
prime adversaries', in other words, 'the threatened leadership ... must align with
one threat to address the other'. 3 This appears to aptly explain the considerations
of the Middle Eastern states concerned.
The balances made up by Syria, Turkey and Iran in the early 1990s neatly
illustrate the point of omnibalancing. Those countries had little more than the
Kurdish threat in common: stemming from Northern Iraq but reinforced by the
internal Kurdish element in each of the states. This type of balancing behaviour
is not considered by the balance of power theory. The complex and multifaceted
nature of the threat means that when faced with an array of threats from many
sources, 'the lesser challenges must be appeased in order to resist the principal
ones'.4
 Hence, omnibalancing could also explain Barzani's 1996 alignment with
Saddam - demonstrating a case of appeasing a secondary adversary (with the
PUK at the time superseding Baghdad as the principal foe)- since any
ideological explanation for his action would appear to be beyond credibility.
I . For a relevant discussion on this, see Buzan, (1983), People, States and Fear: The National
Security Problem in International Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
2. See Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979), Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley.
3.David (1991), p. 235.
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6.1.1 Iranian-Turkish-Syrian co-operation
In shotor dar-e khane-ye hame mikhabad.5
In the aftermath of the events following the Kuwait War in 1991, a general
Kurdish policy prevailed in Iran as well as Syria and Turkey, which, to all
intents and purposes, aimed at preventing the Kurds from asserting themselves
on the regional scene. The countries' unconstructive attitudes were strengthened
after the Kurdish people for the first time held free general elections in May
1992 and established an assembly as well as a regional government to administer
the affairs of their autonomous region. Following these parliamentary elections,
events in Northern Iraq were followed with even greater scepticism and
discomfort, and President Rafsanjani of Iran, for one, declared that elections
could not be tolerated if they led to the disintegration of the Iraqi state.6
Tehran was joined by Ankara and Damascus in condemning any action, which
might have led to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
When facing the possibility of international recognition of Kurdish aspirations,
the regional states made it clear that they would go to great lengths to make sure
that the international borders would not be compromised.
Despite the Kurds' clearly articulated aim of operating within the framework of
the Iraqi constitution, 7 Turkey, Iran and Syria were alarmed by what they saw as
the likely formation of a Kurdish sovereign state in Northern Iraq, and perceived
such a development as a threat to their national security. Notwithstanding these
countries' historical contradictions and conflicting interests, the developments in
4.Ibid. p. 245.
5. A Persian proverb — 'this camel sleeps on everybody's doorstep' — a perfect metaphor
describing the manner in which the Kurdish question is perceived in the countries 'hosting'
Kurdistan.
6. Tehran Times, 17-18 May 1992 (author unknown).
7. Even though having most of the necessary attributes of a state and being in full control of its
territory (and can therefore be termed a `pseudo-state'), 'Free Kurdistan', unlike Chechnya,
Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has not declared sovereignty, and, it
would appear, has not been seriously tempted to do so. For a relevant discussion on 'pseudo-
states', see Kolossov, Vladimir and O'Loughlin, John (1999), 'Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a
New Geopolitics: The Example of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic (TMR)' in Newman,
David Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, Frank Cass: London, pp. 151-176.
216
Northern Iraq carried such significance that it was deemed necessary to monitor
the Kurdish efforts at state-building through a regional alliance. In an unusual
realignment, the Turkish, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers convened, issuing
security protocols stating that they would cooperate against Kurdish self-
determination in Northern Iraq. 8
 Such regional cooperation is something the
Kurds always have had to fear, and quite possibly always will have to. Portrayed
as a sound security measure, there was an attempt to establish a framework for
regional co-operation, and high-profiled tripartite meetings between the foreign
ministers of Iran, Turkey and Syria were held on a six-month basis in the early
1990s, initiated by Iran's foreign minister at the time, Ali Akbar Velayati. With
the first security protocol signed in Ankara in November 1993, 9 the venue for
these meetings alternated between Ankara/Istanbul, Damascus and Tehran, and
addressed the joint concerns about a possible break-up of Iraq.
Iran was the motivator of these talks, but became increasingly frustrated as it
found itself mediating between Turkey and Syria who were at loggerheads over
water problems, in addition to the issue over the PICK (whom the latter
supported). Iran tried to move beyond Turkish-Syrian differences, but as the
issue of Northern Iraq frequently was put on the back burner, the Iranians
eventually felt that it was not worth their efforts to pursue regional co-operation
on this issue.10
The alliance cohesion began to weaken when internal fighting broke out between
the KDP and the PUK, and since 1995 no more tripartite meetings have been
held. Syria withdrew into political obscurity as Turkey and Iran came to discuss
the matter on a bilateral level amidst their increasing support for the opposing
factions in the Iraqi Kurdish civil war, in a constant dispute about where to draw
the lines of their respective spheres of influence.
8.Pope, H. MEI, No 438, 20 November 1992.
9.Olson (2001), p. 16.
I °. As explained by Dr. Jawad-e Zarif, Tehran, 2000.
217
6.1.2 Regional competition for influence in 'Free Kurdistan' 
In the competition for influence in Northern Iraq, the neighbouring countries
(particularly the main regional powers Iran and Turkey) contributed significantly
to the disorder that came to characterise the area in the mid-1990s. The key
interests each country has in Iraqi Kurdistan relate to their concerns about their
own Kurdish populations becoming affected by the developments across the
border.
For each regime, there is to a greater or lesser extent the perception of a 'double
threat', manifested in external aggression from a hegemonic power but also
internal revolts based on the revolutionary nationalist principle. The Kurdish
threat could in fact be perceived as both: an independent Kurdish state in
Northern Iraq could be an external threat to Iran/Turkey, through expansionist
policies snatching a large chunk of Iranian/Turkish territory. There could also be
a scenario where the Iranian/Turkish Kurds do not lean on their eastern/southern
brethren but stage an internal revolt demanding sovereignty for Iranian/Turkish
Kurdistan. Hence with the developments in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish question
may, in addition to being an external threat, also create an internal problem for
mainly Iran and Turkey.
For the countries in the region, an intact Iraq remains a non-negotiable issue, as
the consequences of the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power may
be too unpleasant even to contemplate and there is a frequent reiteration of the
need for Iraq's territorial integrity to be respected and maintained. Turkey's
greatest fear would appear to be the Iraqi Kurds advancing their claims for
independence if Iraq disintegrates, which could possibly result in neighbouring
Syria being surrounded by pro-USA governments. Wahhabi Saudi Arabia may
well worry about southern Shiite Iraq being absorbed by Iran, 11 whereas the
latter could have a new regime in Baghdad strongly allied to Washington to fear.
II . In spite of the general thrust of Iranian foreign policy, certain Iranian officials have indeed
encouraged some Iraqi opposition groups residing in Iran to work towards the separation of the
Shiite South from the Iraqi state, with a view to turn the area into an Iranian protectorate: a safe
haven in the south for Shiite Arabs, similar to the one set up in the Kurdish north of the country.
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During the regional tripartite meetings of 1992 and 1993, disapproval of the INC
(Iraqi National Congress — the then reasonably coherent and united Iraqi
opposition) was also voiced, amidst desires for the establishment of a
democratically elected government in Baghdad. The foreign ministers were all
discontent with the disorder perceived to be prevailing in Northern Iraq, worries
that supposedly more reflected their concerns of the Iraqi Kurdish experiment
proving successful and the repercussions this would have on their own states.
Disorder in the area was, however, indirectly spread by the very same
governments whose foreign ministers called for the cessation of the same. The
PKK, for instance, was, with support from Damascus, gradually establishing
itself in the northernmost areas of the autonomous region, the effects of which
were chaotic for the fledgling democracy of 'Free Kurdistan'. Moreover, if the
replacement of the regime in Baghdad was really sought and the fear of what
may ensue not overriding the wish to have Saddam Hussein forced out of office,
the Islamic Republic would have ceased permitting the illegal transport of Iraqi
oil across its territorial waters, an activity that through the vast revenues
generated has contributed greatly to keep Saddam's regime securely in power.
As previously mentioned, the regional states have long utilised the politicisation
of Kurdish identity as a foreign policy tool. A Kurdish national identity is denied
by Arab Ba'thism, as well as Turkish Kemalism and Iranian Khomeini'ism, who
all view it as disturbing to their national sovereignty. The lack of uniformity in a
Kurdish national identity characterised by multiplicity has been seized upon by
political opportunists in the regional capitals in devising arrays of specific
policies targeting various identities among the Kurds, since the degree of
external pressure and influence may well determine the level of ethnic, religious
and tribal awareness, to mention a few. One could for instance choose to draw
heavily on tribal identities in a particular area, play the religious card to those
individuals most receptive or place great emphasis on economic aspects
appealing to the upper classes in Kurdish society of Northern Iraq - all policies
that have been utilised by the neighbouring countries.
See for example Eamad Mazouri, 'The Viability of an Independent Kurdish State',
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External forces in the region could also have another impact on Iraqi Kurdistan,
in the area of political linguistics. If all restrictions on the Kurdish language are
lifted in Turkey, it may, coupled with the advances made by Kurmanji-speaking
intellectuals in the Kurdish diaspora, have a (long-term) profound effect on
politics in Northern Iraq, insofar as Kurmanji (and its speakers) could gain (and
claim) greater prestige and weight in the power play with Sorani.12
There will now follow a closer look at each of the countries relevant to this
discussion of Iraqi Kurdistan in its regional context. Iran will receive the greatest
attention, due to the fact that it is a regional power whose dealings with the Iraqi
Kurds has not been much examined since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. While a
great deal has been written about Turkey and its actions in the area, 13 the more
recent conduct of the Islamic Republic has not received the same degree of
interest. Moreover, considering the progress made by Iran in the past few years
in its efforts to end its isolation and re-enter the international community, it
appears feasible to envisage Iran in the foreseeable future assuming a leading
position in the Muslim world - a potential that warrants close scrutiny of its
regional policies. Following the account of Iran and Turkey, other regional states
of importance (first and foremost Iraq itself) will also be considered as regards
their policies towards Central Kurdistan.
www.KurdishMedia.corn, June 26 2001.
12.Hassanpour (1992) touches upon such a scenario: see p. 437.
13.This stems from Ankara's proactive approach to developments in Northern Iraq, much related
to its fight against the PKK. Turkey has never been far from the spotlight since the crisis of the
spring of 1991 and every Turkish troop movement and political statements alike have been
reported on a wide scale.
220
6.2 The major regional powers
Due to the strict limitations imposed on Iraq by the international community
with regard to its Kurdish north, Iran and Turkey emerged as the major powers
in Northern Iraq following the Kuwait war. With Saddam Hussein's forces
consigned to the periphery, Tehran and Ankara came to dominate the non-
Kurdish presence in the area of self-rule, which, by the mid-1990s, was
effectively divided into Iranian and Turkish spheres of influence. As key players
in the region, the influence of Tehran and Ankara has been central to the
direction the political developments in Northern Iraq has taken in the past
decade and will take in the future.
6.2.1 Iran
Despite Iran's Persian culture being distinct from the Arab Middle East, a shared
history, basic tenets of religion and, not the least, geography, constitute weighty
factors as to why events in Iran have a considerable effect on policies and
politics throughout the region. Positioned in such a geostrategic location, Iran is
indeed well-suited to play a constructive role in the future of the Middle East.
Since the election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami as Iran's president in
1997, the country has undergone significant changes in terms of democratic
development in comparison with its Arab neighbours, (in spite of the setbacks
later suffered by the reformists). Consequently, the country's international
standing has increased significantly. Its position within the Islamic world has
also been strengthened as a result of Tehran's commendable handling of Iran's
presidency of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held between
1997-2000. Moreover, with regard to the local municipality elections that were
organised in January 1999, Iran has set an example of political reform in the
Middle East. Worth noting is that power in Iran, as opposed to many of the
regional states, is held neither by a specific group or individual, nor a particular
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institution. The authoritarian state constituting Saddam's Iraq, to take one
example, stands in sharp contrast to the Iranian political system.14
Iranian foreign policy has passed through many phases since the change of
regime in 1979. One of the slogans of the Islamic Revolution regarding relations
with other states was na sharghi, na gharbi, jomhuri-e eslami ('neither East nor
West — an Islamic Republic'), a message conveying the intent of the new
republic not to support or to be supported by any major world power — in other
words, to establish a policy of non-alignment. However, with the passing of
years and the Islamic Republic rooting itself all the firmer in Persian soil, this
policy has naturally developed. Notably the Caspian Sea region alongside the
Persian Gulf has come to assume all the greater importance in Iran's foreign
policy concerns. 15
 In the 1990s, the Islamic Republic sought to find ways out of
the isolation it found itself in during its first ten years, and there was a
pronounced desire to regain its previous position as a regional power. In the
words of Ehteshami, a new 'geopolitical assertiveness' became evident.16
Indeed:
the Islamic Republic has demonstrated the potential to move away from being a
major regional actor, which had been its status ... throughout the 1980s, and
towards becoming a major regional power in the 1990s.' 7
During Mohammad Khatami's time in office, the efforts made in foreign policy-
making have been aimed at the easing of tensions in the region, and the success
and clarity with which these policies have been pursued has calmed fears
concerning Iranian expansionist ambitions and its spread of Islamic
14.Cf. Makiya (1999), pp. 3-45 and 73-109.
15.A notion R. K. Ramazani elaborated on in his article 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and
South', Middle East Journal, Vol. 446, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 393-412. Moreover, Former
Foreign Minister Dr. Velayati in his address at a 1996 seminar stated that 'the Islamic Republic
of Iran is convinced that her security lies in preservation of peace and tranquillity in the region
and it is in this context that her policies vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf, the neighbouring countries,
and Central Asia evolve'. The inaugural speech by Dr. Velayati at the seminar 'Security and
Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus', held at the IPIS, Tehran, January 14-16, 1996.
For the text of the speech, see 'The constructive role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in
maintaining regional security', Amu Darya 1,2 (1997), pp. 183-189.
16.Ehteshami (1995), p. 160.
17.Ibid. p. 145.
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revolutionary ideas — rhetoric admittedly halted by previous president
Rafsanjani, though he was unsuccessful in his efforts to remove the doubts
among Iran's Arab neighbours about Tehran's genuine intentions.
Reflecting Iran's concern of the pattern of disintegration, which prevailed in
various places at the end of the Cold War, one of the key issues of Iran's Middle
Eastern policies is the threat of the disintegration of Iraq and the fate of the
Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan, 18 with whom Iranian involvement has been ongoing,
since the latter began their armed struggle against the Baathists in Baghdad. The
Kurdish question has indeed always been a source of friction between Iran and
Iraq, but as Graham Fuller points out, the 'Kurdish card' can be and has been
utilised to greater effect by Iran than its foe Iraq:
By virtue of population size and the location of the Kurdish population in the key
oil-producing zones of Iraq, Iranian manipulation of the Iraqi Kurds is vastly
more costly to Iraq than the converse: Iraqi manipulation of Iranian Kurds.°
As indicated in this thesis' first chapter, Iranian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds
proved most intense in the early 1970s - a time when Iran was heavily
influenced by Washington — with the military aid reaching its height in 1974/75
when all-out war raged between the Kurds and Baghdad. This vital military
support was abruptly cut off through the Treaty of Algiers in March 1975.
Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran actively encouraged the Kurds across their
Western border to challenge the Iraqi authorities, which resulted in several
divisions of the Iraqi army being preoccupied fighting its own Kurds. Moreover,
the horrific gas bombings of Halabja became known to the world largely due to
its propaganda value for Iran, who in depicting the true face of its ruthless
enemy enthusiastically shipped foreign journalists to the area in order to
document the atrocities.
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the
consequences it had on the rest of the region, Iranian policy toward the Kurds of
18.See Table 2 in Lotfian (1998-1999).
19.Fuller (1991), p. 45.
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Northern Iraq has been subject to change, the scope of which becomes clear
when the focus shifts to developments in the 1990s. This changed Iranian policy
is to a certain extent reflected in the transformations that have taken place in
Iran's domestic political arena during the second half of the past decade.
6.2.1.1 Iranian unilateral activities in Iraqi Kurdistan
In the crisis of the spring of 1991, the Iraqi Kurds' relationship with the Iranian
government, which initially during the mass exodus of March and April had
been characterised by delicate co-operation, quickly deteriorated as a result of
the Kurds entering negotiations with the Iraqi government. In the process, the
Kurds were also turning more and more towards Turkey and the Western
powers. Tehran did not look favourably upon this development and
contemplated various measures to isolate the Kurds in Northern Iraq. However,
it appears to have been a realisation on behalf of the Iranians that by keeping the
border open, they could maintain a power-position with regard to the Iraqi Kurds
and a presence on Iraqi territory. Simultaneously, Tehran could profit from the
cross-border trade operations bypassing the UN sanctions against Iraq.
The state formation in Northern Iraq soon became a haven for many outlawed
regional political organisations, which attracted the attention of various national
security services. Also the intelligence section of Iran's Revolutionary Guards
was quick to establish itself in the autonomous region following its
establishment.20 The Iranians took advantage of the prevailing conditions of
weak authority in the area and made large-scale attempts to weaken its enemies
positioned in the area of self-rule. The Iranian military was heavily engaged in
'Free Kurdistan' throughout the summer and autumn of 1993 where it attacked
Kurdish towns and villages below as well as above the no-fly zone, the 36th
parallel, i.e. territories under the control of both Baghdad and the Kurdish
groupings. 21 The focus of the operation was the opposition group Mojahedin-e
20.As frankly stated by Dr. Velayati, Tehran, 2000.
21.Olson (1994), p. 58.
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Khalq Organisation (MKO) as well as the KDP-I. The latter was acting from the
Kurdish controlled territories, those run by the PUK.
Iran may well have embarked upon these 1993 military actions on the
assumption that the attacks directed at Iran by the KDP-I were in fact instigated
by Washington attempting to destabilize the Iranian government. This can be put
against American sympathy for Iranian opposition groups challenging the
legitimacy of the Islamic regime in Tehran. Whether or not this was the case, it
shows that Iran would willingly resort to military action targeting the Iraqi
Kurdish autonomous entity if Tehran had reasons to suspect its leadership of
deciding to 'support or tolerate attacks intended to intimidate, challenge or
threaten the survivability of the Iranian government'. 22 Tehran may also have
wanted to show its strength in the face of Washington's attempts to gain another
foothold in the region, as the Iranians viewed the establishment of the US-led
relief efforts in Northern Iraq.23
In order to aptly monitor events closely on the ground, it was imperative for Iran
to maintain actively engaged in the affairs of the Kurdish Administration in the
area of self-rule. This was mainly done through strengthening its ties with the
PUK. Although the KDP co-operated significantly with Tehran against the KDP-
I during the early 1980s, 24 the PUK is the Iraqi Kurdish party that traditionally
has been reasonably well connected with Tehran. Talabani's party has been
officially present in Iran since 1986, when it established an office in
Kermanshah, and a year later was allowed to set up a head-office in the capital.
Between 1992 and 1994 there was no representation at all in Iran, which
reflected the peaceful conditions that prevailed in the area of self-rule at that
time, but significantly from 1994 onwards (when the fratricidal hostilities broke
out in Northern Iraq), the PUK has maintained an office in Tehran with several
sub-offices in the Iran/Iraq border area.25
22.Ibid.
23.Id. (2001), pp. 14-15.
24.As examined by Sheilchmous (1999), p. 57.
25.A well-informed politically active Kurd (declined to be identified), consulted in Tehran in
February 2000.
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When relations resumed between the PUK and the Iranian government in 1994,
the PUK was forced to tolerate a great deal of pressure from its benefactor -
pressure aimed at Iranian Kurdish groups residing in Northern Iraq. Iran saw its
co-operation with the PUK as an opportunity to settle scores with its own
troublesome Kurds, particularly the KDP-I. The Iraqi Kurds were for example
forced to close radio stations of Iranian Kurdish political groups stationed in
their area.26
 In addition, the need to balance the KDP-Turkey alliance (analysed
below) seems to have been a strong reason for Tehran to expand its relations
with the PUK. Also, given the regional powers' apprehension about one political
party being in domination of the rest, such considerations are likely to have
played a part in Tehran's decision to strengthen the ties to the PUK. However,
this has not been a relationship free of friction. For instance, Iran must have been
disappointed when the PUK fought and defeated the Islamic Movement of
Kurdistan (IMK) from late 1993 through early 1994, as the latter was funded and
equipped by Tehran.27 Talabani was instrumental in putting down these Iraqi
Kurdish Islamists, fighting that led to the outbreak of the protracted KDP-PUK
armed conflict.
As the inter-Kurdish hostilities begun in 1994 steadily intensified, many actors,
notably the United States, tried to mediate between the warring fractions,
without much success. In October 1995 Iran made an attempt at mediation but
failed. A new Iranian mediation attempt was undertaken in January 1996.28
Tehran may well have felt a need to counter American influence in Northern
Iraq and raise its profile as a regional power. Iranian involvement was, however,
to change in nature as the military section of the Revolutionary Guards in July
1996 crossed the border and made an incursion deep into PUK-controlled
territory. This was a short but conspicuous visit by Iranian troops in pursuit of
KDPI-peshmergas, aiming at the KDP-I headquarters in Koi Sanjaq. 29 The
Iranians were permitted to operate in areas controlled by Talabani's forces, but
as the KDP refused entry of the Iranian army into the northern parts of 'Free
26.Natali (1999), p. 37.
27.Olson (1994), pp. 62-63.
28.Dr. Velayati, Tehran, 2000.
29.Dr Rashid, London, 1999.
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Kurdistan' where the sought after guerrillas were supposedly hiding, 3° the
Iranian offensive has to be regarded as rather unsuccessful. However, Tehran
had accomplished one thing, namely exercising further military influence in
Iraqi Kurdistan. The intention with this exercise might seem obvious, but it
cannot be ruled out that the main aim of the attack may not have been to destroy
the headquarters of the Iranian Kurdish party. The Islamic Republic was much
concerned with weakening the Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq, and by
taking military action the Iranians demonstrated that they were able to invade the
Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region when they found reasons to do so.
6.2.1.2 Iran's regional policies in transformation: its effects on Northern Iraq
Iran under President Khatami has shown positive signs of its willingness to
pursue a more balanced foreign policy with the aim to radically improve
relations with the countries in its neighbourhood. This has yielded certain
results, although it has to be emphasised that the power of the president is very
limited, particularly in the area of foreign policy, 3I where the Supreme Leader
Khamene'i, representing the strongest power centre in the Islamic Republic,
determines general guidelines as well as particular policies. 32 Despite this, the
promotion of Iranian interests in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region underwent
notable changes after 1997, when Mohammad Khatami was elected president.33
30.Dabrowska, MEI, No 532, 16 August 1996.
31.As regards foreign policy, Iran's National Security Council (NSC), created by a constitutional
amendment in 1989 to co-ordinate the various agencies responsible for both external and internal
security, shapes the agenda. For the functions of the NSC, see `Foreign policy decisions in Iran:
three institutions' constitutional powers', Iran Focus, March 2000 (Esfand -Farvardin 1378/9)
Vol. 14, No. 3, and chapter XIII of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
32. This duality of power explains the complex foreign-policy making of Iran, the deeper
understanding of which demands an in-depth knowledge of the state's internal political
structures. For an excellent introduction and analysis of these power structures, see Wilfried
Buchta (2000), Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, Washington
DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
33.In the 'Guidelines and Priorities for Iran's foreign policy under President Khatami' - spelled
out in The Viewpoints, Positions, Guidelines and Priorities in the Grand Strategy of
Hojjatoleslam va al-Muslemin Mohammad Khatami for Socio-economic, Political and Cultural
Development, prior to the Presidential elections in May 1997 — one finds highly prioritised the
'maintaining the security of Iran's borders through expanding and reinforcing bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with neighbouring countries'. See Table 1 in Lotfian (1998-1999).
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During the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the 1990s, a policy
characterised by intervention and active involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan was
promoted, which resulted in military engagement in the Iraqi Kurdish region. In
contrast, the current government has opted for a less confrontational policy, and
is also showing signs of being interested in using its contacts with the PUK in
order to establish a connection with the KDP-I. There have been reports about
Iranian attempts to negotiate with the Iranian Kurdish political grouping,
negotiations that were allegedly held in Suleymaniya, with the PUK acting as
mediator.34
Moreover, Iran's official attitude towards the Iraqi Kurds over the past four
years has been characterised by a conciliatory tone, with the focus on making the
PUK and the KDP co-operate with each other. 35 This is in tune with Iran's
general foreign policy of reconciliation and normalisation of relations. The
general change in foreign policy-making of the Islamic Republic can indeed be
detected in the way it deals with the Kurdish state formation on its northeastern
border. As long as the Iraqi Kurds are not encouraging anti-Iranian movements
or making moves towards an independent status, Tehran is not excessively
hostile to the Kurdish Administration. If there are no attacks on Iran, the Iranians
do not permeate the area with armed Revolutionary Guards in pursuit of Iranian
Kurds.36
The Iraqi Kurds themselves admit that Tehran has indeed altered its policies and
now holds a position, which is very different from that held in the early and mid-
1990s. It is true that Iran promotes the respect for and preservation of the
territorial integrity of Iraq with the same intensity as before, but the difference
now is that the current Administration signals no interest in interfering directly
in Iraqi Kurdish politics, as was the case up until a few years ago.37
34.For instance, see Bill Samii, (2000), 'Tehran works with Kurdish parties', RFE/RL Iran
Report, Vol. 3, No. 32, 21 August and Shamal 'Aqrawi, Al-Zaman, 30 March 2000.
35.Outlined by Dr. Araghchi, Tehran, 1999.
36.Indeed, 'the Iranian government is happy if they are not attacked, ... [whereas] Turkey wants
you to be part of an agreement to say I am going to fight the PKK. to the last man'. Dr. Rashid,
London, 1999.
37.Ibid.
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In this context it is also of interest to examine how the Muslim identity affects
the policy-making of Iran with regard to the self-ruled Iraqi Kurdish areas.
Muslim identity versus national interest is a rather complex issue, and while
acknowledging that Islam is an 'infrastructural element of [its] foreign policy',38
national interests do tend to come first,39 particularly with regard to Iraqi
Kurdistan. If the Kurdish autonomous entity is ever perceived as a threat, it is
not to the Islamic Republic but to Iran - it is a question of territory, the
preservation of borders. 4° In the 1990s there has been a general drive to de-
ideologise the foreign policy,4I and Iran has significantly proved itself having a
largely non-ideological approach towards the Kurdish area of self-rule in
Northern Iraq.
Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi in a speech before the
52' d session of the United Nations Assembly New York September 22, 1997,
spoke compassionately about the promotion of human rights when outlining his
doctrine of a Global Civil Society:
It is evident that priority must be accorded to the most fundamental human rights
such as the right to life, the right to self-determination and the right to
development, and special attention must be given to addressing their massive and
systematic violation.42
These words of the Foreign Minister might well be interpreted as if the Islamic
Republic supports the Kurds' aspiration for self-determination. However, as has
been previously suggested in many different ways, the promotion of Kurdish
self-determination in Northern Iraq is hardly to the liking of the Islamic
Republic, which has time and again reiterated its stance of opposition to the
38.Ehteshami (1995), p. 144.
39. As expressed by Dr. Jawad-e Zarif in Tehran, 2000: 'national interests come first in
reformers' view of truism', but at the same time stressed that ideological considerations in the
Islamic world always work in the background. For more on Iran's foreign policy that in the
1990s largely ceased to be ideological, see Oliver Roy's analysis about the Shiite factor in Iran's
foreign policy, pp. 183-193 in his The Failure of Political Islam (1994), London: I.B. Tauris.
40.A point stressed by Dr. Araghchi, Tehran, 1999.
41.The triumph of Iran's national interest over its ideology is interestingly examined by David
Menashri in his Post-revolutionary politics in Iran. Religion, Society and Power, (2001),
London: Frank Cass, pp. 227-37.
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creation of a Kurdish independent state in the region — the likely result of
advocating Kurdish self-determination.43
In the early 1990s the Islamic Republic, as well as Saudi Arabia, tried to
establish Islamic political groupings in the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region, and
the competition between these two regional powers can be compared to their
previous rivalry in Afghanistan for control of the Islamic agenda. 44 However,
these Iranian- and Saudi-financed new Islamist movements were not able to
establish themselves firmly in Northern Iraq, as the support they gained from the
Kurds there was minimal. As tactfully expressed by the PUK London-
spokesman, 'they are not the dominating political groups'. These new groups
were unable to influence the religious thinking of the Iraqi Kurds, especially the
villagers in the countryside. 45 Thus Iranian ideologically motivated Islamisation-
efforts largely failed, and it would be an exaggeration to state that religion has
been the dominating political force in the 1990s Iraqi Kurdistan.
A glance at Iran's approach towards the dissolution of the Soviet Union further
illuminates the issue of ideology versus national interest. Tehran was until the
very end hoping that the political entity constituting the Soviet Union would
remain intact, highlighting the fact that the national political interests received
higher priorities than the religious ideology, despite all the rhetoric pointing in
the opposite direction. What Iran feared the most was the 'Great Satan' being the
only super power in Central Asia and the Middle East in face of a collapse of the
Soviet entity - hence Iran was eager to see Moscow maintaining its authority in
Central Asia. As was the case during the Pahlavi era during much of the
twentieth century, Iran has focused its foreign policy on the West and South (i.e.
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf), with a desire to 'freeze' the situation at its
northern and eastern borders. However, as new republics emerged on its
northern borders, Iran has had to refocus its efforts to that area, although it
would be inaccurate to view the sponsorship of Islamic fundamentalism as the
42. For this quote and his full speech, see the website of the Iranian Foreign Ministry:
http://www.salamiran.orgaraninformation/Govemment/Foreignistatement.html.
43.For instance Adnan Catlayan in TDN, February 12 1994.
44.For an account of the new Saudi- and Iranian-financed groupings, see Sheilchmous (1999), pp.
59-60.
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driving force behind Iranian diplomacy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To try
to acquire political dominance through a religious offensive in the 1990s, let
alone in the 2000s, appears unlikely, in particular since the peoples in this region
adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. Rather, Iran's policy may be denoted as
defensive, seeking to prevent ethnic nationalisms from gaining a foothold in the
area, spilling over into Iranian territory, and also to thwart Turkish hegemonic
ambitions in Caucasus and Central Asia.
Also with regard to the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, the cordial Israeli-Turkish
relations have caused concern in Iran, 46 where it is claimed that such close links
are vastly detrimental to all Muslim people of the Middle East. 47 The effects
such an alliance could have on the power balance in Northern Iraq with the
presence of Israel in an area bordering Iran is weighing heavily on the minds of
those formulating the foreign and security policy of the Islamic Republic. There
is anxiety about Israeli attempts to establish itself in countries surrounding Iran,
a policy for which Iraqi Kurdistan is a primary target. 48 Iran's Deputy Foreign
Minister for Asia and Oceania with obvious reference to the state of affairs in
Northern Iraq stated:
I take the question of NATO and its relations with Israel, as well as the related
topics, as highly important matters, which must be viewed as a new development
and phenomenon.49
Tehran views the Kurdish problem in Northern Iraq as part of the problem with
Iraq. However, in dealing with its western neighbour, Tehran feels the need to
separate different issues from each other. Out of several issues related to Iraq,
the major ones concern the post-war problems, namely the POWs, the disputed
border and river demarcation lines, all of which need resolving before
45.As stated by Mr. Rahman, London, 1999.
46.Not only Iranians but also Arabs have voiced disapproval of the increased co-operation
between the Turks and Israelis, particularly in view of the official American backing: see Asharq
al-Awsat, 5 May 2001.
47.As emphasised by Dr. Velayati, Tehran, 2000.
48.Dr. Jawad-e Zarif, Tehran, 2000.
49.Aminzadeh (1999) p. 18-19 (italics added).
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attempting a serious discussion about the Kurdish issue. 5° The issue of the
Kurdish autonomous entity in the north of the country rather has to be solved
within the framework of the future of the Iraqi state, free from UN sanctions.
Such an assessment would naturally be subject to major adjustments should
developments in Iraqi Kurdistan move in the direction of secession.
Sentiments voiced by President Khatami are not allowed to dominate the policy-
making of the Islamic Republic. However, there are grounds for optimism that
his next three years in office will produce and advance a lasting legacy of
reformation in Iranian politics, on a domestic as well as a regional and an
international level. Khatami's many speeches have revealed sensible political
thinking and if translated into concrete policies, with particular reference to the
Kurdish question, a genuine change may be brought about. Witness his
comments during his autumn 1999 state visit to France:
While the 20th century was centred on the force of the sword, leaving winners
and losers, the main axis of the next century must be that of dialogue, otherwise
the sword will become a cutting blade, from which no one will be safe.51
6.2.2 Turkey
As shown in the first chapter's political history of Iraqi Kurdistan, during the
1980s, Iran was the regional player with whom the Iraqi Kurds mainly had their
dealings and were exploited by. In the following decade, however, Iran assumed
a less transparent role in developments of Central Kurdistan, while the country
emerging as the most visible external power to the autonomous region was
Turkey. The political influence of Turkey is of particular significance in
Northern Iraq, since Turkey is a NATO member and could be envisaged to
enforce the will of Washington on Iraqi Kurds.
5°. Dr. Sariolqalam, Tehran, 1999.
51 . `Khatami offers "dialogue", warns against "force" in rare speech', AFP, October 29, 1999.
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In the early 1990s, Turkey had to cope with several crises in its immediate
neighbourhood. On its Western borders there was the Balkan war with the
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, on the opposite border, in the East, the
Nagorno-Karabalch-conflict raged between Azerbaijan and Armenia, whereas in
the south, Turkey was confronted with the unstable situation constituting Iraq. In
all of these conflict zones, ethno-nationalism was a dominating force, and
naturally this produced fears of such ethnic unrest spilling over into areas within
Turkey. Indeed, Turkey's 'insistence on maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity
reflect[ed] Ankara's concern about the destabilising effects of ethnic and
nationalist movements on Turkey and its regional environment'.52
Following Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, Turkey notably 'departed
from its traditional policy of non-involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts [as it]
became a key participant in the allied coalition against Iraq during the Gulf
crisis',53 the aftermath of which demanded close monitoring by Ankara.
President Ozal showed great visionary thinking for solving Turkey's Kurdish
problem and the sheer novelty of the existence of such creative ideas among the
top echelon of Turkey's Kurd-denying leadership coupled with its obvious
connections to the Iraqi Kurdish question and the developments in the
autonomous region, calls for an emphasis on Ozal's ideas on the following few
pages.
6.2.2.1 Turkish-Kurdish politics in the aftermath of the Kuwait War
The EC-proposal in April 1991 of a UN-supervised safe haven to be established
in Northern Iraq was, as noted above, an idea initiated by the Turkish president.
Turgut Ozal was the first statesman who officially spoke of a sanctuary for the
Iraqi Kurds, many of whom had taken or attempted to take refuge within the
borders of Turkey. This plan is likely to have been connected with Ankara's
unexpected and sudden political move on 12 April, in which several anti-
Kurdish laws were abrogated: the existence of 12 million Turkish Kurds was
52 . Sayari (1994), pp. 186-187.
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dramatically recognised by the Turkish state and the cultural restraints for the
former mountain-Turks eased slightly.54
The late President Ozal was the initiator and promoter of Turkey's new
initiatives in the foreign policy arena. In the aftermath of the Kuwait War there
was great anticipation of the role Turkey was to play in the new regional order
emerging. Possibly the most unexpected policy-change was the radical easing of
the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language, the liberalisation of the 1983
language law, which was significantly amended. The decision to allow Turkey's
own Kurds greater space to express their Kurdishness, as well as Ankara
speaking on behalf of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees, could not be regarded as a
sudden understanding of the Kurdish plight. Rather, it was a result of realpolitik,
further motivated by the country's interest in membership of the EC, perhaps
accentuated by the desire to be a respected member of the NATO. Further,
Ankara feared developments spiralling out of control creating a chaotic situation
if the large number of Iraqi Kurds at its borders were allowed to enter Turkey.
Should that happen, those uninvited masses could well have sympathised with
the PKK and provided the latter with their support in seeking to establish some
sort of political formation on Turkish territory, an unfavourable scenario to be
avoided at all costs by the Turkish government. However, when the Western
powers later in the spring of 1991 began constructing what came to develop into
the semi-independent entity of 'Free Kurdistan', many liberal figures in the
Turkish establishment including Ozal himself, were likely to have got cold feet,
however, determined to make the influence of Turkey felt in any decision-
making circles.
Ozal most likely launched the idea of a safe haven when he realised something
of the sort was the only solution short of allowing hundreds of thousands of
refugees to cross Turkey's border. Ankara suspected Baghdad of seeking a 'final
solution' to the Kurdish issue, namely to force the Kurds out of Iraqi territory, in
the process creating disastrous consequences for Turkey. Therefore it was vital
for the Turks that the refugees stayed within Iraqi territory, as Ankara feared a
53 . Ibid. p. 176.
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repeat of events of 1988, when large numbers of Iraqi Kurdish refugees had
poured into Turkey following the Halabj a-bombings. At that time the West, after
its initial interest had waned, had left Turkey with less aid than considered
necessary by Ankara to adequately deal with the situation.
Ozal also appeared to have placed the unprecedented circumstances in a larger
perspective, interpreting the situation as a unique chance for Turkey to manifest
its aspirations for and seize the leading role in the future discussions on the
Kurdish issue: i.e. he would gain a key role in regional politics but also break the
deadlock that for so long has characterised Turkish-Kurdish relations. On a
regional level, such Turkish overtures to safeguard Kurdish rights — in
suggesting a federal status for the Kurds of Northern Iraq - could also be
understood as a desire to in the long run seek control of the strategically oil-rich
areas of the north of the country: in other words, a re-surfacing of the Mosul-
syndrome. Such an emergence of renewed Turkish hegemonic ambitions in the
region may well have spurred on Turkish encouragement to the international
community to suspend Baghdad's control over large parts of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Turkey's powerful generals might have held hopes for a safe haven in Iraqi
Kurdistan to bring them a chance of incorporating the Mosul-district, i.e.
Northern Iraq, into the Turkish Republic.55 In May 1995 President Demirel even
spoke of rectifying the border and place Northern Iraq, the Mosul district, under
Turkish control, a proposal strongly opposed by Arabs and Iranians alike. It is
still felt in Turkey that Mosul is rightfully theirs and that the new Turkish
Republic in its weak position vis-à-vis the British in 1925 had not been able to
forcefully argue the righteousness of its territorial claim to the area should not
conceal this fact. 56 Desires for expanding Turkey's role in the geopolitically
related areas of Caucasus and Central Asia (where Ankara undoubtedly sees a
great potential for economic and political influence), and a modified view on
54.Berglcvist, SvD, 10 April, 1991.
55.What an annexation of Northern Iraq could mean for Turkey is elaborated on by Heinrich
Lummer in his 'Das Verhaltnis zwischen irkischen Kurden und tiirkischer Regierung'
['Relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish Government] in Kurdisches Forum in
Deutschland (1999), Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und Pespektiven. Ergebnisse einer
Internationalen Tagung 1999 in Berlin [Iraqi Kurdistan: Status and Perspectives. Proceedings
from an International Conference in 1999 in Berlin], Berlin: Awadani, pp. 81-84.
56.Daniel Pipes examines this issue in his "Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq and Mosul", Middle East
Quarterly 2, Sept 1995, pp. 65-68.
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how the issue of regional security ought to be approached, are moreover likely to
have the element of Northern Iraq attached to it.
Ozal's novel initiatives on such a sensitive issue were not well-received nation-
wide, and he was criticised for incapability and naïveté, acting against Turkey's
national interest and encouraging separatist tendencies. The conventions of the
establishment clearly clashed with Ozal's desires to ventilate new, highly
controversial ideas. When the president made his unexpected initiative,
proposing radio- and tv-broadcasts in Kurdish, Premier Minister Demirel reacted
disapprovingly, stating that it would be unconstitutional, a view shared by the
military. 57 Ozal accordingly appeared to be a rather lonely advocate for a
dynamic and advanced foreign policy, as his proposed measures were subject to
substantial criticism by Kemalists defending the indivisibility of the state.
Ozal, who passed away suddenly in March 1993,58 is likely to have thought it an
appropriate approach to solve the country's Kurdish problem in stages and could
even have envisaged the Turkish Republic assuming more of a Turkish-Kurdish
character. He undoubtedly foresaw swift geopolitical changes in the region and
realised that if the Kurdish language was not freed in such a crucial regional
crisis, Turkey would face increased problems later on. It is noteworthy, however,
that the president's visionary initiatives in an area where domestic politics were
intertwined with foreign policy-making, were largely characterised by
insinuations, non-commitments and unclear guidelines. He ventilated
possibilities with the intention to obtain the best possible results as developments
unfolded, hence rendering it unnecessary to prepare lines of retreat.
6.2.2.2 Turkish unilateral activities in Iraqi Kurdistan
For the Iraqi Kurds, it has from the start of their exercise in political autonomy
been of vital importance to keep Turkey favourably disposed towards them, as
Turkish co-operation is absolutely vital for the economic survival of the self-
57 . McDowall, MEI, No 397, 5 April 1991.
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ruling area. A problematic issue all along has been the presence of the PKK in
'Free Kurdistan'. Particularly the KDP, the traditional authority in the
northernmost areas of Iraqi Kurdistan utilised by the Turkish Kurdish grouping,
has been forced to take action and fight its Kurdish brothers in order to satisfy
the powerful northern neighbour. Turkey thus succeeded in driving a political
wedge between the Turkish Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds when forcing the Iraqi-
Kurdish parties to actively fight against their northern Kurdish counterparts in
order to secure the vital border-trade with Turkey.
In October 1992, the Turks decided to take charge of the small-scale offensive
against the PKK commenced by the Iraqi Kurds, and a considerable number of
heavily armed Turkish troops marched across the border. After a few weeks of
fighting an agreement between the PICK and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional
Government was signed. 59 However, Turkish air strikes soon reoccurred at
regular intervals with the aim to hunt down PKK-guerrillas, but also having the
character of warning the Iraqi Kurds not to become too ambitious in aspiring
towards greater recognition regionally as well as internationally. In this sense,
the Turkish army used the conflicts in Northern Iraq as a pretext to justify its
military presence in the area. As Olson writes, 'after the 1992 campaign, Turkey
stationed up to 5,000 soldiers in Northern Iraq along with substantial numbers of
other security and intelligence personnel'. 6° This military presence has, however,
very much been perceived as a provocation, serving to increase rather than
stabilise the conflict and regional tension.
In 1995 Turkey stated the aim to 'once and for all' destroy the PKK-bases in
Northern Iraq, and in late March, with the aim to 'cause as much destruction as
possible' (to the guerrillas), 61 some 35,000 Turkish soldiers with heavy artillery
entered Northern Iraq. 62 This created an almost absurd situation, in which the
coalition air surveillance-planes were flying at 30,000 feet above the security
zone to prevent the Iraqi air force from venturing north of latitude 36°N, while
58.Id. (1996), P. 437.
59.Laizer (1996), p. 68.
60.Olson (2001), p. 14.
61.Pope, N., MEI, No 497, 31 March 1995.
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the Turks dropped bombs from 5,000 feet on the Kurdish villages the former
forces were assigned to protect.63 At the same time, this and other Turkish
incursions were paradoxically facilitated just because of Turkey's direct
connection with the maintenance of the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq. The
European Union as well as the USA appealed to Turkey to withdraw its
excessive killing machine from the Iraqi Kurdish areas, and in the summer the
Turkish army heeded the wishes of the West, leaving destruction and terrorised
civilians behind.
Turkey's massive offensive was far from successful. The obvious military build-
up of the Turkish army in northern Kurdistan weeks before the incursion gave
the PKK-guerrillas sufficient time to move their units far into Northern Iraq,
away from the 40 km deep and 290 km long raiding zone employed by the
Turkish troops. 64 The bases of the peshmergas claimed by the Turks to have
been completely destroyed, mainly consisted of caves in the Kurdish mountains,
used to stock weapons and food, easily recreated at any time with a minimal
effort by the fighters. 65 However, the political aspect of the invasion must be
emphasised, insofar as the Turks unambiguously sought to get the message
across to the outer world that an independent Kurdish state in the region would
not be accepted. However, it is equally important to point out that neither
regional nor international powers accepted the Turkish ambition to establish a
buffer zone in Northern Iraq, similar to the one Israel created in southern
Lebanon in 1982.
Turkey's May 1996 invasion of Northern Iraq was followed by further Turkish
attacks on PKK bases in 'Free Kurdistan'. Despite Ankara's firm belief that all
Turkish-Kurdish guerrillas had been exterminated in the spring 1996 assault,
there must have been a few peshmergas left in the area, since the Turkish
government deemed it necessary to invade the Kurdish security zone over and
over again. According to the official Turkish account, there have been 57
62.For sake of comparison, this was a larger force than that employed by the Turks in the 1974
invasion of Cyprus. Pamuk, Kurdistan Rapport, May 1995.
63.Kutschera, The Middle East, November 1995.
". Serrill, Time, 24 April, 1995.
65 . Zaman, The Middle East, April 1995.
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military interventions in Northern Iraq sine the early 1980s, a figure that one is
inclined to believe is a rather conservative estimate.66
Ethnicity is an important element shaping Turkey's foreign policy. Apart from
the massive interest in the new Turkic republics emerging in the post-Soviet
period, the Turkmens of Iraq are seriously considered and utilised by Ankara as
a way of seeking influence over politics in the autonomous region. Being in a
minority position, the Turkmens are also looking to the Turkish Republic for
inspiration and leadership. In the event of a viable Kurdish state emerging in
Northern Iraq, Ankara would be certain to utilise the Turkmen element in order
to enhance its political presence in the 'state of Mosul', as they might choose to
term it.
The air surveillance system Operation Provide Comfort and the ensuing
observation operations (as described in the following chapter) have been rather
controversial in Turkey. Ankara provides its support, but the relief operation is
viewed as a double-edged sword. While it does protect Turkey from another
mass exodus of Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq by preventing the Iraqi
army from accessing its northern regions, it also produces fears that the
autonomous political entity may constitute the embryo of an independent
Kurdish state. Moreover, when it became clear that the PKK with such ease and
swiftness had established bases in the autonomous region from where it
launched attacks on Turkey, the whole operation came into question. The
coalition mandate was nonetheless prolonged by the parliament in Ankara on a
semi-annual basis until the end of 1996, when disapproving voices in the
Turkish establishment grew too powerful.° One advantage the unprecedented
circumstances presented to the Turks was that with the abolition of Iraqi central
control over the north of the country, Turkey became relatively free to make
military incursions into Northern Iraq whenever it so desired. All Baghdad could
do was loudly protest the violation of its territorial integrity. The long-running
coalition operation was, however, brought to an end, and in January 1997
66. 'A Plethora of Reports Rattles Nerves', Briefing (Ankara), June 8, 1998, P. 7 - a reference
provided by Gunter (1999), p. 126.
67.Braconier, SvD, 31 July, 1996.
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replaced by a less inclusive surveillance system, by which the Turks, Americans
and British provided air cover alone, leaving out the important element of the
provision of humanitarian aid.68
By its gradual upgrading of diplomatic relations with Iraq, Turkey has, however,
showed independence from Washington and Tel Aviv in forming its regional
foreign policy, which its alliance with the two may have put into question. With
improvements in relations with Saddam's regime, Ankara confirmed its deep
concern about the continuing development towards an independent status of the
Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq - a concern that neither the USA nor Israel could
alleviate.
6.2.3 Iranian-Turkish relations concerning Northern Iraq
Considered the two major powers external to the autonomous Kurdish region,
the relations between Iran and Turkey have a noticeable impact on developments
in Northern Iraq. In fact, upon close scrutiny it becomes clear that the issue of
the autonomous Kurdish region occupies a central place in the two countries'
many key concerns. Since the main focus in the current chapter is on Iranian
involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan, this section will look at the relevance of Iranian-
Turkish relations for Northern Iraq from mainly an Iranian perspective.
One of the geopolitical advantages Iran has over Turkey with regard to Iraqi
Kurdistan is that Iran is in a better position to deal with the Kurdish issue and
can more easily move towards some kind of reasonable autonomy solution.69
This also reflects its ability to engage in constructive discussions of the future of
the Kurds of Iraq, provided the positive domestic political development in Iran
under the influence of President Khatami continues and the negative trends
driven by the conservatives are overcome.
69 . Hilterman (1997).
69 . E.g. Fuller (1991), PP . 46-47.
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Being a country essentially consisting of minorities, Iran's general tolerance
towards minority groups is in the regional context relatively satisfactory.
However, the opposite is true if Tehran considers the state threatened. The
considerable number of Azeri Turks living in north-western Iran are relatively
well integrated in Iranian society,70 but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the creation of the independent state of Azerbaijan, Iran's worries about the
emergence of a strong Azeri separatist movement in the northwest has greatly
increased. Such concerns were certainly instrumental when the province in the
early 1990s was divided into East and West Azerbaijan, in order to monitor and
control such tendencies.71
Teheran possesses a certain unease about the occasionally very obvious Turkish
military presence in a weakened Iraq (in spite of Turkish assurances about its
army only responding to the challenge posed by the PKK) and fears that such
Turkish presence will affect Iranian geostrategic and geopolitical interests in
Azerbaijan and in the Gulf. Such fears are held due to the fact that in addition to
the Kurdish element, there is the issue of Azeri Turks in the Islamic Republic
that concerns the Iranian authorities. Between these two minority-problems in
Iran there is a connection, and one in which Turkey and its regional policy-
making is heavily represented. The combination of Turkish efforts in the
Caucasus and Central Asia and the existence of the independent state of
Azerbaijan and its influence on the Azeri populations of Iran's northwestern
provinces are issues unsettling authorities in Tehran. 72 At first glance, there
seems to be no apparent link between these issues and developments in Northern
Iraq. Upon closer examination, however, one can detect a pattern of intertwined
issues and events, and causes for fluctuations in Iranian-Turkish relations, which
can often be detected in developments in Northern Iraq.
7°. This is examined in Mehrdad Izady's article 'Persian carrot and Turkish stick: contrasting
policies targeted at gaining state loyalty from Azeris and Kurds', Kurdish Times, Vol. 3, No. 2,
Fall 1990, pp. 30-47.
71.This issue is dealt with by Touraj Atabalci, Azerbaijan. Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-
century Iran, (1993), London: St Martin's Press.
72.For a clear overview of the region and the positioning of Armenia and Azerbaijan in relation
to Iran (and Turkey), see Figure 1.1.2: Kurdistan in the Context of the Middle East.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union created a general political atmosphere in which
ethnic separatist movements could emerge and prosper. The prospect of Iranian
Azerbaijan producing strong separatist sentiments appeared quite remote in the
past, but in the 1990s seemed less unlikely to occur, as the existence of the
independent state of Azerbaijan provided the incentive for aspirations to join the
fellow sovereign Azerbaijanis. 73 If such a threat to Iran's territorial integrity
becomes acute (a development that will indisputably also bring about desires for
separation of Iranian Kurdistan), Tehran will probably accuse Turkey of being
the driving force behind those developments and react accordingly. Iran's 'chief
resource', as Fuller puts it, to destabilise Turkey would most notably constitute
active encouragement and assistance to the separatist Kurds of Turkey. 74 Internal
threats are indeed 'an ideal vehicle for advancing the interests of outside states',
and 'providing aid to or against insurgent groups ... is a relatively inexpensive
and effective means of asserting one's power'. 75 This is how Iran exerts pressure
on Turkey by providing bases for the PICK on Iranian territory, or encouraging
the Islamist tendencies in Turkish domestic politics. In fact the two are
interrelated since 'the greatest threat facing [Turkey] was not the PKK itself but
the co-operation between the PKK and the Islamists'.76
One example, which serves to highlight Tehran's extreme sensitivity to the
relationship between the Kurdish problem in Iran, its own Azerbaijani question,
and the delicate balance of influence in Iraqi Kurdistan, is the military conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh that kept Annenia and Azerbaijan at loggerheads for a
considerable time. In the summer of 1993 Armenia engaged its military forces in
attacks on neighbouring Azerbaijan, for which Iran, initially at least, gave
Armenia its political support - in all probability an attempt to balance Turkey
and Baku's pan-Turkish rhetoric. Turkey was firmly positioned behind Baku,
who enjoyed Turkey's support of its NATO-partner the USA. Iran regarded
Azerbaijan's pan-Turkish rhetoric as unnecessarily challenging to its own
population of Azeri Turks, and had reasons to fear an upsurge of Kurdish
73. For a recent analysis of the ethnic identity and autonomous movement of Iran's Azeri
minority, see Touraj Atabaki (2001), Azerbaijan. Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran,
London: I.B. Tauris.
74.Fuller (1994), p. 36.
75.David (1991), p. 241.
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nationalism should the Azeris of Iran become dangerously influenced by Turkish
nationalism. If such a scenario materialised, Turkey could be envisaged as
seizing the opportunity to gain control over the Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq in
an attempt to establish an adjoining security zone with Iran's population of Azeri
Turks. Acting to avert such ambitions, Iran discarded the notion of Muslim
brotherhood and aligned itself with Christian Armenia opposing the Muslim
country Azerbaijan.77
One of the main causes for concern for Tehran that emerged in the mid-1990s is
the Turkish-Israeli alliance and a fear that even closer relations between the two
will also increase ties between Baku and Tel Aviv. Tehran believes that the
Turkey-Israel alliance will give Israel an entrance to the Caucasus and especially
to Azerbaijan. As expressed by Robert Olson, 'the last thing Iran wants is Israel
meddling, in co-operation with Turkey, in Azerbaijan and in its own Azeri
question'. 78 This brings back memories of the Ottoman Azerbaijani policy,
which 'produced in Iran the fear of Turkism as the major danger to the state's
unity'.79
 Should Turkey advocate any antagonistic policies along these lines Iran
can respond by using 'the PKK-card', further encourage Islamist currents in
Turkey, and in alliance with Syria affect developments on Turkey's western
flank, such as the Cyprus-issue and developments in the Aegean Sea. In this
respect, the Greek-Armenian-Iranian relations that during the 1990s became
much stronger are significant. In light of a reformed Greek foreign policy and
Turkish capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999, this co-
operation, however, may bear less relevance. Having said that, it is important not
to lose sight of the fact that
there appears to be much closer connection between both Iran's and Turkey's
eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus-Central Asian policies than many analysts
acknowledge. The one area in which both countries have some manoeuvrability is
76.Olson (2001), P. 34.
77.Id. (1994), p. 59.
78.Id. (1998b), p. 19.
79.Swietochowski (1994), p. 121. The author also elaborates on the 'the specifically Azerbaijani
dilemma: historical and religious bonds to Iran, ethnic , linguistic, intellectual and, increasingly,
political links with Turkey'.
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in northern Iraq and that is the reason the jockeying for position and power there
is quite vigorous.80
Iranian fears of Turkish-Azeri co-operation with its potential for bringing serious
repercussions for Iran do not appear to be unwarranted. On a visit to Turkey in
March 2001 Azeri president Aliyev called for the establishment of a Turkish
military base in Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijani officials had previously
voiced similar requests, it was, significantly, the first time such a proclamation
came from the president himself.81
Considering the larger picture of geopolitical and geostrategic concerns facing
Iran and Turkey, it becomes clear what impels the interests both countries have
in Northern Iraq and how developments in the Kurdish region of self-rule affect
their bilateral relations. A high-ranking Turkish security team headed by the
Deputy Turkish Interior Minister arrived in Tehran in late April 2001 for
security talks with Iranian officials. These discussions concerning 'mutual
cooperation and extraterritorial crimes' (with clear reference to the PKK
nuisance) resulted in Turkey's Interior Minister Tantan's follow-up visit to
Tehran where he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with his
Iranian counterpart Moussavi-Lari. The memorandum notably targeted 'specific
acts of terrorism', and the Iran-Turkey High Security Commission set up was
charged with overseeing joint operations in each other's territories. 82 Such
developments indicate that the these two big regional powers are intent on
maintaining cordial relations, since such a policy will best serve their respective
interests. These two powers are, however, not the only countries with an interest
in the affairs of the Iraqi Kurdish self-ruling area, and the following section will
touch upon the most relevant aspects of the interest of other regional actors in
the area.
80.Olson (1998b), p. 20.
81.Tehran Times, 17 March 2001 (author unknown).
82.See for instance Iran News, 10 and 12 May 2001 and Iran Daily, 12 May 2001.
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6.3 Other important actors
6.3.1 Iraq
Those who are part of a state like Iraq are much more esteemed and honoured
than those who live on a tiny and humble part ... Only a small-minded person
would abandon a big clean sea for the sake of a corner or a stagnant canal that is
controlled by foreigners who can deprive him of water whenever they wish.
Saddam Hussein, speaking on Iraqi TV, July 2001
The above statement by the Iraqi president illustrates a frustration with an odd
situation through which a considerable part of the country remains beyond the
control of the central government. As a result of the war over Kuwait, Iraq
became severely restricted by the international community in its ability to
exercise power and influence over the Kurdish north. The much greater
manoeuvrability of Iran and Turkey as regards the area of self-rule shows that
Baghdad's role after unilaterally having withdrawn its administration from Iraqi
Kurdistan in late 1991 has been reduced to such a degree that Iraq could not
compete at the same level as its eastern and northern neighbours concerning the
exercise of power over 'Free Kurdistan'. Hence, Iraq, despite it being the
geographical (and arguably political) framework within which the Iraqi Kurds
operate, will be treated as a minor, although important actor in this analysis.
Iraqi responses to Kurdish nationalism have ranged from genocide, forcible
resettlements and assimilation but also some positive elements of certain cultural
autonomy and political decentralisation have been discernible. All these
strategies were in one shape or another evident in the turbulent months of post-
Gulf crisis. Despite losing control over three of its northern governates following
the forced retreat from Kuwait in 1991, Iraq has not wished to take a back seat to
developments in the autonomous region of Central Kurdistan. Reminiscent of
the two main powers in the region, Baghdad has kept a close eye on the Kurds.
However, in contrast to Iran and especially Turkey, due to the restrictions set by
the international community, Iraq's army and its government have been severely
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limited to intervene in 'Free Kurdistan', knowing heavy retaliation would be the
response to any Iraqi interference in the north.
At an early stage, even when the return of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees was still far
from complete, Saddam Hussein attempted to regain the initiative as he invited a
Kurdish delegation consisting of KDP- as well as PUK-delegates to Baghdad for
negotiations on the future status of Iraqi Kurdistan. 83 This also coincided with
discussions in the United Nations on how to create and maintain secure
conditions for the Kurds within Iraq. The talks in Baghdad, based on the
autonomy agreement of 1970, 84 initially appeared to bear fruit, as it was
announced that President Hussein had agreed in principle to implement the
provisions of the previous peace plan. However, the issue of the frontiers of the
autonomous region remained unresolved, which was the main reason for
Kurdish suspension of further negotiations in the late summer of 1991. The
severance of Kurdish-Iraqi relations generated the Iraqi response of withdrawing
all services from the northern part of the country in October 1991, and in doing
so Baghdad effectively subjected the Kurds to a severe economic blockade.85
This resulted in a situation whereby the Kurds found themselves living under the
economic hardship brought about by a double embargo: the UN embargo on Iraq
coupled with the Iraqi embargo of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Unable to reach his own Kurds, Saddam Hussein adopted the strategy of
supporting the Turkish-Kurdish guerrillas in their struggle against Ankara. The
PKK, which had come to operate largely from the autonomous region, appears
to have been used by Baghdad to pressurise the Turks into closing the border to
'Free Kurdistan', thus isolating the Iraqi Kurds completely. As free and fair
parliamentary elections got under way in the autonomous region, the reaction
generated by such 'illegal' activities was, in Iraq proper, one of fury. Thus when
the democratic process later collapsed amidst intense Kurdish infighting, it was
to the clear delight of Saddam. Throughout the year of 1994, the Iraqi National
Congress, INC, provided mediation and several agreements were reached,
83.Mallet, FT, 26 April, 1991.
84.As outlined in the first chapter, section 1.3.2.
85.Laizer, (1996), p. 46.
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however, they were succeeded by renewed fratricidal fighting. The short-lived
peace accords even impelled Saddam Hussein to action, in offering help from
Baghdad to settle the dispute,86 supposedly with the underlying aim of
reasserting central control over the northern parts of his country.
Not allowed to access the area, the Iraqi army nevertheless marched in,
responding to the unlikely invitation of one of the Kurdish leaders, Masoud
Barzani, in August 1996. Unable to successfully counter the forces of the PUK,
backed by Iranian military power, the KDP requested Iraqi army assistance,
which complicated the situation for the international community on how to react.
International pressure nonetheless made the Iraqis withdraw after only three
days, but even such a brief incursion was sufficient to achieve certain objectives.
A major purpose with the Iraqi invasion was indisputably to destroy the INC
based in 'Free Kurdistan' and the quick, but effective Iraqi attack indeed
constituted a severe blow to the Iraqi opposition groups. These were forced to
flee the region, and the invading army was reported to have held public
executions in Arbil of nearly 100 members of the INC. 87 The short military
alliance also served Baghdad's need to keep the roads and oil-pipelines open
between Iraq proper and Turkey. As for the needs of the KDP later in the
summer of 1996, they were twofold: in addition to the Iran-supported PUK
advancing rapidly on KDP-held areas from the south, Barzani faced Turkish
PKK-motivated plans of extending its border up to 15 miles into Northern Iraq
(incidentally KDP-controlled territory), similar to Israel's security-zone in
southern Lebanon. In the words of Olson, there was risk that 'the Turks would
try to limit the KDP to only a token presence', 88 something that the brief but
forceful military invention from Baghdad may have helped prevent.
As this and previous analyses have shown, the central government of Iraq has
time and again found it necessary to counter the autonomist threat from the
Kurds in order to remain in power, a trend likely to continue should Northern
Iraq be regained by an oppressive Arab regime in Baghdad. Such military
86.Jarrah, MEI, No 492, 20 January 1995.
87.SvD, 8 September, 1996, (author unknown).
88.Olson (2001), p. 20.
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engagement has many times required confronting Iran as the main supporter of
the Iraqi Kurds. Iran alone posed a considerable but manageable external threat
to Iraq. What has made the Iranian forces dangerously unmanageable at times
and may have caused the Iraqis defeat in the Iran-Iraq war had the West not
decisively supported Iraq was Iranian power combined with the massive internal
threat mounted by the Iraqi Kurds. Hence, an external threat may become
pressing if internal factors affect the magnitude of the external threat, which
again proves the point of omnibalancing.
Since Iraqi Kurdistan broke away from the Iraqi body in 1991, Baghdad has
many a time invited the Kurds to renew the dialogue with the central
government and succumb to the leadership of Saddam Hussein. 89 The Iraqi
president frequently addresses 'the abnormal situation' of the autonomous entity
in the north, and voices desires to bring the break-away region under the control
of Baghdad. In July 2001, the Iraqi president spoke extensively of the people in
the area of self-rule before his self-appointed Legislative Council of the
Kurdistan Autonomous Region. 9° The president was adamant that if the Kurds of
the north would determine their political and national future 'their choice will
not be anything but a genuine Iraqi nationalist choice ... because the state of
affairs of our people in Iraq is one, be they Arab or Kurds'. Moreover, his
capability 'resolving any situation that befalls Iraq' has clear implications for the
Kurdish issue, and Saddam regularly stresses Iraqi nationhood remaining the
overriding principle, since 'Basra belongs to the Kurdish people as much as Al-
Sulaymaniyah belongs to people from Al-Najaf'. The unity of the country was,
according to the president, in fact served when the three northern governates
were in all but name separated from the Iraqi body in 1991, as 'we wanted the
Kurdish people to go through this experience so that they can come to realize
who represents them in his conscience, mind, and policies'. In view of this, there
appears to be no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein bides its time and will
act when the time is right.
89.E.g. AFP, 10 March 2000.
90.All the following quotes are from Iraq News, 16 July, 2001, 'Saddam Threatens Kurds, Iraq
TV, July 15', (FBIS Translated Excerpt).
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6.3.2 Syria
Syria's role in the political development of Northern Iraq has not been
particularly pronounced and the country has been a minor actor despite its
geographical location of bordering the autonomous region. It has, however, had
certain leverage, as it since the mid-1990s from time to time has been the only
route in and out of landlocked 'Free Kurdistan'.
In the 1990s, access to water became one of the most pressing political issues for
Damascus, a state of affairs which compelled the Syrians to use the Kurdish
card, i.e. the PICK, in an attempt to force Ankara to adopt a more cooperative
stance on the sharing of the Euphrates-water. As such, coupled with the issue of
water, the regional Kurdish question per se has not stood out in Syrian politics.
In command of its own Kurdish question, Syria has, however, been in a position
to utilise the Kurdish card more freely than Iran and Turkey. Such Syrian
backing of the PKK has naturally impacted on developments in Northern Iraq as
that support has contributed to instability in the area, but any direct Syrian
involvement in the region of self-rule has reached no great heights. Syria may
well have advocated co-operation between the PKK and the ICDP as this, in
Olsons's phrase, would have `provide[d] a potential corridor via northern Iraq
between Syria and [its long-time ally] Iran', 91 a vision Turkey, however, would
not have shared.
Syria may be characterised as a middle ranking power in a penetrated regional
system, as do Ehteshami and Hinnebush (who in this definition also include
Iran), suggesting that it is classed as a middle power in the global system but
represents a key actor in the regional system. Syria is indeed 'distinguishable
from lesser regional powers by ... [its] centrality to the regional power
balance',92 for instance illustrated by its requested participation in the attempted
framework of regional co-operation following the establishment of the Iraqi
Kurdish autonomous entity 1991. However, in the late 1990s, largely as a result
of the consolidation of the alliance between Turkey and Israel (and the role
91 . Olson (2001), p. 25.
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played therein by the USA), Syria's position weakened significantly as in
October 1998 it was forced to expel Abdullah Ocalan in order to avoid a Turkish
declaration of war. President Hafiz al-Asad had ventured to Tehran a few
months earlier in an attempt to reinvigorate his country's ties with the Islamic
Republic,93 in possible preparation for more challenging times, but Iran's own
problems with the Taliban next-door94 meant no tangible support was
forthcoming as Damascus found itself in difficulties in its relations with Ankara.
As it lost its PKK-card, Damascus also lost its foremost political lever against its
powerful northern neighbour, and as a result its position as a middle ranking
power, a key actor in the region, came into question. Indeed, this corresponds
with Olson's concluding remark that 'it wreaks havoc with Syria's ability to be a
major player in the politics of northern Iraq and it lessens Syria's usefulness to
Iran as an ally in the eastern Mediterranean'.95
 Syria's seeking of an
improvement in relations with Iraq96
 can be seen as an attempt to regain some of
its lost regional influence, and such policies may have implications for the
situation in Iraqi Kurdistan.
6.3.3 Israel
Small in size but a political heavyweight on the regional scene, Israel greeted the
post-Kuwait war partitioning of its greatest foe Iraq with profound satisfaction.
Not having such a strong, centralised power in its vicinity holding such
exceptional levels of hostility towards the Jewish state was very much in the
interest of Tel Aviv. In fact, Israel may be the only regional country that has
92.Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997), pp. 6-7.
93.Olson (1998b), p. 19.
94.The killing of eight Iranian diplomats and one journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e
Sharif by advancing Talabani troops brought the two countries to the brink of war in the autumn
of 1998. See Barzin, MEI, No 583, 18 September 1998.
95.Olson (2001), p. 157. An interesting account of Syrian-Iranian relations, characterised by
political rivalry and pragmatic co-operation, is Hussein J. Agha's and Ahmad S. Khalidi's study
Syria and Iran. Rivalry and Cooperation, (1995) London: Pinter (The Royal Institute of
International Affairs).
96.The borders were reopened in 1997. The second Arab head of government to visit Iraq since
1991 (after Jordan in November 2000), Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa Miro arrived
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anything to gain from the dissolution of Iraq and the creation of an independent
Kurdistan.97 Therefore Israeli activities in the autonomous region were not
unexpected.
Similar to other countries involved in the autonomous region, the policy of Israel
is neither clear nor transparent, but that the Kurdish self-ruling region in
Northern Iraq interests Israel in a multi-dimensional way is unmistakable.
Supporting the Kurdish nationalist movement in Northern Iraq consequentially
represents a policy of weakening Iraq and by extension the Arabs. Apart from
these obvious desires to militarily incapacitate Iraq, or at least to severely
decrease the capability of Iraqi Baathists, politically and militarily, a further
reason for Israeli interest in the region may well be gaining access to the Persian
Gulf and its oil resources, and for this purpose the easiest penetration point
would be the semi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq is certainly the weak point
in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf, particularly since Jordan is close to
Israel in relations.
The issue of Northern Iraq has clear links to the ties between Israel and Turkey
and with the increased domain of Israel's influence, which has wider
implications. With the expansion of relations between Turkey and Israel, the
latter can easily through the Turkish security service MIT closely follow and
possibly also influence developments in the autonomous region. In other words,
Israel is certainly present but perhaps not directly.
The Israelis assisted the Iraqi Kurds throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 98 and
following the establishment of the autonomous region in 1991, Israeli
intelligence Mossad was in all likelihood establishing itself there, although no
official contacts have been forged since mid-1970s. Such strategic thinking goes
back to the first years of the establishment of the Jewish state. The first president
in Baghdad in early August 2001, in addition being the first Syrian prime minister to visit Iraq in
20 years. AP, August 11 2001.
97.Russia may also favour such a development, in view of the Soviet support that brought about
and sustained the Iranian-Kurdish Mahabad Republic in 1946.
98.For an interesting and illuminating account of Israel's activities Iraqi Kurdistan during the
1960s and 1970s, see chs 7 and 8 in Jonathan Randal, (1998), Kurdistan. After such knowledge,
what forgiveness?, London: Bloomsbury. See also McDowall (1996), p. 320.
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of Israel, Ben Gurion, advocated strong relations with the non-Arabs in the
region and in the 1960s, good relations characterised Iranian and Israeli
interaction, as well as Israeli-Iraqi Kurdish communications. 99 However, with
the inevitable changes in relations that followed the Islamic Revolution of 1979,
Israeli policy was reformulated to destabilise Iran, just as it had sought the
destabilisation of Arab countries. It must be emphasised here that it is
ideologically in the interest of Israel to dismember a Muslim state, although
ideology when pitted against national interest, as discussed in Iran's foreign
policy-making with regard to Iraqi Kurdistan, often loses out.
The Islamic Republic would accordingly feature in the anti-Muslim strategy of
Israel, and alongside the objective of contributing to the demise of the current
regime in Iraq, Tel Aviv may also use the Kurdish region of self-rule (alongside
Turkish-inhabited Caucasus and Central Asia) as a base from which to monitor
and assess developments in neighbouring Iran. Such Israeli policy of
destabilisation should be seen against the background of the triangular
relationship that has in later years developed between the USA, Turkey and
Israel. 100 The 'Kurdish card' is important in this alliance in its capacity as a
political lever to be used against Iraq but conceivably also Iran. Presently, as the
good ties with Turkey indicate, Israel's policies of developing strong relations
with non-Arabs in region apply to Turkey, seen for instance in the role Israel
supposedly played in finding and capturing PKK-leader ()calm in late 1999.1°1
As Israel sought investment in the Middle East, Turkey with its GAP project
provided great potential, but in exchange for the water Israel was offered, Tel
Aviv had to assist Ankara in its fight against the PKK. Because of its
involvement in the Turkish Kurdish question, Israel landed itself in difficulties
following the February 1999 capture of Ocalan, for which Israeli and American
intelligence services allegedly had been hard at work. When Israeli diplomatic
99.Ofra Bengio has written extensively about this in her The Kurdish Rebellion in Iraq, (1998),
Tel Aviv (publisher unknown).
100.See for instance Jonathan Marcus' analysis 'Middle East's 'phantom alliance", BBC,
February 18, 1999.
1 ° I . Due to their strong military alliance, Israel and Turkey have reportedly provided each other
with intelligence on militant groups - co-operation that suggests Mossad's assistance in tracing
Ocalan. See for instance AP, February 18 1999, and AFP, 19 February 1999.
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missions across Europe were targeted by angry Kurdish mobs with three Kurdish
demonstrators being shot dead at the Israeli consulate in Berlin, such
'unexpected by-products of its improving relations with Turkey /102
 produced
feelings of distress and disbelief in Tel Aviv, as such consequences for the
Jewish state had not been anticipated. The alliance with Turkey certainly made
Israel a present-day actor in Kurdish politics, and the Israelis seemingly have
more to win than lose in this renewed role.1°3
6.3.4 Russia
A former super power but still a major power in the region, Russia's influence
and interests in the Middle East are significant. Russia has good relations with
Iran, Iraq and Syria - all countries with Kurdish populations. The issue of the
Caspian Sea and its gas-deposits with the geostrategic interests it generates, is of
course important, and in seeking a renewed role in the Middle East Russia does
not overlook the autonomous region of Northern Iraq.
For the Russians, the Kurdish card has in the first instance related to the Turkish
Kurds, but as events unfolded, the main arena for Kurdish-related politics, has
indeed been Central Kurdistan. As Turkey militarily as well as politically has
supported the Chechen insurgents in their struggle for independence from Russia
in the early 1990s, Moscow provided the PICK with similar aid - i.e. the Chechen
card pit against the Kurdish card served to bring the Russians into Northern
Iraq. 1 °4 Russia's 'near abroad' foreign policy (denoting Moscow's efforts to
reassert Russian dominance over the former Soviet Union's territories in Central
Asia and the Caucasus) 1 °5
 can thus be seen to connect to Northern Iraq through
Russian support of the PKK.
102.Robins (2000), p 77.
103.This is discussed at length by Olson (2001), pp. 152-55.
104.Id. (1998a), p. 6. Olson further discusses this in his book of 2001, pp. 180-181.
105.This concept is examined in Maxim Shashenkov's Security issues of the ex-Soviet Central
Asian Republics, (1992), London: Brasseys' (for the Centre for Defence Studies). Tiouline also
deals with this issue in his 'Russian Diplomacy: the Problems of Transition' in M. Mozaffari
(ed.), Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (1997), London: Macmillan,
pp. 35-52, as does Philip Roeder (1997), 'From Hierarchy to Hegemony: The Post-Soviet
Security Complex', in David Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building
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An indication of Moscow's interest in the wider geopolitical importance of the
Kurdish question is the following statement of a Russian general in the spring of
1996:
An independent Kurdish state must be created. If we are able to settle the
differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan and draw them to our side, we
would be able to provide the Kurds arms via Armenia: by helping the Kurds, we
help ourselves. ... Turkey within the framework of NATO could control the
Caucasus with an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea. Thanks to the Kurds, we can
prevent thi s . °6
The policy of actively curtailing Turkish expansionist ambitions became more
nuanced towards the end of 1996 when Turkey's Tancu Ciller in the capacity of
Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a trip to Moscow agreed to a 'Protocol of
Co-operation against Terrorism', which in effect meant the cessation of both
countries' military support to the Chechen and Kurdish nationalist causes. 1 °7 A
further sign of Russia forsaking its Kurdish card in order to focus on co-
operative measures regarding the Caspian Sea basin's oil and gas resources,
came when Moscow in late 1998 refused granting Abdullah Ocalan political
asylum.1°8
On the issue of Iraq as a whole, Russia has for some time proclaimed that it is
now appropriate to lift the sanctions on Iraq, 1 °9 which, Moscow envisages,
should be done under international supervision and in line with relevant UN
Security Council resolutions. 11 ° Eager to revive previous Russian-Iraqi co-
operation, Moscow has called for a cessation of the air raids conducted by the
UK and USA in the north and south of the country, and supports the removal of
Security in a New World, University Park Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, PP.
219-244.
106.Quoted in Olson (2001), pp. 182-83.
107.Ibid. --.p 186.
108.An analysis of which is provided by Olson (2001), pp. 201-3.
109.Russia began as early as 1994 to show its support for Iraq, as examined by Anthony
cordesman and Ahmed Hashim (1997), Iraq. Sanctions and Beyond, Boulder, Co: Westview
Press pp. 206-7.
110.In July 2001, for instance, Moscow used its veto to block the UN Security Council decision
on new 'smart sanctions' against Iraq. This may not be unrelated to Russia having been offered
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the no-fly zones. The Russians are not advocates of a pro-Kurdish policy with
regard to the Iraqi Kurds, and a trip to the north by the Russian amb assador to
Iraq in the late 1990s, offering mediation between Baghdad and the Kurds, was
quite likely to have been undertaken at the request of the Iraqi President,'"
6.3.5 The main non-Iraqi Kurdish political groups
The ever-present issue of conflicting interests on an inter-Kurdish level poses
problems, which are difficult to manage for the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Inter-
Kurdish relations have in fact throughout Kurdish history been fraught with
difficulties. Back in the 1960s Mullah Mustafa Barzani sought the mobilisation
of Kurdish organisations all over Kurdistan, to use as a 'strategic resource',
while he at the same time had to control the various groupings from adopting
and promoting their own political agendas and challenging the Iraqi Kurds to the
leadership of the Kurdish national movement.' Such rivalry is still very much
part of Kurdish politics.
With developments in the decade of the post-Kuwait crisis, a new dimension has
added to the overall complexity of the Kurdish problem in Iraq. Until the early
1990s, the 'bipolar' Kurdish conflict of two main opponents, the KDP and the
PUK, was, with the PKK's arrival in 'Free Kurdistan', transformed into a 'three-
cornered conflict'. 113 As the KDP-I also seized the opportunity to operate from
the central power vacuum constituting Northern Iraq, the notion could even be
extended to a 'four-cornered conflict'.
Since the Kurds of the safe haven had to keep the ties with Tehran and Ankara
as intact as they possibly could, friction in political relations with both Iranian
Iraqi oil-deals on very favourable conditions once the sanctions are lifted. See e.g. Hussain
Hindawi, UPI, 10 July 2001 and Jordan Times, July 16 2001.
111 . Gunter (1999), p. 97.
112 , Discussed by Ferhad Ibrahim in his paper 'The Dynamics of Kurdish-Kurdish Relations and
their Relevance for Developments in the 1990s: PKK, PUK and KDP' presented at the
Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and objects of
political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin 9 (1998).
" 3 . Kutschera, The Middle East, November 1995.
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and Turkish Kurds became unavoidable. However, the PKK during the 1990s
was more powerful and assertive than its Iranian counterpart, as the PICK and the
Iraqi Kurds 'each consider themselves to be the leading force in the struggle for
the Kurdish liberation'. 114 The Kurdistan's Workers Party never recognised the
authority of the regional government in Arbil, an attitude that may, in the words
of Sheikhmous, either be 'a result of their narrowminded sectarism and
immaturity or ... [the PICK being] incited by Iran and Syria to destabilise the
situation in Iraqi Kurdistan'. 115 Reacting to such a stance, the Iraqi Kurds have
no wish to jeopardise the very existence of self-rule by taking the side of the
PKK and militarily confronting the Turkish army. With the aim to neutralise the
PKK — at least in military terms, the parliament in Arbil early on made plans for
a coherent Iraqi Kurdish military operation. The PICK was put on the defensive
in Northern Iraq, but Ocalan made progress during 1993 when relations with the
PUK became cordial. As the conflict between the ICDP and the PUK exploded
into full-scale warfare, the PKK remained close to the PUK. 11 6
The Iraqi-Kurdish infighting in the mid-1990s had the effect of the PICK
cementing its positions in the area, bringing the wrath of the Turkish army upon
the fragile autonomous entity, which, as previously examined, happened on a
massive scale in the spring of 1995. Although the KDP and frequently also the
PUK consider the PKK a terrorist organisation that should not be allowed to
roam freely in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is the KDP that has had to tackle the problem
head on in its capacity of controlling the northernmost areas of the autonomous
region, i.e. the Turkish borders. This has caused violent clashes with the PICK on
a number of occasions.
The PKK was the main loser when the Iraqi Kurds finally agreed to put an end
to their war, and the PUK, as a result of the Washington Agreement in 1998,
closed down offices and bases of its former ally in the southern parts of the
autonomous region. Turkish army officers were even allowed into PUK-
114. Id. (1994).
115 , Sheilchmous (1999), p. 62.
116 . 'bid. pp. 63-64.
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controlled territory in order to inspect the results of the operations, 117 Yet, the
agreement reached in Washington did not resolve the PICK-issue between the
two Iraqi Kurdish antagonists.118
The near dissolution of the PKK after the capture and imprisonment of its leader
in 1999 had effects also on developments in Northern Iraq. Following the
surrender of most the movement's militia on the orders of the imprisoned
Abdullah Ocalan, a remaining group of a few thousand zealous PKK fighters in
the borderlands of Turkish/Iranian/Iraqi Kurdistan came to represent a true
Jacobin movement, determined to impose their aims at whatever cost, in line
with the conviction that the end justifies the means. The response of the Turkish
government, on the other hand, to former PKK-members pursuing cultural rights
for the Kurds of Turkey through political approaches has been repeating its
mantra that it intends not to negotiate with the PICK. Instead the Turkish forces
were to intensify their efforts to neutralise the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and
military operations involving the KDP, the PUK and the Turkish army have
continued into the new decade, largely on the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan.'
The KDP-I has for geopolitical reasons enjoyed closer relations with the PUK
than the KDP, predictably as the latter over long periods of time in the 1980s co-
operated with the Iranian forces in Tehran's fight against the insurgents in
Iranian Kurdistan. The PUK then sympathetically provided the KDP-I's
leadership with a safe haven within its territory where the latter also put up
bases. 12° The protection offered by the PUK did, however, have its limits and
when the Iranian army made its military incursions into Northern Iraq in the
early and mid-1990s, the KPD-I was again left vulnerable to Iranian military
might.
After having examined the actions of these different players on the regional
scene, the focus will now shift to actors on the global level, and there will be an
117.Owen Bowcott, The Guardian, February 14 1999.
118.The KDP claims that the PUK failed to properly close all the PICK offices in Suleymaniya: in
the words of Mr Rahman 'they just took off the banners, and the people are still there' (London,
1999).
119.As for instance in the late summer of 2001, see Reuters, 27 August, 2001.
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attempt to examine how the policies of such international powers and bodies as
the European Union, the USA and the United Nations have shaped the Kurdish
scene in Northern Iraq.
120 . As explained by Mr. Valadbeighi, Tehran, 2001.
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Chapter 7: Iraqi Kurdistan in the Global Arena
7.1 The dynamics of relations
As established in the previous chapter, regional stability and the preservation of
the state system are primary goals for most actors in the Middle East. A system-
destabilising confrontation in the region is likely to serve Kurdish interests rather
than those of the remaining superpower, the international community or the
regional powers. Moreover, internal politics in the countries surrounding the
Iraqi Kurdish self-ruling area have often had a direct effect on the autonomous
region. As an issue embedded in the characteristically conflictual relationships
between Turks, Persians, and Arabs, its permanent settlement is likely to depend
heavily on progress in relations between these countries, in combination with
interests of global powers. As history bears witness, any solution would be
highly vulnerable to interference if the neighbours or other influential countries
were at odds.
With Iraqi Kurdistan as the focal point, Figure 7.1 - The Dynamics of Relations
over Iraqi Kurdistan - attempts to establish the present lines of tension and co-
operation in the region, with an emphasis on a constant fluctuation in relations.
As previously indicated, regional relations are not represented by static
formations of alliances and rigid policies. The chart features inter-Kurdish
relations at the centre (only the two main actors in Iraqi Kurdish politics are
considered here) surrounded by regional as well as global powers. While the
PUK and the KDP alike try to maintain cordial relations with Iran and Turkey
respectively, in addition to keeping Damascus well disposed towards the
Kurdish self-ruling area, Baghdad never becomes discarded as a negotiating
partner. All these relationships are, however, as the chart indicates, delicately
balanced and easily disturbed by conflicts. Israel certainly is a regional player,
but since it does not border the autonomous region and hence does not directly
affect developments there, the Jewish state is in this figure pictured as an
external player, along with the USA and Russia. Another reason for Israel's
external position is that it has no direct dealings with either the PUK or the KDP,
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and it enjoys positive relations with only one regional state in this chart, namely
Turkey. The EU has been allowed to take a neutral position.
The chart further shows how the external actor the USA, through its entering
into a collaborative arrangement with the regional actors Turkey and Israel,
affects and influences the political development of Northern Iraq. This alliance
often reinforces Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Iraqi Kurds, but it also appears
that Ankara occasionally is at the receiving end of American pressure in
enforcing the will of Washington on the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Syrian-
American relations are far from cordial, but it is mainly Iraq and Iran with whom
the US maintains adversarial relationships — both seeking dominant positions in
the region. Meanwhile, Russia (with the perceived ambition to step into the
shoes of the former USSR) is anxious to counter US policies in the Middle East
and energetically tries to balance the American presence, most notably in and
around the Caspian Sea basin. As elaborated on above, there are clear parallels
to the situation in Northern Iraq, and the strategic importance of the Kurdish area
of self-rule to a certain extent lies in how it can best be utilised in order exert
influence in the wider region and control of the valuable natural resources.
As Figure 7.1 clearly shows, the autonomous region in Northern Iraq is largely
characterised by political instability, and it represents a situation where a conflict
in the centre tends to exacerbate others in the immediate neighbourhood. There
are numerous examples presented above to support this theory: briefly, the
outbreak of KDP-PUK hostilities in mid-1994 served to increase the presence of
the PKK in the area of self-rule, which invited many Turkish invasions of the
autonomous region. Iran invaded Northern Iraq most notably in 1996 in pursuit
of KDP-I Kurds who were acting from Iraqi Kurdish territory. Moreover, when
the KDP needed backing in face of Iranian military assistance to PUK, the Iraqi
army was invited in — action that Baghdad was subsequently disciplined for, as
Washington retaliated by bombing southern Iraq. Political developments in Iraqi
Kurdistan never fail to produce reverberations in the surrounding area and
therefore the ensuing dynamics of relations, in alternating between tension and
co-operation, are fascinating to observe. One may even draw the conclusion that
Iraqi Kurdistan in its current form is a conflict enhancer.
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7.2 The remaining superpower
Ever since President Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of the First World War
presented his 'Fourteen Points', which incorporated pledges for Kurdish
autonomy, the Kurds have looked to the USA to deliver a solution to injustices
inflicted in the past.
US policy-making on the Kurdish issue in Iraq is particularly interesting when
evaluating Kurdish politics over the past four decades. The role of the US was a
prominent factor in the 1970s revolt as well as the 1990s' uprising, in so far as
vital support was withdrawn in 1975 and military assistance was not
forthcoming in 1991. After 1975 the Kurds were hardly recognised up until the
1990s, when the USA needed a power base in the Middle East. The good
relations previously enjoyed with Iran were abruptly brought to an end with the
Islamic Revolution in 1979, and with that an important political and military
outpost for the Americans in the region disappeared. Following this, Washington
largely supported Iraq, a relationship in which certain influence was exerted in
return for substantial financial support for the war with Iran. When seeking an
oppositional foothold in the region, Northern Iraq provided an ideal venue for
extra-regional forces, as it was utilised by the USA until 1996 when Washington
withdrew its large intelligence operation from the area of self-rule.
7.2.1 American policies regarding Northern Iraq
At the end of the Kuwait War the USA made itself unpopular among the people
of Iraq when it failed to prevent Baghdad's crack down on the Iraqi insurgents
heeding America's call to overthrow the dictatorial Baathist regime.
Washington's shifting policy-making on the issue is remarkable. The policy of
the US government appeared to have been rapidly altered in a profound way:
preventing the disintegration of Iraq came to supersede the initial aim of ousting
Saddam Hussein from power. It was claimed that active support for the
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rebellions would have constituted unjustified interference in the internal affairs
of Iraq, signifying American acquiescence of the Iraqi military operations.'
Following the announcement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 688, Washington took charge of the nascent Operation Provide
Comfort (OPC), a protective shield formed in order to provide aid to the
refugees (named in a positive fashion in a conventional effort to legitimise the
intervention). This initiative was, however, regarded as too little too late, and as
Frelick states, 'the assistance that did arrive was as much to shore up U.S.
alliances with friendly governments as to assist the refugees'. 2
 The UNSC did
not formally decide on such humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq in favour
of the Kurdish refugees. Western powers, in referring to Resolution 688 as the
legal foundation, intervened on their own initiative, and the UNSC never took
the legality of the intervention under consideration.
The OPC coalition withdrew from Northern Iraq in mid-July 1991, and despite
Washington's previous reservations regarding interference in Iraq's internal
affairs, the United States began promoting the idea of a no-fly zone in Northern
Iraq. While providing part of the rationale for the no-fly zones, it is debateable
whether Resolution 688, as interpreted by the United States approved of military
intervention in Northern Iraq in order to protect the Kurds from 'the repression
in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorites'. 3 Nonetheless, acting under
Resolution 688, a new security regime - Operation Poised Hammer (OPH) - an
air patrolling operation above the 36 th parallel, was established, amidst serious
criticism from several members of the UN. 4 This no-fly zone had been
formulated in tight co-operation with Turkey, from whose soil the air
surveillance operations were carried out. In view of the opposition from the UN
to Washington's actions in Northern Iraq, it is worth noting in passing that the
I . Rather, the reason appears to have been Washington's fear of the break-up of the country
amidst an Islamic radicalisation of the Iraqi Shiites promoted by Iran. See Faleh `Abd al-Jabbar's
'Why the Intifada failed' in Fran Hazelton (ed.) (1994), Iraq Since the Gulf War. Prospecs for
Democracy, London: Zed Books, pp. 97-117.
2 , Frelick (1993), pp. 33-34.
3.Paragraph 4 of UNSC Resolution 688, 5 April 1991. For the full text of all UNSC Resolutions,
see the UN Documentation Centre at http://www.un.org/documents/.
4.O'Balance (1996), p. 193.
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remaining superpower has had far from a relationship free of friction with the
world organisation, particularly in the post-Cold War era. America has often
given the impression that while Washington is the decision-maker, the UN, at
best, is there to serve as its parliament.5
The dependence on Turkish permission made the OPH vulnerable from the start,
since it `subordinate[d] US policy towards the Iraqi Kurds to short-term Turkish
domestic considerations'. 6 Indeed, as a former Secretary of State noted, without
producing a genuine strategy with a clear political framework 'America was ...
building its anti-Saddam base on shaky foundations, because it had not reached a
political understanding with Turkey about autonomy for northern Traq'. 7 This
favourable arrangement for Ankara enabled the Turkish generals to impose
conditions on specific military operations.
Mainly due to the KDP's short-lived alliance with Baghdad, 8 the OPH was
brought to an end in December 1996. The fact that Barzani had proved willing to
invite Saddam Hussein and his army back into their self-rule was a severe blow
to the allied commitment to protect the Kurds, and for Washington it provided
the pretext to scale down the operation, as long argued for by its main ally
Turkey. The fate of the OPH certainly does not appear to have been unrelated to
the American failure to take decisive action to safeguard its interests on the
ground when the Iraqi army invaded in August 1996, and the Iraqis had little
trouble finding the CIA-financed Arbil-based Iraqi opposition.
The OPH was replaced by a new surveillance system in January 1997, Operation
Northern Watch, restricted to aerial reconnaissance at Ankara's insistence and
operated by the Americans and Turks with only symbolic European participation
from Britain. 9 Whether in its current shape or possibly replaced by yet another
system of monitoring and protecting the north of Iraq, such an undertaking is
5.The adversarial US-UN relations of the first half of the 1990s are dealt with in detail by former
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his book Unvanquished. A U.S. — UN. Saga,
London: I.B. Tauris (1999).
6.Whitely (1995), p. 145.
7.Kissinger, H., The Daily Telegraph, 8 October, 1996.
8.As outlined in chapter one, section 1.5.3.
9. Gunter (1999), p. 88.
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expected to continue for some time to come. This is underlined by Washington's
continued insistence on the implementation of its interpretation of Resolution
688.1°
Events of the 1990s clearly indicated that the US had struck a deal with Turkey
over the Kurdish question, in which it makes the distinction between 'good
Kurds' (with reference to the Iraqi Kurds) and 'bad Kurds' (denoting the Kurds
of Turkey). Because of American animosity against Saddam Hussein's regime,
and its continued air surveillance protection over Central Kurdistan, the Iraqi
Kurds have come to enjoy a certain amount of US support. However, throughout
the 1990s, Washington was one of very few countries giving Ankara support for
the frequent Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq, outside intervention the
Americans with their presence essentially were supposed to be protecting the
Kurds from. With such selective application of the no-fly zone, the Iraqi Kurds
were not as protected as previously led to believe. Moreover, in exchange for
assisting Turkey in the capture of Ocalan 1999 and standing firm in its
condemnation of the Kurdish terrorist leader, 11
 the US surely secured further
access to the Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey from which it directs its
surveillance flights over Northern Iraq.12
Washington organised several peace conferences during the mid-1990s
attempting to reconcile Barzani and Talabani, but a permanent cessation of
fighting was not achieved until September 1998. Such American efforts to
reconcile Barzani and Talabani could in all probability be attributed to
Washington's desire for both leaders to pose a fresh united challenge to Saddam
Hussein's regime.
I °. Ibid. p. 108.
II . Although 'direct involvement' in the capture of the PICK-leader was denied, Washington
acknowledged engaging in 'extensive diplomatic efforts' to secure Ocalan's arrest and transfer to
Turkey. See Arshad Mohammed for Reuters, February 16 1999.
12 . See MEI, No 594, 26 February 1999.
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7.2.2 The policy of 'dual containment' and the Iraqi Kurds
A major element of Washington's Middle East policies has been that of 'dual
containment' of Iraq and Iran (the two states in the Gulf area that present a
perceived threat to US interests), a policy in which the Iraqi Kurds naturally
feature. Although the United States has engaged in containment politics since
the middle of the twentieth century (with the most prominent feature of post-
1945 American foreign policy being the containment of communism), the US
practice of 'dual containment' came to signify a new phase of American foreign
policy-making in the Middle East. Meant to be an 'offensive' containment in
neutralising Iran and Iraq - using instruments such as economic sanctions, arms
embargoes and political isolation — it was product of the Clinton Administration,
announced in May 1993. 13 Previous attempts to try to balance these two regional
powers against each other had been both venturesome and had demanded a high
level of military capacity, insofar as one was built up in order to counter the
other. Such policies were now replaced by a new formula, where simultaneously
containing the threats posed by Iran and Iraq would facilitate the promoting of
peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This policy was supposedly also
meant to be in conformity with UNSC resolutions.
This policy has not been without flaws. Since Iraq was heavily sanctioned at the
time when US 'dual containment' came into effect, Iran grew progressively
stronger in relation to its neighbour, much to American dismay. In order to
regulate this unsatisfactory state of affairs - namely an imbalance in favour of
Iran - the United States implemented an extensive trade ban in May 1995, the
D'Amato Law, in order to isolate Iran to virtually the same degree as Iraq. In
other words, the US sought to establish a power balance in which Iran's status
was conditioned by that of Iraq.
It is questionable whether the US in its efforts to preserve regional stability has
been addressing the right problem. Although stronger than Iraq, Iran does not
seem to possess the strategic capabilities needed to present a clear danger to
13 . Drake (1994).
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America's interests in the area, regardless of how radical its policies might have
been. One could argue in favour of the 'dual containment' policy, since Iran's
influence in North Africa and the Arab Middle East during this period has
declined. However, such an assessment is most likely a misconception, because
on closer examination it appears to be rather the result of a change in Tehran's
strategic priorities, that is, shifting its foreign and economic policy-making
priorities towards Asia, and away from the Arab lands.
Clearly this US policy of dually containing Iran and Iraq has not proved to be
satisfactory in offering a solution to the problems faced by the Americans in the
Gulf region. Even senior policy-makers in high-level government services have
acknowledged that a more nuanced approach is seriously needed. I4 However,
despite criticism both domestically and internationally, 'dual containment' may
go on for some time to come, although the policy has lost most of its previous
(although limited) impact. George W. Bush recently renewed the trade and
investment ban on Iran, 15 but the Islamic Republic, clearly in the process of
reasserting itself in the Gulf region, has for all intents and purposes escaped
Washington's containment politics through its improvement of relations with
Saudi Arabia and many Gulf states.
Although the current Administration does not use the term 'dual containment', it
is equally committed to it, as was former Democrat President Clinton. In his
State of Union address in late January 2002, President Bush singled out three
countries as constituting threats to the international system, two of which have
been targeted for almost a decade through policies of containment.I6
'Dual containment' has provided much of the framework for US policies in the
region, including the Kurdish situation in Northern Iraq. For instance, when
America perceived Iran trying to break out of its regional isolation brought about
by 'dual containment', for instance by brokering peace between the warring
14.Brzezinsky, Scowcroft and Murphy (1997).
15.This law, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, was widely expected to have come to an end in
August 2001 as reported by Beverly Rudy, among others: 'Fresh thinking on Capitol Hill',
MEED, 6 April 2001.
16.George W. Bush's State of the Union address can be found at
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Iraqi Kurdish factions in the summer of 1995, Washington stepped in to counter
Iranian influence and organised (what proved to be) unsuccessful peace talks in
Ireland in August 1995. These were followed up a year later in London, arguably
largely a response to the brief Iranian incursion into Northern Iraq in July 1996.
Responding to Iraqi disobedience in violating the non-trespassable 36 th parallel
in August 1996 and in doing so disrupting its containment, the US launched a
series of air missile attacks against military targets in southern Iraq the following
month. The relatively minor nature of this attack, however, did not do much to
diminish the considerable success of the Iraqi military operation. The fact that
the USA had been unable to shore up support for military action against Iraq
from its former allies, particularly in the Arab World, was moreover seen as a
great victory for Baghdad, and a diplomatic humiliation for the superpower.
The failure of 'dual containment' can in part be attributed to developments in
Central Kurdistan. As stated above, Turkey found itself forced to collaborate
with Iran in order to regain its full capacity to deal effectively with the PICK and
Kurdish nationalism. Hence 'Ankara's geopolitic need to contain the PICK ...
thus allowed Iran to put a dent in the "dual containment" policy that the US was
implementing to restrain it'. 17 Washington had to accept that its geostrategic
policies were disrupted by a middle level regional power opting for cooperation
with its regional competitor over the Kurdish issue.
Today's world is one in which polarisation is extremely hazardous and where
isolation can easily lead to an even more adverse development. In order to be
effective, an isolation policy requires the international community to be firmly
united, in itself exceedingly difficult. Consequently, the best solution may be to
try to combine more severe measures with flexibility, perhaps promoting a two-
way model: to decide upon sanctions, but delay in executing them, which can act
as a deterrent. After all, 'in a globalised world sanctions have only a limited
effect'.18
http://www.time.comitime/2002/stateoftheunion/index.html.
17.Olson (2001), p. 21.
18.Schafer (1996).
268
7.3 The European Union
The European Union has a desire to assert its identity on the international
political scene, and, as established in the first chapter, it was the Europeans, led
by Britain, I9
 acting on a Turkish proposal, who advocated the establishment of
an UN-supervised region for the Kurds in Northern Iraq following the exodus in
the spring of 1991. This reflects a recognition of the fact that in geopolitical and
geostrategic terms it is vital for the EU to stay engaged in many issues of the
Middle East, since it is not a remote region for the Europeans, but one that is
historically, politically and economically linked to Europe.
7.3.1 Toward a common foreign policy - conflict and compromise
The institutional framework of the Union naturally lacks the solid base of
legitimacy and authority on which a national policy process normally rests, and
its multicultural and multilevel character has throughout the years constituted an
obstacle in formulating and implementing decisions on a European level. The
two institutions in the European Union that play dominant policy roles are the
Commission and the Council of Ministers. The former handles preparation of
proposals, whereas the latter serves as a forum for negotiation and legislation.
The European Parliament has only restricted powers in the policy-making
process, but it does have the ability to influence the policy choices made at
higher levels.20
19.With Iraq being its post-WW1 Mandate, Britain has a special connection to its former client
state of Iraq. Stephen Pelletiere has vividly described London's historical role in dealing with the
Kurds of Mosul velayat: what later became Northern Iraq. See (1984), pp. 58-68.
20.Wallace (1996), pp. 54-57. Moreover, for an account of the European Parliament's position
on the Kurds, see Ozan Ceyhun's 'Die EU und die Kurdenfrage' ['The EU and the Kurdish
question] in Kurdisches Forum in Deutschland (1999), Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und
Pespektiven. Ergebnisse einer Internationalen Tagung 1999 in Berlin [Iraqi Kurdistan: Status
and Perspectives. Proceedings from an International Conference in 1999 in Berlin], Berlin:
Awadani, pp. 137-139.
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Interests and self-interests are important factors in the EU policy process and the
concept of a European interest is very pragmatic and flexible. There have
always been considerable disagreements on which kinds of interests carry the
greater importance and how and why interests are defined in certain ways. A
European regional interest is compounded of the national interests of the
member states, and due to its different nature and character, it cannot be defined
in the same way as the traditional national interest. The European policy arena
symbolises a metaphorical tussle between the self-interests of the member states
and pressures for the desired overall European sphere of influence, and 'it is
rarely certain that the outcome of the policy dialogue will produce a clear and
consistent line of policy amenable to a sustained collective regime'. 21 It seems
that in politically uncertain times or when internal problems become too
complicated for a member state to solve on its own, there is a tendency to
identify more closely with a common interest, an overall European regional
interest.22 A European-level group interest is therefore neither continuous nor
permanent in nature.
The European Union conducts a large share of world trade and is an economic
giant. In spite of that, it was for a long time not able, or willing, to match this
economic power in the political sphere, where it is still very much a pygmy.23
This antithesis may to a certain degree be explained by the reality that until
fairly recently, foreign policy did not form part of the Union's area of
responsibility. The occasional co-ordination of foreign policies of individual
member states, however, developed into a growing awareness of the general
interest in converging positions and establishing joint action on foreign policy
matters.
The intergovernmental mechanism constituting the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) as found in the provisions of the Single European Act
represented the first European attempt to provide an overall direction to the
member countries' foreign policies. With its focus on 'quiet, long-term,
21.Wallace (1996), p. 28.
22.Ifestos (1987) elaborates on this: p. 112.
23.Using Wistricht's antonyms: (1994), p. 142.
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preventive diplomacy', the EPC demonstrated considerable shortcomings when
dealing with critical situations, although it tended to `exibit an action-reaction
cycle in which setbacks bring forth renewed efforts at cooperation'. 24 The
Middle East was a most important policy area within EPC, as demonstrated by
the October War of 1973, which led to the first common declaration being
issued. The outbreak of the war produced an EPC response that was initially
both vague and fragmented. A common declaration was, however, eventually
announced: a call for a ceasefire, followed by an appeal to Israel to withdraw to
pre-1967 borders and respect the rights of the Palestinians. 25 This EPC initiative
came to pave the way for the subsequent Euro-Arab Dialogue, initiated in late
1973 in response to Arab requests.
As the EPC, in the words of Christopher Hill , was not 'particularly well-suited
to handling international crises', 26 the need for a more comprehensive policy
became all too clear during the Gulf crisis from August 1990 to February 1991,
when the member states were individually active but collectively passive. The
idea to co-ordinate national foreign policies of individual member states has
been thoroughly debated and was finally incorporated in the 1991 Treaty on
European Union (aka the Maastricht Treaty), entered into force in 1993. Its
Article J affirmed the establishment of a common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) intended to mould the 12 (now 15) individual sets of foreign and
security policies into one. Instead of seeking the coordination of member states'
foreign policies as the EPC did, the CFSP emphasises the definition of a
common policy. As a result, the member states became obliged to conform to the
common positions taken in relevant foreign and security matters, which were to
be defined by the Council of Ministers.27
The proposed objectives of the CFSP as set forward in the Mastricht Treaty
included safeguarding common values, fundamental interests and independence
of the European Union, strengthening the security of the Union and its Member
States, preserving peace and reinforce international security, promoting
24.Hill (1992), pp. 135-136.
25.Soetendorp (1999), pp. 101-102.
26.Hill (1992), p. 145.
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international co-operation, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule
of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 28 These
objectives were to be pursued 'by establishing systematic co-operation between
Member States in the conduct of policy ... [and] gradually implementing ... joint
action in the areas in which the Member States have essential interests in
common'.29 It is debatable whether this constitutes a solid framework within
which a credible policy-making process can progressively develop, and indeed,
the progress made in regard to the development of the CFSP is slow. The 15
member states of the Union often differ in deciding which attitudes and policies
are most suitable to pursue, and harmonising these various and sometimes
incompatible views to formulate a sound and sustainable EU policy is a
formidable challenge. In spite of the difficulties, Maastricht's CFSP marked a
promising start to the EU's future ambitions.3°
Steps towards a European federation have been taken rather carefully since
efforts to maximise influence through common action inevitably clash with
concern for the preservation of national sovereignty. A common foreign policy
by definition entails a loss of sovereignty on behalf of the member states
concerned, and the Union thus faces difficulties on several levels in its foreign
policy-making. Attempting to reach a compromise with a degree of substance
when negotiating a common position on an important issue is a challenging task,
and one that is made more difficult when coupled with the desire to define its
political role in a precise and clear manner. Given the fact that considerable time
and effort has to be devoted by all member states merely to reach the first stage,
the end product emerging may be that of instead of speaking with one voice,
Europe has been left without any voice at all. Indeed, under certain
circumstances, the Europeans proved most resourceful when they acted
separately, although such resourcefulness was not always a result of constructive
approaches. In the early days of the CFSP there may also have been an
27.For a presentation on the CFSP see http://ue.eu.int/pesedefault.asp.
28.Rummel (1992), p. 326.
29.Ibid.
317 . For an interesting discussion on the CFSP see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999),
The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge, pp. 179-193.
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underlying desire of each member state to give the appearance of being
resourceful in the absence of a united front on issues of European interest.
Despite the fact that the EU is not speaking unambiguously with one voice, the
policy of 'critical/comprehensive dialogue' as pursued in relation to Iran has
shown that the EU member states are capable of international dealings as a
European unit and have the ability to act in a unified manner. Nevertheless, the
joint declarations have always been preceded by considerable negotiation and
compromise - predictably the result of attempts to merge several strong opinions
into a single posture. Consequently, the voice of the European Union has not
always managed to resound more forcefully than individual voices of member
states. However, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, the past alone does not
determine the future, and the European Union has great potential in the foreign
policy arena, which is far from fully explored.
It is encouraging that in recent times the EU has shown determination and forged
ahead with its CFSP. In the spring of 2001, for instance, the Union spoke
forcefully with one voice and made a considerable contribution to defuse the
explosive situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
through long-term engagement characterised by a combination of preventive
diplomacy and regional integration. 31 Moreover, in January 2002, the EU was
considering employing 'targeted sanctions' against Zimbabwe, whose president
Robert Mugabe was acting in a manner inconsistent with international norms.
The Europeans also sought to co-ordinate action with Washington, an unusual
display of concerted political action by the EU member states. 32 These signs are
promising and signify a positive trend for the further development of the CFSP.
7.3.2 The EU in the Middle East
31.Press release issued following the EU Foreign Minister General Affairs Council meeting on
11 June 2001 on www.eu2001.se .
32.See for instance BBC interview with Foreign Office Minister Peter HaM 27 January 2001 at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/otriintext/20000409_int_2.html.
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West European security and prosperity are largely dependent on political
developments in the Middle East. However, it is important to stress that some
EU states are less vulnerable than others in economic terms. Great Britain, for
instance, because of the North Sea oil production and reserves, is less dependent
than, say, Germany and France, who continue to rely heavily on Middle East oil.
This has inevitably led to tensions and disagreements when it comes to co-
ordinating a common EU policy towards the region, and introducing a multi-
lateral dimension in relations between the parties.
When elaborating on future EU action on the Kurdish question, it may be useful
to make a reference to former policies in the region, such as the 'Euro-Arab
dialogue', in which the Arab side constituted the Arab League's twenty-one
member states. Within the framework of the EPC with its main capacity to issue
declarations and initiate dialogues, this specific discourse was initiated in the
early 1970s in order to improve relations between Europe and the Arab world
and to promote mutual understanding. Co-operation between the two sides was
also promoted in areas such as development, trade and culture - some basic
characteristics shared with the EU dialogue policy with the Islamic Republic of
Iran of the 1990s. The Euro-Arab dialogue carried on throughout the 1970s, but
inter-Arab rivalries largely resulting from Egypt's exclusion from the League
after signing the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel brought it to a standstill
in the following decade. Eventually the Europeans sought more rewarding and
worthwhile talks among other organisations, like the Gulf Co-operation Council
(GCC).
In addition to the Euro-Arab Dialogue, there have been bilateral and multilateral
co-operation agreements, e.g. the Mediterranean polices, as well as multilevel
relations between EU member states and regional states, e.g. the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). The latter is closely
linked to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
Proposed in 1990 by North African and east Mediterranean countries, its central
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concern is to establish a stable system of regional co-operation through which it
aims to maintain Mediterranean security.33
The first EC attempts to formalise its relations with the Arab countries of the
Mediterranean date back to the early 1970s, when the EC initiated a series of
wide-ranging co-operation agreements with North African and east
Mediterranean countries. Aiming to create a free trade zone, these pacts were
based on a series of preferential tariff concessions of both industrial and
agricultural items. Included were also provisions for EC aid. 34 Building on this,
in 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean partnership project was launched, tying the
EU's 15 member states to 12 southern Mediterranean countries. In order to
preserve peace, security and stability in the region, the aim is to create a new
political and economic area by 2010 based on free trade and closer co-operation
in areas of energy, water and immigration, but also on the level of regional
politics.35
For long it appeared that issues of foreign policy relevance dividing the EU were
of greater significance than issues leading to a common attitude. However, in
contrast, EU relations with Iran, as mentioned above, are particularly interesting,
since despite occasional outbursts of dissension from various member states, it
has proved to be one of few major issues on which the Union has managed to
adopt a joint and unified position. Indeed, the EU's policy of constructive
engagement with Iran, which began as a 'critical dialogue' and was later
transformed into a 'comprehensive dialogue', is likely to in the long-term future
prove positive for the Kurds, as this rapprochement encourages democracy in
Iran, a development that is likely to affect the rest of a region in which the Kurds
would be main beneficiaries.
The Kurdish question has indeed been recognised by the EU, and it is mainly in
Brussels' relations with Turkey, who for long has sought membership in the
European Union, that the Kurds constitute an important factor. In 1999 the EU
33.Niblock (1993), pp. 251-255.
34.Islam (1988), p. 69.
35.Marks (1995), p. 2.
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granted Turkey candidate status, on the condition that Ankara meets the political
and human rights requirements for E.U. membership — the so-called Copenhagen
criteria - before actual negotiations for membership begin. The implementation
of a great deal of social reforms is deemed necessary, and when the EU demand
measures to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for
and protection of minorities, the Kurds are the first to benefit. In fact, granting
greater cultural rights to the Kurds of Turkey is one of the prerequisites set by
the EU to start accession talks with Ankara. 36 However, relations have not been
free of friction. EU plans to fund a newspaper in Kurdish has angered the Turks
as has Brussels' refusal to brand the PKK a terrorist organisation, which Turkish
pressure brought about in Britain and the USA. 37 It is, however, much due to EU
involvement and insistence that 80 years of Kemalist policies now show signs of
changing. Teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish could not have been brought up
for discussion prior to the signing of the 'Accession Partnership Agreement'
document three years ago. Now there are unprecedented levels of public debate
on the issue, which even include suggestions from the liberal wing of the
Turkish political establishment that the PICK should be allowed to transform into
a political party.38
The EU has indeed had a significant role in championing Kurdish rights and
concerning Northern Iraq, the EU could gradually deepen its engagement
beyond that of provision of aid. Brussels role has been mainly that of providing
funding — through principally the European Commission Humanitarian Office
(ECHO) and the European Agency for Reconstruction- for the many NGOs that
are active in the area of self-rule, while abstaining from taking any political
initiatives.
In a post-Saddam Iraq the EU has an important role to fill as it more than many
other international organisations or group of countries, could present itself as an
honest broker in a post-Saddam Iraq. The EU is a model for regional co-
operation and integration, and as such represents a model for peace-making.
36.Jean-Christophe Peuch, Radio Free Europe, 15 March 2002.
37.Nicholas Birch, Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2002.
38.Mohammad Noureddine, Daily Star (Beirut), March 12, 2002.
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Even though European integration is somewhat different from the type of
integration necessary to be undertaken in Iraq between Kurds and Arabs, 39 the
Europeans are nevertheless useful in the capacity of promoting their experiences
in integration in the process of achieving a sustainable peaceful co-existence
between the two nations-as-people constituting Iraq.
Notably, the Euro-Arab dialogue was not established as being a framework for
solving the Arab-Israeli issue, although it was intended to serve also as a forum
on political matters. Just as the Arabs hoped the dialogue would encourage the
Europeans to a greater involvement and understanding of the Palestine problem,
a Euro-Kurdish dialogue may bring the Europeans closer to the core of the
Kurdish issue. The Kurds admittedly suffer politically from a lack of internal
unity, but with an initial focus on Iraqi Kurdistan, the EU may find it beneficial
to proceed more proactively and make the political gesture to approach the
Kurds as an important unit.
Reaching a settlement to a question such as the Kurdish in a region such as the
Middle East requires the presence of a balancing power in the mediating and/or
negotiating position, preferably one that is detached from the parties to the
conflict.40 The European Union with its unique combination of supranational and
intergovernmental structures appears to be a power establishment well suited to
playing a leading role in conflict-resolution concerning Iraq and its Kurds. As a
distinctive formation that combines the two concepts of sovereignty and
federalism, the influence of the EU is bound to grow, however, slowly.
Considering its strategic and important position, the EU certainly has a greater
role to play in the Middle East, and as opposed to the Americans, the Europeans
could successfully capitalise on their perceived neutrality in dealing with issues
of an explosive character in the region. However, it is not realistic to leave the
remaining superpower out of the equation. Indeed, transatlantic relations were
discussed at length at the summit of the European Council in June 2001,
39.This is further elaborated on in the ensuing concluding chapter 8, Prospects.
40.Countering American acquiescence on the matter, there have been many EU declarations on
Turkish interventions in Northern Iraq in the 1990s in which the EU has stressed that a solution
to the Kurdish problem can only be achieved politically, not militarily. See e.g. Press Release Nr:
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whereby the Middle East was identified as a region for further cooperation or
joint foreign policy action, an area, which is also the focus for reinforced co-
operation with the United Nations.41
The manner in which the Kurds made their presence felt in the global arena,
when the plight of Abdullah Ocalan caused the massive mobilisation of Kurds in
the diaspora, was perhaps most noticeable on European soil. The fact that the EU
neglected an opportunity to make a difference in 1998/1999 when it failed to act
on the PKK leader's quest for political asylum and through concerted action to
try him before a neutral court in The Hague. This was unfortunate. 42 However, it
should not make the EU refrain from getting involved in future aspects of the
Kurdish question. The political contribution of the EU and its capacity to
influence is often underestimated. The Europeans are already deeply involved in
the issue of Northern Iraq, and if the member states harmonise their views and
policies, the Union, with its range of policy instruments, could make a noticeable
difference in the politics of Kurdish presence on the regional scene. Perhaps the
Union and its CFSP needs to mature so as to realise that the considerable effort
required in order to achieve a common position on the Kurdish question is
indeed justified. It also needs to ensure that the political will is there for the
implementation of a policy designed to maximise its leverage in a region in
which it has such a significant stake.
8136/97, 16-05-1997: Press Release Nr: 6323/95, 11-04-1995; Press Release Nr: 6314/95, 05-
04-1995; Press Release Nr: 6726/95, 09-05-1995 at http://ue.eu.int/Pesc/default.asp?lang=en.
41.Presidency Conclusions, Goteborg European Council, 15-16 June 2001, P. 13.
42.The EU restricted itself to a statement on a fair trial of Ocalan once the PICK-leader had been
captured and back in Turkey. See Press Release Nr: 6214/99, 22-02-1999 at
http://ue.eu.int/Pesc/default.asp?lang=en.
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7.3.3 Different approach and potential: the EU vs. the USA
Does the EU have the capacity to rival the USA in world affairs? Being of the
same opinion as Bretherton and Vogler, who argue that in certain matters the
European organisation ranks with the USA as a force in world affairs, 43 it is
argued that the EU can and should explore its role in the Middle East, with
particular emphasis on the Kurdish question in Northern Iraq.
There are no doubts that the European Union and its allies, especially the United
States, share the same basic values of what is generally perceived as acceptable
international behaviour - where they disagree is how best to achieve a desirable
change in the dealings of a country which does not conform to these rules of
conventional behaviour. For instance, the EU argues that Iran's need for Western
investment is a political opportunity as well as a commercial one because it
opens up the possibilities for dialogue, an opinion strongly opposed by the
United States. As a result, an emphasis has often been put on the Union's need to
pursue a policy independent from the United States, based on European
economic and strategic interests. In an effort to distance themselves from
American policies, in the present as well as in the past, the Europeans often
stress that the Middle East/North Africa and Europe throughout history have
been more closely tied to one another than to many other regions of the world. It
is felt that the potential for instability in the Middle East, often challenged by
American attitudes and measures, requires a greater diplomatic effort to guard
Europe's perceived interests, and to fill the occasional vacuum in American
Middle East diplomacy.
The fundamental difference between EU and US policies on many Middle East
issues stems basically from different interpretations over the nature of the threat
to Western interests and the best means of protecting them. The American
policy, formulated to restrain those Middle Eastern states perceived as
constituting potential threats to US/Western interests, is manifested in the
principle of economic sanctions. The EU takes up a diametrically differing
43 . See their The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge (1999).
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opinion on the matter and claims that a greater effect is likely to be felt by the
country imposing the embargo than on the state targeted. 44 Another point worth
acknowledging is that the American compliance towards domestic lobbies,
which exercise great authority over the Middle East policy (i.e. the well-
financed, greatly influential and highly organised Zionist lobby groups), is
without parallel in European policy-making. 45 The more balanced EU policy on
many issues concerning the Middle East can partly be understood in these terms.
Being the only remaining superpower, the United States is in a position to
implement its own policies without having to adjust them considerably to suit
other players in the field. This mentality may have been one of the key factors as
to why sharp differences between the US and the EU emerged and not only
continue to persist, but, in several cases also to increase, clearly displayed by the
divergent policies on Iran, to take one example. Economic sanctions are
perceived by the US government of being powerful foreign policy tools and are
used to further American foreign policy and national security objectives. Much
to the frustration of Washington, the EU refused to join the US in economic
sanctions against Iran following the Iranian revolution, with reference to them
being ineffectual and counterproductive. American policies were further
contrasted by the EU efforts of the 1990s to make Iran an accepted actor in
international politics.46
The policy of 'dual containment' put forward by the US did thus not at all appeal
to the EU member states. The fact that the whole formula seemed almost tailored
to suit the national interests of America's protégé Israel, by removing the
strategically important and towards the Jewish state hostile nations, and thus
strengthening the Israeli position towards its weaker Arab neighbours, did
further alienate the Europeans. In a wider perspective, this hegemonic conduct
by the superpower has angered the European Union member states, who believe
that an isolated and increasingly frustrated Iran on one hand, and a much
44.For an analysis on the 'Atlantic rift', see Michael Cox (1995), US Foreign Policy after the
Cold War. Superpower without a mission?, London: Pinter, pp. 70-83.
45.See the general views of Findley (1985).
46. In a policy statement of August 1996, the EU 'noted with considerable concern' the
enactment of the D'Amator Legislation. See Press Release Nr: 9535/96, 21-08-1996, at
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disintegrated Iraq on the other hand, would be extraordinarily destabilising for
the region. At least maintaining contact on several levels brings opportunities to
influence the other side, which do not exist if a policy of isolation is pursued.
http://ue.eu.int/Pesc/clefaultasp?lang=en.
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7.4 The United Nations
Since the Kurds, as opposed to the Palestinians, have no state in the Middle East
willing to champion their cause, hopes for achieving an improvement of their
situation have been pinned on the United Nations. 47 Towards the end of the
twentieth century, the Kurdish question in Iraq came to receive more attention
and interest internationally, which had consequences for the world organisation.
In the late 1960s, the word 'Kurd' was virtually unknown in the international
political vocabulary, but some 30 years later, it was on everybody's lips. The
world has more than once during the past four decades witnessed the flight of
Kurdish refugees from advancing Iraqi forces. Half a year after the gasbombings
of Halabja, when an intensified Anfa/-campaign entered its final phase, the
enormous wave of refugees created was hardly acknowledged in international
political circles. The disturbing lack of sympathy and unwillingness to help on
behalf of the international community in 1988 forms a sharp contrast to the
universal outcry over Kurdish sufferings three years later. Perhaps it is not so
much the degree of suffering that matters, but from whom they are fleeing. In
the late 1980s, the Kurds tried to escape an ally of the Western world. In the
early 1990s, the situation had changed dramatically - the vulnerable Kurds were
now fleeing from a man of recognised malevolence.
As previously established, the allied forces that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi
occupation in 1991 were subsequently criticised for not advancing to Baghdad
and bringing about the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime. This lack of
willingness to 'finish the job' was, however, attributed to the absence of a clear
UNSC mandate to sanction such action.
The European proposal to create a Kurdish 'safe haven' under UN auspices was
initially viewed with some caution by the international organisation, but despite
it being a complicated issue of international law as well as political dynamite in
47 . As elaborated on by Hussein Saado: 'Document on the United Nations and the Kurdish
Question' in Hochschule Bremen (1989), Documentation of the International Conference on
Human Rights in Kurdistan, Bremen (publisher unknown) pp. 171-179.
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a region where territorial disputes are as frequent elements in inter-state relations
as in relations between countries, the UN elaborated on the idea. Considering the
disadvantaged position in which Iraq found itself in the immediate aftermath of
the Kuwait War, there was a legitimate fear in the organisation that unless
intervention was undertaken, internal developments of such destabilising nature
in an already volatile region might severely undermine the stability of the
international political system.
Resolution 688, as adopted in April 1991, condemned and demanded an end to
the repression of Iraqi civilians, with special mention of the country's Kurdish
minority. It was highly significant for the Kurds, since it was the first time they
received explicit recognition from the international community. 48 This
extraordinary resolution was interpreted by globalists as 'a change in
international norms ... reflect[ing] the expansion of the authority of the
international community', whereas realists viewed Resolution 688 as nothing out
of the ordinary, certainly not a justification for international intervention. 49 That
the UNSC used its powers provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter to assist
the Kurds of Northern Iraq without obtaining permission from the central
government was, however, unprecedented. Such action went against paragraph 7
of the Charter's Article 2, which states that 'nothing in the Charter authorises the
United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state'.5°
Through Resolution 688 did the UN eventually manage to negotiate a
humanitarian agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), with
Baghdad in April 1991 regarding UN-organised assistance to Kurds and other
Iraqis who had fled their homes. 51 The MoU also provided for some 500
unarmed UN-guards to guarantee the security of the UN humanitarian aid
48.The view of Robert Jackson is fully endorsed in that 'the United Nations nowadays best
represents the "international community" in formal organisational terms' (1995, p. 64).
49.Lyons and Mastanduno (1995), p. 15.
5°. The Charter in its entirety is available at http://www.un.org/aboutunicharter/index.html .
51 . MacDowall (1996), p. 376.
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workers in Iraq, guards that also proved to have a general stabilising effect on
the area.52
Resolution 986, often referred to as the United Nations-administered oil-for-food
program, allows the Iraqi government to sell oil and buy food with the profits.
The Kurds are entitled to 13 percent of those Iraqi oil revenues. The various UN
relief agencies acting in the Kurdish area of self-rule, such as the United Nations
Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT), the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
the World Food Program (WFP) have replaced the Iraqi authorities there and
draw their mandates from the abovementioned MoU. The implementation of the
projects they propose, however, requires the approval of the Iraqi government,
although Baghdad has no influence over the distribution of goods.
The program, which initially focused on the implementation of food deals, later
saw its operational framework expanded to include measures to improve the
infrastructure, and it is reported to have channelled about $4.4 billion into the
area of self-rule since 1996. The oil-for-food is through various UN agencies
'paying for the repair of water and sewage pipes, the construction of electricity
grids and the management of telephone networks ... small power stations,
trucks, housing, schools, hospital repairs, medical training and vaccinations'.53
The UNDP has been criticised for unnecessarily delaying the implementation of
various construction and development projects. 54 Criticism has also concerned
the oil-for-food programme as a whole for the lack of provision of aid and relief
services for the internally displaced people — the thousands Kurdish families
subjected to Baghdad's ethnic cleansing campaign in the Iraqi-controlled parts
of Kurdistan. The Iraqi Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq have opened camps
for these refugees, as the program does not address the needs of this needy
category of the Kurdish population. Possibly in part to ease such concerns, in
52 . This deployment has been examined by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse in their
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, London: Polity Press (1996), p. 82.
53 Hugh Pope, 'Iraqi Kurds, Flush With Aid, Lose Desire to Take On Hussein', Wall Street
Journal, February 12, 2002.
54 Iraqi Kurdistan Dispatch, 1 February 2002.
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early 2002 the WFP launched a major census operation in the area of self-rule.
The aim with such a population count is to facilitate the provision of aid and
plans for development projects in the area, in face of the great demographic
changes that have taken place recently.55
By way of Resolution 688, which had a clear humanitarian aim, the UNSC
indicated its desire to seek, if necessary, an active role in a member state's
internal affairs. It also established that under exceptional circumstances the
organisation could and would intervene, with reference to state repression of a
minority group constituting a threat to international peace and security, but also
advocated intervention as a means to render humanitarian aid work possible.
As we have seen, attempting to stabilise trans-state conflicts, such as the Kurdish
one, not only requires a transformation of the states in question so as to grant
increased power to disadvantaged groups within the state and incorporating all
sub-identities in the state structure. In addition, changes also have to be made in
the world organisation to transform it into an institution not only of states but
also of the peoples constituting them. Of the 189 states making up the UN only a
few correspond to nations-as-people and this unsatisfactory state of affairs
disregards those groups for whom a state of their own has been and is likely to
remain unattainable. The United Nations needs to develop mechanisms that
would enable it also to represent what Robert Jackson terms the 'community of
humankind' 56 - those nations-as-people that have been left without any
meaningful platform from which to assert their presence in world politics.
Rather than exclusively being an organisation of states, as the name indicates,
efforts should be made for the United Nations to properly represent existing
nations.
The current Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, during his
first mandate initiated an overhaul of the organisation, which was designed to
55 As reported by Iraq Press on February 5, 2002, the count will provide detailed data on living
standards, and it will also include the number of Kurds who have left the area of self-rule,
seeking asylum in Europe, America or Australia.
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render the institution more efficient and capable of dealing effectively with the
new types of conflicts erupting in the post-Cold War era. 57 Although his
ambitions for natural reasons must be rather limited, a thorough restructuring of
the world organisation is desperately needed in order to cope effectively with the
challenges facing the world of today. Political sovereignty has for centuries been
the condition 'that puts a people on the map'. 58 For the Kurds there is a massive
hunger for international recognition, 'a need to exist as a people on the world
stage', 59 which cannot be satisfied as long as the nation-state remains the elusive
entrance ticket to the receiving of recognition from other actors in the
international political arena. If separated from the state, nations-as-people may
be given due recognition in terms of cultural representation in international
fora, 6° for instance taking the shape of a Kurdish observer position in the United
Nations, with a status similar to that granted the Palestinians. This would not
change the boundaries of states, which will remain the fundamental units of
societal organisation worldwide. Within and across state-boundaries, however,
nations would be duly recognised, for which the creation of yet another state
would be rendered unnecessary. It remains to be seen whether the UN, in its
current structural make up, can meet the challenge of accommodating the Kurds
in the global family of nations and directly address such a question as nations-as-
people versus nations-as-state in the new millennium.
56.A concept used throughout in his 'International Community beyond the Cold War' in Lyons
and Mastanduno (eds.) (1995), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International
Intervention, London: The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 59-83.
57.A lengthy and enlightening article of the Secretary-General and his visions worthy of note is
Joshua Cooper Ramo 's 'The five virtues of Kofi Annan', Time, 4 September 2000.
58.Taylor (1993), p. 52.
59.Ibid. p. 53.
60.As argued by Gidon Gottlieb in his Nation against State (1993), New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press.
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Part D
Conclusion
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Chapter 8: Prospects
Modern history has dealt its hand with respect to the Kurds of Northern Iraq and
an interpretation of the current situation has to take into consideration the great
variety of factors that have been examined throughout this thesis. History has a
tendency to repeat itself, and in the Kurdish case it has become the norm rather
than the exception. The Kurds could be blamed for naïveté and short-term
thinking when choosing negotiating partners and forming alliances, but they
have often been forced to accept help from whoever has offered at the time.
Their fate does not lie in their own hands.
As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (the period of the semi-
independent Kurdish principalities) the seed of disunity among the Kurds was
sown by powers external to the Kurdish areas. These principalities were in
essence small states with few obligations towards the centre, but they were
actively prevented from joining forces so as to frustrate ambitions to work
towards the development of a centralised Kurdistan. This policy has to all intents
and purposes continued in modern times. In 1975 as well as at the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdish movement suffered defeat as a direct result of
agreements reached between two regional powers.
The Kurds seem geopolitically destined to be the primary card to be played by
surrounding countries should relations become adversarial. The policy of
externalising one's own internal threats, to use a phrase of Olson's,' has
successfully been put into practice by the main regional powers, Iran and
Turkey, as examined in part C. The Islamist and Kurdish issues of Turkey and
Iran's concerns regarding its Azeri- and Kurd-minorities, have all had clear
references to Northern Iraq and developments there. In this sense, Iraqi
Kurdistan lives in a symbiotic relationship with the states surrounding the
landlocked region of self-rule.
1 . Olson (2001), p. 43.
288
Since the establishment of Kurdish self-rule of Northern Iraq, no patterns of
alliance have been crystallised, neither on local nor regional levels, although
there has been an increased number of shifting alliances between different
Kurdish political groupings. 2 Prominent examples are the coalition between the
KDP and the IMK targeting the PUK in the early 1990s and the later cooperation
between PUK and PKK against the KDP. The absence of a stable and solid link
with a regional state has meant that the Kurdish leadership has a wide range of
strategic options at its disposal, giving it 'a considerable degree of autonomy in
action', 3
 explaining the fluidity in the constant alignment and realignment.
Above all, however, this state of affairs makes the Kurds vulnerable to the
whims of the bigger actors on the political arena and impairs attempts to achieve
Kurdish unity. Indeed, 'the importance of localised identity among the Kurds
appears to be the driving force behind their alliance behaviour at the expense of
the broader benefits that could be gained if they acted as a cohesive national
movement' .4
Identity-problems face people in many different societies, but for Iraqi Kurds to
place their religious, ethnic, tribal, national and state loyalties in the right order
at a given point in time is made more difficult due to the interference of outside
forces with divide-and-rule-mentalities. As established in chapters three and
four, the Kurds of Northern Iraq have multiple identities, and the impact this has
on politics is compounded by the fact that many of these identities are shared
with large regional powers, some of whom at one time or another have tried to
exploit certain identities with the aim of achieving various objectives. Identity
may also serve as a policy device to be utilised by extra-regional powers in order
to divide certain communities.5
The Kurdish nation has admittedly 'become less of a territorially defined social
entity', 6 but the substantial Kurdish diaspora has a notably important socio-
2. Instead of alliance, perhaps entente is the more appropriate term to use in this context. For a
clarification of these concepts and their uses, see Robert Kann, 'Alliances versus ententes',
World Politics, Vol. 28, July 1974, pp. 611-621.
3.Ehteshami (1995), p. 164.
4.Yousif Freij (1998), p. 33.
5.Britain's post-WW1 policies in the Middle East are examples of this.
6.van Bruinessen (1998), p. 48.
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political role in Kurdish politics: e.g. for being instrumental in the advances
made in Kurdish literature and linguistics. The politically active Kurds from Iraq
were the first to form the Kurdish diaspora, as they were forced into exile from
the mid 1970s onwards. During the 1980s Iraqi Kurds dominated the diaspora's
political scene, but with the establishment of 'Free Kurdistan', many of them
returned to Northern Iraq and the Turkish Kurds became the politically dominant
in the exile. Kurdish identity has been reinforced in the diaspora decisively due
to the favourable conditions provided in the countries offering asylum. Tribal
affiliations do not necessarily weaken in intensity the further away from
Kurdistan proper individuals are living, since the social base is of particular
importance when in a new country with its often alien culture. This is
predominantly true if immigrants are not integrated into the new society, and in
such circumstances traditions resume great importance - traditions many
associate with tribal life.
The position about the withering away of the nation-state and the complete
erosion of the international order based on its sovereignty, has largely been
rejected in this study. The growing interdependence of states reduces the
individual state's ability to formulate and execute its own policies in the areas of
economics, military affairs and diplomacy, but since the dealings are on a
governmental level, it paradoxically also serves to reinforce the concentration of
state-power. Pressures for decentralisation and demands for extensive autonomy
force the state to focus a substantial amount of attention on its areas of
instability, but it does so in its capacity as the sole administrative body to assume
full responsibility over the region and its people. This suggests that although its
authority might be questioned in the domestic arena and it experiences decreased
influence in its external capacities, the state appears unlikely to lose its grip on
political matters. Indeed, nation-states have in many instances reasserted their
authority, as the paradoxical circumstances in the European Union's federation-
building shows: it is the national governments that dominate decision- as well as
policy-making processes. The international political system, which still
constitutes a society of territorial states, appears to have remained reasonably
intact in comparison with the way the financial markets have merged to form the
world economy that exists today. Hence the evidence presented above does not
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point beyond Westphalia to a development where the state would lose its
traditional position of being the central component of the international state
system.
Viewing the state in a realist perspective implies an understanding of the
international order as reflecting the independence and sovereignty of states. This
is, however, not to apply pure realism and declare the system rigid and
impregnable to change. Insofar as states link people to territory, they are
regarded as necessary and lasting formations, but it is also important to point out
that they do not monopolise sovereignty, simply because they no longer retain
the full capacity to meet all the responsibilities that sovereignty requires of them.
This argument does not extend to pure globalism, but remains somewhere in
between those two concepts. International organisations and enterprises have
indeed challenged the sovereign powers of the state but the principal agent of
world politics, which for long has been the state, appears unlikely to be
substituted by the multinational corporation.
Changes have indeed occurred as the evolution of the state system is an ongoing
process, but essentially whatever the changes in their capacity to govern, states
do matter. What has been arrived at is a somewhat modified view of the realist
perspective. The idea of sovereignty is still holding, supported by major powers
as well as those countries with precious little leverage on the international arena.
Authority is being shared more and more, but neither inter-governmental nor
non-governmental organisations have replaced or been able to replace the state
system. In other words, the current system of states may be subjected to
transformation but the basic structure is likely to stay intact. In view of the
evolutionary process it is, however, conceivable that the modern state system
would come to be the first structural arrangement of political and social
organisation to be transformed by peace rather than by war. The implications of
this on the Kurdish case is that a potential Kurdish state is unlikely to gain strict
sovereignty, but, as has become clear, absolute sovereignty has become
somewhat of a an elusive notion.
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Another reason as to why the nation-state system has not and is unlikely to break
down may be that the enduring concept of sovereignty serves to avoid
superpower domination. A whole range of less dominant countries actively seeks
the protection provided by the concept of sovereignty against the domination of
the great powers, regional as well as international. However, since the collapse
of the state system in general and of the nation-states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and
Syria in particular does not appear to be imminent, the task of transforming
Kurdistan from an object in the Middle Eastern political arena to a subject, an
actor with its own agenda, appears daunting.
It has been argued that the changes relating to globalisation (in the areas of
technology, economy and military power) have both weakened and strengthened
the state. State-authority has been weakened, as the boundaries of states no
longer confine the flow of information, goods, money, and people - normally
interpreted as generating the collapse of the nation-state. However, the process
of globalisation not only reinforces regional identities and sub-regional
structures, it also empowers elements to create something whole, and therein
lays its strength. Hence there are two sides of the coin of globalisation
undermining and/or reinforcing the state system. As for the Kurds, they have
benefited greatly from globalisation. In the words of Sherko Bekas, the
distinguished Kurdish poet: 'our enemies will not be able to oppress us as
before; we just have to strike a balance between being part of the modern world
and keeping our identity'.7
Gellner's firm conviction that nationalism is a product of industrialisation could
be taken as a basis for arguing the gradual demise of the force of nationalism. As
industry was transformed from a local to a national level by general economic
developments, political loyalty was simultaneously elevated from localism to
nationalism. With globalisation ever increasing in importance, industry has in
many respects re-transformed onto an international level, which may lead to the
conclusion that nationalism gradually will be supplanted by internationalism.
However, nationalism does not seem to be a force on the decline, just as the
7 . Quoted from Hiwa Osman's 'Wired world of Iraqi Kurds', BBC, 15 August 2001.
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nation-state looks unlikely to deteriorate beyond recognition.
Considering the deep fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism and the serious rifts
between the leading proponents of Kurdish nationalist ideology, in practice there
seems to be a more or less constant fluctuation between nationalism and
ethnicism, since actions are often heavily influenced by short-term political
objectives and a distinctive element of parochialism. Any transnational character
of Kurdish nationalism has been undermined by the unbroken power of tribalism
in the countryside and the less than fully developed social structures among the
middle class in urban areas. 8 A settlement of the Kurdish problem in Iraq would
not make the force of nationalism disappear, but it could well strengthen the
cultural pan-Kurdism, denoting the promotion of cultural unity among all Kurds,
and in all likelihood soften the destructive political pan-Kurdism, which
sanctions irredentism.
8 . However, a distinctive feature about the Kurds' transnational nationalism is the globalising
context in which it has come to operate, as highlighted by the simultaneous protests by Kurds in
the diaspora when Abdullah Ocalan was captured by the Turks in February 1999. See Michael
Humphrey's article 'Victim Diplomacy and Transnational Nationalism: Kurdish Diaspora
Dilemmas', Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle East Studies, Special Issue, January 2000, pp.
1-16.
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8.1 Prospects for Kurdish statehood in the 21 st century
The greatest challenge for new states is to gain international recognition and
indeed 'recognition as members of the United Nations has been the major basis
of their claim to legitimacy'. 9 Once that is achieved, usually through the use of
the principle of self-determination, as outlined above, then its independent status
may well be secured. Recast in a Kurdish mould, the devaluation of the nation-
state concept discussed above means that a sovereign Kurdistan might be no less
viable than many of the nation-states formed in the last decade. External
inadequacy will not automatically incapacitate a new state in the present political
climate, and as Gordon Smith states, it 'may even be able to profit from apparent
weakness by operating at the critical margins of superpower interests'.10
Although not comparable to the long accumulation of political experience by
nations in the west, Kurdish independence could neither be compared to the rush
to statehood of many 'nations' in the Middle East. A look at history tells us that
the emergence and evolution of each individual modern state, although the result
of a set of interconnected internal and external forces characterised by the
dynamic relationships between them, were in many cases largely conditioned by
determinants external to it. As the political history of Kurdistan elucidates,
particularly external factors would be crucial to the hypothetical rise of a
Kurdish state. External influence may simply mean to follow in the footsteps of
other states, as exemplified by the Russian revolutionaries, who took the French
revolution as the model for their own revolution in 1917." What the end of the
Cold War brought about in terms of nations transforming themselves into states
provides an array of external examples for the Kurds to duplicate and on which
to mould their own struggle(s).
9 . Strange (1986), p. 303.
I °. A. D. Smith (1981), p. 206.
I I . For an account of this, see Adam Westoby 'Origins of the Bolshevik Party and Communist
Statecraft' in James Anderson (ed.), The Rise of the Modern State, Brighton: Harvester Press, pp.
143-169.
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The timing of an aspiring state's incorporation into the international state system
heavily influences the subsequent form of the state. With the changes brought
about by the Kuwait War, and the ensuing developments of the political
structures of Northern Iraq, the twenty-first century may mark the beginning of a
new era of Kurdish assertiveness, which could pave the way for the
establishment of an independent, autonomous or separate Kurdish entity. A
crucial shaper of such a state may not be another war, but the Kurds' ability to
unite and the strength Kurdish unity will bring when faced with the pressures,
constraints but also opportunities stemming from its geopolitical situation. In
addition, the large Kurdish diaspora would give great impetus to an emerging
Kurdish state. A majority of exiled Kurds may not return to their homeland, but
strongly supports Kurdish independence — similar to the American Jewish
backing of the state of Israel.
An independent Kurdish state may well experience a conflict between legal
sovereignty and actual power, and its government's power to exert full
sovereignty over its people and territory cannot be taken for granted. The central
problem is that the idea of legal sovereignty does not always correspond with
actual power, and the situation for the countries of Eastern Europe during the
Cold War is a case in point. Just as these nation-states, sovereign in name, were
incapable of forming their own policies independently of the Soviet Union in
matters that were considered Soviet interests, a Kurdish state may find itself
dependent on powerful neighbours.
An important factor to be taken into account whenever the creation of a new
state is discussed is what effect it would have on the status quo of the immediate
region, considering that such a development would by definition entail the loss
of territory for at least one regional state to the possible detriment of regional
stability. Such loss of territory may for a regional state involve a strategic
deprivation of resources, but equally, if not even more harmful a development in
a long-term perspective, may be the deterioration of internal political conditions
resulting from a considerable alteration in the ethnic composition of the state.
This brings the thoughts to Iran, where the loss of Iranian Kurdistan (through the
expansion of a sovereign Iraqi Kurdish state towards a 'Greater Kurdistan' or
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simply the secession of the Kurds of Iran) could have a domino effect prompting
similar actions from Iran's other main minorities, e.g. Azeris, Turlcmens,
Baluchis and Arabs. Similarly, but with religious aspects, this would apply to the
situation in Iraq, where the Sunni Kurds are needed to balance the Sunni-Shi'a
imbalance.
Indeed, should 'Free Kurdistan' proclaim an independent Kurdish state, it would
positively alienate Turkey and Iran to the point of intervention, whose open
borders have been the lifeline of the Kurds of Northern Iraq. The regional states
fear that the creation of an independent Kurdish state could fan separatist
movements within their own borders and, as a previous chapter showed,
therefore display unusually concerted efforts to achieve unity in condemning any
action, which might lead to the creation of a sovereign Kurdistan and the almost
certain break-up of Iraq. International borders are not to be changed in the
Middle East, is the message frequently heard from Tehran, Ankara and
Damascus when facing the prospect of the autonomous Kurdish entity
challenging the present geopolitical situation in the region.
Building on the ideas discussed in a foregoing chapter on nationalism in its
different forms, it may be interesting to point out that a Kurdish state may set an
example in the region by adopting liberal as well as national ideas in organising
its state-formation. Yael Tamir considers the 'ideal marriage' of these two
schools of thought in saying that nationalism could supply 'parameters for
demarcating state boundaries, buttressing the view of the state as a community
characterised by the mutual responsibility and the internal cohesion ... while
liberalism could ... [provide] the moral principles needed to guide personal and
institutional behaviour' •12
Kurdish nationalism has traditionally emphasised the century-old claim that each
of the world's nations has the right of self-determination, indeed self-rule - be it
self-governing entities within existing nation-states or their own nation-state.
One could argue that a factor favouring Kurdish statehood in Northern Iraq is the
12 . Tamir (1993), p. 140.
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reasoning that the original state, i.e. Iraq, is defunct and can no longer provide a
coherent, sustainable socio-political framework for Kurdish-Arab co-existence.
Those with strong nationalist and separatist inclinations may in similar vein
argue that the disparity between the autonomous Kurdish area and Iraq proper
has grown so great over the past decade of separation that reuniting is an
unattainable goal.
8.1.1 A Kurdish microstate
If sovereignty is intertwined with the national history of a country, the issue of
calling this absolute authority into question assumes even greater proportions.
This is particularly true in the case of Iraq, where religious affiliations and ethnic
belonging constitute key components of the Iraqi state. An independent
Kurdistan would jeopardise the accepted sovereignty of Iraq, but in view of the
past decade of de facto independence, the sovereignty of Iraq has already been
compromised. Is the creation of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state a mere
formality? Are the Kurds now after a decade of self-rule strong enough to bring
the long period of appeasement with Baghdad to an end?
With its Turkmen and Arab elements, an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not
quite fit a general definition of the nation-state, but unlike most countries in the
region, it would very nearly constitute 'a polity of homogeneous people who
share the same culture and the same language, and who are governed by some of
their own number, who serve their interests'. 13 The last two components are
perhaps of particular interest in view of the history of the Kurds.
Consequently, an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not be a 'genuine' nation-
state, since the boundaries of even a Kurdish micro-state's territory (as
incorporating what is today autonomous Northern Iraq) would not correspond
with the boundaries of a homogenous ethnic community. A Kurdish state created
out of what is today Northern Iraq, would hence face the problem of 'national
13
. Navari (1981), p. 13.
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congruence', to make state and nation coextensive." There would of course be
the Kurdish ethnic core, but reconciling other ethnic identities, most notably the
Turkmen, with the Kurdish would require a great deal of effort by the new
state. 15 The Turkmens in particular would impair the ethnic unity of a Kurdish
state, and due to this heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity, even in a Kurdish state
there will be a need for more specific nation-building-efforts. A Kurdish state
with considerable Turkmen elements, however, could avoid falling in the same
traps as other 'nation-states' before it, by building an enduring society formed
around solidarity and community.I6
Very few states indeed can hope to acquire the status of nation-state due to their
'plural' characters. Rather, they could aspire to become national states where
heterogeneous populations could enjoy a common public culture." Also a
Kurdish state-formation would have to settle for a national state as opposed to a
nation-state due to its many 'plural' elements.
The 'self' of the principle of self-determination discussed above may cause more
internal friction in a sovereign Iraqi Kurdistan, the establishment of which may
produce a domino-effect - a Kurdish state, which is unlikely to constitute purely
Kurdish elements. Particularly Turkmens might choose to exercise their right to
self-determination and demand further division of territory, enthusiastically
encouraged by Turkey. If, therefore, regional stability is a main reason for the
establishment of an independent 'Free Kurdistan', then that may well be as
illusory as the myth about the single unitary state.
An independent Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq may have to start off as
a centralised state in order to establish its authority in all areas, as it certainly
14.A. D. Smith (1986b), p. 262.
15.According to a 1957 population consensus, there are about 2 million Turlcmens living in Iraq,
most of them in and around Kirkuk city, with some 250,000 currently residing in areas under the
control of the Kurdish Administration. Those Turkmen living in the Iraqi areas beyond the
control of Baghdad did not take part in the Kurdish elections of 1992. Enjoying the full support
of Turkey, they have often acted against the Kurds, but of the main two Kurdish parties, KDP is
favoured due to its ties to Turkey. (Professor Nouni Talabany, an authority of Turkmen and
Kurds, London, 1999.)
16.Such a society is eloquently argued by A. D. Smith (1986b), p. 230.
17.Concept that of A. D. Smith (1992), p. 61-62.
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would have to deal with conflict regulation from within. The state would need to
present itself as arbiter seeking to contain disruptive conflicts, likely to emerge
between elites as well as the lower strata of society. This would be in addition to
the obvious need to defend its territory from external incursions, perhaps most
acutely physical, but also ideological. It is also likely to seek control over
demographic movements, particularly in view of Baathist forced resettlement
programs, to ensure its government is not undermined by actions from Baghdad.
A potentially serious problem in an independence-scenario is that of border
disputes. In the part of Central Kurdistan still under the control of Baghdad, and
particularly in and around the oil rich city of Kirkuk, the Iraqi regime has over a
number of years implemented Arabisation- and dekurdisation-programs to alter
the demography, originally that of a Kurdish majority. In order to return the
large number of internally displaced people to their original place of habitation,
the authorities would need to reverse this social engineering and encourage
Arabs to return to the south of the country. Reclaiming Kurdish land and
generally (re-)negotiating the Kurdish/Arab borders would not be a territorial
dispute in the conventional sense. This highlights the long-term problem of
Kirkuk should Kurdish political independence become reality: a scenario that
would see border disputes likely to continue.
With regard to the discussion above relating to multinational corporations, these
may well have great financial interests in a Kurdish state seceded from oil-rich
Iraq. These companies would certainly be able to exert greater influence when
dealing with a microstate, but the extractive nature of their business, however,
would put the state in a more powerful position. With the geographical limitation
to their operations — i.e. the oil companies cannot depart with the underground
oil fields — control over the natural resources industry would give any Kurdish
government considerable wealth that would translate into influence on a regional
as well as international level.
Where the nation extends beyond the boundaries of the existing state, as would
be the case for a sovereign Iraqi Kurdistan, such an entity, if under the influence
of ethnic nationalism, could easily develop traits of irredentism by seeking 'the
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recovery of the "lost" territories' 18 - a likely implication of that type of
nationalist expression. Of Horowitz's suggested subtypes of irredentism, one,
namely 'attempts to detach land and people from one state in order to
incorporate them in another', 19 would be applicable to an independent Iraqi
Kurdistan, which cultivated aspirations to incorporate other parts of the
historical Kurdish homeland into its own sovereign structure. Irredentist policies
in fact appear to be a modern expression of expansionism, in itself an ancient
phenomenon2° that in the Kurdish case may be termed 'the need to create a
"compact nation" and recover an historic homeland sliced up by rival colonial
powers'. 2I Should a sovereign Iraqi Kurdistan stake irredentist claims to Iranian
Kurdistan, for instance, Tehran would naturally perceive it as a threat to the
territorial integrity and national security of the Islamic Republic, stepping up
oppressive policies to restrain its Kurds from approving the actions of their
ethnic brethren. Oppressive measures from the centre are, however, likely to
play right into the hands of the irrendentists, enabling them to develop stronger
ties with the minority, fuelling a development that could escalate into a military
conflict in which the irredentist state is actively involved. The minority is
seldom the winner in such a conflict, but, if indeed absorbed by the irredentist
state - its 'mother country' - the minority leadership may develop other
concerns, such as having its influence and authority substantially reduced. Hence
it appears more likely that the minority (here illustrated by the Iranian Kurds),
would seek to engage in secessionist activities rather than supporting the
irredentist movement (stemming from Iraqi Kurdistan).
Hayes' discussion of 'the feeling of superiority engendered by success', 22
 may
apply to a future independent Iraqi Kurdistan. A scenario could emerge in which
those with a liberal mindset, who struggled for the freedom of the entire Kurdish
nation, once having achieved independence for their area, began to see the world
with different eyes. Self-satisfaction resulting from having reached their goal
18.A. D. Smith (1981), p. 188.
19.Horowitz (1992), p. 119.
20.For an analysis of this, see Ben-Israel, Hedva (1991), "Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined"
in N. Chazan (ed.) Irredentism and International Politics, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 23-
35.
21.A. D. Smith (1981), p. 198.
22.Hayes (1949), p. 227.
300
could cause them to regard fellow Kurds in the neighbouring countries with a
superior attitude and seek to rule those areas and its 'backward' people in their
newly acquired capacity of an independent Kurdish state.
8.1.2 A 'Greater Kurdistan' 
The state-building experiment that has been ongoing in Northern Iraq since 1991
has placed the Iraqi Kurds in a more favourable position compared to the Kurds
of Iran, Turkey and Syria as regards the prospects of achieving statehood.
Perhaps the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq could even be regarded as a pan-
Kurdish sovereign state at an embryonic stage, with the Iraqi Kurds to play a
crucial role in creating and maintaining this 'Greater Kurdistan'.
In order for a 'Greater Kurdistan' to come into being, the smaller Kurdish state
carved out of Iraq must seek a pan-national sovereignty. Regarding the notion of
a 'Greater Kurdistan', there are many different views to take into account, and it
has only really been the Kurds of Turkey, or rather the PKK, that has upheld a
pan-Kurdish claim. For them, Kurdish independence was during the 1980s the
only acceptable solution to the long and bloody conflict with the Turkish
Republic. The initial aim of the PKK - to establish a Kurdish state in south-
eastern Turkey, which would be a first step towards the formation of a 'Greater
Kurdistan' to include the Kurdish parts of neighbouring countries - was an
ambition never quite shared by other Kurdish political bodies. The politically
active Kurds of Iran have not portrayed themselves as ardent pan-Kurdistanists,
but have since the Iranian revolution in 1979 put forward 'Democracy for Iran,
autonomy for Kurdistan' as their goal. The Syrian Kurds, have never quite been
in the limelight, but demand greater cultural rights.
A central question for the creation and maintenance of a 'Greater Kurdistan' is
to assess how successful Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria have been in dividing the
Kurdish nation. The apprehension shown by these regional states towards the
perceived long-term ambitions of the Iraqi Kurds in particular may be
interpreted as fear of a gigantic hegemonic project where the Kurds aim to seize
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large swathes of land from each state. These sentiments would appear pre-
Westphalian in nature and reflect one of the underlying causes of the European
Thirty Years War: the tension between centralism and decentralism/a centrally-
ruled region and the move towards a more decentralised political order where
the nation-states could keep their autonomy towards all hegemonic ambitions.
The regional states would naturally prefer the current order based on Westphalia
to remain intact, which would counter any expansionist Kurdish plans. As in
post-Westphalian Europe where France under Louis XIV in the second half of
the seventeenth century developed hegemonic ambitions and was opposed by
England and the Netherlands - who between themselves competed for power
over the seas, the main trade routes - the Middle Eastern states put their
differences aside and ally whenever the Kurdish threat surfaces. As in
seventeenth century Europe, this represents a manifestation of pure realpolitik in
order to keep the delicate power-balance intact:
Given the right conditions, a 'Greater Kurdistan' would become a major regional
power and as it is situated at the crossroads of Turkish, Iranian and Arab lands, it
could serve as a bridge between these cultures and civilisations. Moreover, the
political strength of the Kurds would increase greatly if they were to present
themselves as one unit in the political arena. Alternative arrangements of
division into separate entities, 'the fragmentation of their political roofs',23
would certainly not enhance their collective standing as a people on the world
scene.
Building on the notion of Kurdishness as a means to incorporate the people of all
Kurdish areas into an integrated political unit is not an easy task as that would
entail battling with the major concepts of Arabism, Persianism and Turkishness
that all meet in Kurdish territory. Another difficulty is the issue of the
peshmerga and their role in a 'Greater Kurdistan'. Conventional wisdom would
say about freedom fighters that the more they fight, the more nationalist they
grow. However, under certain circumstances, such as those in Kurdistan, this
does not easily apply. The Kurdish militant peshmergas could often be found to
23 . Gellner (1983a), p. 135.
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fight primarily for their own tribe or party than for the Kurdish cause. Hence, the
more they fight, the more loyal they become to their preferred political grouping,
a fact that does not serve to strengthen Kurdish pan-nationalist activity.
Of all different types of nationalism mentioned in the classification earlier, that
of unification is of greatest interest for a discussion of the future of Kurdish
political independence, since a broadened Kurdish nationalism can be envisaged,
which might acquire the attributes of a nationalist ideology of unification. If it
achieved independence in its contemporary form, a strengthened movement
might indulge in irredentist behaviour and mount expansionist claims against
surrounding states, and eventually become the basis of a nationalism of
unification of all the Kurds seeking to attain the political formation of a Great
Kurdistan. If one or two, even three autonomist Kurdish administrative regions
were to emerge alongside the one in Northern Iraq, a restructured Kurdish
nationalism could materialise, characterised by unification sentiments. An
essential characteristic of a successful unification nationalism, as Breuilly points
out, is that it has to achieve success both in the individual state - in this case the
autonomous Northern Iraqi state-formation - and beyond it. The difficulty lies in
that conditions may increasingly 'come to favour the development of the
nationalist movement in one state rather than another', and so 'gradually the
nationalist movement will come to mirror conditions in that state'.24
The events of 1991 disrupted the pattern that had been imposed on the region
more than half a century earlier when a range of new Middle Eastern nation-
states appeared on the map. Although there have not been attempts by regional
powers to reconstitute the old pre-1991 geopolitical order, the policies have been
formulated so as to contain the situation. However, the events of 1991 unleashed
new forces that may well prove to dominate this new century. Nationalism could
then, as it was in the German and Italian cases, serve as the justification to unite
most of the Kurdish culture area under Kurdish leadership into a larger Kurdish
nation-state, the 'Greater Kurdistan'.
24 . Breuilly (1993), p. 121-22.
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In relation to the discussion in the second chapter, the Kurdish nation could only
achieve a state-reinforcing role if all parts of Kurdistan were joined into one
organic whole making it coterminous with an existing state. Just as the Kurdish
nation for much of the twentieth century has been state-subverting, constituting
smaller entities within larger states, it could, in the case of independence for
Iraqi Kurdistan, switch to a state-creating role, as it would then find itself bigger
than an existing state. A state-creating nation would become state-reinforcing if
an independent Iraqi Kurdistan succeeded in absorbing the other parts of the
Kurdish nation. However, this presupposes feelings of national unity across all
Kurdish areas - only then could a 'pan-state' role of the Kurdish nation develop.
The notion of a 'Greater Kurdistan' may also be interpreted as a loose federation
of three to four Kurdish regions with extensive autonomy. Considering the
vastness of the Kurdish nation, such a federation might, however, dissolve and
result in the creation of entirely separate Kurdish states - developments that
would not necessarily damage pan-Kurdism, as there could still be a Kurdish
unity, but of peoples not of states. This unity already exists in its potential form
in the customs and cultures of the people, though the institutions and rulers of
those nation-states keep the people divided and exploitable.
8.1.3 Several Kurdish republics
The absence of a recent shared political history of all of Kurdistan coupled with
the presence of tribalism as well as the until relatively recently abolished feudal
system (which was in itself a huge obstacle in economic and social terms to
efforts at strengthening and uniting the Kurdish nation), present unique problems
for the large state structure of a 'Greater Kurdistan'. In addition, the
achievement of the aim of pan-Kurdish unity of a 'Greater Kurdistan' would
require each political group throughout Kurdistan to dismantle its power base
within its own area, the materialisation of which is difficult to visualize. The fact
that the power bases of the KDP and PUK alike were left intact when a unified
Kurdish Administration was being constructed, and so prevented the efficient
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functioning of the common governmental institutions, is not an encouraging
experience when envisaging co-operation on a larger scale.
Hence, in view of the lack of political unity among the Kurds, and the absence of
a shared political strategy, it might be inaccurate a claim that the Kurds would
want just one independent state. Indeed, the twenty-first century might see more
than one Kurdish state, just as there are many Arab states. Such a development
may also be a consequence of geopolitics in the sense that the geographical
obstacles (i.e. the mountainous character of Kurdistan) have impeded human
interactions, and if these obstacles are not overcome, then separate state-
formations may be envisaged. This is in line with the possibility that
independence for Iraqi Kurdistan may well inspire similar action in other parts
of Kurdistan, but instead of aiming for integration into the Iraqi-Kurdish state
structure, these secessionist movements could aspire to autonomy.
As Baghdad gave up its authority in the three northern governates in 1991, the
area became to all intents and purposes independent. This was, in the words of
Rosenau, a 'downward" relocation of authority',25 as the largest sub-national
group in Iraq took over the running of affairs from the central government in the
area where they constitute a clear majority. One could envisage such a
'relocation process' to become more encompassing in nature and transcend
national boundaries, so as to enable the Kurds of Iran, Turkey and Syria to
assume greater roles in the running of their affairs. They may not wish to join
their national brothers across the border in their aspirations for a 'Greater
Kurdistan' and as a result of the various directions in which authority may be
relocated, they may end up aiming to establish their own independent entities.
Through such decentralising efforts, which may not reflect deliberate policies on
behalf of the central governments, but being a 'by-product' of the globalising
trends and pressures, more than one Kurdish republic may see the light of day.
25 . Rosenau (1995), p. 208.
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8.1.4 The odds against Kurdish independence
Common for all Kurdish independence-scenarios as outlined above is how
prominent a role geopolitics play. Kurdistan faces a very complex set of
impediments to statehood: a rare combination of unfavourable factors that makes
the notion of an independent Kurdish state likely to remain abstract.
According to Richard Falk, a small country may prove enduring only if its
'orientation [is] perceived as useful to reigning geopolitical forces'. 26 Such was
the case with non-Arab, non-Islamic Israel, for instance. It is felt that only if the
state system of the region were to collapse, a Kurdish state may emerge, as the
'end of wars are occasions for geopolitical restructuring'. 27 Falk admits that
'there are niches of opportunities that exist within the geopolitical situation of
the region',28 but they are not easily detected. The geopolitics of the Middle East
in the aftermath of the war over Kuwait provided a window of opportunity for
the Kurds of Iraq to establish an autonomous political community not quite at
the state level, but an unprecedented formation nonetheless.
Only compelling international support and pressure is likely to sustain a new
state in the Middle East, pressure that in all probability would be rooted in strong
economic and strategic interests of the one remaining superpower. If a
landlocked Kurdish state would emerge under these circumstances, it runs the
risk of being unrecognised by its neighbours and isolated diplomatically on the
regional level (again with reference to ostracized Israel). After all, the
geopolitical realities are such that why would the regional countries recognise an
independent Iraqi Kurdistan: what could the incentives or threats possibly be for
such recognition to be granted? Hence, the seal of approval by extra-regional
forces will not necessarily produce favourable conditions for the new state. In
addition, the Kurdish experience of geopolitical betrayal by global powers is
such that the Kurdish leadership is hesitant to entrust any outside forces with
imposing a solution on reluctant neighbours. If considered unjust, the
26.Falk (1991), p. 383.
27.Ibid. p. 385.
28.Ibid. p. 392.
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arrangement would be challenged and declared null and void as soon as one or
more of the affected countries were powerful enough to do so, keeping the
Kurds in a position of geopolitical objects rather than subjects.
Moreover, if independence is regarded as absolute freedom from dependence —
economic, military or political - on any other country, a Kurdish state would
hardly be viable due to the reality of dependency. Equipped with merely de jure
independence, a sovereign Kurdistan might find itself in a position where it has
nothing to it but its name. Political decisions might be taken in Washington DC,
economic policy directed by the World Bank and IMF and Kurdish culture
undermined by strong influences from Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, which
would generate a disempowering relationship.
Within regional politics, the Iraqi-Kurdish experience relates to the Palestinian
state-building process, where representative institutions have been set up despite
the fact that the embryonic Palestinian state remains within the territory of the
"Big State" Israel. The developments in Palestine/Israel give a regional
dimension to the political situation in Northern Iraq: namely, should a regional
precedent be set with a Palestinian state coming into being, there might be hope
for a Kurdish state. If Israel permanently lets go of territory, could Iran, Iraq and
Turkey be envisaged to do the same? The answer to that may to a large extent lie
in each state's relations with the remaining super power, but it appears highly
unlikely that even massive international pressure could coerce these countries
into allowing the formation of a Kurdish state. The situation for the Kurds is far
more complicated than that of the Palestinians. 29 Apart from being less unified
and organised, the Kurds must deal with several countries in their quest for
statehood. Rights to statehood in themselves are not enough in an era and region
where geopolitics have come to matter so much.
29 . Analogies such as this one could be useful but one should bear in mind its limitations. There
are admittedly similarities between the two experiences, but the differences are so much greater
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8.2 A nation without a state
One monumental question arising from this discussion seems to be whether or
not a nation needs its own state, i.e. whether the former can exist long-term
without the latter. The earliest nationalists Herder and Rousseau argued that as
long as their cultures were not threatened, nations could fare well without states
of their own. 3° Fichte, however, launched more aggressive nationalist ideas in
which he claimed that in order to be (and remain) a genuine nation, you have to
possess your own state. 3I The question whether or not a nation needs its own
state is often overshadowed by the issue of whether the nationalists are likely to
achieve the ultimate goal of political independence for their nation. Desiring
one's own nation-state is, according to the logic of the nation-state system, an
ethically defensible claim, but nonetheless a claim that entails a substantial
degree of conflict often leading to a fruitless and destructive quest for something
unattainable.
The most common argument for a nation-as-people to be granted the status of a
nation-as-state is that they either cannot be safe without their own state to live in,
or that they are incapable of flourishing as a people if they remain a nation
devoid of statehood 'because this is the only condition of its insulating itself
from some powerful and pervasive foreign pressure'. 32 But is this true for the
Kurds of Northern Iraq? In view of the analyses put forward in this study, does
the Kurdish nation need a state in order to ensure its political as well as cultural
survival? The answer would be affirmative if endorsing the view of Robert Fine,
who argues that
and the conditions so dissimilar that a comparison between the Kurds and the Palestinians
demand a thesis of its own.
3°. On Herder see F. Barnard (1965), Herder's Social and Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, and on Rousseau see A. Cohler (1970), Rousseau and Nationalism, New York: Basic
Books.
31 . See chapter three in John Holland Rose (1916), Nationality as a factor in modern history,
London: Rivingtons.
32 , Taylor (1993), p. 50.
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The modern pariah — refugees and displaced persons who have no state — become
the visible evidence that belonging to a nation which does have its own state is
the condition of possessing those rights which enlightenment purports to grant to
every individual by virtue to his or her humanity.33
Essentially the same sentiments are echoed by Michael Ignatieff in claiming that
'the right to have any rights at all only inheres in those who have a state'.34
However, one is inclined to argue that the process for a nation to be 'fulfilled'
does not necessitate the establishment of a nation-state carrying its name, in
other words, all nations do not have to become state-nations. Nations could be
said to have lives of their own, as they are entities independent of statehood and
hence do not rely on a state to ensure their survival. As became clear from the
analysis in the second chapter, nations are not historically limited to the
formation and development of the modern nation-state as created in Europe in
the centuries following the French Revolution. Consequently they should not be
regarded as exclusively depending on the state for their continued existence.
The narrow political issues of nation, state and nationalism indeed have
particular complexities in the Middle East. As we have seen, in the post-colonial
period, a great deal of social engineering was undertaken and the prevalent
interpretation of the nation among the 'nation-builders' was the citizenry
occupying the territory of the new states. In these processes there was no room
for the Kurdish nation, conveniently overlooked by the dominant and successful
national movements spurred on by powerful global powers. However, the nation
of Kurds has not disappeared or been weakened beyond recognition.
Over a long period of time, this national community of Kurds with a great deal
of territorial continuity and with a tradition of local autonomy (the earliest
examples being the Kurdish principalities) has identified itself as a specific
people, a nation, in various contexts, against different adversaries, being part of
different states, in modem times having its own state (the Mahabad Republic -
33.Fine (1999), p. 150.
34.Ignatieff (1999), pp. 142-143.
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although on a very limited part of its territory and that being on Iranian not Iraqi
territory), periodically seeking autonomy without challenging the territorial
integrity of the state of Iraq, integrating immigrants (denoting forcibly resettled
Shiite Arabs from the south), enduring humiliation and yet existing as Kurdistan.
The difficulties and repression faced appeared only to strengthen the resolve of a
nation that will not cease to exist. Favourable political conditions creating a safe
environment may well see thriving national communities whose cultures face no
restrictions in expressing themselves. It is just achieving those favourable
conditions in order for the Kurdish nation to thrive that appears rather
overwhelming in the current political climate.
Moreover, since the world we live in contains more nations than states it is not
feasible to co-ordinate nations with states. A countless number of boundaries
would have to be radically altered if there is to be any likelihood of peacefully
resolving the nations-and-states-issue in such a way as to create a territorial state
for each and every nation. Earlier in the last century the Kurds lost out in the
battle for a Kurdish state in the region, but that did not entail the loss of the
Kurdish nation. A nation may not find survival without a state all that difficult
whereas a state without a corresponding nation may exist only with considerable
difficulties. Nonetheless, the eternal longing for an independent state will
presumably persist among Kurds, which in itself is perhaps an indicator of the
enduring appeal of the nation-state concept. It might even be the combination of
rationality and irrationality ingrained in the idea of the nation-state that so
engages and attracts people, particularly those without a state to call their own.
However, the nation-state as such may not be the ultimate form of societal
organisation for the Kurdish nation. 35 Problems inevitably arise when the
European model of the nation-statc is copied onto a different society without the
socio-economic base being the same or at least similar in character. By not
searching for a new state but fighting to preserve their nation and striving to
accommodate it into new political constructions, Kurds may in a way find
themselves returning to their origins as a people of borderless trade with a clear
35 . As Dr. Rashid puts it: 'it's a bit outdated for the Kurdish area'. London, 1999.
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cultural/linguistic identity and flexible arrangements of authority - all features
that seem to characterise the new information age we now live in.
Giddens' view of the nation only being significant insofar as its relation to the
state is concerned- i.e. when it succeeds in attaining and maintaining state power
- and outside that context having no independent status of its own, can now be
discarded. If this were the case, the Scottish people, to take one of many
examples, would not constitute a nation until the day Scotland broke away from
the United Kingdom and formed its own nation-state. Clearly, cultural aspects of
the nation are as important as political ones, and presumably even more critical
to its long-term survival than the latter. As Kurdish culture becomes
institutionalised, its cultural nationalism keeps the nation very much alive.
As emphasised in chapter two on nationalism, there needs to be a willingness on
behalf of the people constituting the nation to grant their community a primary
and persistent loyalty. As long as such loyalty is questionable, the nation is
unable to move to the next stage, i.e. to utilise its right to organise itself as an
independent state — even if the external conditions are favourable. Tribal
loyalties are still strong and hence impair the advancement of Kurdish
nationalism. The plurality of poles of identification in Kurdish society could,
however, in Gellner's wording mean that 'a [partially] tribal nation may for a
time be tribal internally and national externally' •36 In other words, tribalism does
not necessarily incapacitate a nation indefinitely.
If we do accept that tribalism is an inherent part of Kurdish society and one in
which the continuity of tribal social and political structures appears likely to
endure, this phenomenon has to be properly accommodated in a state structure.
This can be accomplished by introducing measures of regionalism in
governmental policies that could serve to pacify certain tribal units of a more
belligerent nature. Such an arrangement would allow and encourage the
development of indigenous cultural and political institutions and enable them to
operate within their own separate areas of jurisdiction with powers exceeding
36 . Gellner (1983), p. 138.
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that of simple administrative duties but excluding sovereign functions. This type
of regional government may be regarded as the middle ground between
federalism and devolution. These regions or regional administrations have to be
created by the central government, who also retains the power to take over the
running of affairs should the need arise. Tribal demands might be successfully
dealt with under such an arrangement.
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8.3 The Kurds in a post-Saddam Iraq
Transitional arrangements can temporarily solve problems, as the creation of the
autonomous region in 1991 proved, but the status quo in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan
cannot be regarded as a lasting formation. The establishment of the area of self-
rule was at the time regarded as a highly temporary solution to the chaotic
situation prevailing at the end of the Kuwait War. Now, more than a decade
later, the Iraqi Kurds continue to rule themselves with a little help from the
United Nations, but still this is not to be regarded as a solution to a long-standing
problem in Iraq.
The Kurdish question seems to be growing stronger in regional political
importance, and may in this new century come to rival the Arab-Israeli conflict
in magnitude. When political change does occur in Iraq, the stateless but self-
ruling Kurds are likely to play a crucial role. It is also important to note the
connection between the availability of water - the importance of which is hardly
on the decrease — and the Kurds. Syria's use of the PKK-card was motivated by
its fear of being deprived of water and Turkey has entered the new decade as one
of the strongest players in regional politics, particularly on the water-front, much
due to the success in curbing the activities of its militant Kurds. With its network
of dams, the Ataturk project, nearly finished, incidentally located in northern
Kurdistan, Ankara is in virtual control of the water market of the Middle East,
similar to OPEC's power over the oil market in the 1970s. But, and this is highly
significant, Turkey can only attempt to regulate the political behaviour of the
Arabs by stopping the flow of water southwards if the Kurds do not disturb the
operation of the dams. It may well be the Kurdish question that determines
whether or not Turkey will remain strong throughout the first decade of the new
century, a Kurdish question that is much centred around Iraqi Kurdistan and the
development there.
The instability characterising the political situation in Northern Iraq owes a great
deal to the longstanding power struggle between the two main Iraqi Kurdish
parties and the personal antagonism between their leaders. Even though the
present may not be an automatic continuation of the past and the future not
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necessarily mirror the present, it would perhaps be unduly optimistic to expect
the two to genuinely settle their differences in the foreseeable future. Ever since
the Kurdish defeat following the Algiers Accords, which closed the era of the
legendary Mullah Mostafa, there has been a constant internal struggle between
the Kurdish political leaders. The unique position enjoyed by the late KDP-chief
of achieving near unity among the Kurds even beyond Iraq's borders, has been
the ultimate goal for any leader ever since.
Events of the 1990s did not indicate a political maturity among the Kurdish
leadership(s), and neither Masoud Barzani nor Jalal Talabani has emerged as a
statesman. Instead, developments proved clearly that the interests of the leaders
of the dominant parties have been placed above those of 'Free Kurdistan' as a
political entity. Once again the theory of omnibalancing can be applied, which
holds that 'the leader of the state rather than the state itself should be used as the
level of analysis'. 37 What are Barzani and Talabani likely to do? It appears
unreasonable to believe that one of them would give up complete control over
his own region for the benefit of Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole. The current factual
division of the area may prove to be so entrenched that it will remain split into
two spheres of influence under a Kurdish administration in a future Iraqi Arab-
Kurdish federation.38
According to the principle of self-determination, the Kurds have qualified for an
independent state of Kurdistan, but is this the only alternative to a solution to the
Kurdish problem in Iraq? Those maintaining that this is so may be advocates of
wishful thinking rather than well-reasoned determination. Some may argue that
since the Kurdish genie is now out of the bottle, political independence will
inevitably follow, but such a simplistic assessment is not endorsed in this
analysis. It is true that the Kurds can no longer be ignored as was largely the
case prior to 1991, but there are other options available in order to achieve a
lasting settlement of the issue.
37.David (1991), P. 237.
38.Back in 1995 David McDowall stated that since both Barzani and Talabani seek ascendancy,
'the only way in which autonomous Kurdistan is big enough for both of them is by partitioning
the area'. This still appears to be the case. See 'The struggle for Kurdistan', ME!, No. 499, 28
April 1995, pp. 17-18.
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Political nationalism argues that only a self-governing people are a free people.
There are those who propose that the reason for a national community to seek
the establishment of their own state is mainly because they want to manage their
own affairs and not be hopelessly dependent. 39 The assumption is then that a
federal arrangement would not satisfy desires or needs for self-rule, since 'the
only road to genuine self-rule lies through independence'. 40 As shown when
discussing the force of economic and political globalisation and its impact on the
nation-state, political independence is often an illusory idea, and one that cannot
bring political satisfaction. 'In the best of all worlds', as Taylor writes, 'nations
would not have to become states': self-determination should still be one option,
but the 'higher aspiration is supranational unity'.4I
Iraq, which is the country that has employed the most brutal methods of treating
its Kurdish population - the Kurds have been in the way of Saddam Hussein's
pan-Arab ambitions of a greater Babylon - is ironically also the country where
the Kurds periodically have enjoyed a certain autonomy. However, despite the
overwhelming changes that have taken place in Central Kurdistan over the last
decade, it appears that the Kurds of Northern Iraq were no more free to
determine their own future in the early 1990s than they were in the early 1970s,
given the non-existence of regional (or international) consensus for
independence. In that sense their position and relation to Baghdad has not
changed significantly - the Iraqi Kurds appear to have no choice but sooner or
later to enter into negotiations with the central government.
If the Kurdish nation of Iraq needs a state to save it from the domination of the
Arabs, a political arrangement that reduces the power of the central government
over the Kurdish areas will give the Kurds the necessary political space without
having to demand the elusive political sovereignty. This is particularly so in
view of the fact that 'the world has become too complex and dynamic for
39.As argued by, for instance, Charles Taylor in his 'Why Do Nations Have to Become States?'
in Taylor, Charles (ed.) (1993), Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and
Nationalism, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 40-58.
40.Taylor (1993), P. 44.
41.Ibid. p. 58.
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independence to satisfy the needs and wants'.42
The artificial construct constituting the state of Iraq has created a situation
whereby the subnational group of Kurds owes allegiance to interests other than
the national interest. Failing to identify with the state, individuals place their
loyalties along ethnic, religious, tribal lines. As the levels of repression steadily
increased in Iraq under the Baathists, identification with the Kurdish nation over
the Iraqi state kept getting stronger. However, there appears to be a discernible
Iraqi element to 'Free Kurdistan', and as full independence has never been
advocated since the establishment of the self-ruling entity, a unified but
decentralised Iraq could emerge post-Saddam. Instead of being the
representative of a group in control of power in the capital, the state could
develop into a participatory incorporative unit, within which the Kurds would
find adequate representation. As the current Iraqi regime has been delegitimised
through its policies in its Kurdish areas, only under a scheme of considerable
decentralisation of state power are the Kurds likely to re-accommodate
themselves under the umbrella of the Iraqi state. With a federal arrangement
Kurdistan would be as Kurdish as Basra is Arab, but still the two nations would
be co-joined within one political structure.
Concerning the Kurdish people, Richard Falk states that 'it is evident that their
sufferings illustrate too well the regional vulnerabilities and perils of a nation ...
without a satisfactory state'. 43 Not contesting the truth in that statement, it is
nonetheless felt that if Iraq were to develop into a well-functioning federation
between Kurds and Arabs, the Iraqi Kurdish people would have far less to fear
from geopolitical power games. There should be some political space for the
Kurds to explore possibilities for expressing their identities.
The Iraqi Kurds advocate a democratic federation of Kurds and Arabs, as made
clear by the announcement of the formation of a Kurdish federal state in late
42.Rosenau (1995), p. 202.
43.Falk (1991), pp. 386-7.
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1992.44 Not only does this present a realistic and lasting solution to the Kurdish
problem in Iraq, it also serves to preserve the unity of the country. Such a
federative arrangement would grant the Kurds political institutions they could
see as 'their own', an important aspect of legitimising any settlement. Iraqi
Kurdistan would cease to be an area of unsatisfied nationalism, as its political
aspirations would have been met, although in a modified way.
Federalism is a general constitutional system, which provides the same degree of
autonomy to each of the units in the federation. It describes a method of
government in which differing territorial interests are accommodated, a structure
that steers clear of the frequent overcentralisation of unitary systems as well as
the extreme decentralisation of confederations. 45 Federal systems function in a
variety of different political contexts and it is important to point out that as any
other system of governing, a federal arrangement needs to be tailored to the
specific conditions of the country and will only prove successful if it responds to
the needs of people being governed.
In their call for a federal system, the Kurds request power to be shared between
the Kurdish region and Baghdad. This implies Kurdish representation in the
central government and the democratically elected parliament (i.e. the sharing of
executive and legislative powers), the latter of which needs to constitute two
assemblies: one for representing the Iraqi people as a whole and one for the two
federal regions respectively. Such a federal, democratic structure requires the
present one-party-domination to be brought to an end. By proposing a federation
of Kurds and Arabs instead of endorsing regional autonomy favoured by the
central government, the Kurds seek a bi-lateral agreement between two equal
parties. This gives power and security to the Kurds that an easily revocable
autonomy law does not provide. 46 Needless to say, a federal system between
44. In the early 1990s Professor Nouni Talabany drafted a comprehensive constitution for the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (which was adopted by the elected Parliament in October 1992), meant to
supplement a future Federal Constitution for Iraq as a whole. See Noun i Talabany (1999), The
Kurdish View on the Constitutional Future of Iraq, London (publisher unknown).
45. Federalism is to be distinguished from mere power-sharing arramgements or
`consociationalism% Arend Lijphart has written extensively on consociational democracy - see
for instance Democracy in Plural Societies, (1977), London: Yale University Press.
46.This Kurdish view of the federation-scenario was explained by Professor Nouni Talabany,
London 1999.
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Kurds and Arabs is possible only in a post-Saddam Iraq as it necessitates the
abolition of Saddam Hussein's regime - a regime that cannot conceivably agree
to a power-sharing arrangement. Only an Iraq that in practice could accept its
plural identity could be fully open to democratic development. The culture of
politics must be transformed if a new Iraq is to enjoy constitutional stability.
When a politically disadvantaged group gains a voice inside the system, exiting
from that system loses its appeal. 47
 That Iraq is unlikely to remain an entity after
the demise of Saddam Hussein from the political scene is an argument mainly
put forward by the Iraqi President himself. Iraq may remain as strong as any
other regional country.
With its composition of Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs, a future
federal state of Iraq will encompass cross-cutting cleavages, which would give
the system stability. The religious cleavage will cut across the ethnic cleavage,
which will prevent an enduring majority factor. Indeed, 'potential tensions will
be cancelled out as, in this way, an individual cleavage does not become
entrenched in the system'.48
Iraq is constitutionally already a multi-nation-state, but federalism is likely to
solve the existing ethno-regional problems and make Iraq a genuine multi-
nation-state. As an ethnonational group the Kurds have not been able to identify
with the state of Iraq, despite being constitutionally recognised, and through
their national movement they have previously been trying to rearrange the
existing state structure. The multifaceted Kurdish identity will naturally also
develop in this new structure, and as a new aspect of this identity evolves,
Kurdistan will assert itself first within Iraq and then together with Iraq. 49 The
citizens of a federated Iraq would simultaneously be Iraqi, Kurdish, Kunnanji-
speaking tribesman without this causing internal contradictions. Neither the
Kurdish language nor tribal affiliations nor religious belonging constitute the
base for political claims of the Iraq Kurds, but remain important factors. These
linguistic political claims can be accommodated in a federal structure.
47.See Albert Hirschman's classic Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
48.Khashman (1999), p. 91.
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However, a note of caution must be added. Just as there were question marks
with regard to the durability of a Kurdish independent state, it is unclear how a
federal Kurdish entity would conduct itself, in view of the fact that 'Free
Kurdistan' has been governed without Baghdad's intervention for over a decade.
Is there a chance that the province would declare itself a liberated zone and
proclaim independence? Would the leadership of a Kurdish province be able and
willing to hand over full responsibility for defence and foreign policy to the
central government and resist the temptation to form an independent policy for
instance in relation to the Kurdish inhabited areas across the northern and
eastern borders? This may cause tension.
The creation of a 'new Iraq', in the process of which no changes to the WWI
borders are to be expected, would also bring substantial benefits to its
neighbours. The economic burden of Turkey, for instance, would be eased and
the enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq would be redirected to economic
development and investment in reconstruction of Iraq, developing trade or
commercial zones, developing industrial and agricultural infrastructure in these
regions, as well as ensuring access to energy sources. Kurdistan on both sides of
the Iraqi-Turkish border in forming a contiguous region could indeed be
developed into such a zone. Trade, culture, and transportation are already
connecting the region together. Such a development could contribute to the
political status of Kurds becoming more equal across the borders.
An Iraqi federation between Arabs and Kurds should not be a utopia. After all,
'the conflict in Iraq is not between the cultures of nationalities, the difficulty is
between the central government and the people'. 5° Iraq is likely to re-emerge on
the regional scene and assert its authority, but in a new shape, in a federation
consisting of Arabs and Kurds. In the next decade or two, the 'new Iraq' may
seek to become integrated into a broader entity, a democratically revolutionised
Middle East that translates into various networks of regional and municipal
governments, as well as of civic associations, which multiply horizontal
relationships throughout the region, but with the nation-state system in place.
49 . With reference to Yael Tamir's discussion (1993) regarding Israel and Palestine.
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5°. Dr. Rashid, London, 1999.
320
Bibliography
Abdulghani, Jasim M. (1984), Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, Sydney
London: Croom Helm.
Ahmad, A. (for the Kurdistan Medical Association in Sweden) (1989), Facts
about Kurdish Refugees from Iraq in Turkey, Stockholm (publisher unknown).
Allawi, Ali (1994), 'Federalism' in Hazelton, Fran (ed.), Iraq since the Gulf
War: Prospects for Democracy, London: Zed Books, pp. 211-222.
Amin, Samir (1980), Class and Nation. Historically and in the Current Crisis,
London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.
Aminzadeh, Mohsen (1999), 'New Regional Geopolitical Developments and the
National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran' (a round-table discussion) in
Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 5-48.
Anderson, Benedict (1991) [1983], Imagined Communities. Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso.
Andreopoulos, George (ed.) (1994), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical
Dimensions, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
Armstrong, John A. (1982), Nations before Nationalism, USA: The University
of North Carolina Press.
Ayubi, Nazih N. (1995), Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the
Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris.
Bani Sadr, Abol Hassan (1991), My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and
Secret Deals with the US., London: Brassey's.
Banton, M. (1983), Racial and Ethnic Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Baram, Amatzia (1997), `Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal
Policies 1991-96', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, pp. 1-
31.
Barker, Colin (1978), 'A note on the Theory of the Capitalist State', Capital and
Class, Vol. 4, pp. 118-26.
Barker, Ernest (1927), National characters and Factors in Its Formation,
London: Methuen.
320
Barnard, F. (1965), Herder's Social and Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
	  (ed.) (1969), 1G Herder on Social and Political Culture,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bartlett, Robert (1996), 'Language and Ethnicity in Medieval Europe' in
Hutchinson, John and Smith Anthony D. (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 127-132.
Batatu, Hanna (1978), The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements
of Iraq. A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its
Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers, Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Bauer, Otto (1978), 'The concept of the nation', and 'Socialism and the principle
of nationality' in Bottomore, Tom and Goode, Patrick (eds.), Austro Marxism,
Oxford; Clarendon Press.
Bauman, Zygmunt (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust, New York: Cornell
University Press.
Beaudin-Saeedpour, Vera (1992), 'Establishing State Motives for Genocide: Iraq
and the Kurds' in Fein, Helen (ed.), Genocide Watch, New Haven: Yale
University Press, pp. 59-69.
Beck, Lois (1980), 'Tribe and State in Revolutionary Iran: The Return of the
Qashqa'i Khans', Iranian Studies, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1-4, pp. 215-255.
Berki, R and Hayward, Jack (1986), State, Class, Nation, Hull: Hull University
Press.
Berridge, Geoff (1987), International Politics. States, Power and Conflict since
1945, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Billig, Michael (1995), Banal Nationalism, London: Sage Publications.
Birch, Anthony H. (1978), 'Minority nationalist movements and theories of
political integration', World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 325-344.
Blau, Joyce (1992), 'The Kurdish Language and Literature in International
Paris Conference 14-15 October 1989; The Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural
Identity, Paris: Kurdish Institute of Paris, pp. 47-52.
Bondi, Liz (1993), 'Locating identity politics' in Keith, Michael and Pile, Steve
(eds.), Place and the Politics of Identity, London: Routledge, pp. 84-101.
321
Bozarslan, Hamid (1998), 'Minority Nationalism and Political Islam: the
Kurdish Case': paper presented at the Kurdological Conference Between
Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and objects of political and social
processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
Brass, Paul (1991), Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison,
London: Sage Publications.
Bretherton and Vogler (1999), The European Union as a Global Actor, London:
Routledge.
Breuilly, John (1982), Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Bromley, Y. V. (1984), Theoretical Ethnography, Moscow: Nauka Publishers.
van Bruinessen, Martin (1982), 'Popular Islam, Kurdish nationalism and rural
revolt: the rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey (1925)' in Bak, Janos M and
Benecke, Gerhard (eds.), Religion and rural revolt, Manchester: Manchester
University Press, pp. 281-295.
	  (1983), 'Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case
of Simko's Revolt' in Tapper, Richard (ed.) The Conflict between Tribe and
State in Iran and Afghanistan, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 364-400.
	  (1986), 'The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq', Middle East
Report, No. 141, July/August, pp. 14-27.
	
 (1992a), 'Traditional Kurdish Society and the State', in
International Paris Conference 14-15 October 1989; The Kurds: Human Rights
and Cultural Identity, Paris: Kurdish Institute of Paris, pp. 39-46.
	
 (1992b), 'Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and
refugee problems' in Kreyenbroedk, Philip G. and Sperl, Stefan (eds.), The
Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London: Routledge, pp. 33-67.
	  (1992c), Agha, Shaikh and State. The Social and
Political Structures of Kurdistan, London: Zed Books.
	
 (1996), 'The debate on the ethnic identity of the Kurdish
Alevis', published by the Kurdish Study Group on
htip.//www. de akin. edu. au./—kstudyg/alevikrd html .
	  (1998), 'Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: The
Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora', Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 39-52.
322
	 (1998), 'The Kurds as Objects and Subjects of their
History: Between Turkish Official Historiography, Orientalist Constructions,
and Kurdish Nationalists' Recuperation of their History': paper presented at the
Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and
objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Scowcroft, Brent and Murphy, Richard (1997),
'Differentiated Containment', Foreign Affairs, May/June, Vol. 76, No 3, pp. 20-
3 O.
Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey (1992), No Friends but the Mountains: The
Tragic History of the Kurds, London: Viking.
Canovan, Margaret (1996a), Nationhood and Political Theory, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
	  (1996b), 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard: Nationhood,
Patriotism and Limited Loyalties' in Caney, Simon, George, David and Jones,
Peter (eds.), National Rights, International Obligations, Oxford: Oxford West
View Press, pp.69-84.
Carr, Edward H. (1945), Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan.
Castells, Manuel (1997), The Power of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Chatterjee, Partha (1998), Nationalist thought and the Colonial World: A
Derivative Discourse?, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Cobban, Alfred (1969), The Nation State and National Self-Determination,
London: Collins.
Cochrane, Allan and Anderson, James (1986), 'States and Systems of States' in
Anderson, James (ed.), The Rise of the Modern State, Brighton: Harvester Press,
pp. 211-230.
Cohen, Robin (1994), Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others, New
York: Longman.
Cohen, Saul (1964), Geography and Politics in a Divided World,
London:Methuen.
Cohler, A. (1970), Rousseau and Nationalism, New York: Basic Books.
Connerton, Paul (1989), How societies remember, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Connor, Walker (1972), Nation-building or Nation-destroying?', World
Politics, Vol. XVIV, No 3, April, pp. 319-355.
323
	  (1973), 'The politics of Ethno-Nationalism', Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 27, pp. 1-21.
	
 (1978), 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is
a ...', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 379-88.
	  (1994), Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding,
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Crone, Patricia (1986), 'The Tribe and the State' in Hall, John A., States in
History, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 48-77.
Darwisha, Adeed (1999), 'Identity" and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq',
Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 551-567.
David, Steven R. (1991), 'Explaining Third World Alignment', World Politics,
Vol. 43, No 2, January, pp. 233-256.
Davis, Charles (1980), Theology and political society, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Davis, John (1987), Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution, Berkely: University
of California Press.
Deutsch, Karl W. (1942), 'The Trend of European Nationalism — the Language
Aspect', American Political Science Review, No 3, June, pp. 533-541.
	  (1969), Nationalism and Its Alternatives, New York: Basic
Books.
Drake, Laura (1994), 'Still fighting the last war", Dual Containment: a Cold
War Policy for a Post-war Middle East', Middle East Insight, Vol. X, No 6,
September/October, pp. 38-43.
Dresch, Paul (1989), Tribes, Government and History in Yemen, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Edgell, Stephen (1993), Class, Routledge: London.
Edmonds, C. J. (1971), 'Kurdish Nationalism', Journal of Contemporary
History, 6, 1, pp. 87-107.
Edwards, John (1985), Language, Society and Identity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (1995), After Khomeini. The Iranian Second Republic,
London: Routledge.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch, Raymond (1997), Syria and Iran..
Middle Powers in a Penetrated Region, New York: Routledge.
324
Entessar, Nader (1992), Kurdish Ethnonationalism, London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Ezell, W. K. (1992), 'Newspaper Responses to Reports of Atrocities: Burundi,
Mozambique, Iraq' in Fein, Helen (ed.), Genocide Watch, New Haven: Yale
University Press, pp. 87-112.
Falk, Richard (1991), 'The Cruelty of Geopolitics: The Fate of Nation and State
in the Middle East', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No.
3, pp. 383-393.
	  (1994), 'The Making of Global Citizenship' in van Steenbergen,
Bart (ed.) The Condition of Citizenship, London: Sage Publications, pp. 127-140.
Fasold, Ralph (1984), The Sociolinguistics of Society, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ferguson, Charles A. (1983), 'Language Planning and Language Change' in
Fischer, Eric (1980), Minorities and Minority Problems, Takoma Park: Erasmus
House.
Fishman, Joshua A. and Cobarrubias, Juan (eds.), Progress in Language
Planning. International Perspectives, Berlin: Mouton Publishers, pp. 29-40.
Fine, Robert (1999), 'Benign Nationalism? The Limits of the Civic Ideal', in
Mortimer, Edward and Fine, Robert (eds.), People, Nation and State. The
Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 149-161.
Frelick, Bill (1993), 'Operation Provide Comfort: False Promises to the Kurds'
in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.), A People without a Country: The Kurds and
Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, pp. 231-237.
Fuccaro, Nelida (1997), 'Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in
Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar', International
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 559-580.
Fuller, Graham E. (1991), The "Center of the Universe", The Geopolitics of
Iran, Oxford: Westview.
	
 (1994), 'The New Geopolitical Order' in Banuazizi, Ali and
Weiner, Myron (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands,
London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 19-43.
Galleti, Mirella (1989), 'Kurds and their Access to Media' in Documentation of
the International Conference on Human Rights in Kurdistan 14-16 April 1989,
Bremen: Hochschule Bremen, pp. 88-97.
325
Gellner, Ernest (1964), Thought and Change, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
	  (1983a), Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell.
	
 (1983b), 'The tribal society and its enemies' in Tapper, R. (ed.),
The Conflict between Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, New York: St.
Martin's Press, pp. 436-448.
Ghareeb, Edmund (1981), The Kurdish Question in Iraq, New York: Syracuse
University Press.
Giddens, Anthony (1973), The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies,
London: Hutchinson.
	
 (1981a), A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism,
London: Macmillan.
	  (1981b), Power, Property and State, vol. 1: A Contemporary
Critique of Historical Materialism, London: Macm i Ilan.
	
 (1982), 'Class Structuration and Class Consciousness' in
Giddens, Anthony and Held, David (eds.), Classes, Power, and Conflict.
Classical and Contemporary Debates, London: Macmillan, pp. 157-174.
	  (1985), The Nation-State and Violence, vol. 2: A
Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gilsenan, Michael (2000), Recognizing Islam. Religion and Society in the
Modern Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris.
Gottlieb, Gidon (1993), Nation against State, New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press.
Gunter, Michael M. (1999), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political
Analysis, London: Macmillan.
Hakan Yavuz, M. (1998), 'A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of
Kurdish Identity', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 9-18.
Hall, John A. (1993), 'Nationalisms: Classified and Explained', Daedalus,
Vol./Part 122 (3), pp. 1-28.
Hassanpour, Amir (1992), Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan 1918-1985,
San Fransisco: Mellen Research University Press.
	
 (1998), 'The racialisation of Kurdish National Identity': paper
presented at the Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds
as subjects and objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
326
Haugen, Einar (1966), 'Dialect, Language, Nation', American Anthropologist,
Vol. 68, No. 6, pp. 922-35.
Hayes, Carlton J. H. (1949) [1931], The Historical Evolution of Modern
Nationalism, 2nd edn, New York: Macmillan.
Haynes, Jeff (1998), Religion in Global Politics, London: Longman.
Hechter, Michael (1975), Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British
National Development, 1536-1966, London: Routledge.
Held, David (1991), 'Democracy and the Global System' in Held, David (ed.)
Political Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 197-235.
Hilberg, Raul (1961), The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago:
Quadrangle Books.
Hill, Christopher (1992), `EPC's Performance in Crises' in Rummel, Reinhardt
(ed.), Toward a Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security
Policy in the European Community, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 135-147.
Hilterman, J. (1997), 'The Demise of Operation Provide Comfort', Middle East
Report, Spring, pp. 44-45.
Hirschman, Albert (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Hitchens, Christopher (1992), 'Struggle of the Kurds', National Geographic,
Vol. 182, No. 2, August 32-61.
Hobsbawm, Eric (1983), 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in Hobsbawm, Eric
and Ranger, Terence (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 1-14.
	  (1992), Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme,
Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hofman, J. E. and Rouhana, N. (1976), "Young Arabs in Israel; Some aspects of
a conflicted social identity", Journal of Social Psychology, 99, pp. 75-86.
Horowitz, Donald (1992), "Irredentas and Secessons: Adjacent Phenomena,
Neglected Connections", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol.
23, No 1-2, pp. 118-130.
Hroch, Miroslav (1995), 'National Self-determination from a Historical
Perspective' in Perival, Sukumar (ed.), Notions of nationalism, Budapest:
Central European University Press, pp. 65-82.
327
Human Rights Watch/Middle East (1995), Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal
Campaign Against the Kurds, London: Yale University Press.
Hussein, Saddam (1977), Saddam Hussein on Current Events in Iraq, London:
Longman.
Hutchinson, John (1994), Modern Nationalism, London: Fontana.
Ifestos, Panayiotis (1987), European Political Cooperation: Towards a
Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?, Hants: Aldershot.
Ibrahim, Ferhad (1998), 'The Dynamics of Kurdish-Kurdish Relations and their
Relevance for Developments in the 1990s: PKK, PUK and KDP': paper
presented at the Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds
as subjects and objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
Ignatieff, Michael (1994), Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New
Nationalism, London: Vintage.
	  (1999), 'Benign Nationalism? The Possibilities of the Civic
Ideal' in Mortimer, Edward and Fine, Robert (eds.), People, Nation and State.
The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 141-148.
Islam, S. (1988), 'The European Community and the Arab World', Arab Affairs,
No 6, Spring.
Izady, Mehrad (1992), The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, London: Taylor &
Francis.
Jackson, Robert H. (1995), 'International Community beyond the Cold War' in
Lyons and Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and
International Intervention, London: The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 59-
83.
Jawad, Saad (1982), 'Recent Developments in the Kurdish Issue' in Niblock,
Tim (ed.), Iraq: The Contemporary State, London: Croom Helm, pp. 47-61.
al-Jaza'iri, Zuhair (1994), `Ba'thist Ideology and Practice' in Hazelton, Fran
(ed.) Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London: Zed Books,
pp. 32-51.
Jenkins, Richard (1997), Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations,
London: Sage Publications.
Jonassohn, Kurt (1992), 'What is Genocide?' in Fein, Helen (ed.), Genocide
Watch, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 17-26.
328
Kahn, Margaret (1980), Children of the Jinn: In Search of the Kurds and their
Country, New York: Seaview Books.
Kakai, Falaq al-Din (1994), 'The Kurdish Parliament' in Hazelton, Fran (ed.),
Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London: Zed Books, pp.
118-133.
Kamath, P. M. (1990), Foreign Policy-Making and International Politics,
London: Sangam.
Karadaghi, Kamran (1993), 'The Two Gulf Wars: The Kurds on the World
Stage, 1979-1992' in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.), A People without a Country: The
Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, pp. 214-230.
Keating, Michael (1988), State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics
and the European State, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Kedourie, Elie (1961), Nationalism, London: Hutchinson University Library.
Keith, Michael and Pile, Steve (1993), 'Introduction Part 2: The place of
politics' in Keith, Michael and Pile, Steve (eds.), Place and the Politics of
Identity, London: Routledge, pp. 22-40.
Keller, Douglas (1992), 'Popular Culture and the Construction of Postmodern
Identities' in Lash, Scott and Friedman, Jonathan (eds.), Modernity and Identity,
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 141-177.
Kendal (1993a), 'The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire' in Chaliand, Gerard
(ed.), A People without a country, London: Zed Books, pp. 11-37.
	  (1993b), 'Kurdistan in Turkey', in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.), A People
without a country, London: Zed Books, pp. 39-94.
al-Khafaji, Isam (1994), 'State Tenor and the Degradation of Politics' in
Hazelton, Fran (ed.), Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy,
London: Zed Books Ltd, pp. 20-29.
Khashman, Zeliha (1999), 'Is a federal structure really an appropriate political
solution for multiethnic societies? The case of Cyprus', Perceptions: Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. IV, No 2, June/August.
Kohn, Hans (1944), The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in Its Origins and
Background, New York: Macmillan.
Kolinsky, Martin (1981), 'The Nation-State in Western Europe: Erosion from
'Above' and `Below'?' in Tivey, Leonard, The Nation-State. The Formation of
Modern Politics, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 82-103.
329
Kostiner, Joseph (1990), 'Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in
Saudi Arabia' in Khoury, Philip S. and Kostiner, Joseph (eds.), Tribes and State
Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp.
226-251.
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. (1992), 'On the Kurdish language' in Kreyenbroek,
Philip G. and Sperl, Stefan, The Kurds. A Contemporary Overview, London:
Routledge, pp. 68-83.
	
 (1996), 'Religion and Religions in Kurdistan' in
Kreyenbroek, P. and Allison, Christine (eds.), Kurdish Culture and Identity,
London: Zed Books, pp. 85-110.
Kuper, Leo (1982), International Action Against Genocide, London: Minority
Rights Group.
	
 (1990), 'The Genocidal State: An Overview' in van den Berghe,
Pierre (ed.), State Violence and Ethnicity, Colorado: University Press of
Colorado, pp. 19-51.
Kutschera, Chris (1979), Le Mouvement National Kurde, Paris: Flammarion.
	  (1994), 'Mad Dreams of Independence: The Kurds of Turkey
and the PICK', Middle East Report, July/August.
Laizer, Sheri (1991), Into Kurdistan: Frontiers Under Fire, London: Zed Books.
	  (1996), Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf
War, London: Zed Books.
Linklater, Andrew (1998), The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lotfian, Saideh (1998-1999), 'Iran's Middle East Policies under President
Khatami', The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. X, No. 4, Winter,
pp. 421-448.
Lyons and Mastanduno (1995), 'Introduction: International Intervention, State
Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society' in Lyons and Mastanduno
(eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention,
London: The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-18.
MacCorrnick, Neil (1996), 'What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?'
in Caney, Simon, George, David and Jones, Peter (eds.) National Rights,
International Obligations, Oxford: Oxford West View Press, pp. 34-52.
330
	  (1999), 'Does a nation need a state? Reflections on Liberal
Nationalism' in Mortimer, Edward and Fine, Robert (eds.), People, Nation and
State. The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 125-
138.
Mafaje, Archie (1971), 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism", The Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol. 9, No 2, pp. 253-261.
Makiya, Kanan (1994), 'Intolerance and Identity' in Hazelton, Fran, Iraq since
the Gulf War. Prospects for Democracy, London: Zed Books, pp. 194-204.
	  (1998), Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, London:
University of California Press.
Mann, Michael (1995), 'A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses' in
Periwal, Sukumar (ed), Notions of Nationalism, Budapest: Central European
University Press, pp. 44-64.
Marks, J. (1995), 'Moving towards a free trade area', MEED, No 47, November.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1888 new ed. 1998), The Communist
Manifesto, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mayall, James (1990), Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Maybury-Lewis, David (1997), Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups, and the
State, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
McDowall, David (1989), The Kurds, London: Minority Rights Group.
	 (1992), The Kurds: A Nation Denied, London: Minority Rights
Group.
	 (1996), A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I.B. Tauris.
Minogue, Kenneth (1967), Nationalism, London: Batsford.
Morad, M. (1992), 'The situation of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey: current trends
and prospects' in Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Sperl, Stefan, The Kurds. A
Contemporary Overview, London: Routledge, pp. 115-133.
Nairn, Tom (1977), The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism,
London: New Left Books.
Natali, Denise (1999), International Aid, Regional Politics, and the Kurdish
Issue in Iraq after the Gulf War, Abu Dabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic
Studies and Research.
331
Navari, Cornelia (1981), 'The Origins of the Nation State' in Tivey, Leonard
(ed.) The Nation-State. The Formation of modern politics, Oxford: Martin
Robertson, pp. 13-38.
Niblock, Tim (1993), 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East' in Nonneman, Gerd (ed.), The Middle East
and Europe: the search for stability and integration, London: Federal Trust for
Education and Research.
O'Ballance, Edgar (1996), The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94, London: Macmillan.
Olson, Robert (1989), The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh
Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
	
 (1994), 'The Kurdish Question and Geopolitics and Geostrategic
Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War', Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Summer, pp.44-67.
	  (1998a), The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations.
From World War 1 to 1998, California: Mazda Publishers.
	
 (1998b), 'Ankara and Tehran: re-establishing links and its impact
on the Kurdish Question', Kurdistan Report, No. 27, September-November, pp.
18-21.
	  (2001), Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia,
1991-2000. The Kurdish and Islamist Questions, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda
Publishers.
Orridge, A. W. (1981), 'Varieties of Nationalism' in Tivey, Leonard (ed.), The
Nation-State. The formation of modern politics, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp.
39-58.
O'Shea, Maria T. (1997), Myths, Maps and Reality: Geography and Perceptions
of Kurdistan, Unpublished PhD Thesis SOAS University of London.
	
 (1998), 'Imagining Kurdistan': paper presented at the
Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and
objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
Othman Ali (1997), 'The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-23',
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, July, pp. 521-534.
O Tuathail, Gearoid (1996), Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global
Space, London: Routledge.
332
Painter, Joe (1995), Politics, Geography, and "Political Geography": A Critical
Perspective, London: E. Arnold.
Parekeh, Bhikhu (1994), 'Discourses on National Identity', Political Studies,
Vol. 42, No 3, September, pp. 492-504.
	
 (1999), 'Defining National Identity in a Multicultural Society'
in Mortimer, Edward and Fine, Robert (eds.), People, Nation and State. The
Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, London: I.B. Taurus, pp. 66-74.
Pelletiere, Stephen C. (1984), The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf
London: Westview Press.
Penrose , Edith and Penrose, E. F. (1978), Iraq: International Relations and
National Development, London: Benn.
Philpott, Daniel (1998), 'Self-Determination in Practice' in Moore, Margaret
(ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 79-102.
Piscatori, James P. (1986), Islam in a World of Nation-States, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Psichari, H. (ed.) (1947 org. 1882), Oeuvres complêtes de Ernest Renan, Paris:
Calmann-Lêvy.
Randal, Jonathan (1998), Kurdistan. After such knowledge, what forgiveness?,
London: Bloomsbury.
Richards, Alan and Waterbury, John (1990), A Political Economy of the Middle
East: State, Class and Economic Development, Oxford: Westview Press.
Robins, Philip (2000), 'Turkey and the Kurds: Missing Another Opportunity?' in
Abramowitz, Morton (ed.), Turkey's Transformation and American Policy, New
York: The Century Foundation Press, pp. 61-93.
Rose, John Holland (1916), Nationality as a factor in modern history, London:
Rivingtons.
Rosenau, James N. (1995), 'Sovereignty in a Turbulent World' in Lyons, Gene
M. and Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond We State Sovereignty and
International Intervention, London: The John Hopkins University Press, pp.
191-227.
Rothschild, Joseph (1979), 'Political legitimacy in contemporary Europe' in
Denitch, Bogdan (ed.), Legitimisation of Regimes: International Frameworks for
Analysis, London: Sage Publications, pp. 37-54.
333
Rummel, Reinhardt (ed.) (1992), Toward Political Union, Planning a Common
Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community, Boulder: Westview
Press.
Salih, Khaled (1994), 'Islam och nationalism i Kurdistan' [Islam and
Nationalism in Kurdistan] in Svanberg, I. and Westerlund, D. (eds.) Majoritetens
Islam: om muslimer utanfOr Arabveirlden [The Majority's Islam: Muslims
outside the Arab World], Stockholm (publisher unknown), pp.191-206.
Sathyamurthy, T.V. (1983), Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political
and Sociological Perspectives, London: Frances Pinter.
Sayari, Sabri (1994), 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia' in Banuazizi, All
and Weiner, Myron (eds.), The new geopolitics of Central Asia and its
borderlands, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 175-196.
Scruton, Roger (1996), A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan.
Seton-Watson, Hugh (1971), 'Unsatisfied Nationalisms', Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 3-14.
	  (1977), Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins
of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, London: Methuen.
Sheikhmous, Omar (1993), `Kurderna i den nya varldsordningen' [The Kurds in
the new World Order], Internationella Studier, No. 3, pp. 33-49.
	  (1999), `Intra-Kurdish Relations of Kurds of Iraq with Kurds
of Other Parts of Kurdistan' in Kurdisches Forum in Deutschland, Irakisch-
Kurdistan: Status und Pespektiven. Ergebnisse einer Internationalen Tagung
1999 in Berlin [Iraqi Kurdistan: Status and Perspectives. Proceedings from an
International Conference in 1999 in Berlin], Berlin: Awadani, pp. 53-64.
Sherzad, A. (1992), 'The Kurdish movement in Iraq: 1975-88' in Kreyenbroek,
Philip G. and Sperl, Stefan, The Kurds. A Contemporary Overview, London:
Routledge, pp. 134-142.
Short, Martin and McDermott, Anthony (1975), The Kurds, London: Minority
Rights Group.
Simons, Geoffrey (1996), Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, Basingstoke:
Macm i Ilan.
Sklar, Richard L. (1960), 'The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in
Western Nigeria', Journal of Human Relations, Spring and Summer, pp. 407-
418.
334
Skocpol, Theda (1977), `Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical
and Historical Critique', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No 5, pp.
1075-90.
Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove (1988),`Multilingualism and the Education of Minority
Children' in Skutnabb-Kangas and Cummins (eds.), Minority education: from
shame to struggle, Clcvcdon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 9-44.
Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove and Phillipson, Robert (1989), 'Linguistic Human
Rights and the Kurdish Language' in Documentation of the International
Conference on Human Rights in Kurdistan 14-16 April 1989, Bremen:
Hochschule Bremen, pp. 60-68.
	  (1999), 'Linguistic Genocide
and Human Rights — Kurdish considerations' in The Kurds — Perspectives on a
Unique Culture, Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, pp. 25-48.
Smith, Anthony D. (1971), Theories of Nationalism, London: Duckworth.
	  (1973), 'Nationalism, a trend report and annotated
bibliography', Current Sociology, vol. XXI, no. 3, The Hague: Mouton.
	  (1981), 'States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical
Implications of National Territory', Millenium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 187-202.
	
 (1982), 'Ethnic Identity and world order', Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 149-61.
	  (1986a), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
	
 (1986b), 'State-Making and Nation-Building' in Hall, John A.
(ed.) States in History, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 228-263.
	  (1990), The Consequences of Modernity, (1990) Cambridge:
Polity Press.
	  (1991), National Identity, London: Penguin Books.
	
 (1992), 'National Identity and the idea of European unity',
International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, January, pp. 55-76.
	
 (1999), 'The Nation: Real or Imagined?' in Mortimer, Edward
and Fine, Robert (eds.), People, Nation and State. The Meaning of Ethnicity and
Nationalism, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 36-42.
335
Smith, Gordon (1981), 'A Future for the Nation-State?' in Tivey, L. (ed.), The
Nation-State. The Formation of Modern Politics, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp.
197-208.
Smith, Michael (1992), 'Modernisation, Globalisation and the Nation-State' in
McGrew, Anthony G, Lewis Paul G. et al., Global Politics. Globalization and
the Nation-State, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 253-268.
Soetendorp, Ben (1999), Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, history
and practice, London: Longman.
Strange, Susan (1986), `Supranationals and the State' in Hall, John A. (ed.)
States in History, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 289-305.
Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1994), 'Azerbaijan's Triangular Relationship: The
Land Between Russia, Turkey and Iran' in Banuazizi, All and Weiner, Myron
(eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands, London: I.B.
Tauris, pp. 118-135.
Talabany, Noun i (1999), Iraq's Policy of Ethnic Cleansing: Onslaught to change
national/demographic characteristics of the Kirkuk Region, London (publisher
unknown).
Tamir, Yael (1993), Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
	  (1996), 'Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination' in Caney,
Simon, George, David and Jones, Peter (eds.) National Rights, International
Obligations, Oxford: Oxford West View Press, pp. 85-101.
Taylor, Charles (1993), 'Why Do Nations Have to Become States?' in Taylor,
Charles (ed.), Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and
Nationalism, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 40-58.
Taylor, Peter J (1985), Political Geography. World-economy, nation-state and
locality, Essex: Longman.
Ternon, Yves (1989), 'Reflections on Genocide' in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.),
Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States, London: Pluto Press, pp. 126-148.
Theophylactou, Demetrios A. (1995), Security, Identity and Nation Building:
Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective, Aldershot:
Avebury.
Tilly, Charles (1975), "Western State-Making and Theories of Political
Transformation" in Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in
Western Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 601-638.
336
Tinker, H. (1964), 'Broken Backed States', New Society, No 30.
Tivey, Leonard (1981), 'Introduction' in Tivey, Leonard (ed.), The Nation-State.
The formation of modern politics, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 1-12.
Tagil, Sven (1995), 'Ethnic and National Minorities in the Nordic Nation-
Building Process: Theoretical and Conceptual Premises' in Tagil, Sven (ed.),
Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, London: Hurst & Company,
pp. 8-32.
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (1995), States of
Disarray: The social effects of globalization, London: UNRISD.
Vail, Abbas (1996-1997), 'Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period,
1942-1947', The Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol. II, pp. 1-12.
	
 (1998), 'The nation-state and its "other": Kurdish national identity
and the politics of denial and exclusion in Turkey': paper presented at the
Kurdological Conference Between Imagination & Denial. Kurds as subjects and
objects of political and social processes, May 29-31, Berlin.
Vanly, Ismet Sheriff (1993), 'Kurdistan in Iraq' in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.), A
People without a country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, pp.
139-193.
Vogler, Carolyn M. (1985), The Nation-State: The Neglected Dimension of
Class, London: Gower.
Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William (eds.) (1996), Policy-making in the
European Union, 3" Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), The Modern World System. Capitalist
Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth
Century, New York: Academic Press.
Waters, Malcolm (1995), Globalization, London: Routledge.
Weber, Max (1968), Economy and Society, Vol. 1, New York: Bedminster Press.
Whitley, Andrew (1995), 'The Clinton Administration and the Kurds: What are
the Principles?' in Kurdistan Human Rights Project, A Democratic Future for
the Kurds of Turkey, London (publisher unknown), pp. 141-145.
Wiberg, Hakan (1983), 'Self-determination as an international issue' in Lewis,
Joanne (ed.), Nationalism and Self-determination in the Horn of Africa, London:
Ithaca Press, pp. 46-51.
337
Williams, Colin H. (1994), Called Unto Liberty! On Language and Nationalism,
Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.
Wistrich, Ernest (1994), The United States of Europe, London: Routledge.
Yalcin-Heckman, Lale (1989), 'Kurdish Women and Ethnic Identity',
Documentation of the International Conference on Human Rights in Kurdistan,
14-16 April, Hochschule Bremen.
	  (1991), Tribe and Kinship among the Kurds, Frankfurt
am Main: Peter Lang.
Yegen, Mesut (1996), 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of
Kurdish Identity', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, April, pp. 216-229.
Yousef Freij, Hanna (1998), 'Alliance Patterns of a Secessionist Movement: The
Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iraq', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 18, No. 1.
Interviews:
Dr. Abbas Araghchi, Iran's ambassador to Finland and the former Director-
General of the Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran, 28 August
1999.
Dr. Mohammad Jawad-e Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and
International Affairs, Tehran, 14 February 2000.
Mr. Hoshyar Rahman, official at the KDP office in London, London, 22 March
1999.
Dr. Latif Rashid, PUK-spokesman in London, London, 23 March 1999.
Dr. Mahmood Sariolghalam, Associate Professor of International Relations at
School of Economic and Political Sciences, National University of Iran (Shahid
Beheshti), Tehran, 27 August 1999.
Professor Nouni Talabany, Chairman of the Kurdish Organisation for Human
Rights in the UK, London, 22 March 1999.
Dr. Mahmood Vaezi, Deputy Director for Foreign Policy and International
Relations at the Centre for Strategic Studies and the former Deputy Foreign
Minister for Europe, Tehran, 10 February 2000.
338
Mr. Bahram Valadbeighi, Director of The Kurdistan Cultural Institute (in Iran),
Tehran, 20 June 2001.
Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister 1981-1997, Tehran, 14
February 2000.
Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Leader of the main Iranian opposition party Nehzat-e Azadi
[the Freedom Movement] and the first Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic
in 1979, Tehran, 25 August 1999.
339
